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NAZI CONSPIRACY 
AND AGGRESSION 


VOLUME III 


Office of United States 
Chief of Counsel For Prosecution 
of Axis Criminality 



r°=' Ici AT 

PUBLIC 


United States Government Printing Office 
Washington • 1946 


v 3 


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HP 1946 

Sold in complete sets 
- by the 

Superintendent of Documents 
U. S. Government Printing Office 
Washington 25, D. C. 




CONTENTS 


Pages 

Document number 001-PS through document number 1406-P-S, ar- 
ranged numerically 1-1003 


(A descriptive list of documents appears at the end 
of the last volume.) 


A Collection of Documentary Evidence and Guide Materials 
Prepared by the American and British Prosecuting Staffs for 
Presentation before the International Military Tribunal at Nurn- 
berg, Germany, in the case of 

THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE FRENCH RE- 
PUBLIC, THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN 
AND NORTHERN IRELAND, and THE UNION OF 
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 
— against — 

HERMANN WILHELM GOERING, RUDOLF HESS, 
JOACHIM von RIBBENTROP, ROBERT LEY, WILHELM 
KEITEL, ERNST KALTENBRUNNER, ALFRED ROS- 
ENBERG, HANS FRANK, WILHELM FRICK, JULIUS 
STREICHER, WALTER FUNK, HJALMAR SCHACHT, 
GUSTAV KRUPP von BOHLEN und HALBACH, KARL 
DOENITZ, ERICH RAEDER, BALDUR von SCHIRACH, 
FRITZ SAUCKEL, ALFRED JODL, MARTIN BORMANN, 
FRANZ von PAPEN, ARTUR SEYSS-INQUART, AL- 
BERT SPEER, CONSTANTIN von NEURATH, and HANS 
FRITZSCHE, Individually and as Members of Any of the 
Following Groups or Organizations to which They Respec- 
tively Belonged, Namely: DIE REICHSREGIERUNG 

(REICH CABINET) ; DAS KORPS DER POLITISCHEN 
LEITER DER NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUT- 
SCHEN ARBEITERPARTEI (LEADERSHIP CORPS OF 
THE NAZI PARTY); DIE SCHUTZSTAFFELN DER 
NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHEN DEUTSCHEN ARBEIT- 
ERPARTEI (commonly know as the “SS”) and including 
DIE SICHERHEITSDIENST (commonly known as the 
“SD”) ; DIE GEHEIME STAATSPOLIZEI (SECRET 
STATE POLICE, commonly known as the “GESTAPO”) ; 
DIE STURMABTEILUNGEN DER N.S.D.A.P. (commonly 
known as the “SA”) and the GENERAL STAFF and HIGH 
COMMAND of the GERMAN ARMED FORCES all as defined 
in Appendix B of the Indictment, 


Defendants. 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 00 1 -PS 


Copy to Regional Leader of the NSDAP 
Extract of par. 1 to DEGENHARD 15 April 

SECRET 

Documentary Memorandum for the Fuehrer 
Concerning : Jewish Possessions in France 

In compliance with the order of the Fuehrer for protection of 
Jewish, cultural possessions, a great number of Jewish dwellings 
remained unguarded. Consequently, many furnishings have dis- 
appeared, because a guard could, naturally, not be posted. In 
the whole East, the administration has found terrible conditions 
of living quarters, and the chances of procurement are so limited 
that it is not practical to procure any more. Therefore, I beg 
the Fuehrer to permit the seizure of all Jewish home furnishings 
of Jews in Paris, who have fled, or will leave shortly, and that 
of Jews living in all parts of the occupied West, to relieve the 
shortage of furnishings in the administration in the East. 

2. A great number of leading Jews were, after a short exam- 
ination in Paris, again released. The attempts on the lives of 
members of. the armed forces have not stopped, on the contrary 
they continue. This reveals an unmistakable plan to disrupt the 
German-French cooperation, to force Germany to retaliate, and, 
with this, evoke a new defense on the part of the French against 
Germany. I suggest to the Fuehrer that, instead of executing 
100 Frenchmen, we substitute 100 Jewish bankers, lawyers, etc. 
It is the Jews in London and New York who incite the French 
communists to commit acts of violence, and it seems only fair 
that the members of this race should pay for this. It is not the 
little Jews, but the leading Jews in France, who should be held 
responsible. That would tend to awaken the Anti- Jewish senti- 
ment. 

BERLIN 18 Dec 1941 
R/H 

signed: A. ROSENBERG 

COPY OF DOCUMENT 001-A-PS 
19 November 1945 

I, Major William H. Coogan, 0-455814, Q. M. C., a commis- 
sioned officer of the Army of the United States of America, do 
hereby certify as follows: 

1. The United States Chief of Counsel in July 1945 charged 
the Field Branch of the Documentation Division with the respon- 
sibility of collecting, evaluating and assembling documentary 


1 


OOI-A-PS 


evidence in the European Theater for use in the prosecution of 
the major Axis war criminals before the International Military 
Tribunal. 1 was appointed Chief of the Field Branch on 20 July 
1945. I am now the Chief of the Documentation Division, Office 
of United States Chief of Counsel. 

2. I have served in the United States Army for more than four 
years and am a practicing attorney by profession. Based upon 
my experience as an attorney and as a United States Army officer, 
I am familiar with the operation of the United States Army in 
connection with seizing and processing captured enemy docu- 
ments. In my capacity as Chief of the Documentation Division, 
Office of the United States Chief of Counsel, I am familiar with 
and have supervised the processing, filing, translation and photo- 
stating of all documentary evidence for the United States Chief 
of Counsel. 

3. As the Army overran German occupied territory and then 
Germany itself, certain specialized personnel seized enemy docu- 
ments, books, and records for information of strategic and 
tactical value. During the early stages such documents were 
handled in bulk, and assembled at temporary centers. However, 
after the surrender of Germany, they were transported to the 
various document centers established by Army Headquarters 
in the United States Zone of Occupation. In addition to the 
documents actually assembled at such document centers, Army 
personnel maintained and secured considerable documents “in 
situ” at or near the place of discovery. When such documents 
were located and assembled they were catalogued by Army per- 
sonnel into collections and records were maintained which dis- 
closed the source and such other information available concerning 
the place and general circumstances surrounding the acquisition 
of the documents. 

4. The Field Branch of the Documentation Division was staffed 
by personnel thoroughly conversant with the German language. 
Their task was to search for and select captured enemy docu- 
ments in the European Theater which disclosed information 
relating to the prosecution of the major Axis war criminals. 
Officers under my command were placed on duty at various docu- 
ment centers and also dispatched on individual missions to obtain 
original documents. When documents were located, my rep- 
resentatives made a record of the circumstances under which 
they were found and all information available concerning their 
authenticity was recorded. Such documents were further identi- 
fied by Field Branch pre-trial serial numbers, assigned by my 
representatives who would then periodically dispatch the original 


2 


OOI-A-PS 


documents by courier to the Office of the United States Chief of 
Counsel. 

5. Upon receipt of these documents they were duly recorded 
and indexed. After this operation, they were delivered to the 
Screening and Analysis Branch of the Documentation Division 
of the Office of United States Chief of Counsel, which Branch 
re-examined such documents in order to finally determine whether 
or not they should be retained as evidence for the prosecutors. 
This final screening was done by German-speaking analysts on 
the staff of the United States Chief of Counsel. When the docu- 
ment passed the screeners, it was then transmitted to the Docu- 
ment Room of the Office of United States Chief of Counsel, with 
a covering sheet prepared by the screeners showing the title or 
nature of the document, the personalities involved, and its im- 
portance. In the Document Room, a trial identification number 
was given to each document or to each group of documents, in 
cases where it was desirable for the sake of clarity to file several 
documents together. 

6. United States documents were given trial identification 
numbers in one of five series designated by the letters: “PS”, 
“L”, “R”, “C”, and “EC”, indicating the means of acquisition of 
the documents. Within each series documents were listed nu- 
merically. 

7. After a document was so numbered, it was then sent to a 
German-speaking analyst who prepared a summary of the docu- 
ment with appropriate references to personalities involved, index 
headings, information as to the source of the document as indi- 
cated by the Field Branch, and the importance of the document 
to a particular phase of the case. Next, the original document 
was returned to the Document Room and then checked out to the 
photostating department, where photostatic copies were made. 
Upon return from photostating, it was placed in an envelope 
in one of several fireproof safes in the rear of the Document 
Room. One of the photostatic copies of the document was sent 
to the translators, thereafter leaving the original itself in the 
safe. A commissioned officer has been, and is, responsible for 
the security of the documents in the safe. At all times when 
he is not present the safe is locked and a military guard is on 
duty outside the only door. If the officers preparing the certified 
translation, or one of the officers working on the briefs, found it 
necessary to examine the original document, this was done within 
the Document Room in the section set aside for that purpose. 
The only exception to this strict rule has been where it has been 
occasionally necessary to present the original document to the 


3 


OOI-A-PS 


defendants for examination. In this case, the document was 
entrusted to a responsible officer of the prosecution staff. 

8. All original documents are now located in safes in the Docu- 
ment Room, where they will be secured until they are presented 
by the prosecution to the court during the progress of the trial. 

9. Some of the documents which will be offered in evidence by 
the United States Chief of Counsel were seized and processed by 
the British Army. Also, personnel from the Office of the United 
States Chief of Counsel and the British War Crimes Executive 
have acted jointly in locating, seizing and processing such 
documents. 

10. Substantially the same system of acquiring documentary 
evidence was utilized by the British Army and the British War 
Crimes Executive as that hereinabove set forth with respect to 
the United States Army and the Office of the United States 
Chief of Counsel. 

11. Therefore, I certify in my official capacity as hereinabove 
stated, to the best of my knowledge and belief, that the docu- 
ments captured in the British Zone of Operations and Occupation, 
which will be offered in evidence by the United States Chief of 
Counsel, have been authenticated, translated, and processed in 
substantially the same manner as hereinabove set forth with 
respect to the operations of the United States Chief of Counsel. 

12. Finally, I certify, that all Documentary evidence offered 
by the United States Chief of Counsel, including those documents 
from British Army sources, are in the same condition as captured 
by the United States and British Armies; that they have been 
translated by competent and qualified translators ; that all photo- 
static copies are true and correct copies of the originals and 
that they have been correctly filed, numbered and processed as 
above outlined. 

[Signed] WILLIAM H. COOGAN 

Major, QMC, 0-455814 


4 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 002-PS 


SECRET 


25 March 1943 

President of Reich Research Dept. 

Head of Executive Council 
To the Reichsminister of Finance 

Berlin W 8 
Wilhelmplatz 1-2 

Ref 503/43 G SR/GE 

In regard to your correspondence of the 19th Dec (J 4761-174 
I g III. Ang) to which I gave you a preliminary communication 
on the 19th Feb, I finally take the following position : 

The Surgeon General-SS and Police, in a personal discussion, 
told me that the budget which he administers concerns primarily 
the purely military sector of the Waffen SS. As for the small 
part used for the enlarging of scientific research possibilities, it 
pertains exclusively to such affairs that can be carried out only 
with the material (prisoners), which is accessible to the Waffen 
SS and can therefore not be undertaken by any other experi- 
mental agency. 

I cannot object therefore on the part of the Reich Experimental 
Counsel against the budget of the Surgeon General-SS and Police. 

Signed : Mentzel 

Ministerialdirektor 


SECRET 

Reich Leader SS 

Reich Surgeon SS and Police 

File : 135/ Secret / 43 TG, NR 24/43 geh. 

Berlin 26 Feb 43 

Subj.: Scientific Institutes 

Ref to: Correspondence of 19 Feb. 43 Rf. 234/43 SR. — 

To the Head of the Executive Counsel of the Reich Research 
Counsel Ministerialdirektor Mentzel 

Berlin-Steglitz 
Grunewaldstrasse 35 

My dear Ministerialdirektor: 

In acknowledgment of your letter of the 19th Feb 1943, I am 
able to reply the following to it today: 

The appropriation for the 53 key positions for my office which 
you made the basis of your memorandum was planned for peace 
times. 


5 


002— PS 


The special institutes of the SS which are to be partly staffed 
through this appropriation are to serve the purpose to establish 
and make accessible for the entire realm of scientific research, 
the particular 'possibilities of research only possessed by the SS. 

In view of the further developments of this war, I have already 
shelved this plan for the time being as the result of negotiations 
with the Reich Finance Minister in the past year, so that my 
authorized personnel amounts to 25 key positions only. Of these 
positions, only 5 are filled at present. 

Under these circumstances your objections with regard to an 
unreasonable overlapping of work of scientific institutes for the 
war’s duration are void. 

I will gladly be at your disposal at any time, however, to discuss 
the particular research aims in connection with the SS, which I 
would like to start after the war according to the" direction of 
the Reich leader SS. 

Furthermore, it is important that these researches — once their' 
realization appears possible, will be tied in with the related re- 
search aims of the state. 

Hoping to have served you with my preliminary summary, I 
remain with best greetings and 

Heil Hitler 

GRAWITZ 


25 March 1943 

Pres, of Reich Research Counsel 
Head of Executive Counsel 

To the Surgeon General SS and Police SS Lt. Gen. Prof. Dr. 
Grawitz 

Berlin W 15 
Knesebeckstr. 51 

Rf. 504/43 g SR/Ge. 

Pertaining to : Letter of 26 Feb. 43 
File : 135/geh. 43-Tgb. — Nr. 24/43 g. 

I am sending the enclosed carbon copy of my letter to the 
Reichsminister of Finance in regard to the conversation of 11 
March, this year, for your information, 

Heil Hitler! 

[rubber stamp] Signed: Mentzel 

Ministerialdirektor SS Major General 


6 


002-PS 


Berlin-Steglitz 
Grunewaldstr. 35 
19 Feb 43 

Pres. Reich Research Counsel 
Head of Executive Counsel 

To the Surgeon General SS and Police SS Lt. Gen. Prof. Dr. 
Grawitz 

W 15 Knesebeckstr. 51 


RECEIPT 


Letter Nr. 

Date 

Nr. of Pieces 

Rf. 234/43 Sr. 

19 Feb 43 

1 


Sent on : 20 Feb 43 
Received on : 22 Feb 43 

[Seal] [Signature illegible] 

SS Lt. Col. 

Signature of person receiving and opened registered letter 


SECRET 


19 Feb 43 

Reich Research Counsel 
Rf. 234/43 Sr. 

The Head of Executive Counsel of the Reich Research Counsel 
To the Surgeon General SS and Police SS Lt. Gen. Prof. Dr. 
Grawitz 

Berlin W. 15 
Knesebeckstr. 51 

The Reich minister of finance told me that you requested 53 
leading positions (BES. GR C3-C8) for your office, partly for a 
new research institute. 

After the Reichsmarshall of the Great-German Reich had, as 
President of the Reich Research Counsel, taken over all German 
research, he issued directives, among other things, that in the 
execution of militarily important scientific tasks, the available 
institutions, including equipment and personnel, should be util- 
ized to the utmost for reasons of necessary economy of effort. 

The founding of new institutes is therefore only possible in as 
far as there are no institutes available for the furtherance of 
important war research tasks. 


7 


002— PS 


As I don’t know your personal purpose and have insufficient 
information from the explanation the Reich finance minister gave 
me about the planned institute, I would be thankful if you would 
further explain your plans and purposes. 

I will gladly be at the disposal of one of your co-workers for an 
interview or would be ready to call upon you personally. 

I wish you would inform me as to when and where these dis- 
cussions may take place. 

Heil Hitler ! 

[rubber stamp] Signed: Mentzel 

Ministerialdirektor SS Major General 


SECRET 

19 Feb. 194,3 

REICH RESEARCH COUNSEL 
Rf. 232/43 Sr. 

To the Reich Minister of Finance 

Head of Executive Counsel of the Reich Research Counsel 

, Berlin W. 8 

Wilhelmplatz 1-2 

You notified me on the 19th Dec. (J4761-174 I g III, Ang) 
concerning the research work by the Surgeon General SS and 
Police, and asked me what stand I take. Since the work of the 
state chief of research started originally in the armament depart- 
ment, I was unable to clear up any questions pertaining to the 
medical department, which came up in the last weeks. But I 
shall do so in the near future, and I believe I can already say 
that the new institutes requested by the surgeon general of SS 
and police will be unnecessary since other institutes can cover 
these planned missions. 

I shall have a conference with the surgeon general SS and 
police pertaining to details of this planned work and, at that 
time, I shall let you know what my final stand will be. I would 
like to suggest, therefore, to defer the decisions at this time. 

In this connection I state that the health officer, State Secretary 
Conti approached the president of the research counsel request- 
ing funds to establish an institute for virus research in Frankfurt 
on Main. 

Investigations to date have shown that the institute is not 

necessary since the planned work can, without doubt, be done 
* * * 


8 


002— PS 


Pres. Reich Research Counsel 
Head of Executive Counsel 

Berlin-Steglitz 19 Feb. 43 

Grunewaldstr. 35 

To the Reichsminister of Finance 
W. 8, Wilhelmplatz 1-2 


RECEIPT 


Letter Nr. 

Date 

Nr. of Pieces 

Rf. 232/43 Sr. 

19 Feb 43 

1 


Sent on : 2 Feb. 43 
Received on: 

Received 22 Feb. 43 Reich Finance Minister 
[Seal] [Signature illegible] 

Signature of person receiving and opening 


SECRET 

The Reich Minister of Finance 
J4761-174 I g III, Ang 

Berlin 19 Dec. 1942 

Wilhelmplatz !/% Tel. 120015 Postal Check Acct. Berlin Nr. 25955 
Assumption of Research Mission By the Surgeon General SS and 
Police 

The surgeon general SS and police has requested 53 key posi- 
tions for the new organization of his office (Bes. Gr. C3-38) . 
The organization plan shows that the surgeon general SS and 
police plans not only special experts for “Research” in pharma- 
ceutical chemistry, in dental and clinical services and a special 
section of scientific service, but also that plans are desired for a 
string of institutes which likewise deal mainly with research work : 

1. Central Institute for Medical Scientific Exploitation 

2. Institute for the History of Medicine 

3. Pharmaceutical Chemistry Research Institute 

4. Pharmacy for Military Requirements 

5. Special Institute Sachenhausen 

6. Pathological Institute 

7. Hygienic Research Institute 

In the informal discussions it was referred to the fact that the 
plans for the research arrangements for the Waffen-SS can only 


9 


002— PS 


be granted if the research missions which the Surgeon General SS 
embarked upon are not already undertaken by other independent 
institutes, resp. by the universities, or belong to their sphere. 

The Hygienic Institute, according to the proposed plan, includes 
the following seven divisions: 

1. Division for combating epidemics with bacteriological 

and serological laboratories 

2. Division for hygiene with corresponding laboratories 

3. Division for chemistry with chemical laboratories 

4. Division for geology and hydrology 
[Reich Research Counsel 

In care of Ministerialdirektor, Prof. Dr. Mentzel] 

5. Division for climatology and geography, especially in 

preparation for cultural waging of war in sub tropical 
and tropical lands in Africa 

6. Division for statistics and epidemic forecast which will, 

with new developments, work against the spreading 
of epidemics for the coming years 

7. Division for the elimination of epidemics which will 

chiefly concern itself with new installation of ap- 
paratus for delousing and sterilization of drinking 
water for the fighting troops 

I lack accurate data for other institutes. I have set aside the 
decision on this budget. 

Regarding the decree of the Fuehrer of the 9th June 42, (RGBL. 
I, 389), and the emphasized necessity of coordinated scientific re- 
search, I ask for your immediate opinion on the matter. 

By order of 

Signed: Dr. Bender 

Certified Cunsich Chief Tax Secretary 

(RGBL I 389) 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 003-PS 

A Short Report of the Activity of the Foreign Policy Office (APA) 

The mission of the Foreign Policy Office (APA) of the National 
Socialist German Workers’ Party (NSDAP) could not from its 
founding be considered a replica of the development of the Foreign 
Office, but is restricted in a very definite manner. From the entire 
foreign policy complex the following concrete problems have been 
selected : 


10 


003— PS 


The German-Englisli Relationship, the North Eastern Region, 
the South Eastern Region (Danube Region) along ivith boundary 
peoples holding interests in these regions, and Soviet Russia. 

With the realization that the entire present day foreign policy 
is tied together in the closest manner with the question of foreign 
trade, a definite division was established to deal with this subject. 
Thus the following divisions were set up in the APA. : 

England, the North, the South-East Region, the Near East, 
Foreign Trade, and the Press. 

1. England: The attempts to find persons in England who had 
the desire to understand the German movement date back to 1929. 
Our English agent R. in Berlin made possible my first trip to 
London in 1931. There a number of connections were made which 
worked out well in a practical fashion to bring about a German- 
English understanding. Above all was Group Leader W., member 
of the Air General Staff, who was firmly of the belief that Ger- 
many and England must stand together in the defense against the 
Bolshevist danger. These different voicings of opinions had the 
result that the circle in the English Air General Staff enlarged and 
the Flying Club became a center of German-English understand- 
ing. In 1934 Group Leader W. came to Germany where he was 
received by the Fuehrer (Hitler). The utterances of the Fuehrer 
had the result to further strengthen these already favorably in- 
clined policies, and since this time this cordiality has not been 
broken. The Air General Staff always inquired of us what they 
could state to refute the anti-German elements in London in a 
manner favorable to us. The German arguments were then ap- 
plied in a corresponding manner. In contrast to certain English 
persons who would speak out very fervently for Germany, only to 
speak the contrary some months later, this staunch group, namely, 
the Air General Staff which was run by the younger officers, had 
proven itself to be a solid and conscious support in all changing 
situations. Not least in this influence was the great speech of 
Baldwin of the previous year in which he promised Germany the 
right to air protection. The English periodical “The Airplane” 
which is printed under the guidance of the Air General Staff, be- 
gan to express against Bolshevism in an always increasing sharper 
tone, 'and always declared, when there was agitation against Ger- 
man militarism, that one could today feel well pleased if Germany 
had a strong air force to combat the Asiatic barbarism. The 
English ministers who did not wish to adopt this point of view 
were sharply criticized. In the change of foreign ministers the 
pro-French candidate for foreign office was not selected, but rather 


11 


003— PS 


the ex-Minister of Air, Samuel Hoare, who till this day still keeps 
up his personal contacts with the Air Ministry. Upon his request 
a memorandum on the spiritual foundation of national socialism, 
inspired by us, was translated to him; it being his desire to un- 
derstand our movement more fully. 

During the reign of MacDonald this feeling of cordiality was 
supported through the private secretary of MacDonald, Mr. Bad- 
low whom I also met in 1933 and with whom I had extensive 
discussions. Since this time he has constantly been informed 
through us, and has had more than one heated difference of opinion 
with MacDonald over this subject. 

A resulting activity of this connection with the British Air 
General Staff was the establishment of a liaison between our Air 
Ministry and the British fliers. However, before it was possible 
for us to reveal our armament, W. revealed to me on official sta- 
tionery of the British Air Ministry, a representative of the air- 
plane motor factory which was engaged in producing motors for 
the British Air Force, and which said representative I later met 
here in Berlin. Since the German industry itself had attained 
production capacity by now, this almost official British offer for 
German air arming could not be fully accepted. However, the 
Chief of our England Division (Kapitaenleutnant Obermueller, 
reserve) took two representatives of the German Air Ministry to 
London and himself undertook several trips to London. He was 
the first German to receive an invitation from the vice-Air Mar- 
shal to view the British Air Force and British air strength. The 
APA had placed an automobile at the disposal of this same Air 
Marshal in which to tour Germany when he was in Germany last 
year. A firmer bond has also been accomplished between our 
English Division and Henry Deterding and his associates. Mis- 
understandings in matter of taxes pertaining to the German pos- 
sessions of Deterding could be removed, thus preventing a change 
of management in respect to Deterding and the Shell Works 
whereby Germany would have lost some large contracts. 

At the close of last year we received the message that the King 
of England has expressed himself to be very dissatisfied over the 
official press agency. The visit of the Duke of Kent to Munich 
had made matters still worse pertaining to the King’s views on 
the press agency. Consequently we one day received the request 
from London to make possible that our English agent take a trip 
to London in order to orient the Duke of Kent in every detail per- 
taining to national socialism in order to convey this information 
to the King. R. went with me to London exactly as requested and 


12 


003— PS 


there had an over three hour long unobserved conference with the 
Duke of Kent, who then conveyed this to the King of England. 
One can assume that this instruction has served its purpose and 
exerted a definite strengthening pressure for change of cabinet 
and head it in a direction of closer cordiality for Germany. 

A number of Englishmen were invited to the Party Day of 1934, 
of which some at least portrayed a favorable attitude towards 
Germany. Above all was Captain McCaw, semi-official counsel of 
the English Ministry of War and liaison man between other min- 
istries. McCaw was previously adjutant to Lord Kitchener, and 
as we ascertained, has worked for a German-British understand- 
ing in official quarters. Besides, there was also the truly enthusi- 
astic adjutant of the Duke of Connaught (uncle of the English 
King), Archibald Boyle, who was called upon all matters of foreign 
policy by the Air Transport Ministry, and who worked for the 
same purpose. To these important contacts may be added a great 
number of other connections with British politicians, officers, and 
members of Parliament. 

It naturally is to be understood that other personalities of the 
Nazi Party (NSDAP) had important connections in England and 
have utilized them. In conclusion I believe I can say that the 
England Division of the Foreign Policy Office (APA), in spite of 
many difficulties and counter-currents upon which I will not enter 
any further, has done its duty in the special purpose of helping to 
create a German-English understanding. 

2. Northern Division: The winning over of the Scandinavian 
countries to the side of Germany appears as a foregone necessity 
for future German foreign policy, but the necessity is also as great 
to prevent the Scandinavian countries from making a clean entry 
into the circle of anti-German countries. The political possibili- 
ties towards these Marxist governments were extremely difficult. 
Trade policies, according to my belief, have suffered most through 
sins of omissions, hence the APA restricted itself more to the 
cultural political field. For this purpose it expanded the Nordic 
(Scandinavian) Society. This formerly small society has grown 
to be a decisive bond in the German-Scandinavian relationship 
since its support by the APA two years ago. The society’s leader, 
Lohse, is selected by the APA. The offices in all sections [GauJ 
are headed by corresponding section chiefs [Gauleiter]. Trade 
groups and other organizations and branches of the party which 
have dealings with Scandinavia have come to agreement so that 
almost all of the traffic between Germany and Scandinavia today 
passes through the hands of the Nordic Society. The society has 


693256 — 46 — 2 


13 


003-PS 


to date celebrated in Germany all memorial days of great Nordic 
scientists and artists (Hamsun, Holberg, Heidenstam) and has 
brought a number of Nordic conductors to Germany, as well as 
having furthered Nordic literature. Through its periodical “The 
North” [Der Norden] thoughts have been exchanged. Finally, 
personal relations were increasingly favored through conventions. 
Especially was the Convention of 1935 a complete success. This 
convention met under the sanctity of the Scandinavian ministers 
in Germany and the German ministers in Scandinavia, as far as 
it applied to the Nordic Music Conclave as the main purpose of the 
convention. The committee was composed of the authoritative 
Nordic Music Society. Fourteen sold out concerts and over 200 
Scandinavian visitors attest to the success of the convention. 

Thereupon the First National Finnish Art Exhibition came to 
Germany, followed by the request of the Finnish Government to 
the APA to hold a German exposition in Helsinki in March of 
1936. These psychologically valuable affiliations have undoubt- 
edly loosened the tension in many circles and it would do well for 
a clever trade policy to make use of this loosened tension, as for 
example, the trade treaties between England and Finland expire 
in 1936. The Chief of the Northern Division is my private sec- 
retary, Thilo von Trotha. 

3. Southeast (Danube-Region) : Since the Fuehrer (Hitler) 

has reserved Austria for his own, the APA has relayed on to the 
responsible places any reports from Austria, and has not dealt in 
Austrian politics. Relations with Hungary were immediately es- 
tablished. The APA invited Premier Gombos to Berlin in 1933 for 
a private visit where he was presented to the Fuehrer. The Fuehrer 
took him along to Erfurt to observe a review of the SA. Specific 
discussions were undertaken with Hungary to convince her of the 
futility of her demands for 100 percent revision of boundaries. 
Finally in August of 1935 I spoke with his excellence von Angian 
and made clear to him that although we well understood her own 
interests, the necessity that Hungary must decline its revision 
demands upon Yugoslavia and Rumania and address its demands 
to Czechoslovakia. One can assume that the Hungarians are now 
ready to realize the necessity of the boundary revisions as pro- 
posed. 

Exceptionally long and drawn out discussions were in process 
with Rumania because definite measures were necessary, not be- 
cause we did not wish to be intervening in Rumanian affiairs with- 
out being called, but because we had to await the attitude of the 
Party as a result of the King of Rumania sending a friend to Ber- 


14 


003— PS 


lin. Here on Rumanian soil a bitter battle was going on between 
the pro-French Titulesco and Jewish elements on one side against 
the anti-Jewish elements on the other side. The King is well aware 
of the fact that in the end his support of Bolshevism may cost him 
his throne. However, he is so intimidated by the threats of 
France, so as not to call for an election, and hopes only that the 
powers of the people, which are mounting against Titulesco, are 
so strong that he can support himself upon the will of the people. 
In order to create unity of expression the APA suggested forma- 
tion of a large German-Rumanian Chamber of Commerce in Berlin. 
The profits of this business were not to benefit any private associ- 
ates, but were to go to those groups that worked for a German- 
Rumanian understanding. Because of a false report of Herr von 
Neurath to the Fuehrer (Hitler) in which it was stated as though 
the action were taken in the name of the Fuehrer, the work was 
delayed and hindered and finally stopped, even though all of the 
ministers concerned had agreed to the plan. Through this many 
costly months were lost and the APA was forced to try other 
means. Since it was not possible to work with money, many con- 
ferences were arranged between the coming Premier Goga. Finally, 
an agreement which had been considered impossible, was concluded 
between Goga and the anti-Semitic leader Cuza. Cuza, upon my 
wish, deleted several points from his program, after which he in- 
formed us that it was necessary in the interest of his fatherland 
(Rumania) and a German-Rumanian understanding that he com- 
ply with my wish, as he had recognized in me an unyielding anti- 
Semite. I have informed the Fuehrer of the complicated later re- 
lationships in numerous reports. Germany is fighting France and 
Bolshevism in Rumania, and when affairs have progressed so as 
to warrant further discussion, the King of Rumania will invite 
me to a visit to discuss the matter further. 

Feelers have been sent out to Belgrade through Rumania. Here 
also exists the possibility of splitting the “lesser entente,” but as 
far as I can ascertain, Yugoslavia is not considering withdrawal 
from this alliance singly under certain guarantees, but will with- 
draw together with Rumania. The work in Rumania has to a part 
been undertaken by Herr Duckwitz, but especially by Party-Mem- 
ber Schickedanz. 

The Near East : Next it was necessary that the position of the 

national socialistic movement be secured not only within the con- 
fines of the Party but also in public life. This was the more so 
necessary since the old Rapallo Treaty was constantly being dis- 
cussed in the universities in numerous lectures. In relation with 


15 


003— PS 


this was the Near East Ideology of Moeller van dem Brock which 
exerted its influence deep within the Party. The APA proceeded 
in the most tenacious fashion to prevent the proponents of the 
Rapallo school from coming to the universities, although this was 
not always possible. The APA prevented that instructional lec- 
tures of the School of Rapallo and Moeller van dem Brock were 
held within the Party and other societies. Through the Reich 
Ministry for the Furtherance of German Literature were issued 
many sharp criticisms over the eastern ideology of Moeller van 
dem Brock to all -government and party offices. Furthermore, Dr. 
Leibrandt, the Chief of the Near East Division delivered several 
speeches on this matter to Party Conventions, student societies, 
and so forth. It was this activity which caused the APA to make 
enemies with many governmental offices until the Fuehrer in his 
speech of May 21 set forth the authenticity of this work and 
forced a withdrawal of those who opposed this activity of the 
APA. From there on the Near East Division has pursued the en- 
tire current Russian political activity, collected and examined 
current Russian reports, made an exact study of the minority 
feelings in Russia, and contacted anti-Soviet circles, although only 
for purposes of study. The Near East Division has supplied other 
divisions, namely the English Division with necessary material 
about Russia, as well as making available to the Press Division 
material for “Dem Voelkischen Beobachter” [official Nazi Party 
newspaper] . 

Foreign Trade: In all these political connections the question 
of foreign trade played an important part. Reluctantly one must 
say that it was just in this field, according to my view, that much 
opportunity has been lost. First of all, the Manchuko Incident, 
which came to the attention of the Fuehrer, was without question 
sabotaged in the worst fashion by the Foreign Offices in Berlin 
and Tokio. Still, it is of significance that the form of the recip- 
rocal trade treaties which were written up by the Foreign Trade 
Division serve as models for many other governmental treaties. 
In many instances the division was able to establish order when 
things had been greatly neglected, as the German-Finnish Dis- 
cussions (for which the chief of the Foreign Trade Division 
received the Finnish decoration) , the German-Norwegian Wal 
Agreement, and a great number of other questions. Problems 
dealing with the foreign trade of Germany and the middle east 
(Turkey and Iran) were also attacked. One may say today that 
a very cheerful cooperation has been established in this field be- 
tween the representatives of the Foreign Office and our Foreign 


16 


003— PS 


Trade Division. The German-Rumanian question was tackled by 
our Foreign Trade Division during all this time, but unfortunately 
did not produce the desired results. The Foreign Trade Division 
produced a stimulus for German industry on the question of Ger- 
man-Russian credit. As things stood, greedy circles in heavy 
industry threatened the interests of the medium and small indus- 
tries whom they were willing to sacrifice for the tempting Soviet 
business. Seventy million marks would have been lost in this 
deal because Russia would not accept the decisions of the Board 
of Arbitration, while heavy industry was willing to forego this 
sum. Through the intervention of the APA the situation was 
changed. Shortly thereafter the Board of Arbitration again met 
and acknowledged the claims of little and medium business, and 
divided among the several categories, thus saving the German 
Reich 70 million marks. 

The Foreign Trade Division worked under the theory, that 
the question of foreign trade would be a rapid development, and 
therefore formulated exact recommendations in the discussions. 
The recommended foreign trade drafts, as were recommended in 
these discussions, were not refuted by Wagemann nor Josias 
Stamp in London. Opposition, however, has arisen in the Reich 
Ministry of Commerce, which apparently, however, has not given 
the matter a very exact examination. Thus the matter rests. 
German foreign trade has not progressed, and the forced taxation 
by means of export duties of over 700 million marks for German 
industry in 1935 can only be considered an emergency measure 
and not a fundamental policy. Here again the APA recommends 
to the Fuehrer to give these proposals a trial. 

Party Member Daitz has worked with initiative on questions of 
foreign trade. Party Member Malletke, who has proven himself 
to be a far-seeing associate, has conducted the daily adminis- 
tration and the examination of all problems. 

The Press: The Press Division of the APA is comprised of 
persons who together master all the languages that are in use. 
Daily they examine approximately 300 newspapers and deliver 
to the Fuehrer, the deputy Fuehrer, and all other interested 
offices the condensations of the important trends of the entire 
world press. I know that these press reports are highly praised 
by all who constantly follow them. The Press Division further- 
more conducts an exact archives on the attitudes of the most 
important papers of the world and an exact archives on the most 
important journalists of the world. Many embarrassments dur- 
ing conferences in Germany could have been avoided had one 
consulted these archives (case of Leumas. Nurnberg, 1934; case 


17 


003— PS 


of Dorothy Thompson; and others). Further, the Press Division 
was able to arrange a host of interviews as well as conducting a 
great number of friendly foreign journalists to the various official 
representatives of Germany. Hearst then personally asked me 
to often write about the position of German foreign policy in his 
papers. This year five continuous articles under my name have 
appeared in Hearst papers all over the world. Since these articles, 
as Hearst personally informed me, presented well founded argu- 
ments, he begged me to write further articles for his papers. 

The Press Division of the APA was able to step into a position 
of arbitration in the conflict which arose between the representa- 
tives of the foreign press in Germany and the Office of Propa- 
ganda because of the general attack that the Minister of 
Propaganda, Dr. Goebbels had made upon the combined world 
press in July of 1934. Thus from the combined press representa- 
tives it was able to select and take care of those who were of a 
pro-German opinion, or at least conducted themselves in a neutral 
manner. Because of the willingness to cooperate that the Press 
Division under the skillful guidance of Dr. Bomer showed the 
foreigners, the Press Division has won a position of honor, and 
can today claim to have a truly personal and factual knowledge 
of world journalism. 

In general the APA has attempted in the last IV 2 years to estab- 
lish contact between diplomacy and the world press in Germany. 
For this purpose the APA held a Beer Party [Bierabend] each 
month. On each of these evenings a prominent representative 
of the party or government spoke about the work of his division. 
The most prominent national socialists spoke at these gatherings 
(Goering, Rust, Todt, Schirach, Hierl, Dr. Gross, Frau Scholtz- 
Klinck, Frank, Ley, and others). These evenings were constantly 
attended by the majority of the diplomatic representatives. We 
could always count on having at least 350 to 400 visitors. Since 
we invited a great number of representatives of the German 
ministries and party offices in the last year, a hefty traffic has 
developed. Many items which later appeared in the papers can 
be accredited to the personal clarification of a national socialistic 
party member who attended these evenings. The APA further- 
more conducted a great number of foreigners to the labor 
battalions [Arbeitsdienst] or acquainted them with other estab- 
lishments. That has been a bit of work that has constantly been 
going on so that the APA here too has experience to answer all 
questions which may arise. 

The School of Instruction [Das Schulungshaus] : The 2 14 year 
work of all those active in the APA has given them a very exact 


18 


003-PS 


picture of the practical workings of foreign policy and foreign 
trade. It has also enabled them every bit of knowledge which 
can be obtained from a national socialistic point of view in order 
to accurately judge the questions of foreign policy at all. In 
order to also develop potential and interested capable powers 
arising from the people and develop them as successors in the 
movement of national socialism the Foreign Policy School of 
Instruction [Aussenpolitisches Schulungshaus] was founded in 
Dahlem in 1935. Students from all over Germany who displayed 
an interest in foreign policy were assembled at this school. They 
were here instructed and schooled through lectures and coopera- 
tive work similar to seminars. Into this school were drawn the 
Hitler youths, SS, and the plan exists to have persons who will 
later travel abroad as representatives of large German concerns 
undergo an extensive course of instruction. Furthermore, the 
foreign Policy School of Instruction should also examine those 
students which the Academic Student Exchange is sending 
abroad. Lectures at the school were given by a number of Ger- 
man economists, as well as the Japanese and Chinese military 
attaches. The Chief of the APA himself lectured there. 

The administration of the APA as well as the School of Instruc- 
tion rest in the hands of Party Member Knauer, who in his youth 
was party to the March on Coburg. 

In conclusion I may well say that these 2 l /> years were rich in 
experiences and have tested people in their capacity to perform 
work. These 2 y 2 years have led to the elimination of one or 
another incompetents, but at least a dozen people have become so 
enriched through experience that they can be a great help to the 
Fuehrer in the field of their enterprise. 

The lack of necessary and sufficient means naturally prevents 
a complete exploitation of the entire activity, which surely would 
be desired. But in spite of this one can say that the most hu- 
manly possible was accomplished here with sacrifice, sense of 
duty, and energy. 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 004-PS 

Copy 

The Political Preparation of the Norway Action 
(The enclosures mentioned in the report have been omitted from this paper 
since they are only relative to specific matters. The complete report includ- 
ing appendices has been submitted to the Deputy of the Fuehrer by Reichs- 
leiter Rosenberg on 17 June 1940) 

The Office of Foreign Relations [Aussenpolitisches Amt] of 


19 


004-PS 


the National Socialist Party (NSDAP) has had contact with 
Vidkun Quisling, leader of the Nasjonal Samling in Norway, 
for years. The director of the “Office North” [Amt Norden] of 
the office of Foreign Relations — later victim of a fatal accident — 
paid him (Quisling) a personal visit on one of his trips to Scan- 
dinavia. 

When in 1939 the general political situation was beginning to 
grow critical Quisling gave the Office of Foreign Relations an 
estimate of the situation and his opinion about the possible inten- 
tions of Great Britain with relation to Scandinavia in case of 
conflict (Great Britain’s) with the German Reich. Prior to the 
convention of the Nordic Association [Nordische Gesellschaft] in 
Luebeck, Quisling was received by Reichsleiter Rosenberg in Ber- 
lin. He ( Quisling) pointed out the decisive geopolitical impor- 
tance of Norway in the Scandinavian region and the advantages 
gained by the Power in control of the Norwegian coast in case of 
conflict between the German Reich and Great Britain. He 
further explained the extraordinarily clever, democratic and par- 
ticularly anglo-saxon propaganda which had been accepted fa- 
vourably by almost the entire nation, also because of Norway’s 
economic dependence on the seas and therefore on England. Since 
he did not believe that the small nations would remain neutral 
in case of conflict — as had been the case in the World War of 1914 
— but was convinced that they would become involved in one way 
or the other he requested support for his party and press in Nor- 
way, basing his request on the “pangermanic” ideology. Reichs- 
leiter Rosenberg also requested Director [Amtsleiter] Scheidt to 
arrange a meeting between Quisling and his Deputy Hagelin with 
State Secretary [Staatssekretaer] Koerner, bearing in mind that 
this matter might be of particular interest to General Field Mar- 
shall. Goering with regard to air strategy. This meeting with 
the State Secretary Koerner did take place. At the same time 
Staff Director [Stabsleiter] Schickedanz, directed by Reichsleiter 
Rosenberg, submitted the attached memorandum to Reich Min- 
ister and Chief of the Chancellery [Reichsminister und Chef der 
Reichskanzlei] Lammers for the information of the Fuehrer by 
the end of June 1939 (Enclosure No. 1). 

After the Luebeck convention Director [Amtsleiter] Scheidt 
took a vacation trip to Norway to further pursue this matter. 
His observations are found in the attached report (Enclosure No. 
2) . Even during his presence in Germany Quisling had requested 
a short, pertinent training program for reliable party function- 
aries especially selected by him. This request was granted by 


20 


004--PS 


Reichsleiter Rosenberg. In August 1939 a 14 day course was held 
at the School of the Office for Foreign Relations of the NSDAP 
[Aussenpolitisches Schulungshaus der NSDAP] in Berlin for 25 
followers of the Nasjonal Samling who had been selected by Quis- 
ling. 

In September Burgermeister Dr. Winkler revealed that he had 
been charged with the financial aspects of Quisling’s request by 
General Field Marshal Goering through State Secretary Koerner. 
The outbreak of war and the beginning of the Polish campaign 
delayed the decisions (Enclosure No. 3). A further reminder of 
Reichsleiter Rosenberg to General Field Marshal Goering in the 
course of a talk about the importance of Norway in connection 
with the matters set forth originally by Quisling had no practical 
results. 

At the same time political tension increased in Norway as Rus- 
sian activity made itself felt in the Baltic regions. Of this Quis- 
ling kept the office (APA) informed through his deputies in 
Germany. The outbreak of the Russo-Finnish war at the end of 
November helped to further increase the anti-German currents 
in all Scandinavia and played into the hands of the anglo-saxon 
propaganda which was now building up to full strength. Greater 
Germany was represented as a secret ally of Soviet Russia and as 
the real culprit in Finland’s misfortune. At the same time the 
Western Powers promised Finland military support which could 
only be supplied via Norway and Sweden. The possibility of a 
plan by Great Britain to occupy Norway and possibly Sweden to 
effectively close the blockade against Greater Germany and fur- 
ther to gain convenient air bases against Germany began to take 
shape under the pretence of altruistic help to Finland. Its aim 
was to involve also the Nordic Nations in a conflict against 
Greater Germany. Quisling informed the office (APA) about 
these new possibilities shaping on the political scene, acting 
through his deputy in Germany. 

As the activities of the Allies became more and more noticeable 
in Norway Quisling again came to Germany to voice his fears. 
He was received by Reichsleiter Rosenberg in the early part of 
December and he again presented his ideas. Firmly convinced 
that in the long run a genuinely neutral position in the great con- 
flict would become impossible for the small nations and in his 
firm faith in the victory of Greater Germany in this conflict 
which also was an ideological one, Quisling considered it his duty 
— supported as he was by a small but determined minority — to tie 
Norway’s fate to that of Greater Germany as the new centre of 


21 


004-PS 


strength of a nordic-germanic life community. We knew that 
his courageous group was the only pro-German Party. His deputy 
in Germany, Hagelin, had also arranged for a talk between Quis- 
ling and Grand Admiral Raeder which took place about this time. 
During a report to the Fuehrer Reichsleiter Rosenberg again men- 
tioned Norway. He particularly pointed out her importance in 
the case of England deciding to occupy Norway with the tacit 
consent of the Norwegian Government, for the purpose of 
strengthening the blockade and under the pretence of help for 
Finland. Grand Admiral Raeder, too, upon his request, was called 
to the Fuehrer in connection with his talks with Quisling. As a 
result of these steps Quisling was received by the Fuehrer for 
personal instructions on the 16th of December and again on the 
18th of December. During this interview the Fuehrer emphasized 
repeatedly that the most preferable httitude of Norway as well 
as all of Scandinavia would be one of complete neutrality. He 
had no intentions to enlarge the theatres of war to draw other 
nations into the conflict. If, however, the enemy were preparing 
an enlargment of the zones of war with the aim to further throttle 
and threaten the Greater German Reich then, of course, he would 
be obliged to arm against such steps. Then the Fuehrer promised 
Quisling financial support for his movement based on the pan- 
germanic ideology and for the purpose of combatting the in- 
creasing enemy propaganda. The military matters of the ques- 
tions were now transferred to a special military staff which as- 
signed special missions to Quisling and heard his opinions (Enel. 
No. 29). The political treatment was to be handled by Reichs- 
leiter Rosenberg, expenses were to be carried by the Foreign 
Office [Auswaertiges Amt] and Reichsminister for Foreign 
Affairs [Reichsminister vom Aussenpolitischen Amt] was to be 
kept informed at all times. Maintenance of liaison with Quisling 
was assigned to Director [Amtsleiter] Scheidt who, as matters 
developed further, was attached to the Naval Attache in Oslo, 
Commander [Korvettenkapitaen] Schreiber. Strictest secrecy 
was ordered for the entire matter. 

Then, in January, during a conference between Reichsleiter 
Rosenberg and Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop it was decided 
to appropriate to Quisling an initial sum of 200,000 Goldmark. 
This money was to be taken to Oslo, in two instalments, by the 
liaison agent Scheidt where it was to be handed to Quisling. In 
the Foregin Office [Auswaertiges Amt] Privy Councillor [Ge- 
heimrat] Von Grundherr was the only one to be told of this ar- 
rangement (Enel. No. 3). 


22 


004-PS 


As shown in the attached documentary memoranda Quisling’s 
reports transmitted by his deputy in Germany Hagelin concerning 
the possibility of active intervention of the Western Powers in 
Norway with consent of the Norwegian Government became 
more and more alarming. These reports continuously supple- 
mented with more and more accurate confirmations by Quisling’s 
confidants were in certain contrast with the opinions of the Ger- 
man Legation in Oslo. The Legation believed in the neutral 
intentions of the Norwegian Government of that time, the Ny- 
gardsvold, and was further convinced that the Government would 
take arms in defence of its neutrality policy. The Foreign Office 
[Auswaertiges Amt] held the same opinion as is shown in the at- 
tached documentary memorandum dated January 8 which is the 
result of a talk between Director [Amtsleiter] Scheidt and Privy 
Councillor [Geheimrat] Von Grundherr (Enel. 8). It is of special 
interest that Hagelin, Quisling’s Deputy in Germany, whose inti- 
mate connection with Quisling was not known in Norway suc- 
ceeded in getting a foothold in the circles of the Nygardsvold 
Government. Thus he heard the uncolored opinions of the mem- 
bers -of the Government who conducted themselves like a secret 
Norwegiait-Anglophile society. 

In the documentary memorandum of January 13 he relates the 
opinions expressed to him by two Norwegian Ministers. The 
gist of the opinions was that Germany had already lost the war 
and that Norway — if only because of its large Merchant Marine — 
could not do other than favour England in her politics, in war 
even more so than in peace. And further that the entire nations 
agreed with this policy (Enel. 9). During the night of February 
16 to 17 the English raided the “Altmark” in the Joessingsfjord. 
The reaction of the Norwegian Government to the Altmark-affair 
seemed to indicate that certain secret arrangements had been 
made between the Norwegian Government and the Allies. This 
was further emphasized in Director Scheidt’s consolidated report 
covering January 20th to February 20th (Enel. No. 11) after he 
had received Hagelin’s report. Hagelin had overheard the con- 
versation between two members of the Storting during which 
one member said to the other that the actions of the two com- 
manders of the Norwegian torpedo boats had been a “prearranged 
affair.” The same report also refers to the English demands for 
air bases in Norway and for freedom of trade in the Norwegian 
waters. It goes on to say that although the Norwegian Govern- 
ment refused those demands it was agreed that violations by the 
English would be answered with paper protests only. Such re- 


23 


004-PS 


ports, and confirmations thereto were time and again supplied 
through Quisling. In complete contrast to those opinions the 
German Legation, even after the Altmark Affair, relied fully 
upon the good will of the Norwegians. The Ambassador cited 
the signing of the Norwegian-German trade agreement as weigh- 
ing heavily in favour of his point of view. He already considered 
the Norwegian Government Nygardsvold somewhat dependent on 
the Greater German Reich (Enel. Nos. 11 and 12). All these 
reports were currently submitted to the Fuehrer by Reichsleiter 
Rosenberg. Quisling always emphasised that more than 90% 
of the country was behind England and that he only represented 
a minority which, however, was chosen by virtue of its intuition 
to take charge later on as representatives of a new Norwegian 
nation. 

Apart from financial support which was forthcoming from the 
Reich in currency, Quisling had also been promised a shipment 
of material for immediate use in Norway such as coal and sugar. 
Additional help was promised. The shipments were to be con- 
ducted under cover of a new Trade Company to be established 
in Germany or through especially selected existing firms while 
Hagelin was to act as consignee in Norway. Hagelin had already 
conferred with the respective Ministers of the Nygardsvold Gov- 
ernment as for instance the Minister of Supply and Commerce 
[Versorgungs-und Handelsminister] and had been assured per- 
mission for the import of coal. 'At the same time the coal trans- 
ports were to serve possibly to supply the technical means 
necessary to launch Quisling’s political action in Oslo with 
German help. It was Quisling’s plan to send a number of selected, 
particularly reliable men to Germany for a brief military train- 
ing course in a completely isolated camp. They were then to be 
detailed as area and language specialists to German Special 
Troops who were to be taken to Oslo on the coal barges to accom- 
plish a political action. Thus Quisling planned to get hold of 
his leading opponents in Norway including the King, to prevent 
all military resistance from the very beginning. Immediately 
following this political action and upon an official request of 
Quisling to the Government of the German Reich the military 
occupation of Norway was to take place. All military prepara- 
tions were to be completed previously. Though this plan con- 
tained the great advantage of surprise it also contained a great 
number of dangers which could possibly cause its failure. For 
this reason it received a quite dilatory treatment while, at the 
same time, it was not disapproved as far as the Norwegians were 
concerned. 


24 


004-PS 


In February, after a conference with General Field Marshal 
Goering, Reichsleiter Rosenberg informed the Secretary in the 
Office of the Four Year Plan [Ministerialdirektor im Vierjah- 
resplan] Wohlthat only of the intention to prepare coal shipments 
to Norway to the named confidant Hagelin. Further details 
were discussed in a conference between Secretary Wohlthat, 
Staff Director Schickedanz and Hagelin. Since Wohlthat received 
no further instructions from the General Field Marshal, Foreign 
Minister von Ribbentrop — after a consultation with Reichsleiter 
Rosenberg — consented to expedite these shipments through his 
office. Based on a report of Reichsleiter Rosenberg to the Fuehrer 
it was also arranged to pay Quisling ten thousand English pounds 
per month for three months commencing on the 15th of March, 
to support his work. This money was to be paid through liaison 
agent Scheidt. 

Meanwhile Hagelin, through his connection in Norway as 
trusted agent of the Norwegian Navy, had been commissioned 
with the purchase of German AA-guns (Flaks) through the 
German Navy Ministry. Through this connection he gained 
more and more insight into the actual ideas and intentions of the 
Norwegian Nygardsvold Government and into the Allied prepara- 
tions which had already started in Norway. While in Germany 
on the 20th of March to attend conferences regarding the delivery 
of the German AA guns, he made a detailed report about the 
increasing activities of the Allies in Norway, tolerated by the 
Nygardsvold Government. According to his reports the Allies 
were already checking the Norwegian coastal towns for landing 
and transport possibilities. He also stated that the French Com- 
mandant Kermarrec who was charged with this reconnaissance 
had a confidential talk with Colonel Sunolo, Commandant of 
Narvik, who is a follower of Quisling; during the course of the 
talk he told him of the Allied intentions to land motorized troops 
in Stavanger, Dronthoim and possibly also at Kirkenes and to 
occupy the airport at Sola (Enel. no. 14). 

At the same time Hagelin increased his oral and written warn- 
ings regarding the confidential agreements between the Allied 
and the Norwegian Governments stipulating that in case of an 
Allied occupation of coastal towns the Norwegian Government 
would not go beyond paper protest, as was the case in the Alt- 
mark Affair. And again, in his report of March 26 (Enel. Nos. 
15 and 16) he pointed out that the speech of the Norwegian 
Foreign Minister Koht dealing with Norwegian neutrality and 
containing some protests was not being taken seriously either in 
London by the English nor in Norway by the Norwegians. It 


25 


004-PS 


was well known that the Government had no intentions to take 
a stand against England. However, to keep up appearances 
towards Germany up to the last minute the Norwegian Govern- 
ment intended to issue an order to fire. This was to demonstrate 
that everything within their power had been done. There was a 
continuous series of conferences between the King, the Command- 
ing Admiral, the Crown Prince and the newly appointed Minister 
of War Ljundberg who had been placed in office at the special 
request of England as early as January. A person close to the 
King as well as the commanding Admiral explained to Hagelin 
that the above mentioned actions by England were quite unavoid- 
able since she knew that she could only win the war if she were 
in control of the Norwegian ports. Furthermore England feared 
a German counterblow which was not to be allowed to materialize. 
The Norwegian Government was also notified by London that 
Germany intended to mine the waters between Jutland and the 
Norwegian coast. Based on a message from England this plan 
was revealed on or about March 15 during a secret session of the 
Foreign Affairs Committee of the Storting by Foreign Minister 
Koht. As a matter of fact, during the course of the military 
preparations fof the occupation of Norway this plan had been 
adopted by the German military authorities and to this day it is 
a mystery how this plan got to London. In view of all this news 
Quisling could no longer back his earlier advice to continue 
watching the develbpment of the situation in Norway. He now 
had to point out that any further delay would mean a grave risk. 
The above was probably the most decisive report ever to be sub- 
mitted here by Hagelin. Reichsleiter Rosenberg immediately 
transmitted it to the Fuehrer (Enel. No. 15). 

While still in Berlin Hagelin was requested by Colonel 
Schmundt to make speedy arrangements for a conference between 
Quisling and a Colonel of the General Staff, at some neutral 
location. This conference was held in Copenhagen in the begin- 
ning of April. 

In confirmation of all this information coming from Quisling 
and his confidants and in contrast to the opinion held up to the 
end by German Legation in Oslo and by the Foreign Office, the 
Allies, on April 8th. initiated their first major blow as an intro- 
duction to their intended occupation of Norway. During the 
night from the 7th. to the 8th. of April they mined the Norwegian 
coast and made public announcement of this act. Norway’s reac- 
tion, consistent with the reports always received by the Office 
of Foreign Relations [Aussenpolitisches Amt] of the NSDAP, 
was nothing more than protests on paper growing weaker by 


26 


004-PS 


the hour. Then, after proper preparations and by command of 
the Fuehrer Greater Germany undertook the counterblow in the 
morning of April 9th. and occupied the most important Nor- 
wegian airfields and seaports. 

Reports about the further political developments in Norway 
proper are found in the appended documentary memorandum 
(Enel. Nos. 18 to 30). 

After the success of the occupational operations in Norway 
seemed assured the Fuehrer called for Reichsleiter Rosenberg 
for a short talk before lunch, on April 25th. He oriented him 
(Rosenberg) about the developments of the military action in 
Norway where the English Auxiliary Corps had just suffered a 
decisive defeat combined with the capture of important docu- 
ments and plans. He further revealed to Reichsleiter Rosen- 
berg that he had based this most daring decision which was now 
approaching successful completion on the continuous warnings 
of Quisling as reported to him by Reichsleiter Rosenberg. And 
that it actually happened in the Drontheimfjord that behind the 
stern of the last German Troop Transport there appeared the 
bow of the first English destroyer which convoyed the Allied 
Troop Transport fleet. This destroyer was wiped out by the 
German Navy. 

Berlin, June 15th. 1940 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 007-PS 

Brief Report on Activities of the Foreign Affairs Bureau of the 
Party from 1933 to 1943 

When the Foreign Affairs Bureau [Aussenpolitisches Amt] 
was established 1 April 1933 the Fuehrer directed that it should 
not be expanded to a large bureaucratic agency, but should 
rather develop its effectiveness through initiative and sug- 
gestions. 

Corresponding to the extra ordinarily hostile attitude adopted 
by the Soviet Government in Moscow from the beginning the 
newly-established bureau devoted particular attention to internal 
conditions in the Soviet Union, as well as to the effects of World 
Bolshevism primarily in other European countries. It entered 
into contact with the most variegated groups inclining towards 
National Socialism and combatting Bolshevism, focussing its 
main attention on Nations and States bordering on the Soviet 
Union. On the one end those nations and states constituted an 
Insulating Ring encircling the Bolshevist neighbor ; on the other 
hand they were the lateral of german living space [Fluegel- 


27 


007-PS 


stellung zum deutschen Lebensraum] and took up a flanking 
position towards the Western Powers [Flankenstellung Gegen- 
ueber Den Westmaechten] especially Great Britain. In order to 
wield the desired influence by one means or another, the Bureau 
was compelled to use the most varying methods, taking into con- 
sideration the completely different living conditions, the ties of 
blood, intellect and history of the movements observed by the 
Bureau in those countries. 

In Scandinavia an outspoken pro-Anglo-Saxon attitude, based 
on economic considerations, had become progressively more 
dominant after the World War of 1914/1918. There the Bureau 
put entire emphasis on influencing general cultural relations with 
the Nordic peoples. For this purpose it took the Nordic Society 
[Nordische Gesellschaft] in Luebeck under its protection. The 
Reich conventions of this society were attended by many out- 
standing personalities, especially from Finland. While there 
were no openings for purely political cooperation in Sweden and 
Denmark, an association based on Greater Germanic ideology was 
found in Norway. Very close relations were established with 
its founder, which led to further consequences. (See annex I 
for more detailed exposition). 

South-Eastern Europe was dominated by the French post-war 
system of alliances. The countries united in the Little Entente 
were aiming at a more favorable defence of the booty accumu- 
lated during the war. In addition each one of these countries 
sought to gain through this mutual-assistance pact safety against 
a superior opponent: Czechoslovakia against Germany; Yugo- 
slavia against Italy; Rumania against the Soviet Union. In 
Czechoslovakia a common hatred against everything German 
united the still remaining, partly pan-Slavic, Masonic and pro- 
Jewish tendencies. In Rumania the feeling of insecurity and 
fear of the superior neighbor, from whom she had taken 
Bessarabia was growing. In Rumania a primitive anti-Semitic 
group still existed. Its academically doctrinaire attitude pre- 
cluded large scale political effectiveness, but nevertheless offered 
points of mutual interest. The Foreign Affairs Bureau picked 
these up, developed them, instigated the formation of a new 
party and thereby forced a decisive change in the whole political 
situation in Rumania, which is still having its effect today. (See 
Annex II for more detailed exposition). 

Hungary and Bulgaria alone, Allied nations of the World War 
which had formerly been completely deprived of their rights, 
were attracted by the newly-formed center of gravity in the 
north. This attraction was nourished by the hope of obtaining 


28 


007-PS 


an expansion of their own power through the increasing strength 
of Germany. However, National Socialism met a certain reserve 
or antipathy in Bulgaria because of widespread contagion of the 
Communistic blight. In Hungary it met similar reserve due to 
the still-fashionable feudal leading circles, who are bolstered by 
Jewish capital. At any rate it may be mentioned here that the 
first foreign state visit after the seizure of power took place 
through the mediation of the Foreign Affairs Bureau. Julius 
Gombos, who in former years had himself pursued anti-Semitic 
and racial tendencies, had reached the Hungarian Premier’s 
chair. The Bureau maintained a personal connection with him. 
In September 1933 he paid a visit to Germany and was received 
by the Fuehrer in Erfurt. With this visit the official cordon of 
isolation surrounding National Socialism was pierced for the first 
time. This visit had been preceded by the Fuehrer’s reception 
of the Rumanian poet and former minister Octavian Goga 
through the Bureau’s mediation. Goga later became the decisive 
exponent of a political reproachment with Germany. 

In Yugoslavia other German Reich agencies had become active 
in the same direction, so that the Foreign Affairs Bureau 
remained in the background and shifted its efforts to the purely 
commercial sphere. It initiated the first contracts with Croation 
and Serbian cooperatives. 

Motivated by reasons of War Economy, the Bureau advocated 
the transfer of raw material purchases from overseas to the 
areas accessible by overland traffic routes, i. e. primarily in the 
Balkans, naturally insofar as practicable. At first little heed 
was paid to the Bureau in these endeavors, but it later secured 
the active support especially of the Food Estate; through its 
cooperation, e. g., on the subject of fruit and vegetable imports, 
a very substantial shift in the source of imports was attained, 
particularly through the currently initiated cooperation with 
Croatian and Hungarian cooperatives as well as with commercial 
associations all over the Balkans. 

From the beginning, work in Italy was out of the question 
because ever since the days of our struggle for power ties of a 
personal nature have existed, which were taken over by official 
institutions or cultivated by individual personalities. Work in 
Austria was also excluded, since a special “Provincial Directorate 
for Austria’’ existed within the Nazi Party. 

The Bureau declined to concern itself with questions of Racial 
Germans [Volksdeutsche] abroad. For this phase of the problem 
the “Racial Germans” Central Agency [Volksdeutsche Mittel- 
stelle] was later created. 


693256 — 16—3 


29 


007-PS 


Towards Western European States the Bureau limited its activ- 
ities to simple observation of existing conditions, or to the estab- 
lishment of relations, especially of a commercial nature, primarily 
in Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg . 

In accordance with the attitude on foreign policy laid down 
by the Fuehrer, the Bureau endeavored to establish far-reaching 
connections with England through continuous personal contacts 
with influential personalities of English political life. Eminent 
Englishmen were invited to the annual Party Rallies. 

Pursuant to its self chosen task the Bureau devoted its atten- 
tion to the Near East. Turkey, newly consolidated by Mustapha 
Kemal, adopted a hesitating attitude of watchful waiting. This 
position was probably due to military impotence against Soviet 
Russia, clearly recognized, on the one hand, and also to hostility 
to Fascist Italy, already previously manifested, on the other hand. 
In Iran, however, the Bureau’s initiative in the economic field to 
stimulate the mutual exchange of goods encountered greatest 
understanding and the greatest readiness in carrying it through. 
The Bureau’s initiative in developing with the head of commer- 
cial circles, entirely new methods for the economic penetration 
of Iran found expression, in an extraordinarily favorable way, 
in reciprocal trade relations. Naturally in Germany, too, this 
initiative at first encountered a completely negative attitude and 
resistance on the part of the competent state authorities, an atti- 
tude that had first to be overcome. In the course of a few years 
the volume of trade with Iran was multiplied five-fold, and in 
1939 Iran’s trade turnover with Germany had attained first 
place. Even Soviet Russia, the competitor who had been biggest 
and most dreaded previously, had been eliminated from the run- 
ning. Concurrently with the activation of commercial relations 
the Bureau had also intensified cultural relations and had, in 
conjunction with growing commercial influence and in closest 
collaboration with the Iranian Government, created a series of 
cultural institutions headed and directed by Germans. In conse- 
quence the dominant French cultural influence in Iran has already 
been broken since the year 1936. 

The Bureau simultaneously attempted to also draw Afghanistan 
into its orbit. Relations established with leading individual per- 
sonalities led to the willing opening of this country, which had 
formerly been rather neglected by Germany. All the leading 
personalities of Afghanistan were guests of the Bureau. The 
Bureau favored the taking part of German economy in the indus- 
trial upbuilding of the country ; German experts in all fields were 
called to Afghanistan in increasing numbers through the Bureau’s 


30 


007-PS 


mediation. The German Colony became the dominant one in 
Afghanistan. The preparation for expansion of the Afghan 
army was in German hands; carrying it through was prevented 
by the outbreak of war. Even though the German Colony had to 
leave Afghanistan later on, Afghanistan’s neutral position today 
is largely due to the Bureau’s activity. 

The Arab question, too, became part of the work of the Bureau. 
In spite of England’s tutelage of Iraq the Bureau established a 
series of connections to a number of leading personalities of the 
Arab world, smoothing the way for strong bonds to Germany. 
In this connection, the growing influence of the Reich in Iran and 
Afghanistan did not fail to have repercussions in Arabia. All 
these relations took place on a purely economic basis and fostered 
the systematically directed advancement of German influence and 
prestige in the domains reserved by the Western Powers for 
themselves. In this connection it may be mentioned in general 
that the internal peril to England’s preponderance in those areas 
would have been considerably more pronounced, if the Bureau’s 
foresighted initiative, which took Oriental conditions very well 
into account, had not been forever ignored by official authorities. 

The Bureau foresaw the necessity of technical improvement of 
the Danube water route to facilitate traffic, because of the shift 
in the increase of the exchange in goods, especially in the Balkans 
and in the Orient. On its own initiative it attempted to influ- 
ence competent authorities (especially of the Bavarian Govern- 
ment), together with particularly interested private commercial 
circles, to enlarge our Danube shipping facilities (primarily the 
port of Regensburg) . Although the Bureau throughout the years, 
asserted this necessity, which was becoming more and more 
urgent, and although the Bureau relentlessly maintained its ini- 
tiative, its endeavors in this matter were unfortunately not 
crowned by any success. Presumably all responsible authorities 
regret it bitterly to-day. 

Among other projects due to the Foreign Atfairs Bureau’s ini- 
tiative, endeavors to grow the rubber-fibered Kok Sagys plant 
in Germany deserve to be emphasized. This plant is being culti- 
vated in the Soviet Union. In spite of efforts during many years, 
no success was attained in planting sizeable experimental crops, 
because of latent disunity among competent authority. The Bu- 
reau was compelled to resort to experimental fields in Greece 
through its own connections in the Balkans. 

Somewhat off the beaten path was the Bureau’s undertaking in 
Brazil, which grew out of personal connections, large quantities 
of cotton (60,000 tons) were successfully brought to Germany un- 


31 


007— PS 


der a clearing agreement at a time when imports of this raw 
material had become very critically short, already necessitating 
work outs. A Bureau representative was twice the Brazilian 
Government’s guest. Brazil and Iran were the only nations from 
whom Germany could purchase this indispensable raw material 
for Reichsmark. The Brazilian Minister expressed his thanks for 
this initial step to the Head of the Bureau in an address de- 
livered at the occasion of an exposition. 

About 40 lecture evenings for diplomats and the foreign press 
should also be listed. They dealt with the construction of the new 
Germany, and speakers included many leading personalities of 
the Reich. 

The Bureau has carried out the initiating of all politically feas- 
ible projects. With the outbreak of war it was entitled to con- 
sider its task as terminated. The exploitation of the many per- 
sonal connections in many lands can be resumed under a dif- 
ferent guise. 

Signed : ROSENBERG 

2 Inclosures 

I Norway 

II Rumania 


Annex I to Brief Report on Activities of the Foreign Affairs 

Bureau of the Nazi Party from 1933 to 1943. 

The Political Preparation of the Military Occupation of Norway 
During the War Years 1939/1940. 

As previously mentioned, of all political groupings in Scandi- 
navia only “Nasjonal Samling”, led in Norway by the Former 
Minister of War and Major of the Reserve Vidkun Quisling, de- 
served serious political attention. This was a fighting political 
group, possessed by the idea of a Greater Germanic Community. 
Naturally all ruling powers were hostile and attempted to prevent, 
by any means, its success among the population. The Bureau 
maintained constant liaison with Quisling and attentively observed 
the attacks he conducted with tenacious energy on the middle 
class which had been taken in tow by the English. From the 
beginning it appeared probable that without revolutionary events, 
which would stir the population from their former attitude, no 
successful progress of Nasjonal Samling was to be expected. 
During the winter 1938/1939, Quisling was privately visited by 
a member of the Bureau. When the political situation in Europe 


32 


007— PS 


came to a head in 1939, Quisling made an appearance at the con- 
vention of the Nordic Society [Nordische Gesellschaft] in Luebeck 
in June. He expounded his conception of the situation, and his 
apprehensions concerning Norway. He emphatically drew atten- 
tion to the geopolitically decisive importance of Norway in the 
Scandinavian area, and to the advantages that would accrue to 
the power dominating the Norwegian coast in case of a conflict 
between the Greater German Reich and Great Britain. Assuming 
that his statements would be of special interest to the Marshal of 
the Reich Goering for aero-strategical reasons, Quisling was re- 
ferred to State Secretary [Staatssekretaer] Koerner by the Bu- •* 
reau. The Staff Director [Stabsleiter] of the Bureau handed the 
Chief of the Reich Chancellery a memorandum for transmission 
to the Fuehrer. It dealt with the same subject, still taking into 
account the then doubtful attitude of Soviet Russia. After the 
outbreak of German-Polish hostilities and of the Soviet-Finnish 
war, tensions in Scandinavia became more strained and facilitated 
the work of Anglo-Saxon propaganda. It began to appear possible 
that, under the pretext of altruistic aid to Finland, Great Britain 
might intend to occupy Norway, and perhaps Sweden, to complete 
the anti-German blockade in the North Sea for all practical pur- 
poses, and to gain comfortable airplane bases against Germany. 
The aim would have been to drag the Northern countries, too, into 
a military conflict with Germany. Apprehensive about this de- 
velopment, Quisling again appeared in Berlin in December 1939. 
He visited Reichsleiter Rosenberg and Grand Admiral Raeder. In 
the course of a report to the Fuehrer, Reichsleiter Rosenberg 
turned the conversation once more to Norway. He especially 
pointed to Norway’s importance should England, to tighten her 
blockade and under the pretext of aid to Finland, take steps to 
occupy the country, with the Norwegians’ tacit consent. On the 
basis of his conversation w r ith Quisling and at his own request, 
Grand Admiral Raeder, too, had been asked to see the Fuehrer. 

In consequence of these steps, Quisling w r as granted a personal 
audience with the Fuehrer on 16 December, and once more on 18 
December. In the course of this audience the Fuehrer emphasized 
repeatedly that he personally would prefer a completely neutral 
attitude of Norway as well as of the whole of Scandinavia. He 
did not intend to enlarge the theaters of war and to draw still 
other nations into the conflict. Should the enemy attempt to 
spend the war, however, with the aim of achieving further throt- 
tling and intimidation of the Greater German Reich, he would be 
compelled to gird himself against such an undertaking. In order 


33 


007-PS 


to counterbalance increasing enemy propaganda activity, he prom- 
ised Quisling financial support of his movement, which is based on 
Greater Germanic ideology. Military exploitation of the question 
now raised was assigned to the Special Military Staff, which trans- 
mitted special missions to Quisling. Reichsleiter Rosenberg was 
to take over political exploitation. Financial expenses were to 
be defrayed by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs [Auswaertiges 
Amt], the Minister for Foreign Affairs being kept continuously 
by the Foreign Affairs Bureau. Chief of Section [Amtsleiter] 
Scheidt was charged with maintaining liaison with Quisling. In 
the course of further developments he was assigned to the Naval 
Attache in Oslo, Lt. Commander [Korvettenkapitaen] Screiber. 
Orders were given that the whole matter be handled with strictest 
secrecy. 

Quisling’s reports, transmitted through his representative in 
Germany, Hagelin, and dealing with the possibility of interven- 
tion by the Western Powers in Norway with tacit consent of the 
Norwegian government, became more urgent by January already. 
These increasingly better substantiated communications were in 
sharpest contrast to the view of the German Legation in Oslo, 
which relied on the desire for neutrality of the then Norwegian 
Nygardsvold cabinet and was convinced of that government’s in- 
tention and readiness to defend Norway’s neutrality. No one in 
Norway knew that Quisling’s representative for Germany main- 
tained closest relations to him; he therefore succeeded in gaining 
a foothold within governmental circles of the Nygardsvold cabinet, 
and in listening to cabinet members’ true views. Hagelin trans- 
mitted what he had heard to the Bureau, which conveyed the 
news to the Fuehrer through Reichsleiter Rosenberg. During the 
night of 16 to 17 February English destroyers attacked the Ger- 
man steamer “Altmark” in Jossing fjord. The Norwegian gov- 
ernment’s reaction to this question permitted the conclusion that 
certain agreements had been covertly arrived at between the Nor- 
wegian government and the Allies. Such assumption was con- 
firmed by reports of Section [Amtsleiter] Scheidt who in turn 
derived his information from Hagelin and Quisling. But even 
after this incident the German Legation in Oslo championed the 
opposite view, and went on record as believing in the good inten- 
tions of the Norwegians. 

Thanks to his connections in Norway as agent of the Norwegian 
Navy, Hagelin had succeeded, in the meantime, in being entrusted 
with the purchase of German AA guns through the German 
Navy Ministry. Through these connections he gained more and 


34 


007-PS 


more insight into the real views and intentions of the Norwegian 
Nygardsvold cabinet, and into the preparations already initiated 
by the Allies in Norway. At the occasion of his presence in Ber- 
lin on 20 March to negotiate about delivery of German AA guns 
he mentioned that the Allies were now even examining Norwegian 
ports for loading and transportation facilities. The French Kom- 
mandant entrusted with this mission was said to have revealed 
Allied intentions in confidential conversations with the commander 
of Narwik, an adherent of Quisling. These intentions were to 
land motorized troops at Stavanger, Drontheim and perhaps Kir- 
kenes, and to occupy Sola airdrome near Stavanger. Hagelin also 
re-emphasized his warnings about agreements secretly concluded 
between the Allies and the Norwegian government according to 
which the Norwegian government would content itself solely with 
paper protests in case of a possible occupation of port cities by the 
Allies. He pointed out that the Norwegian government had never 
intended to seriously oppose England, and that it was playing a 
two-faced game with Germany solely to gain time for faits ac- 
complis. He also mentioned that the Norwegian government had 
been informed by England that Germany intended to lay a mine- 
field from Jutland to the Norwegian coast. In view of all the in- 
formation that had reached him, Quisling could no longer stand 
by his advice to await developments in Norway for a little while 
longer; he was compelled to point out that any delay of the Ger- 
man counter-thrust would entail extraordinary risks. These re- 
ports were immediately transmitted to the Fuehrer by Reichsleiter 
Rosenberg. On 8 April the Allies struck the first blow in prepara- 
tion for their intended occupation of Norway, thus confirming 
these reports made by Quisling and his agents, and in contrast to 
the views held to the end by the German Legation in Oslo and by 
the expert of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs [Auswaertiges 
Amt]. During the night from 7 to 8 April minefields were laid 
alongside the Norwegian coast by the Allied fleet, and the Allied 
governments informed the world of the steps they had taken. In 
accordance with indications given by the Bureau, only progres- 
sively more tepid protests were made by Norway. By order of the 
Fuehrer Greater Germany counter-attacked, after corresponding 
preparation, in the morning of 9 April and occupied the most im- 
portant Norwegian sea ports and airdromes. 


35 


007-PS 


Annex II: Rumania (From the overthrow of Titolescu to Mar- 
shal Antonescu) 

In 'spite of almost complete occupation by the Central Powers 
in the last World War, Rumania was indebted to Versailles for 
her re-creation, which was effected partially even at the expense 
of her one-time Eastern ally. A basically sound anti-Semitic ten- 
dency existed in this post-war country, which was torn asunder 
by dynastic squabbles and innumerable party fights. But in spite 
of repeated efforts this tendency had never risen above the limi- 
tations of a club, because of solely scientific doctrinaire leader- 
ship. What was lacking was the guiding leadership of a political 
personality. After manifold grouping trials the Bureau believed 
to have found such a personality — the former Minister, and poet, 
Octavian Goga. It was not difficult to convince this poet, pervaded 
by instinctive inspiration, that a Greater Rumania, though it had 
to be created in opposition to Vienna, could be maintained only 
together with Berlin. Nor was it difficult to create in him the 
desire to link the fate of Rumania with the future of the National 
Socialist German Reich in good time. By bringing continuing 
influence to bear, the Bureau succeeded in inducing Octavian Goga 
as well as Professor Cuza to amalgamate the parties under their 
leadership on an Anti-Semitic basis. Thus they could carry on 
with united strength the struggle for Rumania’s renascence in- 
ternally, and her affiliation [Anschluss] with Germany externally. 
Through the Bureau’s initiative both parties, which had hereto- 
fore been known by distinct names, were merged as the National- 
Christian Party, under Goga’s leadership and with Cuza as Hon- 
orary President. The attempts concurrently undertaken by the 
Bureau to amalgamate this Party with the much more youthful, 
but energetic Iron Guard movement were initially frustrated by 
the apparently insurmountable personal incompatibility of Cuza 
and Codreanu. At any rate these attempts led to the secret es- 
tablishment of good personal relations between Goga and the 
mystic-fanciful Codreanu. 

In the course of the years after his return, the king had suc- 
ceeded in becoming the country’s decisive factor through crafty 
tactics in dealing with the dominant political parties. Had the 
Bureau also succeeded in merging the National-Christian Party 
with Codreanu, Rumania would have obtained sharply anti-Semitic 
leadership based on strong mass support. Such leadership could 
have attained its aims even against the will of the king. However, 
surviving rivalries between the country’s anti-Semitic trends later 


36 


007— PS 


enabled the king to use them separately for his plan, in order to 
destroy them as far as possible. 

The struggle for re-orientation of Rumania’s foreign policy was 
taken up by Goga with bold elan. He had earlier succeeded in 
upsetting the position of Foreign Minister Titulescu, the agent of 
Franco, of the Geneva League of Nations and of the Little En- 
tente. Titulescu was later overthrown. Among the numerous, 
not very significant splinter parties, the “Young Liberals”, 
founded by George Bratianu, supported Goga’s campaign, with- 
out joining the anti-Semitic trend. The Rumanian front of Vaida 
Voevod, wobbling to and fro among all camps, adopted a similar 
position for some time. 

Through intermediaries, the Bureau maintained constant con- 
tact with both tendencies, just like it constantly consulted with 
Goga, through Staff Director [Stabsleiter] Schickedanz, about 
tactics to be followed. The whole struggle was accelerated by 
Soviet Russia’s increasing pressure in the Bessarabian question, 
and by the process of political rapprochement with Moscow, 
which was supported by Paris and Prague. Following a long 
period of recurring political trials involving scandal and graft, 
Rumania’s internal struggle for the future make-up of the coun- 
try had been aggravated by the coming to the front of the Chris- 
tian-Nationalist Party and of the Iron Guard. This struggle was 
being fought with increasing bitterness. The king’s attitude to- 
wards the national movement was procrastinating and under- 
handed. The movement was agreeable to him for eliminating the 
two parties which, by tradition, took turns in the government. 
But he intended to prevent the unequivocal victory of anti-Semitic 
and racial [Voelkisch] principles, influenced by growing Na- 
tionalism, in the country. That is why the Nationalists’ foreign 
policy, secretly projected by Germany, did not fit into his plans. 
Because he was in possession of the police and of the army, he 
remained the decisive factor in the country. After repeated post- 
ponement of the elections, which were legally due, the king 
decided to hold an election. The decision was based on a very re- 
liable report of his then Prime Minister Taterescu. Taterescu 
was convinced that the Liberal Party would again receive 40% 
of all votes, through the machinations customary in Fomia. 
However, after a bitter election campaign the Liberal Party suf- 
fered painful defeat. The opposition National Movement had 
achieved indisputable victory in spite of all chicanery and mach- 
inations by their opponents. The Iron Guard received about 
16% of the total vote, the National-Christian Party Goga-Cuza 


37 


007 -PS 


about 11%, the government party about 35%. The rest of the 
votes were scattered. After some vacillation and hesitancy, the 
king appointed Goga Prime Minister on 27 December 1937 with 
a binding promise that Parliament would be dismissed and new 
elections held within the legally prescribed time limit. In spite 
of warnings by the Bureau Goga believed the promise given by 
the king. But the king was only attempting to gain time. 

Thus a second government on racial and anti-Semitic founda- 
tions had appeared in Europe, in a country in ivhich such an event 
had been considered completely impossible. The government im- 
mediately made known its intention to proceed against Jewish 
predominance in the country and declared repeatedly that it 
would have to subject Rumania’s previous foreign policy to re- 
examination and reform. In the meantime the Judaic-Masonic 
and liberal opposition did not lose time. Passions were inflamed 
and became increasingly more envenomed. It looked like a hot 
and bloody election campaign. The prospects of Goga’s Chris- 
tian-Nationalist Party pointed to a big victory with sure cer- 
tainty, especially since, with the Bureau’s cooperation he had on 
the sly made q. secret agreement with Codreanu. To be sure, 
Goga did not act on the Bureau’s advice to immediately develop 
his party cadres, to expand his party machine all over the coun- 
try and to permeate the police and gendarmerie. Goga postponed 
the execution of organizational reform, which he also intended, 
until after the election. He considered himself to be under ob- 
ligation to the king not to undertake anything until the electoral 
decisions had been rendered, but to take steps all the more in- 
cisively after legally attaining the majority. 

In innumerable interviews the opposition must have succeeded 
in convincing the king that an electoral victory of Goga would 
react most acutely against the king himself. In that case he 
would no longer be able to get rid of the ghosts he had called in; 
if Goga attained a two-thirds majority, he, the king, would be 
Goga’s captive. These expostulations, and the uncontrollable 
Judaic influences of the Jewish clique at the Rumanian court, plus 
the pressure of the French and British Ministers led to a change 
in the king’s attitude, assuming that this change had not already 
been anticipated by him at the time of Goga’s appointment. The 
king decided to prevent the elections. Goga resisted. Thereupon 
the king offered Goga the formation of an authoritarian govern- 
ment, i. e., a government created solely by virtue of royal sover- 
eignty. That meant a coup d’etat. Goga declined. Thereupon the 
king informed Goga that he would accept the cabinet’s resigna- 


38 


007— PS 


tion, which, however, had not even been offered to him. Goga 
realized too late that the strength at his disposal was entirely 
inadequate to thwart the king’s plans. He resigned. 

But the course once embarked upon forced even the king to 
pay heed to the mood that had been created in the country. Also, 
a return to the disrupted foreign-policy ties was no longer possible. 
Although an authoritarian system had been built up, Rumania 
found herself without her former backing. The French security 
system had been ruptured and could not be re-established, if only 
in view of Yugoslavia’s attitude in the South-East, where rela- 
tions established by other German agencies had simultaneously 
loosened the cohesiveness of the Little Entente. That, at any rate, 
was the Goga government’s success. 

In his last great speech to the Rumania Academy, shortly be- 
fore his death, Goga welcomed Austria’s affiliation with Germany, 
and affirmed for the last time his belief in adherence to new 
Greater German Reich and to Fascist Italy, a belief he had 
struggled for. 

Now the king’s war of extermination against the Iron Guard 
began. Codreanu was arrested with his closest collaborators, to 
face a specially convoked court-martial. Sole basis for the prose- 
cution was an alleged communication from Codreanu to the 
Fuehrer, which was proved to be a forgery, and a telegram ad- 
dressed to the Fuehrer. On the basis of these “records” he was 
sentenced to ten years’ hard labor. In vain did the Bureau at- 
tempt to bring about an intervention of the Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs in this episode, which diminished the whole prestige of 
the German Reich. It did not prevail against the official agencies, 
which condemned the entire project of the Bureau in Rumania, 
because the official German delegation expected their sole salva- 
tion from the attitude of the king and his creatures. Logically, 
the acceptance without dissent of this challenge was interpreted 
in Bucharest as granting carte blanche and Codreanu was shot 
with his closest collaborators for establishment of the first per- 
sonal contact between the King and the Fuehrer. 

This appeared to doom the Iron Guard, too, Goga’s party, de- 
prived of his leadership, was submerged into insignificance. But 
Goga left behind a personal heir, who is now Marshal Antonescu. 
Against the king’s wish, Goga had appointed this politically in- 
significant provincial general, with whom the king was on bad 
terms, as his Minister of War. At first, completely pro French in 
outlook, Antonescu gradually adopted a different view under 
Goga’s influence. After Goga’s resignation, Antonescu still re- 


39 


007-PS 


mained in the king’s cabinet at Goga’s wish. He also maintained 
continued relations with the Iron Guard. Thereby the possibility 
of eliminating the king was at hand — and was exploited. 
Antonescu’s to-day appears in practice as executor of the heritage 
bequeathed to him by Goga, who had led him from political in- 
significance into the political arena. Thereby a change to Ger- 
many’s liking had become possible in Rumania. 

[signed] ROSENBERG 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 014-PS 

Report to the Fuehrer 

I report the arrival of the principal shipment of ownerless Jew- 
ish “cultural property” [Kulturgut] in the salvage location 
Neuschwanstein by special train on Saturday the 15th of this 
month. It was secured by my staff for Special Purposes [Ein- 
satzstab] in Paris. The especial train, arranged for by Reichs- 
marschall Hermann Goering, comprised 25 express baggage cars 
filled with the most valuable paintings, furniture, Gobelins, works 
of artistic craftsmanship and ornaments. The shipment con- 
sisted chiefly of the most important parts of the collections 
Rothschild, Seligmann, Bernheim-Jeune, Halphen, Kann, Weil- 
Picard, Wildenstein, David-Weill, Levy-Benzion. 

My Staff for Special Purposes started the confiscatory action 
in Paris during October 1940 on the basis of your order, my 
Fuehrer.' With the help of the Security Service (SD) and the 
Secret Field Police [Geheime Feldpolizei] all storage — and hid- 
ing-places of art possessions belonging to the fugitive Jewish emi- 
grants were systematically ascertained. These possessions were 
then collected in the locations provided for by the Louvre in 
Paris. The art historians of my staff have itemized scientifically 
the complete art-material and have photographed all works of 
value. Thus, after completion, I shall be able to submit to you 
shortly a conclusive catalogue of all confiscated works with exact 
data about origin plus scientific evaluation and description. At 
this time the inventory includes more than 4000 individual pieces 
of art, partly of the highest artistic value. Besides this special 
train the masterpieces selected by the Reichsmarschall — mainly 
from the Rothschild collection — have been forwarded in two 
special cars to Munich already some time ago. They have been 
deposited there in the air raid shelters of the Fuehrer-building. 

According to instruction the chief special train has been un- 
loaded in Fussen. The cases containing pictures, furniture etc. 


40 


0)4 — PS 


have been stored in the castle Neuschwanstein. My deputies ac- 
companied the special train and took care of the unloading in 
Neuschwanstein too. 

First of all the paintings have to be unpacked to determine any 
possible damage suffered during the transport. Furthermore, 
the observation of climatic influences upon the paintings and 
their future careful maintenance necessitate their unpacking as 
well as their skillful setting-up. Due to lack of time a part of 
the shipment has not yet been fully inventoried in Paris. This 
has to be taken care of by my co-workers on the spot in 
Neuschwanstein to supplement the inventory in full. I have 
detached for Neuschwanstein the necessary technical and scien- 
tific personnel of my staff for the execution of this work. The 
required time for the unpacking and arranging in Neuschwan- 
stein as well as the preparing of the exhibition rooms will take 
approximately 4 weeks. 1 shall report the completion of the 
work to you then, and request you, my Fuehrer, to let me show 
you the salvaged works of art at the spot. This will give you a 
survey over the work accomplished by my staff for Special Pur- 
poses. 

Over and above the chief shipment there are secured in Paris 
a mass of additional abandoned Jewish art possessions. These 
are being processed in the same sense and prepared for shipment 
to Germany. Exact accounts about the extent of this remaining 
shipment are at the moment not available. However, it is esti- 
mated that the work in the Western areas will be finished entirely 
within two to three months. Then a second transport can be 
brought to Germany. 

Berlin, 20 March 1941 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 015-PS 

• [Rosenberg Letter and Report to Hitler] 

16 April 1943 
673/R/Ma 

Mr Fuehrer : 

In my desire to give you, my Fuehrer, some joy for your birth- 
day I take the liberty to present to you a folder containing photos 
of some of the most valuable paintings which my special purpose 
staff [Einsatzstab], in compliance with your order, secured from 
ownerless Jewish art collections in the occupied western terri- 
tories. These photos represent an addition to the collection of 
53 of the most valuable objects of art delivered some time ago to 


41 


0 1 5— PS 


your collection. This folder also shows only a small percentage 
of the exceptional value and extent of these objects of art, seized 
by my service command [Dienststelle] in France, and put into a 
safe place on the Reich. 

I beg of you, my Fuehrer, to give me a chance during my next 
audience to report to you orally on the whole extent and scope of 
this art seizure action. I beg you to accept a short written inter- 
mediate report of the progress and extent of the art seizure action 
which will be used as a basis for this later oral report, and also 
accept 3 copies of the temporary picture catalogues which, too, 
only show part of the collection you own. I shall deliver further 
catalogues which are now being compiled, when they are finished. 
I shall take the liberty during the requested audience to give you, 
my Fuehrer, another 20 folders of pictures, with the hope that 
this short occupation with the beautiful things of art which are 
nearest to your heart will send a ray of beauty and joy into your 
revered life. 

Heil, my Fuehrer 


Intermediate Report of the Seizure of Ownerless Jewish Art 

Possessions, by the Special Purpose Staff [Einsatzstab] of 

Reichsleiter Rosenberg in the Occupied Western Territories. 

The seizure action began in compliance with the Fuehrer order 
of 17 Sept 1940. At first those art collections were seized which 
the Jews, fleeing from occupied territories, left behind in Paris. 
The seizure action was extended to all remaining cities and vil- 
lages of the occupied French territory where it was thought that 
Jewish art collections might be hidden. By using all possible 
ways and means we discovered and seized all Jewish art collec- 
tions which were hidden either in Jewish homes in Paris, in 
castles in the provinces or in warehouses and other storage places. 
The seizure action was in part very difficult and tedious and, up 
to now, not all completed. The escaped Jews knew how to camou- 
flage the hiding places of these objects of art, and to find them 
was made more difficult by the Frenchmen originally charged 
with the administration of the hiding places. The special pur- 
pose staff [Einsatzstab] in connection with the security police 
[Sicherheitsdienst-SD], the squad for the protection of the for- 
eign currency market [Devisenschutzkommando] and by using 
their own ingenuity succeeded in securing the main part of art 
collections, left behind by the escaped Jews, and bringing it 


42 


015 - PS 


safely to the Reich. The most important part of the action was 
the securing of 79 collections of well-known Jewish art collectors 
in France. The list of collections is attached hereto. Top place 
on the list is taken by the famous collections of the Jewish family 
of Rothschild. The difficulty of the seizure action is shown by 
the fact that the Rothschild collections were distributed over va- 
rious places in Paris, in Bordeaux and in the Loire castles of the 
Rothschilds, and could only be found after a long and tedious 
search. Although the action covered the past 2 years, we dis- 
covered and secured, through the use of trusted agents, quite a 
large part of the Rothschild collection in 1942. 

Besides the seizure of these complete Jewish art collections, we 
also searched all vacant Jewish apartments in Paris and other 
places for single art objects which might have been left behind. 
The main job in this action was to ascertain all addresses of Jews, 
escaped from the occupied territories, since we had to overcome 
quite a few difficulties on the part of the French police force which 
naturally tried their best to retard our progress. During this 
search through hundreds of single Jewish apartments a large 
amount of art objects were secured. 

These in this manner secured collections and single pieces of 
art were transferred to central collecting points in Paris, located 
in the so-called Jeu de Paume and rooms of the Louvre. The art 
expert of the special purpose staff inventoried, photographed and 
packed all secured objects of art. Taking the inventory was made 
more difficult by the fact that all data pertaining to the collection 
were suppressed by the former owners. For this reason each art 
object had to be examined separately for origin, place where 
found, and period. The work is so designed that at its conclusion 
the finished inventory will represent an unimpeachable document, 
as far as the historical background of the art collection is con- 
cerned. It will show, on one side, the monetary, and on the other, 
the historical value. The Jewish owners and collectors only judged 
these collections by their material value. Consequently they did 
not recognize the historical value and therefore showed no in- 
clination to make these collections available for research. How- 
ever, this research has now been accomplished by the sorely 
understaffed special purpose staff. All their findings were in- 
corporated into 3 temporary books which will serve as basis for 
one catalogue, soon to be compiled. 

During the time from 17 Sept 1940 to 7 April 1943, 10 trans- 
ports of 92 cars or a total of 2775 crates were sent to Germany. 
The contents of the crates were: paintings, antique furniture, 


43 


015-PS 


Gobelins, objects of art, etc. Besides all this another special 
transport of 53 art objects was shipped to the Fuehrerbau in 
Muenchen, and 594 pieces (paintings, plastics, furniture, textiles) 
delivered to Reichs Marshal [Goering], 

Castle Neuschanstein was designated as the first shelter. After 
this castle was filled, the Bavarian administration for state-owned 
castles and parks saw fit to relinquish several rooms in the castle 
Herrenchiemsee for further shipments. 

Since these 2 shelters were not enough and since the Bavarian 
administration could not supply any more we rented 2 more in the 
neighborhood; it was made possible through the intervention of 
the State Treasurer [Reichsschatzmeister]. We rented several 
rooms in the former Salesianer monastery at Buxheim near Mem- 
mingen in Schwaben and the privately owned castle Kogl near 
Voecklabruck at Upper Austria [Oberdonau]. The location and 
condition of these 2 shelters is such that they are perfect in re- 
gards to safety against air attack and fire, and can easily be 
guarded. All art objects are so divided between the 4 shelters 
that it is possible to continue the inventory and care, and that no 
large collection^ of valuable art objects will be . concentrated in 
any one place. All measures for safety are taken care of by the 
combined efforts of: 1. the Bavarian administration for castles 
and parks, 2. the central control of the fire prevention police, and 
3. the local representatives of State and Party. In this way the 
highest degree of safety has been achieved. 

9455 articles in the aforementioned shelters have been com- 
pletely inventoried, as of 1 April 1943. The inventory is as follows : 
5255 Paintings 
297 Sculptures 
1372 Pieces antique furniture 
307 Textiles 

2224 Small objects of art, including East- Asiatic art 
The inventory in addition to records of seizure and lists of 
seizure and transport, follows the pattern of the enclosed file 
card [Karteikarte] . On this file card is noted all information 
necessary to characterize all objects as to origin, master, tech- 
nique, time, etc. These file cards together with the extended ex- 
planations of the men charged with taking the inventory con- 
stitute the basis for the editing of the master catalogue. Besides 
this there is in preparation a photo-library in one of the central 
offices in Berlin, as well as in Neuschwanstein. Since the number 
of technicians was small, the time short, and the necessity of a 
quick expert from Paris was paramount, only the most valuable 


44 


0 1 5— PS 


objects were inventoried in Paris. Therefore the inventory has 
to be continued in the shelters. According to the latest count 
there are approximately 10,000 more objects to be inventoried. 

At present there are 400 crates in Paris, ready for shipment 
which will be sent to the Reich as soon as necessary preliminary 
work in Paris is completed. Should the present 4 shelters not 
prove sufficient for consequent shipments, 2 more places, namely 
the castle Bruck near Linz and the camp Seisenegg near Am- 
stetten on the lower Danube have been prepared. 

For reasons of fire prevention all art objects in the shelters had 
to be unpacked skillfully. These measures were also necessary to 
accomplish the inventory and to continue with the care of the 
"valuable art objects. Restoration has begun since many needed 
it when we acquired them. At present a repair shop with all nec- 
essary tools is being outfitted in Fuessen in which all paintings, 
pieces of furniture and other objects will be restored, to safeguard 
preservation. The unpacking, the continuation of the inventory, 
and the establishment of the photo-library, and too, the editing 
of the master catalogue, will take considerable time. 

The action of seizure [Fassungaktion] in Paris and occupied 
Western territories will be continued, although on a reduced scale, 
since there are still new art objects of great value to be found. 
The administration of the East not only will seize furniture, but 
also the art objects which might yet be found there. Here too 
valuable art objects were found in the last months. These art 
objects, found during the collection of furniture, were also sent 
to the shelters and will receive the same treatment as the others. 
Besides these objects, whose art value is established, hundreds of 
modern French paintings were seized which from the German 
standpoint are without value as far as the national-socialist art 
conception is concerned. These works of modern French painters 
will be listed separately, for a later decision as to their disposition. 

On orders from the Reichs Marshal some of the works of mod- 
ern and degenerate French art were exchanged in Paris for paint- 
ings of known value. The exchange was of great advantage to us, 
since we received 87 works by Italian, Dutch and German masters 
who are known to be of great value. We shall continue to trade 
whenever a chance presents itself. At the completion of the 
action a proposal as to the disposition of the modern and degen- 
erate French paintings will be presented. 

Berlin, 16 April 1943 

693256 — £6 — i 


45 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 016-PS 


The Deputy for the 4 Year Plan 

The General Plenipotentiary for Labor Mobilization 

GBA 

Berlin W 8, 24 April 1942 
Mohrenstrasse 65 (Thuringia/House) 

Phone: 126571 

Bureau of Ministry [Ministerburo] received 27. April 1942, No. 
0887 Min. 28/v 
Dr. K.P. has been informed 

Very esteemed and dear Party-member Rosenberg! 

Inclosed please find my program for the mobilization of labor. 
Please excuse the fact that this copy still contains a few cor- 
rections. 

Heil Hitler! 

Yours 

[signed] : Fritz Sauckel 

5 copies 

copie for Mr. Wittenbacher 

[signed] : WACHS 

70x 

[Stamp] 

Chancellory 1 May 1942 (Kanzlei) Mischke 

read : ILFL/KS 45.42 
filed : 1-5, 5/5 42 Pg 

To The “Reichsminister” for the Occupied Territories of the 
East, Party-Member Rosenberg 
Berlin 


The Deputy for the Four Year Plan 
The Plenipotentiary for Labor-Mobilization 


Sckl./We. 


20 April 1942 

The Labor-Mobilization Program 


On the occasion of the Hero/Memorial Day, in 1942, the hard- 
est and most gigantic commitment of German soldiery in all his- 
tory was announced to the German people by the Fuehrer. Besides 
the heroic and victorious conduct against an enemy of an unheard 
of superiority in number and material, and fighting with the 
courage of utter despair and beastly brutality, stands the en- 
durance of hardships unparalleled in history of severest winter 
of cold, ice, snow and story since 140 years. The conquest of the 


46 


0 1 6 — PS 


unbelievable difficulties arising from such a climate and terrible 
weather conditions elevates our soldiers of the East Front, by 
comparison with the human and soldierly efforts of all times up 
to now, without exaggeration, to supermen. 

It is now the duty of the Home Front towards those soldiers 
to summon all its strength for an equally gigantic effort to enable 
them to win complete, final and most rapid victory. 

All the Durdens and further necessary restrictions, even in the 
field of nutrition, must be endured with proud determination in 
consideration of the shining example of the soldiers. 

Our Armed Forces of Greater Germany surpassed themselves 
in heroism, resistance and endurance at the Front of the East, 
in Africa, in the air and on the sea. To insure their victory 
in any case, it is necessary now to produce more and better 
weapons, materiel and ammunition through another increased 
effort and endeavor of the entire German people, that is, all the 
producing workers, intellectual and manual, the women and the 
entire German Youth. 

In this manner will the German Home Front contribute de- 
cisively to the frustration of the hopes of our enemies to again 
escape their complete and final defeat. 

The aim of this new, gigantic labor mobilization is to use all 
the rich and tremendous sources, conquered and secured for us by 
our fighting Armed Forces under the leadership of Adolf Hitler, 
for the armament of the Armed Forces and also for the nutrition 
of the Homeland. The raw-materials as well as the fertility of the 
conquered territories and their human labor power are to be used 
completely and conscientiously to the profit of Germany and their 
allies. 

In spite of the fact that most of the German people capable of 
doing so have already made a most commendable effort for the 
war economy, more considerable reserves must be found and made 
available under any circumstances. 

The decisive measure to realize this is in the uniformly regu- 
lated and directed Labor-mobilization of the nation in the war. 

To reach this goal, the following principles must be worked 
out and executed: 

A. All important Production Programs, actually in progress, 
must under no circumstances be disturbed by the new measures. 
On the contrary, they should even be increased. 

B. All orders of the Fuehrer, Reichs-Fieldmarshal of the 
Greater German Reich and the “Minister” for ammunition and 
armament are to be carried out as quickly as possible. Labor sup- 


47 


016 -PS 


ply necessary for that purpose must be freed and made available 
either in Germany or in the occupied territories. 

C. The task concerning the seed and harvest of German peas- 
antry and all the territories under German control with the view 
to secure the largest production is just as urgent. The lacking 
laborers must be made available as quickly as possible. 

D. A supply system for the vitally necessary materials for the 
German people will be assured. 

The realization of these principles for labor-mobilization re- 
quires : 

1. The cooperation of all the forces of the party, economy and 
the state under coordinated leadership. 

2. The best will of all the German people. 

3. The most far-reaching measures to imbue all the employed 
German workmen and women with the highest confidence in the 
justice of the consideration of their own personal welfare and 
their salaries as well as the best possible care for their health 
and shelter under the actual war circumstances. 

4. The quickest and best solution of the question of the use of 
women and youth labor. 

To reach the goal determined by the Fuehrer the simultaneous 
and quickest use of numerous different measures of unified pur- 
pose are absolutely necessary. As any one of those must not inter- 
fere with the others, but rather complement them, it is also abso- 
lutely necessary that all the offices [Dienststellen] in the Reich, 
its territories and communities, in party, state and economy, par- 
ticipating in this decisive task act according to coordinated, syn- 
chronized directives. 

Thus, the labor-mobilization of the nation contributes extra- 
ordinarily to the quickest and victorious termination of the war. 
It requires every effort of the German people on the Home front. 
It is for that German people, for their preservation, their free- 
dom, happiness and amelioration of their nutrition and standards 
of living that this war is being fought. 

Basic Principles 

I. In the districts [Gau], it is the task of the district-chief 
[Gauleiter] to take in his hands the propaganda and orientation 
of the German people concerning the necessity of labor-mobiliza- 
tion and to carry out important measures for the care of the em- 
ployed youth and women as well as to supervise the condition of 
camps and shelters. 

They also assure themselves of the closest and friendliest co- 
operation of all the participating institutions. 


48 


016 PS 


II. It is not only the most distinguished duty of the General 
Plenipotentiary, but a condition sine qua non for the success 
of his task, to assure himself of the utmost cooperation and un- 
derstanding of all the highest Reichs-Bureaus [Reichs-stellen], 
especially those offices [Dienststellen] of the Armed Forces whose 
departments are concerned with his task. 

III. Equally necessary is the mutual understanding of all the 
Reichs-leaders [Reichsleiter] of the party, especially the co- 
operation of the German Labor Front [Deutsche Arbeits-front] 
and the institutions of economy. 

IV. The General Plenipotentiary for labor mobilization will 
therefore use with the help of the smallest, personal staff of as- 
sistants the existing party, state and economic institutions and 
assure the quickest success of his measure with the good will and 
the cooperation of all concerned. 

V. The General Plenipotentiary for labor mobilization has 
therefore, with the consent of the Fuehrer and the knowledge of 
the Reichsmarshal of Greater Germany and the director [Leiter] 
of the Party Chancellory [Reichskanzlei] appointed all the dis- 
trict chiefs [Gauleiters] as his plenipotentiaries in the German 
Districts of the National Socialist Party. 

VI. The plenipotentiaries for labor mobilization are using all 
the offices of the Party in their district. The chiefs of the highest 
offices of the State and economy of their districts will assist and 
advise the District chiefs in all matters concerning the labor 
mobilization. 

The most important for that purpose would be the following : 
The President of the Land Labor Office [Praesident des 
Landesarbeitsamtes] 

The Trustee for Labor, [Treuhaender der Arbeit], 

The leader of the Peasants [Landesbauernfuehrer], 

The economic adviser of the district [Gauwirtschafts- 
berator] 

The District Superintendant of the German Labor Front 
[Gauobmann der Deutschen Arbeitsfront], 

The leader of the womanhood of the district [Gaufrauen- 
schaftsleiterin] , 

The leader of the Hitler Youth of the region [Gebiets- 
fuehrer der Hitler-Jugend], 

The highest representative of the interior and general 
administration, and of the office for Agriculture [der 
hoechste Vertreter der Inneren und Allgemeinen Ver- 
waltung bzw. des Landeswirtschaftsamtes]. 


49 


016- PS 


Should the confines [Bezirk] of a Land-Labor Office comprise 
several Districts, it seems advisable that the President of the 
Land-Labor Office in question should make available to the Dis- 
trict Chief, in whose district capital there is no Land-Labor Office, 
his closest and most capable assistants in such a way that also in 
those offices the continuous information and instruction of the 
district-chiefs about all the measures concerning the labor-mobil- 
ization remains assured. 

VII. The most distinguished and important task of the dis- 
trict-chiefs of the National Socialist Party in their capacity as 
plenipotentiaries in their districts consists in assuring the best 
understanding and cooperation of all the offices of their districts 
participating in the labor-mobilization. 

Nevertheless, it must be strictly observed that the dignitaries 
of the party and the offices of the National Socialist Party, its 
organizations, sub-divisions and attached institutions do not as- 
sume functions coming under the jurisdiction of the State, the 
Armed Forces or economic institutions and for which only those 
authorities are responsible; they are not to interfere with official 
business not coming under their jurisdiction, according to the 
wish of the Fuehrer. 

Should we succeed with the help of the Party in convincing all 
the German intellectual and manual workers of the great impor- 
tance of the labor-mobilization for the outcome of the war, and 
succeed in taking good care and keeping up the morale of all the 
men, women, and the German youths who work within the labor- 
mobilization program under extraordinarily strenuous circum- 
stances, as far as their physical and mental capabilities of en- 
durance are concerned, and should we furthermore be able, also 
with the help of the party, to use prisoners of war as well as 
civilian workmen and women of foreign blood not only without 
harm to our own people but to the greatest advantage to our war 
and nutrition industries, then we will have accomplished the most 
difficult part of the labor mobilization program. 

The Task and its Solution 

(No figures are mentioned because of security reasons. I can 
assure you, nevertheless, that we are concerned with the greatest 
labor-problem of all times, especially with regard to figures.) 

A. The Task: 

1. The conscription of new soldiers to a gigantic extent for all 
branches and services of the Armed Forces has been rendered 
necessary by the present war-situation. 


50 


0 l 6— PS 


This means : 

a. The removal of workers from all professional enterprises, 
especially of a great number of trained personnel from armament 
producing war industries. 

b. Also the removal of especially non-essential personnel from 
the war nutrition industry. 

2. The war situation also necessitates the continuation of the 
tremendously increased and improved armament programs as 
ordered by the Fuehrer. 

3. The most essential commodities for the German people must 
continue to be produced for minimum requirements. 

4. The German housewife’s health, particularly the health of 
those on the farms, must not be endangered in their quality as 
mothers by the war. On the contrary, they must be relieved in 
every possible way. 

B. The Solution: 

1. All skilled workers removed from defense plants through 
induction into the Armed Forces must absolutely and immedi- 
ately be replaced in such a way that no bottleneck or decrease in 
the production of the war product results. It is the responsibility 
of all the authorities for the labor mobilization to make sure that 
this directive is considered in each case. 

The most capable workers must, therefore, be removed from 
the reserves of discontinued, lesser defense installations, and the 
discontinued construction industry and be made available to the 
enterprises from which specialists are being called into the Armed 
Forces, 8 weeks before their actual induction, in order to enable 
them to instruct and familiarize their replacement with their 
work. 

2. Workmen or women available because of destruction or 
damage of their installations must just as quickly be made avail- 
able and incorporated again in the war industry. 

3. The Armament and Nutrition tasks make it vitally neces- 
sary, not only to include the entire German labor power but also 
to call on foreign labor. 

Consequently, I immediately tripled the transport program 
which I found when I took charge of my mission. 

The main effort of that transport has been advanced into the 
months of May-June in order to assure in time and under any 
circumstances the availability of foreign labor power from the 
occupied territories for an increased production, in view of coming 
operations of the army, as well as agricultural labor in the sector 
of the German Nutrition Industry. 


51 


016 -PS 


All prisoners of war, from the territories of the West as well 
of the East, actually in Germany, must be completely incorpo- 
rated into the German armament and nutrition industries. Their 
production must be brought to the highest possible level. 

It must be emphasized, however, that an additional tremendous 
quantity of foreign labor has to be found for the Reich. The 
greatest pool for that purpose are the occupied territories of the 
East. 

Consequently, it is an immediate necessity to use the human 
reserves of the conquered Soviet territory to the fullest extent. 
Should we not succeed in obtaining the necessary amount of labor 
on a voluntary basis, we must immediately institute conscription 
or forced labor. 

Apart from the prisoners of war still in the occupied terri- 
tories, we must, therefore, requisition skilled or unskilled male 
and female labor from the Soviet territory from the age of 15 up 
for the labor-mobilization. 

On the other hand, one quarter of the total need of foreign la- 
bor can be procured in Europe’s occupied territories West of 
Germany, according to existing possibilities. 

The procurement of labor from friendly and also neutral coun- 
tries can only cover a small part of the total need. Practically 
only skilled workers and specialists can be considered in this case. 

4. In order to relieve considerably the German housewife, es- 
pecially the mother with many children and the extremely busy 
farm-woman and in order to avoid any further danger to their 
health, the Fuehrer also charged me with the procurement of 
400,000-500,000 selected, healthy and strong girls from the terri- 
tories of the East for Germany. 

5. The spring cultivation of the fields [Fruehjahrsbestellung] 
will be assured by the use of the German youth in class-forma- 
tion, together with their teachers according to an agreement with 
Reichs-Youth-Leader [Reichsjugendfuehrer] and the responsible, 
highest Reichs-Authorities. 

6. The labor mobilization of the German women is of very 

great importance. ; 

Examining this very difficult problem and after getting thor- 
oughly acquainted with the fundamental opinion of the Fuehrer 
as well as of the Reichsmarshal of the Greater German Reich and 
my own most careful inquiries and their results, I must abso- 
lutely reject the possibility of having an obligatory service de- 
creed by the State for all German women and girls for the Ger- 
man War and Nutrition industry. 


52 


016 -PS 


Although, at the beginning, I myself, and probably the ma- 
jority of the leading personalities of the party and of the wom- 
anhood with me, believed that for certain reasons an obligatory 
service for women should be decreed, I am of the opinion that 
all responsible men and women in party, state and economy 
should accept with the greatest veneration and gratitude the 
judgment of our Fuehrer Adolf Hitler, whose greatest concern 
has always been the health of the German women and girls; in 
other words, the present and future mothers of our nation. 

I cannot enumerate all the reasons which made me come to that 
decision. I only ask for confidence in me as an old fanatical dis- 
trict chief of the National Socialist party and to believe that this 
could be the only possible decision. 

We all agree that this decision might appear unjust towards 
millions of women who are engaged in defense and nutrition in- 
dustries under the most strenuous conditions but we also realize 
that an evil cannot be remedied by spreading it to the utmost. 

The only possible way to eliminate the existing injustices and 
hardships consists in winning the war in order to enable us to 
remove all women and girls engaged from jobs unsuitable for 
women, namely endangering their health, the birth-rate of our 
nation, and family and national life. 

We must also consider the difference, whether a woman or girl 
has been used to work in the field or in a factory because of her 
young age, and whether already she has proved to be able to stand 
this kind of work. 

Aside from physical harm, the German women and girls under 
any circumstances must be protected from moral and mental harm 
according to the wish of the Fuehrer. 

It is doubtful that these conditions could be fulfilled in the case 
of mass-conscription and employment. It is impossible to com- 
pare the German Woman with the German soldier in this case, 
because of the existing fundamental natural and racial differences 
between man and woman. 

We cannot accept the responsibility for the dangers threaten- 
ing the life of the nation resulting from such a measure in the 
field of women labor mobilization, in view of the countless men on 
the fighting front — our dead soldiers. 

The many millions of women, however, faithfully and indus- 
triously engaged in the German economy, and especially now, in 
war time, rendering valuable services, deserve the best possible 
care and consideration. They, as well as the soldiers and work- 
men, deserve the greatest gratitude of our nation. They must be 


53 


016 PS 


treated in the best possible way by the labor offices and labor 
authorities and their economic and health necessities must be 
generously considered. The Fuehrer as well as the Reichsmarshal 
of the Greater German Reich attach the greatest value to those 
measures. For instance, it would be completely wrong to threaten 
pregnant women with punishment and court procedures, as has 
happened already, if they miss a day of work because of troubles 
resulting from their condition during the usual period of pre- 
caution [Schonungsperiode]. Nevertheless, it must and will be 
possible to maintain the necessary work discipline. 

7. A last, but also important reserve consists in the possibility 
of the personal increased production of each German worker. It 
will be the most distinguished task of the party and the German 
labor front to achieve that increased production. There is no 
doubt that the German intellectual and mental worker will accom- 
plish it, no matter where he works and in spite of the difficult 
conditions of our present nutrition. 

This will be the best way for the German worker on the home 
front to express his gratitude towards the soldier on the fighting 
front who bears the most gigantic and terrible hardships in this 
severe winter, thus remaining victorious over our enemies. 

It is also the task of the party, State and economy in coopera- 
tion to improve the sick rate by 1 percent through the adequate 
cooperation of health insurance institutions [Krankenkasse] and 
approved doctors [Vertrauensarzt]. This was accomplished in 
the district of Thuringia. Such an improvement of the sick rate 
throughout the Reich would mean the gain of 200,000 new 
workers. 

The severest measures must be used against loafers, as we can 
not allow those parasites to shunt their duties in this decisive 
struggle of our people at the cost of the others. 

1 tried to determine the exterior solution of the task concern- 
ing the labor mobilization, as conditioned by the present war 
situation, under paragraph B, 1-7. 

It is only natural that all the possibilities contained in that 
paragraph will be completely exhausted. The rejection of a gen- 
eral conscription of all the women and girls does not mean that I 
condemn absolutely the use of women and girls who are in a po- 
sition to make themselves available for a suitable job wherever 
they can be useful to the war industry without violating the 
principles of the Fuehrer. This will be done in closest cooperation 
with the competent offices of the party, state, the Armed Forces 
and the economy. 


54 


016-PS 


The labor mobilization program as laid down in paragraph 1-7 
constitutes not only the greatest labor mobilization of a people 
but also in history. 

Adolf Hitler, however, made it clear through his idea of Na- 
tional Socialism that figures are not the decisive factor in the life 
of nations. Besides the tremendous figure of the employed labor 
forces stands their productive capacity. This productive capacity 
depends not only on the amount of calories, which I put at their 
disposal in the form of nourishment, but also on their moral and 
mental condition. 

This makes it necessary to consider besides the gigantic, organi- 
zational question, the questions of nutrition, shelter, orientation, 
propaganda, and spiritual guidance. 

Measures to be Taken to Assure the Well-Being 
of German Workmen and Women 

There must be no doubt for the German producing people that 
they out-do by far all the other workers of the world through 
their conscientious work and their readiness to accept the most 
strenuous tasks under proper political and philosophical guid- 
ance. 

The district Chiefs will at this decisive stage of the war assure 
with the help of all the institutions and organizations of the 
party the best political and ideological care ever known in the 
history of labor and humanity in wartime, for the German pro- 
ducing people in their districts. 

I am convinced in my capacity as general plenipotentiary for 
labor mobilization that everything will be done by the party to 
maintain within or without the plants the attitude and morale of 
the German workers on a high level through the use of all means 
of propaganda and orientation, meetings and appeals, as the only 
way to make the home front worthy of the fighting front, and the 
only means of accomplishing this gigantic task and winning the 
war. 

I will constantly see to it, that the authorities for labor mobili- 
zation as well as the managers of the plants assist the party and 
primarily the German labor front in its decisive and great task 
in this field. 

Even workmen and women employed in war plants in their 
home towns and living and eating with their families must be 
properly looked after. I mention only: Provisions of coal and 
potatoes, consideration of their possibility to get to their place of 
work. The lack of spring vegetables and other troubles caused 


55 


0 1 6 — PS 


by war conditions and affecting the nerves and health of our 
people must be offset by the strength and satisfaction gathered 
by the realization of the National Socialist principles of folks 
community [Volksgemeinschaft] social justice and the* necessity 
to hold out together and the belief and the confidence in our 
Fuehrer. 

This task becomes much more complicated in the case of those 
millions of workmen and women who have been conscripted for 
labor far from their homes in jobs they are not used to. This 
is a necessity of war. 

Such utilization of labor power can neither be restricted nor 
can the hardships connected with it be reduced. 

The aim is to make life for our folks comrades [Volkskamer- 
aden] as agreeable as possible and to facilitate the conditions of 
their utilization. All these German people must be assisted by 
billeting them, if possible, in decently furnished rooms under 
as decent conditions, by encouraging companionship during their 
free time through the party and to assure prompt issue of ration 
tickets and other such things. 

In this connection the Politeness-Drive [Aktion “Hoeflich- 
keit”] introduced by Reichs-Director party member Dr. Goebbels 
will be binding to the utmost for all labor offices and all offices 
of economy and nutrition. 

All camps where German producing people, men or women, are 
to be quartered, must be perfect examples of German cleanliness, 
order and hygiene. 

The German plants and the German economy must not hesi- 
tate to do everything in their power to make life far from their 
own homes and families tolerable for conscripted folks comrades 
men or women quartered in those camps. As there is a complete 
order guaranteed in a way for the German soldier of the Armed 
Forces in his company for his external requirements as well as 
for his character, which elevates him far above the soldiers of 
other nations, so should this also be made possible in adequately 
applied form for the producing men within the labor mobiliza- 
tion program. 

The necessary measures for the care of the producing German 
people within the labor mobilization program should therefore be 
carried out to the fullest extent by the German labor front. 

In case of more extensive commitment of women and girls 
away from their home towns and families, the rules for shelter 
and care as applied by the women's labor service [Weiblichen 
Arbeitsdienstes] must fundamentally be respected. 


56 


01 6 - PS 


Prisoners of War and Foreign Workers. 

The complete employment of all prisoners of war as well as the 
use of a gigantic number of new foreign civilian workers, men and 
women, has become an indisputable necessity for the solution of 
the mobilization of labor program in this war. 

All the men must be fed, sheltered and treated in such a way as 
to exploit them to the highest possible extent at the lowest con- 
ceivable degree of expenditure. 

It has always been natural for us Germans to refrain from 
cruelty and mean chicaneries towards the beaten enemy, even if 
he had proven himself the most bestial and most implacable ad- 
versary, and to treat him correctly and humanly, even when we 
expect useful work of him. 

As long as the German defense industry did not make it abso- 
lutely necessary, we refrained under any circumstances from the 
use of Soviet prisoners of war as well as of civilian workers, men 
or women, from the Soviet territories. This has now become im- 
possible and the labor power of these people must now be ex- 
ploited to the greatest extent. 

Consequently, I arranged my first measures concerning the 
food, shelter and treatment of these foreign laborers with the 
highest competent Reichs-authorities and with the consent of the 
Fuehrer and the Reichsmarshal of the Greater German Reich in 
such a way that a top performance will be demanded and will be 
obtained. 

It must be remembered, though, that even the effort of a ma- 
chine is conditioned by the amount of fuel, skill and care given to 
it. How many more conditions must be considered in the case of 
men, even of low kind and race, than in the case of a machine! 

I could not accept the responsibility towards the German peo- 
ple, if after having brought such a tremendous number of men to 
Germany these men would one day become a burden for the Ger- 
man people or even endanger their health, instead of doing very 
necessary and useful work, because of mistakes made in their 
nutrition, shelter and treatment. 

The principles of German cleanliness, order and hygiene must 
therefore also be carefully applied to Russian camps. 

Only in such a way will it be possible to exploit that labor to 
the highest benefit of arms production for the fighting front and 
for the war nutrition program, without any trace of false senti- 
mentalism. 

The necessary instructions concerning the food, shelter and 
treatment of the people from the East have been communicated 


57 


016 -PS 


to the competent authorities of the police, defense and nutrition 
bureaus; beyond that, I turn to the district-chiefs of the National 
Socialist Party with the request to assist me also in this field to 
the best of their abilities, in order to avoid any harm that might 
result from the use of that kind of labor to the German people. 

The subjects of blood-related, allied and friendly nations are to 
be treated with particular care and consideration. 

All action making the stay and work in Germany more dif- 
ficult and unnecessarily unbearable for the foreign workers and 
exceeding the restrictions and hardships imposed by the w r ar 
must be avoided. We depend to a large extent on their good will 
and their production. 

It is therefore only logical to make their stay and work in Ger- 
many as bearable as possible — without denying anything to our- 
selves. 

This can be realized, for instance, by facilitating their national 
and folk [volkstuemlich] habits concerning food, shelter, and 
organization of their evenings after work, etc., as far as condi- 
tions and the consideration of our own people permit. 

It is very possible that, if the authorities for the labor mobiliza- 
tion, the general and interior administration, party and labor 
front cooperate in close harmony in this mobilization of foreign 
workmen and women, the tremendous advantage resulting from 
this mass commitment of millions of prisoners of war and for- 
eign, civilian working men and women for the German defense 
and nutrition industries may be supplemented by an equal suc- 
cess for the propaganda of the national socialist Great German 
Reich and for its prestige throughout the world. 

On the other hand the greatest harm for our war industry may 
result if the cooperation of all forces involved is not assured and 
all those problems are not solved by all competent offices. 

Therefore in closing I would ask you to observe the following 
principles carefully: 

1. All technical and administrative matters for the labor mo- 
bilization come exclusively under the authority and responsi- 
bility of the General Plenipotentiary for Labor Mobilization, the 
National Labor Offices [Landesarbeitsaemter] and the Labor Of- 
fices [Arbeitsaemter]. 

2. All questions and tasks concerning propaganda orientation, 
observation of political consequences and care (of people engaged 
in this labor-mobilization program) come under the jurisdiction 
of : 

a. The party, if outside of the plant 

b. The German Labor Front for manufacturing plants, the 


58 


0 1 6— PS 


Bureau for farm politics [Amt fuer Agrarpolitik] for agricul- 
tural enterprises. 

3. The issue of food and clothing ration cards, financial in- 
demnities and relief come exclusively under the jurisdiction of the 
competent authorities or institutions of economy. 

Ask the district chiefs of the National Socialist Party, as my 
plenipotentiaries, to assure a smooth cooperation between those 
various bureaus as well as the best possible harmony and mutual 
complete exchange of information. 

4. The solution of the task concerning the war mobilization of 
labor is of such decisive importance that even the most important 
local or regional interests concerning most vital peace tasks must 
not interfere with it. Whoever violates that rule must be made 
responsible if the German soldier in his decisive struggle for the 
fate of our nation lacks arms and ammunition, synthetic gasoline 
or rubber, vehicles or airplanes. 

Therefore, I want to deeply impress upon all the men and 
women who participate decisively in this war in the labor mobili- 
zation program with insistence to comply with all those necessi- 
ties, decisions and measures, according to the old National So- 
cialist principle : 

Nothing for us, everything for the Fuehrer and his work, that 
is, for the future of our Nation ! 

[signed] : Fritz Sauckel 

[Stamp] 

(The Deputy for the 4 year plan 

The General Plenipotentiary for labor mobilization) 


59 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 017-PS 


Copy /T 

The Deputy for the Four Year Plan 

The General Deputy for the Mobilization of Labor 

Va. Nr. 5780,28/4265 

Berlin SW 11, 3 Oct 1942 
Saarlandstrasse 96 (Reich Labor Ministry) 

Phone of the Ministry 11 00 28 
Postal Check account Pay Master Berlin 10019 
Urgent Mail 

To the Reichsminister for the Occupied Eastern Territories 
c/o Gauleiter Meyer 
Berlin W. 35 

B — StV 
5 Oct. 1942 
Nr. 904 A/42 

Dear Party Fellow member Meyer! 

The Fuehrer has worked out new and most urgent plans for the 
armament which require the quick mobilization of two more mil- 
lion foreign labor forces. The Fuehrer therefore has granted me, 
for the execution of my decree of 21 March 1942, new powers for 
my new duties, and has especially authorized me to take whatever 
measures I think are necessary in the Reich, the Protectorate, 
the General Gouvernement, as well as in the occupied territories, 
in order to assure at all costs an orderly mobilization of labor for 
the German armament industry. The additional required labor 
forces will have to be drafted for the majority from the recently 
occupied eastern territories especially from the Reichskommis- 
sariat Ukraine. Therefore the Reichskommissariat Ukraine must 
furnish 225,000 labor forces by 31 December 1942 and 225,000 
more by 1 May 1943. I ask you to inform Reichskommissar Gau- 
leiter party fellow member Koch about the new situation and re- 
quirements and especially to see to it that he will support per- 
sonally in any possible way the execution of this new require- 
ment. 

I have the intention to visit Party member Koch shortly, and I 
would be grateful to you if you could inform me as to where and 
when I could meet him for a personal discussion. 

Right now though, I ask that the procurement be taken up at 
once with every possible pressure and the commitment of all 
powers especially also of the experts of the labor offices. All the 
directives which had limited temporarily the procurement of 
Eastern laborers are annulled. The Reichs procurement for the 
next months must be given priority over all other measures. 


60 


0 1 7— PS 


I do not ignore the difficulties which exist for the execution of 
this new requirement, but I am convinced that with the ruthless 
commitment of all resources, and with the full cooperation of all 
those interested, the execution of the new demands can be accom- 
plished for the fixed date. I have already communicated the new 
demands to the Reichskommissar Ukraine via mail. 

In reference to our long distance phone call of today, I will send 
you the text of the Fuehrer's decree at the beginning of next 
week. 

Heil Hitler! 

Your devoted 

[signed] FRITZ SAUCKEL 
[stamp] Certified conform to the original 
[signed] ACKERMANN clerk 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 018-PS 

The Reichsminister for the Occupied Eastern Territories 

21 December 1942 

Nr. 02926/42 

To Gauleiter Fritz Sauckel 

General deputy for labor deployment 

Berlin W 8 

Mohrenstrasse 65 

Dear party member Sauckel : 

I thank you very much for your report on the execution of the 
great task given to you, and I am glad to hear that in carrying 
out your mission you have always found the necessary support, 
even on the part of the civilian authorities in the occupied East- 
ern territories. For myself and the officials under my command 
this collaboration was and is self-evident, especially since both 
you and I have, with regard to the solution of the labor problem 
in the East, represented the same view-points from the beginning. 
For political as well as efficiency reasons, you have devoted your 
attention, above all, to the care of the Eastern workers, employed 
in the Reich, and in the same sense I also have striven toward 
an overall satisfactory solution, by the establishment of special 
posts, collaborating with the welfare organizations [Betreuungs- 
organisationen]. 

If there is now complete agreement between your and my con- 
ception of the matter, I nevertheless find it necessary on the 
grounds of several occurrences during the last months, to point 
out with reference to the enclosure, the methods applied by youi 
agencies and collaborators. I thereby do not disregard the fact 


693 * 256 — 46—5 


61 


018 -PS 


that considering the scope and urgency of the task to be accom- 
plished, difficulties and hardships, yes even false measures by the 
executing branches, can in the long run not be avoided. But it 
seems necessary to me, to follow up these occurrences insofar as 
they touch the conduct of war and the interests of the Reich. 
This would always be the case, where the acquisition of new la- 
borers is undertaken in a way which intimidates the population. 
The reports I have received show, that the increase of the guerilla 
bands in the occupied Eastern regions is largely due to the fact 
that the methods used for procuring laborers in these regions 
are felt to be forced measures of mass-deportation, so that the 
endangered persons prefer to escape their fate by withdrawing 
into the woods or going over to the guerilla bands. Add to the 
occasionally unfavorable news regarding the treatment of the 
Eastern laborers in the Reich, about experiences with the labor 
procurement authorities, then the result can only be a strengthen- 
ing of the number and fighting spirit of the hostile troops. This 
development is further aided by the return of tens of thousands 
of useless Eastern workers from the Reich (sick, cripples, etc.). 

To this point I should like to add that my repeated plea to es- 
tablish sick-camps in the regional labor office districts, instead 
of the mass deportation of the Easterners who are incapable of 
work, has so far not been answered. Hence I found it necessary 
to contact the Reichskommissar [Commissioner] for health and 
sanitation on this matter. In the session of the propaganda de- 
partment called by State Counselor, Professor Boerger on the 
17th of this month, the negative repercussions which will be 
caused in the native provinces by the recently planned return 
transports were referred to not only by the representatives of my 
agency, but particularly by the representative of the economic 
staff East, since such events interfere with the demands for labor 
and production in the rear military zones. Measures such as con- 
scription, return of the sick or similar things not only impair the 
procurement and the legal validity of the executive orders of the 
compulsory-labor order released by me on Dec 19.41, but more- 
over endanger all the important war work in the occupied East- 
ern territories. This goes as well for the urban as for the rural 
procurement districts, where so far, thanks to the self-sacrificing 
activity of the leaders of the economic land bases, an atmosphere 
permitting productive work was created between the German ad- 
ministration and the native population, which now threatens to 
become lost. Even if I do not close my eyes to the necessity that 
the numbers demanded by the Reichs minister for weapons and 
ammunition as well as by the agricultural economy justify un- 


62 


018 PS 


usual and hard measures, I have to ask, due to the responsibility 
for the occupied Eastern territories which lies upon me, that in 
the accomplishment of ordered tasks such measures be excluded, 
the toleration and prosecution of which will some day be held 
against me, and my collaborators. In order to achieve this, and to 
bring into agreement the requirements given by the peculiar po- 
litical situation of the Eastern territories with the measures of 
the commissions and the staffs of your agencies, I have em- 
powered the Reichs commissioner for the Ukraine insofar as nec- 
essary to make use of his right, and to see to it that methods 
which run contrary to the interest of the conduct of the war and 
war economy in the occupied East be abolished. 

It appears strange to me, that in numerous cases which should 
have been discussed with the civil authorities, we only receive 
information through the police and other agencies. I am referring 
in this connection to the note of my standing representative of 
Nov. 11.42. — III wi 5 — 1231-3587 — in which I asked for a discus- 
sion concerning the mutual cooperation, and especially on the po- 
sition of your delegates, to which I have unfortunately never re- 
ceived an answer from you. With consultation of our mutual 
wishes, which you personally will certainly understand, it is un- 
fortunately impossible for me to accept a co-responsibility for 
the consequences, which result from the recounted state of affairs. 

I should not like to have informed you of this, without express- 
ing my hope that in the interests of both of us, this condition will 
be terminated with the coming of the new year. I am personally 
convinced that you, dear Party member Sauckel, have the same 
desire. I assume that there will be an opportunity for discussion 
of this in the conference prompted by me on Jan. 11.43. 

I am gratefully looking forward to your reports in this connec- 
tion. 

Yours, 

signed: A. ROSENBERG 


Extracts from the Secret Report on Morale by the F oreign 
Mail Censorship Post Berlin. 

(Reg. No. 7328/42 secret Group VIII) 

Selected letters from the occupied Eastern regions regarding the 
period from Sept. 11 to Nov. 10, 1942. 

In the letters from the Ukraine a further sharp decline in the 
morale is pictured, and under the impact of an increased requisi- 


63 


018 -PS 


tion of labor forces for the Reich, the Ukrainian population has 
been seized by a terrible fear. 

Horrifying picturizations of compulsory measures by the ad- 
ministrative authorities for the seizure of Eastern laborers, form 
a major part of the news from home to their relatives working 
in Germany. The disinclination to answer the call to work in 
the Reich has evidently grown steadily, not only due to the re- 
ports of Eastern workers, which fled home and their workshops 
or have been dismissed. In order to secure the required number 
for the labor transport, men and women including youngsters 
from 15 years on up, are allegedly taken from the street, from the 
market places and village festivals, and carried off. The inhabit- j 
ants therefore hide themselves in fear and avoid any appearance 
in public. After public beatings during the month of October, 
so available letters state, came the burning down of homesteads, 
and of whole villages as retribution for failure to comply with the 
demand for the appropriation of labor forces directed to the com- 
munities. The execution of the latter measures is being reported 
from various villages. 

Parts from Two Letters 

“At our place, new things have happened. People are being 
taken to Germany. On Dec. 5, some people from the Kowkuski 
district were scheduled to go, but they didn’t want to and the 
village was set afire. They threatened to do the same thing in 
Borowytschi, as not all who were scheduled to depart wanted to 
go. Thereupon 3 truck-loads of Germans arrived and set fire to 
their houses. In Wrasnytschi 12 houses and in Borowytschi 3 
houses were burned. 

“On Oct. 1 a new conscription of labor forces took place. From 
what has happened, I will describe the most important to you. 
You can not imagine the bestiality. You probably remember 
what we were told about the Soviets during the rule of the Poles. 
At that time we did not believe it and now it seems just as in- 
credible. The order came to supply 25 workers, but no one re- 
ported. All had fled. Then the German militia came and began 
to ignite the houses of those who had fled. The fire became very 
violent, since it had not rained for 2 months. In addition the | 
grain stacks were in the farm yards. You can imagine what 
took place. The people who had hurried to the scene were for- 
bidden to extinguish the flames, beaten and arrested, so that 7 
homesteads burned down. The policemen meanwhile ignited 
other houses. The people fall on their knees and kiss their hands, 1 




64 


018 -PS 


but the policemen beat them with rubber trunchions and threaten 
to burn down the whole village. I don’t know how this would 
have ended if I Sapurkany had not intervened. He promised 
that there would be laborers by morning. During the fire the 
militia went through the adjoining villages, seized the laborers, 
and placed them under arrest. Wherever they did not find any 
laborers, they detained the parents, until the children appeared. 
That is how they raged throughout the night in Bielosirka. The 
workers which had not yet appeared till then, were to be shot. 
All schools were closed and the married teachers were sent to 
work here, while the unmarried ones go to work in Germany. 
They are now catching humans like the dog-catchers used to catch 
dogs. They are already hunting for one week and have not yet 
enough. The imprisoned workers are locked in at the school- 
house. They cannot even go out to perform their natural func- 
tions, but have to do it like pigs in the same room. People from 
many villages went on a certain day to a pilgrimage to the mon- 
astery Potschaew. They were all arrested, locked in, and will be 
sent to work. Among them there are lame, blind and aged peo- 
ple.” 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 019-PS 

The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan 
The Deputy General for Labor Supply 
No. IVa 5780.28/1138 

Berlin, SW 11, 17 March 1943 
Saarlandstr. 96 (Reich’s Ministry for Labor) 

Tel. of the RAM: 11 00 28 

Postal Checking Account of the RAM, Branch: Berlin 100.19 
Copies : 

1. Gauleiter 

2. Ill W 5 

3. Special Deputy for the Eastern Labor Supply 
Receipt stamp 03487 dated 18 March 1943 

Personal ! 

To: The Reichsminister for the Occupied Eastern Territories. 

Att. Mr. Reichsminister ROSENBERG, Berlin 
Subject: Draft of workers from the East 
Dear Party Member Rosenberg: 

After a protracted illness my Deputy for Labor Supply in the 
occupied Eastern Territories, State Councillor Peukert, is going 


65 


0 1 9— PS 


there to regulate the labor supply both for Germany and the ter- 
ritories themselves. 

I ask you sincerely, dear party member Rosenberg, to assist 
him to your utmost on account of the pressing urgency of Peu- 
kert’s mission. Already now I may thank you for the hitherto 
good reception accorded to Peukert. He himself has been charged 
by me with the absolute and completely unreserved cooperation 
with all bureaus of the Eastern Territories. 

Especially the labor supply for the German agriculture, and 
likewise for the most urgent armament production programs or- 
dered by the Fuehrer make the fastest importation of approxi- 
mately 1 million women and men from the Eastern Territories 
within the next 4 months a must. Starting 15 March the daily 
shipment must have reached 5000 female and male workers 
respectively, while beginning of April this number has to be 
stepped up to 10,000. This is a requisite of the most urgent pro- 
grams, and the spring tillage, and other agricultural tasks are not 
to suffer to the detriment of the nutrition and of the armed forces. 

I have foreseen the allotment of the draft quotas for the in- 
dividual territories in agreement with your experts for the labor 


supply as follows: 

Daily quota starting 15 March 1943: 

From General Commissariat White Ruthenia ... 500 people 

Economic Inspection Center 500 people 

Reich’s Commissariat Ukraine 3 000 people 

Economic Inspection South 1 000 people 

Total 5 000 people 


Starting 1 April 1943 the daily quota is to be doubled corre- 
sponding to the doubling of the entire quota. 

I hope to visit personally the Eastern Territories towards the 
end of the month, and ask you once more for your kind support. 

HEIL HITLER! 

Signed: SAUCKEL 


66 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 025 -PS 


I H (ZO) 1/752/42 


Copy 

for the files on hand I 3 [handwritten] 
SECRET! 


Berlin NW 7, 4 Sept. 42 

Subject: The importation of domestic workers from the East 
into the Reich. 

Here: Conference with the General Deputy for Labor 

mobilization on 3 Sept. 1942. 

1. Notice 

On 3 September 1942 a conference, under the presidency of the 
General Deputy for Labor Mobilization, of the representatives of 
the highest Reich authorities, the Party Chancellory, as well as 
of the German Labor front (DAF) was held at the Thuringen- 
haus, Berlin W. S, for the discussion of the pending importation 
of domestic workers from the East from the Ukraine into the 
Reich. To this Gauleiter Sauckel declared the following: 

It is the definite wish of the Fuehrer that the law over the duty 
year [Pflichtjahr] for women be not over extended, that all 
German girls must work one additional year in housekeeping. 
This position of the Fuehrer is motivated by the positive experi- 
ences which have been made so far with the women’s Reich’s la- 
bor service; this service has proved itself to be an instrument of 
political breeding through which the German girls are made po- 
litically more reliable than through one additional year of private 
housekeeping. Therefore, and this is also the opinion of the 
Reichsmarshall and of Reichsleiter Bormann, the housekeeping 
problem must be solved through a different way than the above- 
mentioned one. 

Therefore, the Fuehrer has ordered the immediate importation 
of 400,000 to 500,000 female domestic Eastern workers from the 
Ukraine between the ages of 15 and 35, and has charged the Gen- 
eral Deputy for labor mobilization with the execution of this ac- 
tion which is to end in about 3 months. In connection with this 
— this is also approved by Reichsleiter Bormann, the illegal 
bringing of female housekeepers into the Reich by members of 
the Armed Forces, or various other agencies, is to be allowed 
subsequently, and furthermore, irrespective of the official re- 
cruiting, is not to be prevented. The determining factor for the 
recruiting of Ukrainian female domestic workers is this: ac- 
cording to the specific wish of the Fuehrer only such girls are 


67 


025-PS 


to be recruited against whose permanent stay in Germany, to be 
determined by their conduct and their physical appearance, there 
will be no scruples; it is in accordance with a specific desire of 
the Fuehrer that the greatest number of these girls be german- 
ized through the recruitment. To this, the Fuehrer declared that 
we have to review our school knowledge about people migrations, 
to the extent that the Lebensraum of the Germanic peoples is not 
only to be considered from a point of view of the newly gained 
territories at that time, but also from the point of view of the 
region of origin of those peoples. The Germans have spread “like 
beer”. Only the young people have left whereas the old ones re- 
mained at home. This is the reason why there are, especially in 
the Ukraine and in the northerly part of the Black Sea, such a 
great number of blond haired and blue eyed people who have nei- 
ther Tartar nor Caucasian appearances. This can only be the 
case of peasants, descendants of settled Germanic tribes; to re- 
germanize them can only be a question of time. It is the 
Fuehrer’s desire that in 100 years from now 250 million German 
speaking people will live in Europe. 

If, therefore, the recruitment of Ukrainian domestic workers is 
not only under a labor mobilization consideration but also a racial 
one, it ensues forcibly that a special treatment of this labor mobi- 
lization measure is necessary, which does not exclude the fact 
that the domestic Ukrainian workers are to be considered in the 
first place as workers from the East and are to be provided with 
the sign “OST”. They are to be employed in city households as 
well as in country households, preferably in families with many 
children and essential constructive families (Aufbau Familien) 
so that 200,000 of them will be furnished to city households and 
200,000 to country households. In order to prevent a better po- 
sition of the Eastern domestic workers employed in country 
households as compared to the ones employed in cities, the do- 
mestic workers from the Ukraine are to receive basically the 
same food as the German civilian population. Because these 
regulations necessitate a revision of the feeding precepts of Pris- 
oners of War and soviet civilian laborers as stated in a communi- 
cation of the Reich’s nutrition ministry of April 4, 1942, the 
Reich’s minister 'for nutrition and agriculture has asked the Gen- 
eral Deputy for labor mobilization to refrain from the execution 
of the measures at least until the food situation of the German 
people permits the importation of more foreign labor forces and 
a better food situation for the workers from the East can be as- j 
sured. Gauleiter Sauckel spoke in harshest terms against the 


68 


025 -PS 


stand of the Reich’s minister for nutrition stating that he refuses 
to discuss an order of the Fuehrer. He added furthermore that 
irrespective of the importation of domestic workers, the mobiliza- 
tion of one more million workers from the East is being planned, 
this being the only way to realize in the years to come the Fueh- 
rer’s Armament and Steel production program for the execution 
of the great plans in the West and for the annihilation of the 
greatest war economy of the world, the North American one. 
For the feeding of this million men labor force which number 
furthermore is equilibrated by the fact that approximately 7 mil- 
lion German soldiers are in greater part supplied with food from 
the foreign countries, party member Backe has only to solve the 
organizational problem in order to take advantage of the first 
rate harvest throughout Europe. Never before did a minister 
for nutrition start his function under such favorable conditions 
as State Secretary Backe. The reference to the difficult trans- 
portation conditions to bring the foreign harvests into the Reich 
does not impress Gauleiter Sauckel in the least; he would find 
ways and means to utilize the harvest and the cattle from the 
Ukraine even if he has to draft the whole Jewry of Europe to use 
them as a human road for the handling of boxes to the Ukraine. 
“If the food rations both for the Germans and the foreign work- 
ers are not increased shortly, then a scandal of the greatest pro- 
portion will take place”. The decreased resistance of the bodies 
— especially with the shortage of doctors — will give rise to great 
epidemics (see Diphtheria Epidemy) . It is to be requested from 
Party member Backe that the proposed increase of bread and 
meat ration be not done with the start of the winter time only 
but at the end of the present allotment period, so that the weak- 
ened bodies can build up a reserve of strength which will get them 
well through the winter. The Fuehrer cannot understand the 
fact that it has to be in the country which carries the greatest 
weight in the fight for the future of Europe that most people go 
hungry while this is not the case with France, Holland, Hungary, 
and the Ukraine and everywhere else ; he desires that this be the 
contrary in the future. As far as the foreign workers in Ger- 
many are concerned (with the exception of the workers from 
the East) a slow reduction of food according to renderment has 
to be applied to them ; it cannot be tolerated that lazy Dutchmen 
or Italians receive better food than a diligent worker from the 
East. As far as the nutrition is concerned, here too the prin- 
ciple of renderment has to be applied. Since the new nutrition 
regulation is seen as being feasible by Gauleiter Sauckel in the 


69 


025— PS 


above mentioned way of thinking, therefore, the special action 
of the General Deputy for labor mobilization (GBA) for the 
importation of domestic workers from the East must be coupled 
with the current recruiting commission in the Ukraine. The del- 
egation from October to April of 200,000 to 300,000 male and fe- 
male workers from the East already employed in the German 
agriculture to industry factories is not. affected by this; these 
forces (inch the female ones) will be returned in the spring to 
their original peasant organizations, and there just as before, 
they will not be employed at home but for agricultural work. A 
lawful ground for special domestic action, a decree is being 
prepared, the text of which was read at the conference by Coun- 
cellor in the Ministry Dr. Letsch. The recruiting which in the 
case of the female domestic workers will be based especially on 
voluntariness will be executed in connection with the office of the 
Reichsfuehrer SS and the Chief of the German police who in- 
tend to step in for the pre-examination with regard to a possible 
worthiness of becoming a German. Those female workers from 
the East found to be apt for housekeeping will be marked in a 
special way by the labor and social officers so that they can be 
recognized as such on the transport lists of the collective ship- 
ments. Independent of these, special shipments of domestic fe- 
male workers are to be considered since Gauleiter Sauckel plans 
on having brought into the Reich 6,000 persons a day. With 
reference to the treatment of the female domestic workers from 
the East in the Reich, this question has been talked over with the 
Reichsfuehrer SS and the Chief of the German Police, the 
Reichswomen office, the Party Chancellory, the General Deputy 
for labor mobilization, the result being a plan for a notice for 
the German housewomen. The wages of the female domestic 
workers are to be paid according to a remuneration table for 
workers from the East ; however, this has to be deviated through 
the fixation of special tariffs by the labor trustees. In reference 
to the Eastern worker’s tax for management directors, it was de- 
cided to ask the Reich’s finance minister to higher the Eastern 
worker’s tax by half for the families of up to three children and 
to cut it out completely for families of 4 children and more. 

At the end of the conference, the Councellor to the Ministry 
Letsch — as he had done previously with new notices — tried to get 
the proposed notice for the German housewomen ratified by those 
who took part; however, the undersigned protested against that 
by demanding a copy to determine his position. The representa- 
tives of the party chancellery, the nutrition ministry and other 


70 


025- PS 


offices joined in this demand so that Gauleiter Sauckel promised 
to make available the draft of the text for September 4, 1942 
with the request that final positions be taken by 1400 o’clock. 

Generally one gathered from this conference that the questions 
concerning the recruitment and mobilization as well as the treat- 
ment of the female domestic workers from the East are being 
handled by the General Deputy for labor mobilization, the Reichs- 
fuehrer SS and the Chief of the German police and the party 
chancellory and that the Reich’s ministry for the occupied terri- 
tories of the East is not considered as competent or only as half 
competent. In reference to this the undersigned established spe- 
cifically that the Reich’s ministry for the occupied territories for 
the East has not until now participated in the drafting of the 
notice. He declared furthermore that the Reich’s ministry for 
the occupied territories of the East is greatly interested in the 
Propaganda for the mobilization of domestic workers, and that it 
be carried out in a favored way considering the necessity to have 
only volunteer forces at the disposition for housekeeping. 

Gauleiter Sauckel took knowledge of this with satisfaction. 

(signed) Gutkelch 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 031-PS 

Chief of the Political Directing Staff, personal referee 

Bei’lin, 12 June 1944 

TOP SECRET 

Copy No. 1 of 2 copies 

Re: Evacuation of youths from the territory of Army Group 
“Center” (Heu-Aktion) . 

1. Memorandum: 

The Army Group “Center” has the intention to apprehend 
40-50,000 youths at the ages of 10 to 14 who are in the Army 
Territories, and to transport them to the Reich. This measure was 
originally proposed by the 9th Army. These youths cause con- 
siderable inconvenience in the Theatre of Operations. To the 
greater part these youths are without supervision of their par- 
ents since men and women in the theatres of operations have been 
and will be conscripted into labor battalions to be used in the con- 
struction of fortifications. Therefore Children’s Villages are to be 
established behind the front, for the younger age groups, and 
under native supervision. To collect adequate experiences the 
9th Army has already established such a Children’s Village and 
has achieved good results also from the political viewpoint. Army 


71 


03 1 -PS 


Group further emphasizes that these youths must not be allowed 
to fall into the hands of the Bolsheviks in case of a withdrawal 
since that would amount to reinforcing the enemy’s potential 
war strength. This measure is to be strongly fortified by propa- 
ganda under the slogan: Care of the Reich for White-Ruthenian 
Children, Protection against Brigandry. The action has already 
started in the 5 kilometer zone. The Youth Bureau has already 
had preliminary talks with the Organization Todt and with the 
Junkers works. It is intended to allot these juveniles primarily to 
the German trades as apprentices to be used as skilled workers 
after 2 years’ training. This is to be arranged through the Or- 
ganization Todt which is especially equipped for such a task 
through its technical and other set-ups. This action is being 
greatly welcomed by the German trade since it represents a de- 
cisive measure for the alleviation of the shortage of apprentices. 

The Chief of the Political Directing Staff, SS-Obergruppen- 
fuehrer Berger, submitted the action to the Minister on the 10th 
of the month. The Minister feared that the action would have 
most unfavorable political consequences, that it would be re- 
garded as abduction of children, and that the juveniles did not 
represent a real asset to the enemy’s military strength anyhow. 
The Minister would like to see the action confined to the 15-17 
year olds. 

Following are the arguments against this decision of the Minis- 
ter : 

1. This action is not only aimed at preventing a direct rein- 
forcement of the enemy’s military strength but also at a reduction 
of his biological potentialities as viewed from the perspective of 
the future. These ideas have been voiced not only by the Reichs- 
fuehrer of the SS but also by the Fuehrer. Corresponding orders 
were given during last year’s withdrawals in the southern sector. 

2. A similar action is being conducted at the present time in 
the territory of the Army Group Ukraine-North (General Field 
Marshal Model) . Even in this politically especially preferred Gal- 
izian territory recruiting measures were being taken with the aim 
to collect 135,000 laborers to be organized in battalions for the 
construction of fortifications. The youths over 17 were to be de- 
tailed to the SS Division and those under 17 to the SS Auxiliary. 
This action which has been going on for several weeks has not led 
to any political disturbances. While it is true that the population 
has to be recruited by force, they do show a certain understanding, 
later on, for this measure of purely military necessity. Provided, 
of course, that they receive correct treatment, good food and lodg- 
ings, etc. 


72 


03 1 -PS 


The unified organization of parents in labor battalions makes it 
possible to extract this group as a whole in the case of withdrawals 
which are quite conceivable in the case of Army Groups "Center” 
and South. The children already transported into the Reich would 
serve as a suitable incentive. 

3. As to Army Group "Center” this measure is to be initiated 
in Army Territories, that is to say in those territories not under a 
civil administration. During a conference with the Chief of Staff 
of the 9th Army I gained the impression that the action will be 
executed, if necessary, even without the consent of the Reich 
Ministry for the Occupied Territories of the East. 

4. If the Ministry for the East should not support or execute 
this action, it is expected that the procurement will be undertaken 
by the GBA [Generalbevollmaschtiger fuer den Arbeitseinsatz — 
General Deputy for the Mobilization of Labor]. Army Group 
"Center” and especially 9th Army thought it of greatest impor- 
tance not to let the children be put to work in the Reich through 
the General Deputy for the Mobilization of Labor. They preferred 
the offices of the Reichs-minister for the Occupied Territories of 
the East [RMfdbO]. Only through these offices did they believe 
to have a guarantee for correct and proper treatment. This desire 
of the Army Group is a particular expression of confidence 
towards the Ministry for the East. Army Group desires that the 
action be accomplished under the most loyal conditions, as had 
been done previously in the case of recruiting for the SS Auxil- 
iary. They further desired special arrangements regarding care 
mail exchange with parents etc. As far as possible the children 
are to remain in groups according to their village communities, 
then be collected in small camps in the Reich where they would 
be at the disposal of trade establishments. These technical mat- 
ters have already been discussed. They can be accomplished with 
the help of the offices of the Hitler Youth through the Youth 
Bureau of the Ministry. Thus the Ministry is also able to exer- 
cise political guidance over the juveniles and has them at its dis- 
posal at all times. If I should re-occupy the territory the Min- 
istry of the East could return the juveniles in the proper man- 
ner. Together with their parents they would then most likely 
represent a positive political element during the reconstruction 
of the territory. 


73 


03 1 -PS 


The Chief of the Political Directing Staw, personal referee, p 612 
a/44g 

Berlin, 14 June 1944 

SECRET 

Re: “Heu-Aktion” 

1. Annotation 

The Obergruppenfuehrer has given his consent to again sub- 
mit the matter “Heu-Aktion” to the Minister, with the aim to 
bring about a reversal of his decision. This was done on this day. 
The Minister has approved the execution of the “Heu-Aktion” in 
the Army Territories, under the conditions and provisions ar- 
rived at in talks with Army Group Center [Heeresgruppe Mitte]. 
Urgent! 

2. Write via radio to : 

Army Group “Center” 

Att: Councillor in the Ministry Tesmer 

[Marginal note] Radio station 2 complied. 14 June 44 
[signed] 

Re: “Heu-Aktion” 

“Heu-AktionV approved under conditions and provision arrived 
at in conference. 

By order of 

The Reichsminister for the Occupied Eastern Territories 

Signed: BRANDENBERG 

3. Copies to : 

[Marginal note] complied 15 June 44 signed: Sg 

a. SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Berger, Chief of the Political Di- 
recting Staff, respectfully submitted for information 

b. Chief Labor Bureau, for information 

4. Matter p5 for information. Please return. 

5. File 

[Marginal notes] 

returned from P5 without acknowledgement 

August 25, 44 
signed : Bz 24 Aug 

June 14, 44 
[Initials] 

P OK by Dr. Streube ( ?) 

To the Chief of the Political Directing Staff, SS-Obergruppen- 
fuehrer Berger, respectfully submitted with the request to re- 
submit the contents of this memorandum to the minister with 
view to reconsideration of the Minister’s decision. 

Signed: BRANDENBERG 


74 


03 I -PS 


[Note in ink] regarding the above-Obergruppenfuehrer Berger 
received the memorandum on June 14. Consequently the Reichs- 
minister has approved the Action. 


Signed: Str. June 16 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 035-PS 

SECRET 


Berlin, 26 October 1943 


Short report 

regarding security measures by Main Division Ukraine [Hauptar- 
beitsgruppe Ukraine] during the withdrawal of the Armed Forces. 

On 24 Sep 1943 a prohibited zone was created by a decree of 
the War Commander in the city of Kiev — , which runs some 3 km 
west of the Dnjepr. The whole civil population in this area, in- 
cluding non-military officials, had to abandon this zone as of 
2100, 26 Sep 1943. The office of the Special Purposes Staff 
[Einsatzstabes] on Rowno Street #8 lies in the prohibited zone. 
The apartment house on Theaterstrasse #9 was evacuated and 
troops quartered within. 

The removal of the materials on hand encountered extraor- 
dinary difficulties due to lack of loading space. However the trans- 
porting of the following was earned out: 

24 Sep 43 : Materials of the Museum of Art at Charkoiv. 

Taken over by party member Pfeiffer from General Commis- 
sioner, Shitomir for shipping by trucks to Reichs Commissioner 
Ukraine [RKU] in Rowno. 

96 Ukrainian paintings. 

185 Western European paintings. 

12 wood carvings and etchings. 

25 carpets and tapestries. 

The inventory and files of those objects are in the hand of the 
staff leaders. The Reich Commissioner kept a copy of the in- 
ventory. 

26 Sep 43: Materials of HAG [Hauptarbeitsgruppe — Main Divi- 
sion] 

The document-house library, utensils, office supplies and the 
administration were loaded in a freight car by 13 native work- 
ers for Truskawiec under the supervision of Special Purpose 
Staff Director FUCHS. 

27 Sep 43 : Materials of the Department of Seizuro [Abteilung 
Erfassung ] 


75 


035— PS 


This shipment went to Ratibor- and contained 
42 cases — 10,186 books 
7 cases-total catalog of the East Library 

21 cases — selected publications 
12 cases — art folios 

11 packages of samples of magazines 

9 crates and ) „ , , . , . , 

„ „ ; Bolshevist pictures 

7 rolls ) 

22 crates Bolshevist films 

Several cases of negatives and positives from the photoarchive, 
dispositives andi slides, materials of Special Purpose Com- 
mandant Dr. Huettig of the Special Purpose Staff “Science” 
1 case of Bolshevist data in German and others. 

1 Oct. 43 : Materials of the Ukrainian Museum in Kiev. 

On the basis of the General evacuation orders of the city com- 
missioner the following were sorted out by us and loaded for 
shipment to Krakow. 

Textiles of all sorts 

Collections of valuable embroidery patterns 
Collections of brocades 
Numerous items of wood, etc. 

Moreover an essential part of the prehistoric museum was trans- 
ported away. 

Since already on the 20 Sep the head of the provincial admin- 
istration of libraries, museums and archives, Dr. Winters, had 
requested his assignment to the Special Purposes Staff. Because 
of the evacuation of the civil administration, he left the city on 
25 Sep on the basis of the general evacuation order. Dr. Winter 
turned over to the leader of the main division (HAG) a list of 
the articles under his protection in case the Special Purpose Staff 
remained longer in Kiev and would also take charge of these ma- 
terials. Dr. Winter could only send 2 freight cars of material into 
the interior. Shortly before his departure Dr. Winter had turned 
over by a transfer document to the city commissioner the admin- 
istration of the materials entrusted to him. The latter had charged 
Prof. Dr. Mansfeld with .as complete an evacuation of these arti- 
cles as possible. Since Prof. Dr. Mansfeld knew little about the 
articles, he requested support from the Special Purpose Staff of 
Reichsleiter Rosenberg. On 1 Oct. it was possible to load 2 freight 
cars with museum goods, but under great difficulty. Since labor 
was unobtainable all the members still in Kiev on the Special Pur- 
pose Staff of Reichsleiter Rosenberg undertook the loading them- 
selves. 


76 


03 5— PS 


The activity in Kiev became more difficult since the German 
artillery stands in the center of the city and from there fires its 
salvoes toward the East bank. 

Through the military measures the salvage work was carried 
out, under ever-increasing difficulties. At the request of Prof. Dr. 
Mansfeld 2-3 collaborators were assigned to him for the evacu- 
ation of the articles and institutes which up to now had been 
under the civil administration. 

Since the remaining in Kiev of all members of the Chief Labor 
Group Ukraine was impossible the leader of the Chief Labor 
Group HAG had come to an agreement by the 2 Oct. with G-2 
(Ic) on the following points concerning the division in that area. 

1. The Special Purposes Staff of Reichsleiter Rosenberg’s Chief 
Labor Group Ukraine will leave behind a detachment of 5 men 
for security and safety of the cultural articles in the off-limits 
zone of the city of Kiev. 

2. The remaining detachment will at the request of the in- 
fantry division (ID) and at the command of the 7th Army Corps 
(7AK) -work in close cooperation with the G-2 (Ic) of the infantry 
division (ID). 

3. The infantry division (ID) is prepared to take care of the 
detachment and provide each member with corresponding identi- 
fication papers and thereby guarantee the utmost protection pos- 
sible in the prohibited zone. 

4. At the request of G-2 (Ic) of the Infantry Division (ID) 
the particular detachments were to take over tasks which lay in 
the competence of the Armed Forces. 

5. The Infantry Division (ID) places great value on further 
evacuation of precious articles, since this battle zone can in no 
case be protected sufficiently by the army. One may even count 
on artillery shells falling at any time. Army installations, 
means of transportation, etc., should be provided by the Infantry 
Division, if possible. 

Of course it was the duty of the Chief Labor Group Ukraine 
(HAG) to hold out in Kiev as long as possible, until it was ren- 
dered impossible by the military situation. 

All members of the Chief Labor Group [HAG] have worked 
in harmony and w T ith strong interest to insure the safety and 
evacuation of the most precious cultural goods. At the loading 
they lent a hand in order to complete the loading w r ork in the 
few hours remaining. 

The remaining of the Chief Labor Group [HAG] and its work 
has greatly impressed G-2 and the Division. The intention that 


693256 — 46 — 6 


77 


035-PS 


the remaining detachment would leave Kiev at the last possible 
moment met with strong approval. This last movement was de- 
fined by the Army as the one on which the remaining detachment 
would be “bombed out of office.” 

On 5 Oct 1943 the leader of the Chief Labor Group departed 
from Kiev with his staff except those selected for the remaining 
detachment in order to continue leading the work of the Chief 
Labor Group of Ukraine [HAG] from Truskavice. 

Signed : UTIKAL 


The Staff Directorate 
[Stabsfuehrung] 

Referee East 

Berlin 21 Oct. 1943 
II b/Dr. Z./Z/ 

[hand-written notation] 

Miss Girschberg for final copy to Reich Directorate, Staff Di- 
rector, Subordinate Leaders, etc. 

Memorandum for the Reichs Leader 

Subject: Evacuation of the Office at Kiev. 

As you all know the Chief Labor Office Group Ukraine (HAG) 
of the Special Purposes Staff had to, for the time being shift its 
offices [Dienstsitz] to Truskaviec near Drobobycz 90 km South of 
Lomberg. This shifting was accomplished without any friction. 
A remaining detachment was left behind in the prohibited zone in 
Kiev. This remaining detachment still protects the cultural goods 
which lie in the battle zone insofar as their salvage has not been 
carried out. Numerous cultural goods were saved in the last hour 
by the Special Purposes Staff before the destruction through en- 
emy action, aided by the strenuous work of the staff members as 
a whole. The following items were shipped: 

1. 24 Sept. 43: Materials from the Charkoiv Art Museum. 

Taken over by party member (Pg.) Pfeiffer from General Com- 
missioner Shitomir to be transported by trucks (LKW) to Reich 
Commissioner Ukraine in Rowno. 

96 Ukrainian paintings 
183 Western European paintings 
12 wood carvings and etchings 
25 carpets and tapestry 

The files 'and inventory of these objects are in the hands of the 


78 


03 5— PS 


staff leaders [Stabsfuehrung], The Reich Commissioner kept 
a copy of the inventory. 

2. 26 Sept. 43: Materials of the Main Divisions [HAG] 

The documents, house library, utensils, office supplies, private 
luggage, and the supplies of the administration were loaded in a 
freight car by 13 native workers for Truskaviec under the super- 
vision of Special Purposes Staff Director FUCHS. 

3. 27 Sept. 43: Materials of the Department of Seizure [Abt. 
Erfassung.] 

This shipment went to Ratibor and contained: 

42 chests — 10,186 books, East library (OBR) 

7 chests — Total catalog of the East library (OBR) 

1 chest — books for the higher school 

21 chests — selected publications 
12 [?] chests — art folios 

11 packages of model samples of magazines 
9 crates 

7 rolls (Bolshevist pictures) 

22 frames [Vorschlaege] Bolshevist films 

Several chests of negatives and positives from the photo- 
archives, dispositives and slides, material of Special Pur- 
pose Commandant, Dr. Huettig of the Special Purpose 
Staff “Science.” 

1 chest of Bolshevist data in Germany and others. 

4. 27 Sept 43: Material of the Prehistoric Museum. 

Independently from the work of the Special Purposes, Staff of 

Prehistoric History had packed and shipped to Krakau the most 
important items of the Prehistoric Museum. 

5. 1 Oct 43: Materials of the Ukrainian Museum in Kiev. 

On the basis of the general evacuation orders of the city com- 
missioner the following were sorted out by us and loaded for ship- 
ment to Krakau : 

Textiles of all kinds (clothes, blouses, shirts, coats, over- 
coats, etc.) 

Collection of valuable embroidery patterns 
Collections of brocades 
Collection of Ukrainian easter eggs 
Numerous items of wood, etc. 

6. 1 Oct 43: Materials of the Prehistoric Museum. 

In a second inspection party member (Pg.) Prof. Dr. Stamp- 
fuss with the help of several collaborators gathered another col- 
lection of prehistoric articles and also shipped it to Krakau. 

When the civil administration left Kiev the head of the pro- 


79 


035— PS 


vincial administration for archives, libraries, and museums, Dr. 
Winter and his helper Dr. Benzing, again joined the Special Pur- 
poses Staff on 20 Sep. However these two gentlemen also left 
Kiev on 25 Sep. The Special Purpose Staff did then undertake 
again its original task of protecting the cultural articles and 
goods. Though the personnel has been decreased materially in 
the course of the development of the situation, it was then ar- 
ranged that right up to the last minute one group of workers 
capable of action remained in Kiev for the carrying out of the 
final tasks. The Special Purpose Staff is the last German office 
which remains in the dead zone of Kiev. Its remaining and its 
assistance to the G-2 (Ic) of the combat division involved has 
made a strong impression on the army. We were permitted to 
remain in the fighting zone up until the point when we would be 
bombed out of the office. 

This successful work was in the main due to the devotion to 
duty and to personal inspiration of the Chief of the Special Pur- 
poses Staff Anton, but also due to the unselfish performance of 
duty of his other co-workers. 

. Signed: Dr. ZEISS 

Chief of the Special Purposes Staff. 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 04 1 -PS 

Memorandum for the Fuehrer 

By a decision of the Fuehrer the Reichsminister for the oc- 
cupied Eastern territories has received the authority to put to 
use for the support of government arrangements in the Eastern 
territories the available household goods of refugees, absent or 
deported Jews in the occupied Western areas. This is the so- 
called Action “M”. For the execution of Action “M” the service 
office West [Dienststelle Westen] has been set up in Paris with 
directive authority in France, Belgium and the Netherlands. Up 
to the present time about 40,000 tons of household goods have 
been loaded on free transportation space (ship and railway) 
bound for the Reich. 

In recognition of the fact that the requirements of bomb dam- 
aged persons in the Reich must take precedence over the de- 
mands of the East, the Reich Ministry has placed a major por- 
tion (over 19,500 tons) of the household goods at the disposal of 
the bomb damaged persons in the Reich. The goods have then 
been transported by the appropriate service office west in the 
occupied territory. Likewise, the Reich Ministry will place at 
the disposition of bomb-damaged persons the greatest portion, 


80 


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at least 80%, of the goods accruing from Action “N” [sic]. For 
its own purposes only these goods which are urgently needed in 
the East will be reserved. 

The execution of Action “M” has resulted in two categories of 
difficulties up to the present time: 

a. Transportation Question. The goods have been transported 
up to this point as Armed Forces goods by means of railway cars 
and ships. The transportation authorities [Kommandanturen] 
now wish to treat the transport requirements of Action “M” as 
the transport of the civilian sector. This would lead to unbear- 
able delays and among other difficulties would require the export- 
approval of the French State. Because of this the following de- 
cree is required: Goods which the Reich Minister for the East- 
Service Office West [Dienststelle Westen] Paris or their directive 
authorities in France, Belgium and the Netherlands, declare as 
goods accruing from Action “M”, are to be transported as Armed 
Forces goods. 

b. Distribution of furniture among bombed-out persons. The 
giving up of the furniture to bomb-damaged persons is being de- 
layed in order that it may be submitted upon import into the 
Reich territory to handling by the customs. After time-losing 
determination of the value, the furniture in many cases is auc- 
tioned to the bomb-damaged persons by Chief Financial Commis- 
sioners [Oberfinanzpraesidenten] ; to avoid these red-tape proce- 
dures the following decree is proposed : 

1. Goods accruing from Action “M” are exempt from all cus- 
toms handling. For such goods there are no obligations or duties 
to pay. 

2. Bomb damaged districts announce their needs in household 
furnishing under the auspices of the competent Reich defense 
commissar to Reich Ministry for Occupied Eastern Territories — 
Central Section. The Reich Ministry instigates the immediate 
removal of the objects placed at its disposal by its service office 
West [Dienststelle Westen] and in accordance with the indica- 
tion of the Reich defense commissar ships directly to the compe- 
tent regional directorates [Gauleitungen]. These give the furni- 
ture to the persons suffering the bomb damage on a loan basis. 
The determination of the value of the furniture and the definitive 
acquisition by the person suffering the bomb damage remains in 
abeyance till a later accounting. Up to the time of reckoning the 
goods are Reich property, and are subject to the evaluation right 
of the Reich Minister for the occupied Eastern territory. 

By these proposals a type of management would be achieved 


81 


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whereby persons who have suffered bomb damage would have 
furniture and household goods at their disposal in the shortest 
possible time. And thereby also a portion of their most immedi- 
ate difficulties would be eliminated. 

Berlin, 3 October 1942 

Signed: A ROSENBERG 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 047-PS 

HOTEL KAISERHOF 
Berlin W 8 


Berlin 24 August 1931 

My dear Mr. Rosenberg: 

I am just reading in the Voelkischer Beobachter, edition 235/ 
236, page 1, an article entitled “Does Wirth intend to come over ?”. 
The tendency of the article is to prevent on our part a crumbling 
away from the present form of government. I myself am travel- 
ling all over Germany to achieve exactly the opposite. May I 
therefore ask that my own paper will not stab me in the back with 
tactically unwise articles. 

Persons, who are known to seek connection or are even pre- 
pared to break from the present constellation, are to be spared 
under all circumstances. Our fight is to be directed in the first 
line against the stubborn defenders of the present course and 
against persons who reject us. 

I ask therefore the Voelkischer Beobachter as well as the Party 
Press Office to pay punctilious attention to this in the interest of 
our work. 

With German greetings, 
signed: ADOLF HITLER 

An identical information went to Mr. Dr. Dietrich, Party Press 
Office 

signed: WILHELM BRUECKNER, Adj. 


82 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 053-PS 

The Deputy of the Reichs Ministry [Reichsministerium] for the 
Occupied Eastern Provinces with the Army Group South. — Cap- 
tain Dr. Koch 

REPORT 10 

(Concluded on 5th October 1941) 

SECRET 

(See also the morale report which will be ready in a short time 
“Legacy of the Soviets in the Ukrainian Areas” — concluded at 
the end of September 1941) 

A. The Ukraine on the Right of the Dnieper can, for all pur- 
poses, be considered as inactive. 

a. The German Wehrmacht was regarded by the populace now, 
as ever, as emancipator and liberator from physical and mental 
pressure; the political points of view at present are not as im- 
portant as the physical. 

A temporary administration was almost put in everywhere by 
the troops, especially by officers of Defense II, who were reserved 
for this, and will be enlarged upon by the field commanders under 
the direction of Section VII (military) with the commander-in- 
chief of the rear communication zone ; the proportional far-reach- 
ing net of the field and Army post command will be support and 
condensed through the organization of the office of the inspector 
of economy (especially the chief group of agriculture) which is of 
the same opinion. Occasional or regular conferences lead to uni- 
fication of the points of view. Upon my trip through the land (so 
far about 6000 km), I have tried through personal contacts, to 
work for clearness and unification as much as possible; through 
speeches, conferences, participation in informal discussions, etc., 
I have reached, so far, some 600 native village burgermeisters, 12 
larger city governments with their burgermeisters, about 500 pro- 
fessors or students, 30 ministers with their church councils and 
20 leaders of rayons or their assistants. I was asked by 4 com- 
manders-in-chief, several garrison leaders [Standortaelteste], and 
a few division commanders of various German garrisons, to lec- 
ture. I was heard by almost all Ic officers of the armies and other 
higher command posts, also some 100 agriculture leaders, 30 com- 
munications officers and 3 propaganda companies. The present 
Defense II officers gladly procured such connections for me and 
guaranteed continued execution of probable decisions. 

b. Where friction arises between German- (Retinue) sections 
and the native populations, they are not of political, but econom- 
ical or personal nature. 


83 


053-PS 


Economy. The populace is aware and understands that a very 
large part of their total harvest has to be given to the Wehrmacht 
(and economical command) ; but they resist against “unjust” and 
“individual” requisitions, that means against continued confisca- 
tion in the villages along the same large routes of march, without 
uniformly requisitioning in the country; and also against unra- 
tionalized or wild demands (the confiscation of pregnant cows, 
requisition without proper receipts, disregarding of letters of safe 
conduct issued by higher German echelons, etc.). 

Individual German economical commands made complaints, and 
rightly so, over delayed terms and quantities; in most cases it 
was found that technical hindrances were the reasons (delayed 
or curtailed orders, lack of transportation) and not malice or sabo- 
tage. The farmers reply to the oft heard remarks of their laziness 
and lack of working effort, was that they brought in the large 
harvest on their own free will without having many machines, 
manpower and the time. 

Personal. The Bolshevists, using brutal measures (such as 
prison, deportation, etc.) in general nevertheless refrained from 
punishing individuals (by whipping). Now that it occasionally is 
done by German troops, well meaning people blame it on the mis- 
understanding or ignorance of the language; but should it be done 
too often, antipathy and distrust will be created. 

Furthermore the population emphasizes the difference which 
exists between the occasional mistakes of the Germans and the 
systematic oppressions by our allies. Here especially the Ru- 
manians and Hungarians caused much gossip. The German Army 
Command, which operated for the safeguarding of German prop- 
erty in the newly acquired Rumanian special (partly drastic) 
countermeasures, [sic] 

c. A complete report on these so-called Partisan-movements 
was made on 14 Sept 1941. 

The Army High Command decided, therefore, in favor of cen- 
tralizing the work on the problem, and requested Captain Lazarek 
for this, who until now was assigned to me (Koch). 

Examples from Czernigow, Poltawa and other Army groups 
(for example, Staraja Russa near Orscha) prove that the enemy 
in the future will employ partisans using explosives and mines. 

d. The inner political interest of the population is limited at 
present to questions of administration and meritorious service in 
offices or semi-military associations. 

Of all the old, strong political parties in Kiev, only a subordi- 
nate (“Kultur”) section of the “Sojus Wyzwolennia Ukrainy” (or- 


84 


053— PS 


ganisation for the liberation of the Ukraine) could be found; 
other trails led to Shitomir, Uman, and Lemberg, but were lost 
there in some remnants of local organizations. 

Up till now, the Bandera people could not fulfill their original 
plan, the establishment of a self-supporting government in Kiev, 
since the “Command Kiew” which was to perform this, was re- 
moved by the security service [SD] in Fastow and Wassilkow; in 
the first days after the occupation of the city, they pasted small 
propaganda placards right next to the German governmental pub- 
lications, however without much result. Also handbills, in which 
it was tried to justify the attentat of Shitomir, remain ineffective. 
The burning of Kiev and the strict screening of the population 
following thereafter [Sichtungen] have caused, it seems, a (pass- 
ing) standstill in the organizational construction of the Bandera 
group. 

From the Melnyk organization it was possible to obtain a secret 
directive called “in Matters of Propaganda”; aside from the old 
and well-known requests (self-rule demands of totalitarianism, 
national socialistic philosophy of life) the following is noticeable 
in regards to the Reich’s relative points (Par. 18) : “The special 
aim is to obtain a clarification of the relations to the German fac- 
tors. It is to be pointed out that Germany is at war with Moscow 
and therefore is our ally which one must support in battle. At the 
same time it is emphasized that the opportunity of the construc- 
tion of a Ukrainian political system does not only depend alone 
on the Germans but also on our own combined organization and 
on our ability to produce. Our motto here is: “Our strength lies 
in ourselves.” (This settlement of a German policy differentiates 
itself, despite their careful composure and stipulation, fundamen- 
tally from the rules laid down by Banderas, in which — to my 
knowledge — it was, up until now, referred to as “allies”, often set 
in quotation marks but never used in connection with the specific 
references to the Reich.) 

e. A permanent security police force (military) is in every 
town. It draws its replacements from newly captured Ukrainians, 
is entirely under German command and wears the blue-yellow 
brassard ; weapons are only issued them for guard duty or patrols. 
At the beginning of September a (melnyk-friendly) group of 300- 
500 Ukrainian fugitives out of Bukaw'ia was used in the district 
Winnica-Gaisin. They are mainly serious men with some knowl- 
edge of German and up till now we received no complaints about 
their services. 

/. The fire of Kiev (24-29 September 1941) destroyed the very 


85 


053— PS 


center, that is the most beautiful and most representative part 
of the city with its two large hotels, the central Post Office, the 
radio station, the telegraph office and several department stores. 
An area of about 2 square kilometers was affected, some 50,000 
people are homeless; they were scantily housed in abandoned 
quarters. As reconciliation for the obvious sabotage, the Jews 
of the city, approximately (according to figures from the SS- 
Commands for commitment) 3,500 [sic] people, half women, were 
liquidated on the 29th and 30th September. The population took 
the execution — as much as they found out about it — calmly, many 
with satisfaction; the newly vacated homes of the Jews were 
turned over for the relief of the housing shortage. Even if cer- 
tain relief was created in a social respect, the care of the city of 
half a million is still in danger and one can already foresee food 
shortages and eventual epidemics. 

Up to date the danger of mines has not been eliminated — ac- 
cording to official reports of the engineer officers — at least 10,000 
(ten thousand!) mines were deactivated, among them, of course, 
a great number in the outskirts of the city (railroad station, civil- 
ian airport, etc.), and in the tactical forward areas; in individual 
buildings (also in museums) there were found 3*4 tons of ex- 
plosives in prepared, technically correct mine chambers ; captured 
detonator apparatus leads to the belief that other arrangements 
of similar nature were built for wireless detonation. With con- 
sideration to possible electrical mine detonation, the power supply 
has not yet been switched on and therefore most staffs and com- 
mands are functioning only with candle or poor petroleum light- 
ing. The explosion and the burning of the city caused several 
losses on officers, men and materials. 

The inhabitants of the city remain quiet and disciplined as be- 
fore ; German regulations are enforced to the best ability and 
without resistance. 

I reported over the evacuation measures of the Bolshevists in 
Kiev in my telephone conversation of the 24-29 September; the 
picture has not changed noticeably as a whole. 

g. I safe-guarded as much of the local art treasures from li- 
braries, academies, institutes and museums with my special de- 
tail (2 officers, 2 drivers) as I could. Around 20, partly large, 
objects could be safe-guarded in this manner and are at the dis- 
posal of the Reich. 

B. A uniform and supervised administration has not become 
possible in the Ukraine on the left of the Dnieper River; the 
streets to the few Dnieper bridges are swarming with prisoners 


86 


053- PS 


and fugitives, the active troop counter-traffic eastward still hasn’t 
stopped. The Bolshevists were able to trash and carry away un- 
determined quantities of the harvest, according to the populace. 
On the other hand, several evacuees, formerly of Soviet authority, 
managed to stay back in the “Kessel of Kiev” and to save them- 
selves from further deportation; the whole Kiev fire department 
with its equipment, which was evacuated by the Russians, came 
back again in a like manner on the day before the fire. In some 
cases it was possible to salvage several herds of cattle and ma- 
chinery. 

II 

The economical commands concerned and 1st Lt. Dr. Dittloff 
report through channels about the special economical situation 
of the occupied Ukrainian provinces. 

III 

With the continuation of the peace, the people are again con- 
cerned with cultui'al and religious questions: 

a. Where it was technically possible, the lower classes of 
schools were opened. The initiative (and the cost) lie with the 
inhabitants themselves. The administrative court will be held 
responsible for the political attitude of the teachers, the super- 
vision ties with the Germans. The Soviet school texts are de- 
stroyed, all communistic emblems removed from the buildings 
and institutes. 

Request by Russian (and occasionally Polish) minorities to es- 
tablish Russian (or Polish) — especially private — schools will be 
denied in all cases. 

Junior high schools, business schools, or even colleges, will not 
even be subject to discussion. 

b. A permanent press can be assumed to be existing (in a tech- 
nical sense). 

There are Ukrainian newspapers in Kamienec Podolsk, Rowne, 
Berditschew, Winnica, Shitomir, Uman, Kirowograd, Nowo- 
Ukrainka, Kriwoirog, Cherson, Nikolajew and Kiev (perhaps in 
a few other places) ; the papers are published from once to six 
times weekly and are mostly, fairly pure newspapers; some (nat- 
urally censored) articles deal with the anti-bolshevistics and in 
the field of German-Ukrainian coopei'ation (thankfulness for the 
emancipation, similar parallels, etc.). The following ground 
rules pertain to the technique of foreign propaganda : The term 
“Ukraine” can only be used in a territorial (not pertaining to 
state) sense; the Reich is not an “ally”, but a “protector” of the 
Ukraine; the German Wehrmacht is not “garrisoned” (or even 


87 


053— PS 


“occupationally army” as was formulated by several Bandera 
men) but instead “saviors”; the title “Fuehrer-Emancipator” is 
to be used when talking of Adolf Hitler, etc. ; as far as these 
directives went, they were looked upon as natural and obeyed 
without a trace of objection. 

c. Six different groups were found in the religious circles in 
the Ukrainian Province right of the Dnieper : 

1. The old Orthodox-Eastern Church (also named “Tychon” or 
“Slavian”) ; it is the closest successor of the pre-bolshevistic re- 
ligious organization and includes the greater part of the church- 
going populace, Ukrainians and Russians alike; amongst the 
priests are several pro-Russians; the rest lean toward a final re- 
establishment of the Ukraine. The strength of the group cannot 
yet be given in figures. Alone in the Shitomir province for ex- 
ample, there are 100 priests; in the city of Kiev there remained 
two small churches during the time of the Russians. Bishops 
are not present. The 83 year old Archbishop Antonij Aba- 
schidse, who was found in Kiev, is crippled and not capable of any 
conceivable service. A published appeal by the metropolite and 
so-called patriarch Sergius from Moscow to resist against 
“Fascism and the German bandits” (dated 22 June 1941) aroused 
no interest among the populace. 

2. The Ukrainian “Autokephal” Church, a (from an orthodox 
standpoint) uncanonic group, consisting of a Ukrainian, home- 
conscious people, without lawful bishops ; it constitutes a religious 
minority, but suffered especially severe persecutions from the 
Bolshevists and is composed exclusively of radical enemies of 
Moscow and Bolshevism. It has congregations and churches in 
almost all Ukrainian cities and openly pledges ties to the national- 
Ukrainian bishops in Wolhynien and to the general government. 

Its union with the first mentioned group for a permanent, anti- 
Moscow and pro-German organization is probable. The German 
authorities [Behoerde], remembering the decree of the Fuehrer, 
did not hinder the religious participation of both groups, how- 
ever instructed them, in the main intersession prayer — to first 
remember a prayer for the Fuehrer, the Reich and the German 
Wehrmacht; the instructions were carried out everywhere where 
they had been given. Larger religious services (in open places, 
etc.) were often requested, but have so far been rejected. 

3. The Synodale (also “Erneuerungs Synodale” or “Lebende”) 
church. It is justified by laws of the church; however it stands 
at present near an agreement with the Soviet government. Their 


88 


053— PS 


services where requested — for example in Berditschow — were not 
permitted. 

4. The Roman-Catholic Church. Within the framework of the 
German military administration, only one religious service was 
permitted at the old cathedral in Shitomir (16 Sept 41), but was 
stopped because of the following “misuse of the trust placed in 
the (Polish) local priests.” The Roman-Catholic cathedral of 
Shitomir was closed again for Latin and Polish services and 
might be taken over by the Ukrainian-Orthodox congregation. 

5. The Sect of the Altglaeubigen (Russian and Ukrainian 
“Raskolniki”) . 

6. Sects converted to Protestantism (Adventists, Baptists, 
Evangelical Christians, Stundists, etc.) . 

Both sect groups did not request religious services and did not 
openly come into appearance and can be regarded as harmless. 

Special director Dr. Stumpp, who was especially appointed for 
this, reported on the situation of the Evangelical Congregations 
in the German Settling Space; he is at present with Lt. Vohrer in 
the German settlement on the Black Sea. 

IV 

Next Intentions for the Future : 

As soon (around the end of October) as the civilian adminis- 
tration occupies the whole territory right of the Dnieper and 
their Headquarters are established in Kiev, I will follow — pro- 
viding no other commands are given — the high command of the 
Army Group South and report at that place. 

For the time, after the conclusion of the Eastern campaign, I 
request permission for special proposals. 

signed : GIRUS KOCH 

Captain 


89 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 054-PS 


The Reichminister 

For The Occupied Eastern Territories C.P., 7 October 1942 
The Representative at the Army Sector B. L 14/10 

To the Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories, 
Chief Section I, 

BERLIN, Unter den Linden 63. 

Reprint to Captain Lorenz Hq. of the High Command of the 
Army 

Subject: Treatment of Ukrainian Specialists. 

Enclosures : — 2 — 

Attached I send you the copy of a report made by the Com- 
mandant of the Collecting Center for Specialists at Charkow. 
(report submitted at the end of September 1942) as well as the 
copy of a letter from April 1942. 

Relative to the treatment of Ukrainian specialists in the Reich, 
I was asked by the Chief of Staff of the Commander in Chief to 
attend to the matter most emphatically since the complaints here 
never cease. I have discussed it thoroughly with the chief of sec- 
tion VII at the Commander in Chief’s. I went to see Captain 
Schmid and visited the camp. As synopsis of the discussions with 
the gentlemen and reading of reports the following can be estab- 
lished in general: 

a. With some few exceptions the Ukrainians employed indi- 
vidually in the Reich e.g. at small trade plants, as agricultural 
laborers, as domestic helps, etc., are very satisfied with their con- 
ditions. 

b. The Ukrainians sheltered in the community camps, however, 
complain very much. 

The enclosed report of Captain Schmid reports these matters 
in detail. 

The question of treatment of the Ukrainians, transported to the 
Reich as workers of the East worries the bureaus of the Army 
concerned a great deal. The Commander in Chief urged me to 
visit some of the camps in the Reich myself as soon as possible 
and to report to the proper authorities in order to bring about 
immediate relief. The Army zone is by no means satisfied. All 
the circumstances of discontent contribute more and more to 
more people joining the bands or wandering away to the camp 
of the Bandera esp. other groups hostile to us. 

The best propaganda of all would be to treat the workers of 
the East well; great demands are not made by the Ukrainians 
anyhow. If their treatment will only be somewhat better and hu- 


90 


054— PS 


manely decent these people, who make in part a good impression, 
will be more than satisfied; these people after all came to the 
Greater German Reich — at least at the beginning of the employ- 
ment of workers of the East in the Reich — of their own free will 
and full of hope. The unsuitable treatment described in the re- 
ports is hardly propaganda and is not profitable for us. After all, 
we are not at war with the Ukrainian population and certainly 
not with people who by their voluntary enlistment for labor, help 
us to w r in the war. 

It also would serve our purposes definitely better to utilize the 
specialist in his specialty. 

[signed] THEURER 

(Theurer) 
1st Lieutenant 


Copy of Copy 

Collecting Center for Skilled Workers at Charkow. 

Captain Schmid, Commandant. 

To the Commander of the Army Sector B., Section VII 
CHARKOW 

Subject: Abuses in the treatment of Ukrainian skilled workers. 

By reason of my capacity as commandant of the Collecting Cen- 
ter for skilled workers and the transport of skilled workers to the 
Reich connected with it and thereby being in touch with the vari- 
ous groups of the Ukrainian population, I am informed of the 
morale of the Ukrainians in the extended surroundings of the 
Eastern Ukraine. Resulting from this knowledge I have to state 
that an atmosphere of animosity has taken the place of the origi- 
nal attitude toward the Reich. This sudden change of mood is 
connected partly with the scarcity of food for the civilian popu- 
lation caused by the war and intensified by the measures for 
centralization. The more important motive — the extreme abuses 
which have taken place at various times in the treatment of 
skilled workers shipped to Germany. 

Since a prosperous economic cooperation with the 35 million 
people of the Ukraine lies within the interest of our coming gen- 
erations and since the Ukrainians themselves are organically 
healthy, very capable of development and rich in valuable and 
willing constructive forces, it is necessary to prevent in time an 
estrangement starting at the roots and to recognize the begin- 
nings of the disastrous development before it is too late, and to 
take effective countermeasures. 


91 


054-PS 


I. Abuses in recruiting . 

At the beginning of the action the recruiting worked on the 
basis of voluntary enlistment. Later on a certain pressure had 
to be put on to reach certain minimum quotas. This however did 
not give a license to the starosts and to their militia, entrusted 
with the drafting, to the brutalities mentioned in the following. 

The starosts esp. village elders are frequently corruptible, 
they continue to have the skilled workers, whom they drafted, 
dragged from their beds at night to be locked up in cellars until 
they are shipped. Since the male and female workers often are 
not given any time to pack their luggage, etc., many skilled 
workers arrive at the Collecting Center for Skilled Workers with 
equipment entirely insufficient (without shoes, only two dresses, 
no eating and drinking utensils, no blankets, etc.). In particularly 
extreme cases new arrivals therefore have to be sent back again 
immediately to get the things most necessary for them. If people 
do not come along at once, the threatening and beating of skilled 
workers by the above mentioned militia is a daily occurrence and 
is reported from most of the communities. In some cases women 
were beaten until they could no longer march. One bad case in 
particular was reported by me to the commander of the civil po- 
lice here (colonel Samek) for severe punishment (place Sozolin- 
kow, district Dergatschi). The encroachments of the starosts and 
the militia are of a particularly grave nature because they usually 
justify themselves by claiming that all that is done in the name of 
the German Armed Forces. In reality the latter have conducted 
themselves almost throughout in a highly understanding manner 
toward the skilled workers and the Ukrainian population. The 
same, however, can not be said of some of the administrative 
agencies. To illustrate this be it mentioned, that a woman once ar- 
rived being dressed with barely more than a shirt. 

Particularly distressing is the fact that, on account of issued 
ordnances to prevent smuggling, all food acquired by the skilled 
workers and the rest of the population by buying or bartering 
household utensils, etc., is being taken away by the militia on the 
way. This is not rarely accompanied by beatings (without regard 
to objections or given circumstances). 

It happened that skilled workers who came to Germany had 
sold or bartered their own belongings partly or completely in that 
way, thus they owned neither household furniture, etc., nor any 
other goods or food. By combatting smuggling in that manner, 
unfortunately only too often very poor people are being affected 
and robbed of their last property, while the real smugglers are 


92 


054 PS 


hard to catch. Furthermore food has disappeared from the mar- 
ket due to a freezing of prices. 

Family members left behind and formerly supported by those 
who went to Germany get social care. This, however, is only the 
case in the city of Charkow, not in the case of people on the coun- 
try (note : used to be the case, now all get special food distribu- 
tion, the hardship thus is removed). The taking away of food 
esp. the sale of goods mentioned above often results in consider- 
able hardships for those left behind and has sometimes strong ef- 
fects, since neither communal nor reciprocal assistance exist here. 

Very depressing for the morale of the skilled workers and the 
population is the effect of those persons shipped back from Ger- 
many for having become disabled or not having been fit for labor 
commitment from the very beginning. Several times already 
transports of skilled workers on their way to Germany have 
crossed returning transports of such disabled persons and have 
stood on the tracks alongside of each other for a long period of 
time. These returning transports are insufficiently cared for. 
Nothing but sick, injured and weak people, mostly 50-60 to a car, 
are usually escorted by 3-4 men. There is neither sufficient care or 
food. The returnees made frequently unfavorable — but surely 
exaggerated — statements relative to their treatment in Germany 
and on the way. As a result of all this and of what the people 
could see with their own eyes, a psychosis of fear was evoked 
among the specialist workers esp. the whole transport to Ger- 
many. Several transport leaders — of the 62nd and the 63rd in 
particular-reported thereto in detail. In one case the leader of the 
transport of skilled workers observed with his own eyes how a 
person who died of hunger was unloaded from a returning trans- 
port on the side track [1st Lt. Hoffmann of the 63rd transport, 
Station Darniza]. Another time it was reported that 3 dead had 
to be deposited by the side of the tracks on the way and had to be 
left behind unburied by the escort. It is also regrettable that these 
disabled persons arrive here without any identification. Accord- 
ing to the reports of the transport commanders one gets the im- 
pression that these persons unable to work are assembled, penned 
into the wagons and are sent off provided only by a few men 
escort, and without special care for food and medical or other 
attendance. The Labor Office at the place of arrival as well as 
the transport commanders confirm this impression. 


693256— 46— T 


93 


054 PS 




II. Deficiencies on Transport 

During the transport to Germany provisions should be made 
for food, water and drink, answering the call of nature, medical 
care, orderly transportation, avoidance of maltreatment, delousing 
according to regulation, and supervision. To take care of all this a 
military escort is detailed consisting of 1 car commander for each 
car, 1 train guard for every 6 cars, 1 supply man for every 5 cars, 
and 1 control staff for every 3 cars. This is the minimum strength 
required according to corresponding reports of all transport 
commanders. With less than that orderly care and transporta- 
tion of specialists is no longer secured. It has been often con- 
firmed that insufficient and uninstructed escorts caused fatal acci- 
dents, insufficient food and care, escape of hundreds of workers, 
most brutal maltreatment with consequent disorder and confu- 
sion. Unfortunately the escorts were depleted on the way in 
various manners by Army details esp. by commanders for the 
supervision of furloughs or after the transports were taken over 
by the police. This always affected the transports unfavorably. 
The transports, commanders are instructed to secure the interests 
of the transports by all possible means against encroachments of 
all kind. They are of vital importance for the Great German 
Reich. 

Recently the practice started of handing the transports over to 
new escorts in Przemysl. These escorts are under the command 
of a delegate of the German Labor Front or the Ministry of La- 
bor. This practice is clearly against the regulations and rules of 
the Reich Marshal and the Deputy General for Labor Supply. 
Taking a good management of the transport by the delegates 
for granted, incoming reports here list the following de- 
ficiencies: The escorts are understaffed which causes in part 
lack of care and food and rough treatment, doctors and released 
female domestic helpers are detained in camps without authority 
for want of supplementary identification papers, social care is 
lacking. A verbal report at hand relates in detail and with the 
witnesses the irresponsibility and indecent conduct of delegate 
Albert Nuessen who took over the 62nd transport. The transfer 
to the camp is made as fast as possible and not perfect. The rail- 
road offices are of course directed to support the transport com- 
manders. Unfortunately, however, some of the office chiefs of the 
railroad treat the transports of specialists often as very imma- 
terial. The chief of transportation in Romodan e.g. stated to a 
transport commander that these transports are not important. 
Yet the Fuehrer himself ordered these transports, and the prob- 




t 


K 


to 

fe 

m; 


1 

I 

% 


94 


054-PS 


lem of work power was declared to be the most important and 
urgent in order to increase the potential of armament! 

The food situation of the transports is now somewhat improved 
after giving right notice ahead of time. Previously some of the 
food stations failed grossly. However, it happens again and again 
that in spite of giving advance notice of the transports strength 
in time, no warm or cold food is ready or available. Sometimes 
this is due to military or hospital transports which passed 
through before. This can be easily understood. Sometimes, how- 
ever, the notice was not passed on or simply nothing at all was 
done. In the Reich it is generally better. Of course it happens 
when trains are detoured a great deal of the specialists go hungry 
for days. The iron ration is always taken along and also used. 
It mostly depends on the transport commander and the office 
chief for social care how unforeseen food difficulties are over- 
come. The Army offices show always greatest understanding for 
supplying these transports, the deputies of the labor front most 
of the time fulfill their appointments well, however some of the 
deputies of the attendance service have completely failed in their 
duties. The transport commanders are instructed to give exact 
names and conditions in the future. The red cross which at times 
is overburdened helps with the supplying; unfortunately, how- 
ever, the attitude and behavior of many female red cross workers 
toward the specialists is based often on uncomprehension of the 
Fuehrer’s great action in regard to Eastern workers, and they 
treat especially the female workers in an outrageous manner. 
Food also has been refused at times, with the reference that these 
were “Russian swine.” Nobody pays attention to the fact that 
these are Ukrainians, because there is a lack of information to 
that effect. In reference to this, attention is called to the fact 
that it has happened on several occasions that people have broken 
out of the cars after several days of hungering, hurried into the 
nearby villages, sold their goods and acquired food. In such cases 
of course, it is not to be expected that they all come back. Such 
gross incidents of the transports of the first months have not, 
to our knowledge been repeated in the summer. However, it has 
been reported that about 500 workers escaped along the route 
out of a transport which started from Kiev, accompanied by only 
a few policemen, supposedly 5 in all, (and without medical per- 
sonnel) and which convoy was badly supplied and taken care of. 

To understand the supply problem, it is important to know 
that often only a short time is being alloted for the feeding of 
the many hundred people by the train commander or the rail- 
way station officer. Therefore all the workers can only be fed 


95 


054-PS 


before the departure of the train if there is a sufficient amount of 
accompanying and attendance personnel and if the food is handed 
out quickly at several distributing points; in addition close co- 
operation of the workers is needed. Because the transports must 
often stop 1-3 Km outside of the stations it still happens fre- 
quently that a small part of the workers remains without rations 
because the engineers, in spite of agreements and the stationmaster 
let the trains take off without warning. On the basis of reported 
incidents, attention must be called to the fact that it is irrespon- 
sible to keep the workers locked in the cars for many hours so 
that they cannot even take care of the calls of nature. It is evi- 
dent that the people of a transport must be given an opportu- 
nity from time to time to get drinking water, to wash, and in 
order to relieve themselves. Cars have been showed in which peo- 
ple had made holes so they they could take care of the calls of 
nature. When nearing bigger stations persons should, if possible 
relieve themselves far from these stations. 

The following abuses were reported from the delousing sta- 
tions: In the women’s and girls’ shower rooms, services was 
partly performed by men or men would mingle around or even 
helped with the soaping ! ; and vice versa, there was female per- 
sonnel in the men’s shower rooms ; men also for some time were 
taking photographs in the women’s shower rooms. Since mainly 
Ukrainian peasants were transported in the last months, as far 
as the female portion of these are concerned they are mostly of a 
high moral standard and used to strict decency, they must have 
considered such a treatment as a national degradation. The 
above mentioned abuses have been, according to our knowledge, 
settled by the intervention of the transport commanders. The 
reports of the photographing were made from Halle ; the reports 
about the former were made from Kiewerce. Such incidents in 
complete disregard of the honor and respect of the Greater Ger- 
man Reich may still occur again here or there. 


III. Abuses inside Germany 

Undoubtedly the higher authorities in the Reich do everything 
to attend, in the best manner, to the workers from the East, es- 
pecially from the Ukraine, who have been called to Germany. In 
most of the enterprises, too, in the countries and in households, 
one is not only satisfied most of the time with the Ukrainian 
women and girls as help, but they are also treated with a happy 
solicitude and with understanding for their position and for our 
relations to the Ukraine. 


tic 

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at- 


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054- PS 


Here too, unfortunately voices are heard that tell of bad treat- 
ment in the collecting as well as other camps. All the time people 
tell about beatings and thrashings and constantly also they write 
about them. It seems that especially these men who have func- 
tions pertaining to order and security violate sometimes very 
much the limits of admissibility and identify the Ukrainians as 
Bolsheviks while they have actually for decades opposed them- 
selves to Bolshevism as its natural enemies. The camp com- 
manders also, usually show no understanding for the Ukrainians. 
The treatment in the camps is described as being bad and very 
brutal. 

With regard to food, it is being felt in Germany that in a war 
for life and death, it is but natural to impose harsh restrictions in 
the first place on foreigners who have been up to the present in 
the enemy's camps. No doubt the Reich and the businesses make 
efforts to keep the workers who were brought in, in good health 
and working condition. If abuses take place here, it is harmful 
to ourselves and should be remedied in each single case. 

Disadvantageous also is the fact that a great portion of the 
German population considers the Ukrainian labor forces as their 
worst enemies and as Russian Bolshevists and treat them accord- 
ingly. A definite clarification is urgently needed here. In the 
face of such an attitude of the Ukraine it will be completely im- 
possible to have for decades and centuries a successful and du- 
rable solution for the great economical and political problem of 
the East especially of the Southern part. 

Until recently the postal communication problem of the 
specialists with their country was not fully solved and gave cause 
to ill rumor and depression. At present an improvement is being 
planned. 

Here in the Ukraine thousands of recruiting notices and pla- 
cards have been put out to get cooperation from the people and 
urging them to report to the Reich with the assurance of best 
treatment. Therefore, considering this and also the above men- 
tioned abuses, it would seem to be of interest to the Reich, and 
necessary for the security of our future race and to prevent a 
I later evil, to prevent by all means an alienation of the Ukraine 
with its precious territories and population by settling vicious 
abuses and by a clarification of the situation. 




97 


054-PS 


Certified True Copy C. P. 5 Oct 1942. 

[illegible signature] 

Envelope 

At the V.O. of the Reichs Ministry for the occupied territories of 
the East. 

Deputy with Army, Territory B. 

Official seal. 

Copy of Copy 

Copy of a letter of graduate engineer given to the Specialist 
Collecting Camp. 

(Translated from the original in the Specialist Collecting Camp.) 

27 April 42 

• Camp Dabendorf, Berlin 

Reich Railway direction. 
Mister Franz H. Ergard and H. Nester! 

Good Day! 

As I have told you in my letter of 20 Apr. 42, we have been 
transported to the Grunewald Railroad car repair factories. In 
the first week. I have worked as a manual laborer in the main 
warehouse of the works. I have unloaded coal, have dug the 
ground and have stacked lumber. This is supposed to be the “em- 
ployment of Specialists” in their own line of work. The question 
constantly arises, why did I go to Germany, maybe that I who 
volunteered as a specialist (graduate engineer) for Germany, am 
to be transformed into a banned prisoner? I wonder why? What 
misdeeds have I committed against Germany? On the contrary, 
I have believed all those who spoke in Charkow about the worker’s 
life in Germany. My attitude toward Germany has remained kind 
and friendly, I want to work, but I do not want to be led astray, 
to be treated as a civilian prisoner and without any care, or as a 
forgotten man who can find nowhere and receives from nobody, 
care and moral backing. I had hoped that we would be treated 
humanely and quite differently. It should be clear that I did not 
come to Germany to beg for charity. I had a job in Charkow and 
a decent working place; this I have renounced for the good of 
Germany and sacrificed for the improvement of the condition of 
my family. It was clear to me that I had to help that state that 
delivered me from the Bolshevist yoke, from this yoke under 
which I had to live for 24 years. Now I had expected a better 
future for myself. Our food ration consists of: at 4 o’clock in the 
morning % of a liter of tea, in the evening at 6 o’clock % of a 
liter of soup and 250 grams of bread a day. That is all. With such 
food we have to dig the ground and great requirements are made 


98 


054-PS 


from us just like from manual laborers. On account of the under- 
nourishment and the heavy work I am weak and exhausted today 
and I don’t know if I can endure and survive this much longer. 
To what conditions thoughtlessness can drive a man ! Into a con- 
dition which will probably not be pleasant to anybody. 

I beg you all, deliver me, help that I can go back to my family ! 
If this is impossible, ease my condition otherwise I may commit 
a stupidity, escape or suicide. 

There is no possibility to continue to live like this. 

Your, 

Grigori. 

P.S. : Expect with impatience to hear from you. What is the 

possibility of sending me a work suit which in my stupidity I 
have not taken along. 

Certified copy of Original 5 Oct. 42 
Mamperl, employee 

(At the V. 0. of the Reich Ministry of the occupied territories of 
the East. Deputy with Army, Territory B.) 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 055-PS 

SECRET 
[rubber stamp] 

German Reichs Ministry for the Occupied Regions of the East, 
Director of Group P4. 

P 4/894 a/44g Department: Goepel 

Berlin, 12 Sept. 1944 
Prinz Louis Ferdinand Str. 

Received. Bau 9/12 

DECREE 

1. To the Chief of the Political Directorate Staff, In the Building 

Subject: Presentation of a list of works of art which have been 
shipped back from the Ukraine. . 

The Reichs Commissar for the Ukraine has stored the works 
of art and paintings shipped in from Kiev and Charkow, in the 
following storage places in East Prussia: 

1. Domain Bichau bei Wehlau. 

2. Manor House Wildenhoff (Owner Count Schwerin). 
Concerned are 65 chests whose contents will be given completely 
in the enclosure. There is as yet no inventory of some further 20 
chests, 57 folios and one role of engravings. There are a great 


99 


055-PS 


many of the oldest icons, works of famous masters of the German, 
Dutch and Italian schools of the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries, as 
well as works of the best Russian artists of the 18th and 19th 
centuries. On the whole, the contents include the most valuable 
works of the known Ukrainian art possession, which in themselves 
represent a value of many millions after a cursory appraisal. 
Beyond that they have a high ethical and cultural-political mean- 
ing as the only collections of this sort in the German orbit with 
international repute with which the Reich wishes to carry out a 
collaboration at present or in the future. 

In accordance with the ordinance of the Reichs Chancellery of 
18 Nov. 1940 — Rk. 15 666 B (enclosure 2) it appears necessary to 
submit a list of the contents to the Fuehrer. I request your sig- 
nature on the proposed list which is enclosed. 

2. Disseminate immediately. 

(Copies for signature were presented in pencil (to Ministry and 
Chancellery of party on 15 Sept. 1944.) 

Sv. 9/15 


German Reichs Ministry for the Occupied Regions of the East 
Director of Group P 4 
P 894a/44 

Berlin, 14 Sept. 1944 
Prinz Louis Ferdinand-str. 2 

Phone: 16 45 61 
Received: Bau 14.9.44 


DECREE 
[Rubber stamp] SECRET 

1. To the Reichs Minister 

Via Chief of the Political Directorate Staff, in the Building 

Subject: Works of art shipped back from Ukraine. 

The Reichs Commissar for the Ukraine has stored the works 
of art and paintings shipped in from Kiev and Charkow in the 
following storage places in East Prussia: 

1. Domain Richau bei Wehlau. 

2. Manor House Wildenhoff (Owner Count Schwerin). 
Concerned are 65 chests whose contents will be given completely 
in the enclosure. There is as yet no inventory of some further 
20 chests, 57 folios and one role of engravings. There are great 
many of the oldest icons, works of famous masters of the Ger- 


100 


055— PS 


man, Dutch and Italian schools of the 16th, 17th and 18th cen- 
turies, as well as works of the best Russian artists of the 18th 
and 19th centuries. On the whole the contents include the most 
valuable works of the known Ukrainian art possession, which 
in themselves represent a value of many millions after a cursory 
appraisal. Beyond that they have a high ethic and cultural-po- 
litical meaning as the only collections of this sort in the German 
orbit with international repute with which the Reich wishes to 
carry out a collaboration at present or in the future. 

I request an acknowledgement. 

In accordance with the decree of the Reichs Chancellory of 
18 Nov. 1940 — RK. 15 666 B — a list of the contents was presented 
to the Fuehrer. 

2. Disseminate. 

[initialed] US 14/9 


September 1944 
16 43 61 

• received Bau 14.9.44 
The Chief of the Political Directorate Staff 

DECREE 

[rubber stamp] SECRET 


P 894a/44g 

1. To the Reichs Chancellory 
(1) Berlin W 8 

Wilhelmstr. 

Re: Reservation for the Fuehrer [Fuehrervorbehalt] of works 

of art from the occupied territories of the East. 

According to an expression of the Fuehrer’s will (communica- 
tion to the Director of the Gallery of Paintings in Dresden — File 
number: RK 10 811 B) it is required to report all treasures of art 
which have been shipped back from the occupied territories of the 
•East. I submit, therefore, in the enclosure a list of the items 
from the museums of Kiev and Charkow which are at present 
stored in East Prussia with a request for acknowledgement. 

2. Disseminate. 

By direction. 

US 9/14 


101 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 057-PS 


NATIONAL SOCIALISTIC GERMAN WORKERS PARTY 
Party-Chancellory 
The Head of the Party-Chancellory 
Fuehrer headquarters, the 30.5.1944 
[Fuehrerhauptquartier] 

SECRET 

[Receipt Stamp] 

CHANCELLORY ROSENBERG 
Dated 7 June 1944 Nr. 041 K 
(Marked) Shown to RL 7/6 

Circular Letter 125/44 Secret 
(not for publication) 

Concerns: Justice exercised by the people against Anglo-Amer- 
ican murderers. 

In the last few weeks low-flying English and American flyers 
have repeatedly shot children playing in squares, women and 
children at work in the fields, peasants plowing, vehicles on the 
highways, trains, etc. from a low altitude with their aircraft guns 
[Bordwaffen], and have thus murdered defenseless civilians — 
particularly women and children — in the vilest manner. 

Several instances have occurred where members of the crews 
of such aircraft who have bailed out or have made forced land- 
ings were lynched on the spot immediately after capture by the 
populace which was incensed to the highest degree. 

No police measures or criminal proceedings were invoked 
against the German civilians who participated in these incidents. 

signed M. BORMANN. 

Distributed List: 

Members of the Executive Board of the NSDAP [Reichsleiter] 
Regional leaders [Gauleiter] 

Leaders of the incorporated and affiliated organizations of the 
Party [Verbandefuehrer] 

District leaders [Kreisleiter] 

[STAMPED] 

For Cognizance to 

1) Staff Leader 
[Stableiter] 

2) Central Office 

Authenticated: 

Friedrichs 




102 


057 — PS 


30.5.1944 

To all Province and District Leaders: 

Concerns: Circular letter 125/44 Secret. 

The leader of the Party-Chancellory requests that the local 
group leaders [Ortagruppenleiter] be instructed concerning the 
content of this circular letter orally only. 

signed: FRIEDRICHS 

Authenticated : 

Karms 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 058-PS 

[Letterhead of the NSDAP Party Chancellery] 

The Director of the Party Chancellery 
Fuehrer Headquarters 

30 Sept 1944 

Circular letter 288/44g 
SECRET 

[Rubber stamped] 

Chancellery Rosenberg 
Received 3 Oct 1944 Nr 09640 
Shown to Reichsleiter 3/10 
Filed circular letter secret 

Subject : Reorganization of the concerns of prisoners of war. 

1. The Fuehrer has ordered under the date 25 Sept 1944 : 

The custody of all prisoners of war and interned persons, as 
well as prisoner of war camps, and institutions with guards are 
transferred to the commander of the reserve army from Octo- 
ber 1, 1944. 

For all questions which have to do with the fulfilling of the 
agreement of 1939, as well as affairs of the police and aid so- 
cieties, and for the affairs of the German prisoners of war in the 
enemies hands, the high command of the military forces will give 
particulars of the transfer and the delineation of the twofold 
duties in direct consultation with the commander of the reserve 
army and the divisions of the military forces. 

2. The Reichsf uehrer SS has commanded : 

a. In my capacity as commander of the reserve army, I transfer 
the affairs of prisoners of war to Gottlob Berger, SS-lieut. gen- 
eral and [SS-Obergruppenfuehrer und General der Waffen-SS] 
chief of staff of the Volksturm. 

b. The commanders of prisoners of war with the individual 


103 


058— PS 


military commands are subject to the command of the senior SS 
officer effective as of 1 October 1944. 

[Rubber stamp] For cognizance to 

1) Chief of Staff 

2) Central Office 

Back to chancellery 

c. The mobilization of labor of the prisoners of war will be 
organized with the present labor mobilization office in joint 
action between SS-Lieut. General Berger [SS-Obergruppen- 
fuehrer] and SS-Lieut. General Pohl. 

The strengthening of security in the field of prisoner of war 
affairs is to be accomplished between SS-Lieut. General Berger 
and the Chief of the Security Police, SS-Lieut. Gen. Dr. Kalten- 
brunner. 

d. Particulars of the transfer will be determined in joint action 
between SS-Lieut. Gen. Berger and the Chief of the General 
Office of the Military Forces, General Reineck. 

3. The Reichsfuehrer SS has also commanded: 

All camp and labor commands are immediately to investigate 
with respect to. security and suppression of any attempt at up- 
rising, and to take all the proper measures. In this connection I 
order that from now on, all canned goods which the prisoners' re- 
ceive in packages are to be cut open and must be given to the 
prisoners opened because of the notes and tools which are often 
hidden in the cans. This treatment is to be accorded to any 
canned goods of prisoners which have been saved unopened up 
to now. 

4. I am passing this new order on for information. As soon as 
further details of the transfer, future treatment of the affairs 
of prisoners of war, and the exact delineation of the tasks of the 
Reichsfuehrer SS and of the High Command are established, I 
shall forward them. 

I request you work in closest collaboration with the offices to 
whom the responsibility of the affairs of the prisoners of war 
was transferred. 

signed: M. BORMANN 

Distribution : 

Reich Directorate 

Gauleiter 

Chiefs of the organizations affiliated with NSDAP. 

[ V erbaendef uehrer ] 

Authenticated: Suergart [?] 

File word : Prisoners of War 

Order number 8810 


104 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 061 -PS 


N S D A P 
Party Chancellory 

11 January 1944 

Leader of Party Chancellory 
Fuehrer’s Headquarters 
Announcement 9/44 secret 

SECRET 

Re ; Supply of Bombed Districts 

Since the supply of textiles and household goods for the bombed 
populations is becoming increasingly difficult, the proposition was 
made repeatedly to effect purchases in the occupied territories in 
greater proportions. Various district leaders proposed to let 
these purchases be handled by suitable private merchants who 
know these districts and have corresponding connections. 

I have brought these proposals to the attention of the National 
Economic Minister and am quoting his reply of 16 December 1943 
on account of its fundamental importance: I consider it a spe- 
cially important task to make use of the economic power of the 
occupied territories for the Nation. You are aware of the fact 
that since the occupation of the Western territories the buying 
out of these countries has been affected in the greatest proportion. 
Raw r materials, semi-finished products and stocks of finished goods 
have been rolling to Germany for months, valuable machines 
were sent to our armaments industry. Everything was done at 
that time to increase our armament potentialities. Later on the 
shipments of these important economic goods were replaced by 
the so-called distribution of orders from industry to industry. 
These measures are running smoothly and with good success for a 
long time. They were again strengthened these last few months 
because we were more than ever before forced by the shutting- 
down of the consumer goods industry in favor of armament to use 
the economic powers of the Western occupied territories for these 
German needs. 

With the growing volume of the distribution of orders the 
black-market also lost more ground and the termination of prod- 
ucts as to kind, quality and price was taken into our hands much 
more effectively. In the spring of this year, therefore, the 
Reichsmarschal was able to decide to prohibit all black-market 
purchases through German agencies. Since, besides the indus- 
trial fabrication from old stocks and from uncontrollable produc- 
tion in the Western occupied territories, certain supplies always 
exist which are not covered by the industrial displacement, the 
proper German agencies have received the order from me to get 


105 


06 1 -PS 


also these free stocks of finished goods besides securing produc- 
tion for the displacement. In doing so, one must not form a 
wrong idea of the amount of these stocks. They usually are not 
as big as they might appear to be in the display window of some 
cities of the Western territories. These purchases are being made 
under the control of central purchase agencies and according to 
the regulations of the national agencies. Moreover, these pur- 
chases have already been in the hands of German companies 
proven in foreign business. Since, in addition to these firms, 
buyers have recently acted who used to be active in the black- 
market and are not sufficiently competent nor always reliable, I 
have formed recently for France and Belgium each a common 
buying office for the companies permitted for certain businesses. 
It is the task of these offices to purchase the finished goods with- 
out disturbing the distribution of orders specially for the supply 
for air attack losses. These offices represent a coordination of 
the especially experienced German companies in Belgium and 
France. Among them are, for instance, also a number of re- 
spectable Hamburg firms. The offices are getting general direc- 
tions from the Reich offices as to which goods are urgently needed 
for the provision for bombed out people. Besides, it is up to 
their private economical initiative to develop fully these possibili- 
ties, on which I am also putting the greatest importance. 

Accordingly, I may assume that your proposals have already 
been carried out. Difficulties in the delivery of the goods to the 
Reich are solely due to the present specially strained transport 
situation. Frequently during the last few weeks it was not pos- 
sible to bring in even the most important goods destined for the 
bombed out civilians from the Western occupied territories. 
Upon an improvement of the transport situation, the provision 
with these goods will also improve. Special actions, therefore, 
can also not change this situation. They would only disturb the 
order of the practice established after many troubles. 

Signed M. Bormann 

Distribution : 

Reichsleiter 
Gauleiter 
Verbaendefuehrer 
Correct [signed] Goerz 

Subject index: Household goods — Airwar measures — Textiles 

— Supplies 


106 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 062-PS 


NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY 
The Deputy of the Fuehrer 
[Receipt Stamp: 

Chancellery Rosenberg 
No. 941, dated 1 April 1940] 

Munich 33, 13 March 1940 

Bi’own House 

TOP SECRET! 

(Initialled) : R 
DIRECTIVE A 5/40 g- 

Subject: Instructions to the civilian population regarding ap- 
propriate behavior in case of landings of enemy planes or para- 
chutists in German territory [Reichsgebiet] 

The French civilian population was directed officially and by 
radio how to behave in case of landings by German planes. 

On account of this fact the Commander in Chief of the Air 
Force has requested me to instruct the civilian population cor- 
respondingly by means of party channels. 

The attached direct-ions as to procedure are to be disseminated 
only orally via district leaders [Kreisleiter] , local municipal 
leaders [Ortsgruppenleiter], cell leaders [Zellenleiter], block 
leaders [Blockleiter], leaders of the incorporated and affiliated or- 
ganizations of the party. Transmittal by official orders, posters, 
press or radio is prohibited. 

1 enclosure 
Authenticated : 

(F.d.R.) 

FRIEDRICHS 

signed: R. HESS 

OFFICIAL STAMP: TOP SECRET 

(gives the exact routine instructions how to handle state secrets) 

1. This is a state secret in the sense of par. 88 Reich Criminal 
Code in the wording of the law of 24 April 1934. German laws 
of 1934 Vol. 1 p. 341 ff. 

2. To be passed on only personally or upon personal written 
request in two envelopes against receipt certificate. 

3. Transmission if possible through courier or trusted person- 
ality; in case of postal transmission as money-letter (value 1050 
marks) . 

4. Multiplication of any kind as well as making of excerpts is 
prohibited. 


107 


062-PS 


5. Recipient responsible for safe keeping. Violation of this 
results in severest punishment. 

DISTRIBUTION 

Members of the Executive Board of the NSDAP 

Regional Leaders 

Adjutant’s Office of the Fuehrer 

Liaison Staff of the NSDAP 

Reich Organization Directorate 

Reich Propaganda Directorate 

Reich Student Leadership 

SS Gruppenfuehrer HEYDRICH. 


INCLOSURE TO DIRECTIVE— A 5/40 g 
Direction about behavior in case of landings of enemy planes 
• or parachutists 

1. Each enemy plane landing on German soil is to be put under 
effective protection immediately. 

2. The airmen are to be arrested at once, and, first of all, a 
restarting as well as the destruction or burning of the plane or 
its contents are to be prevented. 

3. It is to be kept especially in mind that each part of the 
plane, even the smallest, or of the equipment of the airmen is 
important and of the utmost significance to the competent service 
office. The retaining of any objects — possibly as souvenirs — is 
detrimental to the country’s defense, and will be punished as loot- 
ing according to law. This category includes also, i. e. notebooks, 
letters, postal cards, either in the plane or in the clothing of killed 
or wounded airmen. Any attempt by enemy airmen to destroy 
such objects is to be prevented by all means. 

4. Likewise, enemy parachutists are immediately to be arrested 
or liquidated [Unschadlich Gemacht]. 

5. The nearest military or constabulary post is to be informed 
at once. 


108 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 064 PS 


[Letterhead — NSDAP] 

The Deputy of the Fuehrer 
Chief of Staff 

at present in Berlin, 27 Sept 40 
Bo-An 

[Rubber stamp] 

Chancellery Rosenberg 
Received No. 2565. 1 Oct 194.0 

To 

Reichsleiter A. Rosenberg 
Berlin W 35 
Margaretenstr. 17 

Dear party member Rosenberg: 

I am sending you a photostatic copy of a letter from Gauleiter 
Florian dated 23 Sept 1940 and I request you to take action on it. 

Heil Hitler ! 

Yours very respectfully 
signed: M. BORMANN 


Enclosure 

[Letterhead of the NSDAP] 

Duesseldorf 

Duesseldorf 23 Sept 1940 

Gauleitung • 

Subject: Lecture of Major General von RABENAU 

Our file: Fl./V. 

Department: The Gauleiter 

Personal 
[Receipt stamp] 

Deputy of the Fuehrer 
27 Sept 1940 

To the Deputy of the Fuehrer 
Party member 
Rudolf HESS 

Munich 

Photocopy 

[penciled] 

Dear Party Member Hess: 

A pamphlet entitled “The Spirit and Soul of the Soldiers” writ- 
ten by Major General Dr. h. c. (doctor, honorus causa) von Rab- 
enau has appeared in the publications section of the NSDAP. 


693255—46 — h 


109 


064 PS 


Group I: German Military Might, published by the Central Pub- 
lishing Co. of the NSDAP, Successors to Franz Eher Inc. Ltd. 
(GmbH) Berlin. 

I cannot but point out this spiritual outpouring as a digression, 
at least as inadequate. It is on the same order as the many lec- 
tures which General von Rabenau gave to officers before the 
present war and its tendencies are directed against the concept 
of the German soldier which was born with the national-social- 
istic revolution, even if this tendency is cleverly kept to a mini- 
mum in this case. Just as in his lectures, Rabenau uses the 
method of arbitrary juggling with philosophic learning, which on 
one hand displays a widespread knowledge, and on the other con- 
sciously holds back from the clarity for which we strive with the 
national-socialistic world philosophy [Weltanschauung]. 

As I have reported before in conversation with you, General 
von Rabenau gave a lecture in Aachen some time before this war 
to a group of some 60 to 70 younger officers and about 15 leaders 
of the party who were invited, and among whom I chanced to be, 
about the development of the people’s army. According to Rab- 
enau, the present people’s army began about 1813 during the wars 
of Liberation (Napoleonic) and developed in the decades which 
followed to its present size, thanks to the great German qualities 
of soldiery which reached their zenith in the army of one hundred 
thousand men. The national-socialistic revolution which created 
the popular will for soldiery, and with it the developments for the 
establishment of the first German people’s army is not mentioned 
in any way, much less, in the role of being the dynamic creative 
force. Rabenau contented himself with presenting only a few 
quotations from the Fuehrer’s “Mein Kampf”. The politically ig- 
norant officers got the impression, as Rabenau knew how to talk 
vividly and convincingly, that the size of the present day people’s 
army was an accomplishment of the old military forces, and in 
their later thinking they w r ill ask themselves: “Why is there so 
much emphasis on the Party? Why invite the Party fuehrers? 
This is an affair for soldiers.” 

When I asked a question after the lecture, which unfortunately 
did not offer a discussion period, and explained to him that he 
was in no wise justified by history, that he had denied the mother 
of the people’s army, the Revolution, the Party, he overbore me 
in the arrogant manner which is peculiar to him with references 
to Indian, Chinese, Fi’ench, English and German philosophies in 
order to prove to me in front of several listeners that his lecture 
presentation was correct. I replied with the philosophic ideas 


110 


064-PS 


which I have won in the practical struggle of life, and insisted on 
the correctness of my concept. He professes not to be able to 
allow my contentions because they were not scientifically based. 
According to all appearances only those philosophic ideas are sci- 
entifically based, for him, which were developed before the na- 
tional-socialistic revolution. 

The inadequacy of Rabenau made itself clear at the close of 
this conversation, when the church came into the debate as the 
educational factor [Erziehungsfaktor], After he had affirmed 
the necessity of the churches, Rabenau said with emphasized self- 
assurance something like the following, “Dear Gauleiter, the 
Party is making mistake after mistake in the business with the 
churches. Obtain for me the necessary powers from the Fuehrer, 
and I guarantee that I shall succeed in a few months in estab- 
lishing peace with the churches for all times.” After this cata- 
strophic ignorance I gave up the conversation about the impor- 
tance of philosophic ideas for our ordinary life [Volksleben]. 

Dear Party Member Hess: The reading of General von Ra- 
benau’s pamphlet “Spirit and Soul of the Soldier” has reminded 
me again of this. In this brochure, just as at that time, Rabenau 
affirms the necessity of the church, straightforward and clearly, 
even if it is prudently careful. He writes on page 28 : 

There could be more examples, they would suffice to show that 
soldiers in this world can scarcely get along without thoughts 
about the next one. 

Because General von Rabenau is falsely based spiritually, I 
consider his activities as an educator in spiritual affairs as dan- 
gerous and I am of the opinion that his educational writings are 
to be dispensed with absolutely, and that the publications section 
of the NSDAP can and must renounce these writings. 

If such spiritual educational work should be done, in the in- 
terests of the German armed forces, then the Publications Sec- 
tion of the NSDAP can be permitted to accept for publication 
only brochures about “Spirit and Soul of the Soldier” which point 
out most strongly the permanent danger for “Spirit and Soul 
of the Soldier.” The churches with their Christianity are this 
danger against which the struggle must always be carried on. 

I considered it my duty to tell you again of my concept of Gen- 
eral von Rabenau, as well as to convey my criticism of the Pub- 
lications Section of the NSDAP. 


official seal of 
Gauleiter 
Gau Duesseldorf 
enclosure. 


Heil Hitler 
signed : FLORIAN 

Gauleiter 


111 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 066 -PS 


NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY 
The Deputy of the Fuehrer 
Chief of Staff 

Reichsleiter- 
Alfred Rosenberg 
Berlin W 35 
Margaretenstr 17 

Munich 24 June 1940 
The Brown House 
III/Dr Kl— Eg 
Chancellory Rosenberg 
Receipt Nr 1799 M. 

1 July 40 

H 

Copy to III for comment — 2 July 
Enclosed please find the draft of a decree about the judicial 
status of religious organizations and congregations in the Reich 
district Danzig-West Prussia, with a request for your comment. 

The draft in .its present form has been approved by District 
Leader Forster. 

Heil Hitler ! 

Signed: M. BORMANN 


1 enclosure 


Copy 

DECREE 


About the Juridical Status of Religious Organizations and Con- 
gregations in the Reich district Danzig-West Prussia. 

The following decree is issued under authority of par. 3 of 
the decree of the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor regarding the 
organization and administration of the Eastern territories, dated 
October 8, 1939 — Reich Law Publication (Reichsgesetzblatt) 1 
page 2042 — and of par. 4 of law of April 14, 1939 — Reich Law 
Publ. I, page 780 — with the approval of the Reich Minister of 
the Interior and the competent Reich Ministers. This shall not 
be binding for a subsequent general Reich decree. 

Par. 1 

Because of the peculiar folkloristic conditions in the Reich Dis- 
trict Danzig-West Prussia, all religious organizations and con- 


112 


066 -PS 


gregations need the approval of the Reich Deputy, to assure legal 
competence. 

Par. 2 

The Reich Deputy may, with the consent of the Reich Minister 
of the Treasury, grant subsidies to certain religious organiza- 
tions and congregations within his own judgement. The subsi- 
dies are subject to cancellation at any time. 

Par. 3 

All claims of the existing religious organizations and congre- 
gations to a state of municipal subsidy are suspended. The re- 
ligious organizations and congregations have no claim to Church 
dues. 

Religious organization and congregations may not exercise their 
rights of collecting dues without approval of the Reich Deputy. 
This also relates to the issuance of regulations concerning dues. 

The organization of collections as well as the acceptance of 
voluntary contributions by the religious organizations and con- 
gregations is subject to the approval of the Reich Deputy. 

Par. 4 

Yearly, and prior to each fiscal year, the religious organiza- 
tions and congregations will submit a budget plan about the in- 
tended expenditures of their receipts, to the government inspec- 
tor. Further, and upon demand, they must substantiate their 
expenditures at the end of the fiscal year. 

The Government inspector is entitled to inspect the property 
administration of the Church and to demand any explanations 
deemed necessary about items in the budget. He may object to 
certain items in the budget in which case such items are to be 
eliminated. 

Par. 5 

Acquisition of property, in particular of real estate by re- 
ligious organizations and congregations is subject to the approval 
of the Reich Deputy. This regulation applies to acquisitions 
through deeds of living persons as well as to testamentary dis- 
positions. 

Obligations of money, work or material contributions to reli- 
gious organizations or congregations, their institutions and 
affiliations, must be ratified by the Reich Deputy to become law- 
ful, insofar as these obligations have been contracted prior to 
January 1, 1940. 

Par. 6 

With view to the peculiar conditions existing in the Eastern 
territories organized under the Reich District [Reichsgau] 


113 


066-PS 


Danzig-West Prussia, the public administration of real estate 
which was owned or possessed by the religious organizations 
and congregations prior to 1 Sept. 1939, will remain in effect 
in this territory until further notice. This does not apply to 
tracts with no buildings other than those intended for worship. 

Par. 7 

Unless otherwise indicated this decree is effective for the entire 
Reich District of Danzig-West Prussia. 

Par. 8 

All regulations conflicting with this decree are void. 

The Reich Deputy issues the necessary decrees for the execu- 
tion and amplification of this law. He designates the agency 
which will execute the powers invested in the State by this law. 

Par. 9 

This decree is effective as of * * * 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 068-PS 

NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY 
Berlin — Wilhelmstrasse 64 
The Deputy of the Fuehrer 

Munich — Brown House 
5 April 1940 
III/Dr Kl.-Pu 

[Stamped] 

Office Rosenberg 

Rec’d Nr 1028 M April 9, 1940 

Submitted to R April 9 

Copy AR and Urban H Personal! 

To 

Reichsleiter 
Alfred Rosenberg 
Berlin W 35 
Margaretenstr. 17 

Subject: “Church Services 

Enclosed please find a copy of the letter of the High Command 
of the Navy as well as a copy of my reply of this date, for your 
personal information. 

Heil Hitler! 
by [illegible] 
signed: M BORMANN 

2 enclosures 


114 


068 — PS 


NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY 
Berlin — Wilhelmstrasse 64 
The Deputy of the Fuehrer 

Munich — Brown House 
April 5, 1940 
III/Dr. Kl-Pu 

To the High Command of the Navy 
Berlin W 35, Tirpitzufer 72/76 

Subject: “Church Services” Your letter of 9 Feb 1940 — AMA/ 

M Wehr lib B. Nr 896 

In the opinion of the party the term “Church Service” cannot 
be objected to. I consider it fitting since it properly implies meet- 
ings arranged and organized by the churches. 

Those Germans who are not members of a Christian Church 
may be offended by an announcement in a daily newspaper that 
only the members of the Christian confession are holding a “di- 
vine service”. After the National Socialist State has ci'eated the 
conception “God-believing” [Gottglaubig] especially for those 
Germans who confess the belief in God and who have placed their 
lives in the “Service of God” — without being members of a Chris- 
tian confession — it can no longer be justified to refer exclusively 
to the Services arranged by the Christian confessions as “Divine 
Services”, even in the National Socialist dailies. 

Heil Hitler! 

signed: M BORMANN (acting) 


Copy 

The High Command of the Navy, AMA/M Wehr lib B Nr 896 
Berlin W 35, Tirpitzufer 72/76 Feb 9, 1940 
To the office of the Deputy of the Fuehrer. 

With reference to the letter of the Supreme Commander of the 
Navy dated Oct 24, 1939 and the reply of the Deputy of the 
Fuehrer dated Nov 3, 1939 I inform you that in the Wilhelms- 
haven newspapers the expression “Church Services” is still being 
changed to “Divine Services”. 

The High Command requests that this regulation, apparently 
issued erroneously to all principal newspapers by the Chief Press 
Agency in Bremen, be revoked. 

Heil Hitler! 

by [illegible] 

signed: [signature illegible] 


115 


068 PS 


Rear Admiral and Headquarters Commandant in the Supreme 
Headquarters of the Navy, 
certified a true copy: signed: PAFF 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 069-PS 

NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY 
The Deputy of the Fuehrer, Staff Director 

Munich 33, Brown House, January 17, 1939 
SECRET 

Regulation No 1/39 g 

Subject: Jews 

After a report of General Field Marshal Goering the Fuehrer 
has made some basic decisions regarding the Jewish question. The 
decisions are brought to your attention in the enclosure. Strict 
compliance with these directives is requested. 

signed : M BORMANN 

1 enclosure 
Distribution : III b 
Official: 

[signed: signature illegible] 

Office Rosenberg, Rec’d Nr 5827 Jan 19, 39; filed Feb 2 
Submitted to 
RL Jan 19 
Urban Jan 20 
Schickedanz Feb 13 




Copy 

Berlin, Dec 28, 1938 

Minister President General Field Marshal Goering, Commissioner 
for the Four Year Plan 

SECRET 

Pursuant to my report the Fuehrer has made the following de- 
cisions on the Jewish question. 

A. 

I: Housing of Jeivs 

1. a. Protective regulations for tenants will not be generally 
revoked in the case of Jews. It is desirable, however, to proceed 
in individual cases in such a way that Jews will live together in 
one house, as much as feasible under rental conditions. 

b. For this reason the arianization of real estate will be the 
last step of the total arianization, that means that at present 


116 


069-PS 


real estate is only to be arianized in individual cases where there 
are compelling reasons. An immediate concern is the arianiza- 
tion of plants and business enterprises, farm property, forests, 
etc. 

2. The use of sleepers and dining cars is to be prohibited for 
Jews. Apart from that no separate Jew-compartments must be 
arranged for. Neither should any bans be pronounced regard- 
ing the use of railways, streetcars, subways, buses and ships. 

3. The ban for Jews is to be pronounced only for certain public 
establishments etc. This includes such hotels and restaurants 
which are mainly visited by Party members (for instance : Hotel 
Kaiserhof, Berlin; Hotel Vierjahreszeiten Munich; Hotel 
Deutscher Hof, Nurnberg; Hotel Drei Mohren, Augsburg, etc.) 
The ban can further be pronounced for swimming pools, certain 
public squares, resort towns, etc. Mineral baths may, in indi- 
vidual cases and if prescribed by a doctor, be used by Jews, but 
only in a manner not causing offense. 

II. Pensions are not to be denied to Jews who have been civil 
servants and who have been pensioned. It is to be investigated, 
however, whether those Jews can manage on a smaller pension. 

III. Jewish social care is not to be arianized or to be abolished, 
so that Jews will not become a public burden but can be cared 
for by Jewish institutions. 

IV. Jewish patents are property values and therefore to be 
arianized too. (A similar procedure was used during the World 
War by America and other states pertaining to German citizens.) 

B. 

Mixed Marriages: 

I. 1. with children (half-Aryans 1 class) 

a. If the father is German and the mother Jewish the family 
is permitted to remain in their present apartment. No ban for 
Jews regarding housing is to be pronounced against these 
families. 

The property of the Jewish mother may be transferred in such 
cases to the German husband respectively the half-Aryan 
children. 

b. If the father is Jewish and the mother German these 
families are neither to be housed in Jewish quarters for the 
time being. This because the children (half-Aryan 1st class) 
are not to be exposed to the Jewish agitation as they will have 
to serve later in the labor service and the armed forces. 

The property may for the time being be transferred partly or 
entirely to the children. 


117 


069-PS 


2. 'without children 

a. If the husband is German and the wife Jewish par. 1 a 
holds true accordingly. 

b. If the husband is Jewish and the wife German these child- 
less couples are to be treated as pure Jews. 

Property values of the husband cannot be transferred to the 
wife. Both can be lodged in Jewish houses or quarters. Espe- 
cially in the case of emigration both spouses are to be treated 
like Jews as soon as the augmented emigration has been set into 
motion. 

II. If the German wife divorces the Jewish husband she returns 
to the German blood-kinship. All disadvantages for her are 
dropped in this case. 

signed : GOERING 

Authenticated copy: 

signed : JAHN 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 070-PS 

NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY 
The Deputy of the Fuehrer Staff 

Munich 33, The Brown House April 25, 1941 

III D — Schw, 1180/0 
Chancellery Rosenberg 
Receipt No. 4746 Urg 5 May 41 
Submitted to the RL on 
May 6 
H 

To the Fuehrer’s Commissioner for the Supervision of the entire 
mental and world-philosophical training and education of the 
NSDAP 

Berlin W 35, Margaretenstrasse 17 

Subject: National Socialist School Services 
We are inducing schools more and more, to reduce and abolish 
religious morning services. Similarly, the confessional and gen- 
eral prayers in several parts of the Reich have already been 
replaced by national socialist mottos. I would be grateful to 
know your opinion on a future national socialist morning service 
instead of the present confessional morning services which are 
usually conducted once per week. 

Should those services be held at designated times, that is once 
per week or once every other week, or should they only be held 
at special occasions? I would further appreciate your advice 
on whether you have prepared concrete suggestions for the ar- 


118 


070— PS 


rangement of such national socialist school services. If so I 
would be grateful to receive them. 

Copy to Party member Scheller 5 April 41 complied 
Dr. Stellbrechtstang complied 6 April 

Heil Hitler ! 

signed: KRUEGER [?] 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 071-PS 

23 April 1941 

4609/R/MA 

To Reich Director Bormann at present at Fuehrer’s Headquarters 
Dear party member Bormann : 

I cannot agree with your letter of the 19th inst., since some 
misunderstandings occurred therein. 

1. The clause concerning confiscations to be undertaken in 
Reich territory is doubtless a regulation which has not yet been 
introduced, and directly because of this I have asked you to pro- 
pose such a regulation to the Fuehrer. The proposal originated 
in a decree of the Fuehrer relative to the work of the higher in- 
stitutes of learning whereby the question of research institutes 
and library were given priority and the official bureaus of the 
Party and the state were instructed to support me in this work. 
Now it is clear that the philosophical opponents of the regime 
(this is especially true in the case of the recently confiscated re- 
ligious archives) are concealing a quantity of the things which 
are of priceless, perhaps of irreplaceable, value for the later re- 
search of the higher institutes of learning. Because an actual 
necessity seems to be present, I wish to make the already cited 
proposal. It is understood that the confiscations are not executed 
by the regional authorities [Gauleitungen] but that this is con- 
ducted by the Security Service [SD] as well as by the police. 
Scientific work can only be done of course after the confiscation 
by the police, but here — and this is decisive — all must decide 
what is necessary for police compilations (actual correspondence 
with philosophical opponents and other material) and what does 
not fall under the competency of the police, but under the re- 
search work done by seminary, that is the Reich direction 
[Reichsleiter] of the Nazi Party. The taking of an office by Grup- 
penfuehrer Heydrich is only to be considered as much, not as a 
binding engagement. I therefore have decided on this proposal 
because it has been communicated to me in writing by a Gauleiter, 
that the Chief Office of the Reich Security [Reichssicherheitshaup- 


119 


07 1 -PS 


tamt] of the SS has claimed the following from the library of a 
monastery: The Catholic Handbook, Albertus Magnus; Edition 
of the Church Fathers; History of the Papacy by L. V. Pastor and 
other works. That means that already historical sources and 
works are being claimed for the Police from the monastery li- 
braries of the districts [Gaue] which must remain! reserved 
uniquely for the work of the Reich direction [Reichsleitung] of 
the Nazi Party respectively the state research places. These 
aspects have already been discussed thoroughly in the question 
of confiscated property in occupied areas. I have transmitted to 
you a photocopy of my convention with the Security Service [SD] 
which was reached with the express approval of Gruppenfuehrer 
Heydrich. I would like also to mention that this work has been 
executed in accordance with the agreement and always in a loyal 
fashion (with the exception of a case in Holland which I hope 
will be likewise solved in the same way) . Photocopies and written 
copies should be made available to me of all material which the 
police has rightly confiscated for their political police purposes, 
but which according to its nature, must also be appropriated for 
a later research value. In my view there exists in itself no funda- 
mental difficulty if both sides adopt the viewpoint of being loyal 
on their own and to the missions of the Partner. I request once 
more special efforts to prevent that valuable writings are arbi- 
trarily extracted from the libraries in various districts by the 
Chief Office of Reich Security [Reichssicherheitshauptamt] or 
other police service offices. On this account I propose the regu- 
lation that all confiscations remain under the full powers [Ober- 
hoheit] of the district leader and be examined by my deputies in 
case later research value in the respective district itself appears 
possible. 

2. There is a great misunderstanding with respect to what 
is involved in the question of the south-east and the employment 
of my administrative staff; art objects have always been treated 
as a second line problem. In the first line an order of the chief 
of the high command of the Armed Forces [OKW] on the instance 
of the Fuehrer has gone twice to the occupied territories of the 
west to place all scientific and archive materials of ideological op- 
ponents of the regime [Weltanschaulicher Gegner] at my disposal 
for research purposes. That has resulted also in close coopera- 
tion on the widest scale with the Security Service [SD] and the 
military commanders, and I believe that I have secured priceless 
research pieces for the Reich directorate [Reichsleitung] of the 
Nazi party and its higher institutes of learning. I wish to inform 
you especially that as many as 7000 crates have been brought 


120 


071 PS 

to Germany up to the present moment. In the course of these con- 
fiscations we have found according to the nature of the case other 
valuable cultural objects including very valuable works of art. 
And in order that these things should not be dispersed and that 
they be secured for the Fuehrer, the Chief of the high command 
of the armed forces (OKW) on my request and on the instance 
of the Fuehrer has ordered that these art objects should be cata- 
logued by me. I ask you that if necessary it should be established 
for the benefit of the Reich Marshal that my working staff has 
executed these tasks in a correct fashion and in an objective 
blameless form. Art objects generally do not come into question 
as far as the Balkans are concerned although there are Free- 
Masonry archives and Jewish libraries and other relevant re- 
search objects. In my opinion only the same attitude as that 
prevailing in occupied French territory can be taken and what 
I requested, was really only an expansion of an already existing 
regulation. For General Field Marshal List, and likewise for 
the General Quartermaster of the Army the work has already 
begun and my men are at work with these circles in Belgrade. 
By command of General Field Marshal List as well as of his 
deputy general, these men will also be employed in closest rela- 
i tionship with the Security Service in Salonika. As you know, 
Salonika is one of the largest Jewish centers. 

I should like to remark in this connection that this affair has 
already been executed on our side with the Security Service in 
the most loyal fashion. One of our collaborators who also belongs 
to the Security Service, had his duty-obligation countermanded 
by the Security Service, whereupon it was impressed upon him 
that the Security Service cooperates with my administrative staff 
in a most loyal fashion. The position is thus clarified in a prac- 
tical fashion and the work has taken its course. What I asked 
was only a confirmation that the already pronounced decisions 
for the West should also have validity under the given circum- 
stances for other occupied or to be occupied areas. Finally the 
representative of the Fuehrer has expressly ordered that the ap- 
propriate party members in this question should be placed, so 
as not to permit this unique opportunity for an inquiry in the 
Jewish and Masonic lodge question to be lost. The agreement on 
this matter is thus general. 

I trust that this letter has cleared up the resulting misunder- 
standings. 

Heil Hitler ! 


121 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 072-PS 


NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY 
The Deputy of the Fuehrer, Staff Commander 

Fuehrer Headquarters 19 April 1941 

Fuehrer Bureau (Bo/Fu) 
Chancellory Rosenberg 
No 4609 H, 21 April 41 
Shown to the Reichsleiter on the 22. 4 
[rubber stamp] 

To Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg 
Berlin W 35, Margaretenstr. 17 
Copy to Utikal 

Dear party member Rosenberg ! 

In connection with the received draft of the decree I attended, 
as ordered, a speech made by SS Brig. Gen. Heydrich. The latter 
called attention to the fact that the sentence, “In the confiscations 
undertaken, or to be undertaken in the Reich area, of the prop- 
erty of ideological opponents, the same rules apply”, anticipates a 
regulation which has so far not been introduced and would for 
the first time set a precedent through this decree-draft. More- 
over, the regional governments [Gauleitungen] are never al- 
lowed to carry out confiscations. 

Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich further pointed out that he could 
under no circumstances recognize the attempted regulation in 
the final sentence of your decree-draft, since there existed some 
objections to it. The scientific treatment of the ideological op- 
position could only be done in conjunction with the political police 
work. Only the material should be handed over to you, and the 
seminar respectively. If a speedier treatment through your of- 
fice is necessary, duplicates and photocopies should be put at your 
disposal. 

The Fuehrer emphasized that in the Balkans the use of your 
experts would not be necessary, since there were no art-objects to 
be confiscated. In Belgrade only the collection of Prince Paul 
existed, which would be returned to him completely. The re- 
maining material of the lodges, etc. would be seized by the 
agencies of Gruppenfuehrer Heydrich. 

The libraries and art objects of the monasteries, confiscated in 
the Reich, were to remain for the time being in these monasteries, 
insofar as the Gauleiters had not determined otherwise. After the 
war, a careful examination of the stock could be undertaken. 
Under no circumstances, however, should a centralization of all 
the libraries be undertaken, the Fuehrer has repeatedly rejected 
this suggestion. signed : M. BORMANN 


122 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 078 PS 


OFFICE IV 


COPY 


Berlin 28 June 1941 
SECRET STATE MATTER! 


Directives for the Chiefs of Security Police and Secret Service 
Teams Assigned to PW Camps 


These teams are assigned after agreement has been reached 
between the chiefs of the Security Police, secret service and the 
Supreme Command of the Army and * * * (see annex). 

The Commands work upon the special authorization and accord- 
ing to the general directives in the Camp regulations which was 
given to them and is independently in close harmony with the AO. 

The duty of the Commands is the political screening of prison- 
ers and the segregation and further handling of undesirable ele- 
ments among them with regard to political, criminal or similar 
respects. 

Resources cannot be placed at the disposal of the Commands 
for the fulfillment of their missions. The “German penal code” 
[Fahndungsbuch], the “Temporary permit of Leave List” [Auf- 
enthaltsermittlungsliste], and “Special Penal Code USSR” will 
prove to be of little value ; the Special Penal Code USSR therefore 
does not suffice as only a small part therein is dangerous to the 
designated Soviet Russians. 

The Commands will therefore have to rely on their own specialty 
and ingenuity upon establishment and self-producing knowledge. 
Therefore they will only then be able to begin with the fulfillment 
of their mission when they have gathered an appropriate amount 
of material. 

For their work, the Commands are to make as much use of the 
! experiences of the Camp Commanders as possible, who in the 
meantime have profited by the observation and examination of 
prisoners. 

Further, the Commands will have to take pains from the begin- 
ning to search among the prisoners for seemingly trustworthy 
elements, may they be communists or not, in order to make them 
useful for their intelligence purposes. 

Through the establishment of such trusted personnel [V-Per- 
sonen] and through the use of all other present possibilities 
among the prisoners, it must succeed to screen all elements. 

In every case the Commands are to provide themselves with 
definite clarity over the encountered measures through the exami- 
nation and eventual questioning of prisoners. 


123 


078-PS 


Above all it is important to find out: 

1. all outstanding functionaries of the State and of the 
Party, especially 

2. professional revolutionists, 

3. the functionaries of the Comintern, 

4. all leading Party functionaries of the Russian Secret 
Police [KPdSU] and their associated organizations 
in the Central, district, and county Committees, 

5. all the Peoples’ Commissars and their Assistants, 

6. all the former Polit-Commissars in the Red Army, 

7. all leading personalities of the Central and Middle 
Offices among the State authorities, 

8. the leading economic personalities, 

9. the Soviet Russian Intelligence agents, 

10. all Jews, 

11. all persons who are established as being instigators or 
fanatical communists. 

Just as important is the finding of persons who are devoted to 
the reconstruction, the administration, and management of the 
conquered Russian provinces. 

Finally, such persons must be secured who can be used to trans- 
act further discoveries, whether of the Police or similar work, and 
for the clarification of universal interesting questions. In this 
category fall all the higher State and Party functionaries who are 
in the camp on the basis of their position and knowledge and who 
can give information on the measures and working methods of the 
Soviet State, the Communistic Party or the Cominterns. 

In view of the pending decisions, considerations must also be 
given to the peoples’ membership. At the end of the screening, 
measures, to be decided later, as to the transfer of prisoners from 
one command to another, will follow. 

The Camp Commanders are directed by the Supreme Command 
of the Army to report such proposals. 

Executions will not be carried out in the camps or immediate 
vicinity. Should the camps in the General Government be situ- 
ated in the immediate vicinity of the border, then the prisoners 
for special handling are to be taken care of in former Soviet Rus- 
sian Provinces. 

The Commands are to keep records of the fulfillment of special 
handlings; which must include: 

Serial number 
Family and Surname 
Date of birth and place 


124 


078-PS 


Military rank 
Profession 
Last residence 
Reason for special handling 
Day and place of special handling 
Office IV 


SECRET STATE MATTER 

Supplement to the Directives for the Commands of the Security 
Police and Security Service assigned to P. W. camp^, 

1. In the directives of the 17th July 1941, I have repeatedly 
pointed to the fact that it is the duty of the Special Purpose Com- 
mand of the Security Police and Security Service to find not only 
the untrustworthy but also those trustworthy elements in general 
wffiich can come into consideration for the reconstruction of the 
Eastern provinces. 

I reemphasize that one duty is as important as the other. 

In order to obtain a most extensive view of the co-activity of 
the Special Purpose Command, I order that the numeral 4 (num- 
ber of those persons found to be trustworthy) wifi be especially 
heeded in the weekly reports. 

The war prisoners who are found to be trustworthy and who 
were formerly in leading positions in the Soviet Russian economic 
circles, are to be listed, if possible, according to branch their last 
employment, and by name. 

2. I reemphasize again the fact that in view of the pending de- 
cisions, consideration must especially be given to the peoples’ citi- 
zenship. 

Ukranians, White Russians, Aserbeidschanians, Armenians, 
North Caucasians, Georgians, Turks are only to be designated as 
definitely untrustworthy and dealt with according to the directive 
when they are definitely proven to be Bolshevists, Polit-Commis- 
sars, or other dangerous functionaries. 

One must be careful, in as much as the Turkish people fre- 
quently have a Jewdsh appearance and the circumcision alone does 
not denote a Jewdsh descent (for example, Mohammedans). 

3. The conception “highbrow” [Intelligenzler] should not be 
interpreted along European viewpoints. 

The simplest, most primitive Soviet-Russian illiterate can, in 
his political fanaticism, be more dangerous than, for instance, the 


693256 — 46—9 


125 


078— PS 


Soviet-Russian engineer, who due to his ability, went to High 
School, even though, he only outwardly appeared to be in accord 
with the Bolshevistic system. 

In this respect the highbrow' are mainly the professional rev- 
olutionists, waiters, editors, and persons in the Comintern. 

4. Those Soviet Russians who are definitely found to be untrust- 
worthy are to be forthwith reported — as designated in the direc- 
tives of the 17th July 1941. Following the introduction of the 
execution authorization, further fulfillment of the designated 
measures are to begin without further delay. 

A further custody in the camps in question are to be avoided 
for various reasons. 

Finally I reemphasize that under no circumstances are the ex- 
ecutions to be carried out either in the Camp or in the near 
vicinity. 

It is self-understood that these executions are not public. It is 
a matter of principle not to admit spectators. 

5. I again charge the leaders and members of the Special Serv- 
ice Staff with the following: exemplary behavior during and after 
duty hours, top cooperation with camp commanders and careful 
checking of work. 

signed : Heydrich 

(S) 

Verified: 

signed : Wolfert, Member of the Chancellory 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 081-PS 

[TOP SECRET] 

28 February 1942 

1/1 /41 g.Ks 

To the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 

[OKW] 

Berlin W 35, Tirpitzufer 72-76 
Subject: Prisoners of war. 

Since the beginning of its existence, the Reich Ministry for 
the occupied Eastern territories has taken the viewpoint, that 
the large number of Soviet prisoners of war constitute a highly 
valuable material for propaganda. The treatment of Soviet 
prisoners of war must be considered differently than the treat- 
ment of prisoners of war of other nations, for various reasons : 

1. The war in the East has not been concluded, and the treat- 


126 


08 1 -PS 


ment of the prisoners of war must have far-reaching results on 
the will-to-desert of the Red Army man who is still fighting. 

2. Germany intends to keep a large part of the former Soviet 
Union occupied, even after the end of the war, and to develop it 
industrially for her purposes. Therefore she depends on a far- 
reaching cooperation of the population. 

3. Germany is conducting the fight against the Soviet Union 
because of ideological viewpoints. Bolshevism must be over- 
thrown and something better must be put in its place. Even the 
prisoners of war themselves must realize that national socialism 
is willing and in the position to bring them a better future. They 
must return later to their homes from Germany with a feeling 
of admiration and esteem for Germany and German institutions; 
and thus become propagandists for the cause of Germany and 
national socialism. 

This attempted goal has not been attained so far. The fate of 
the Soviet prisoners of war in Germany is on the contrary a 
tragedy of the greatest extent. Of 3.6 millions of prisoners of 
war, only several hundred thousand are still able to work fully. 
A large part of them has starved, or died, because of the haz- 
ards of the weather. Thousands also died from spotted fever. 
It is understood, of course, that there are difficulties encountered 
in the feeding of such a large number of prisoners of war. Any- 
how, with a certain amount of understanding for goals aimed at 
by German politics, dying and deterioration could have been 
avoided in the extent described. For instance, according to in- 
formation on hand, the native population within the Soviet Union 
are absolutely willing to put food at the disposal of the prisoners 
of war. Several understanding camp commanders have success- 
fully chosen this course. However in the majority of the cases, 
the camp commanders have forbidden the civilian population to 
put food at the disposal of the prisoners, and they have rather 
let them starve to death. Even on the march to the camps, the 
civilian population was not allowed to give the prisoners of war 
food. In many cases, when prisoners of war could no longer keep 
up on the march because of hunger and exhaustion, they were 
shot before the eyes of the horrified civilian population, and the 
corpses were left. In numerous camps, no shelter for the pris- 
oners of war was provided at all. They lay under the open sky 
during rain or snow. Even tools were not made available to dig 
holes or caves. A systematic delousing of the prisoners of war 
in the camps and of the camps themselves has apparently been 
missed. Utterances such as these have been heard: “The more 
of these prisoners die, the better it is for us”. The consequence 


127 


08 1 -PS 


of this treatment is now this, that spotted fever is spreading due 
to the escape and discharge of prisoners and has claimed its vic- 
tims among the armed forces as well as among the civilian 
population, even in the old part of Germany. Finally, the shoot- 
ing of prisoners of war must be mentioned; these were partly 
carried out according to viewpoints which ignore all political 
understanding. For instance, in various camps, all the “Asiatics” 
were shot, although the inhabitants of the areas, considered be- 
longing to Asia, of Transcaucasia and Turkestan especially, are 
among those people in the Soviet Union who are most strongly 
opposed to Russian subjugation and to Bolshevism. The Reich 
ministry of the occupied Eastern territories has repeatedly em- 
phasized these abuses. However, in November for instance, a 
detail [Kommando] appeared in a prisoner of war camp in 
Nikolajew, which wanted to liquidate all Asiatics. 

The treatment of prisoners of war appears to be founded for 
a great part on serious misconceptions about the people of the 
Soviet Union. One finds the opinion that the people become more 
inferior the further one goes East. If the Poles already were 
given harsh treatment, one argues, it should therefore be done 
to a much greater extent to the Ukrainians, White Ruthenians, 
Russians, and finally the “Asiatics”. 

It was apparently completely ignored, in the treatment of pris- 
oners of war, that Germany found, in contrast to the West 
(France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway), a people who w r ent 
through all the terror of Bolshevism, and who now, happy about 
their liberation, put themselves willingly at the disposal of Ger- 
many. A better gift could not come to Germany in this w r ar, 
which requires every last man. But instead of accepting this 
gift, the people of the East are being treated more contemptibly 
and worse than the people of the West, w T ho do not hide their 
enmity towards Germany. 

It was a basic mistake that no difference was made between 
real prisoners of war and deserters. It is known that German 
propaganda deposited millions of leaflets beyond the lines, and 
encouraged the Red soldiers to desert, whereby good treatment 
and sufficient food was specifically assured to them. These prom- 
ises were not kept. The deserters were beaten and left to starve 
the same as so many prisoners of war. A natural consequence of 
this politically and militarily unwise treatment was not only a 
paralyzing of the will to desert, but a plain deadly fear to get 
into Geiman captivity. It would be naive to assume that the 
occurences in the prisoner of war camps could be kept hidden 
from the Soviet government. As can be seen in Molotov’s cir- 


128 


08 1 -PS 


cular, the Soviets have in fact an excellent knowledge of the con- 
ditions described above, and naturally they have done everything 
in their power to influence the Soviet population and Red soldiers 
accordingly. It can be said without exaggeration that the mis- 
takes in the treatment of prisoners of war are to a great extent 
the cause for the stiffening power of resistance of the Red Army, 
and therefore also cause for the death of thousands of German 
soldiers. 

After the Reich ministry for occupied Eastern territories was 
finally successful in overcoming the prejudice against Soviet pris- 
oners of war partially, and when the prisoners of war were to 
come to Germany to a great extent for work, it was found that 
of 3.6 million only several hundred thousand were still able to 
work. Thus, German economy and armament industry also must 
suffer for the treatment of prisoners of war. 

The above explanations are not intended to be a belated, fruit- 
less criticism, nor are they directed against any official agency, 
especially since very many objective situations came into play, as 
has been mentioned, and the responsibility is shared. They 
should only become the basis for a new policy toward the pris- 
oners of war which corresponds more to our military and civilian 
interests. The Reich ministry for the occupied Eastern terri- 
tories is endeavoring with all its powers to assist the fighting 
troops by effective propaganda for the deterioration of the en- 
emy’s military forces. All propaganda will be useless, however, 
if there is more fear of captivity than of death and wounds on 
the battlefield. 

The primary demand is that the treatment of the prisoners of 
war ensues according to the laws of humanity and according to 
the dignity of the German nation. It is understandable that in- 
human treatment, proven many times, of German prisoners of 
war, by members of the Red Army has embittered the German 
troops so much that they retaliate with the same treatment. How- 
ever, such retaliatory measures do not improve the situation of 
German prisoners of war by any means, but must have as their 
last consequence the fact that neither side will take any more 
prisoners, thus that they conduct the war in a most inhuman 
manner. At any rate, as much as is known, such retaliatory 
measures have not been able up to now to cause the enemy to 
change. They were therefore without purpose. 

Furthermore, sufficient food, and at least primitive shelter, are 
to be provided for the prisoners within the framework of possi- 
bility. In the camps for prisoners, scheduled for work projects, 
as well as in those for the others, skillful propaganda is neces- 


129 


08 1 -PS 


sary, which must be carried out by camp newspapers, mo\ies, 
lectures, simple musical events, games, etc. 

Every camp commandant must be made responsible that every 
prisoner of war, guarded by him, will return to his home later on 
as a propagandist for Germany. Of course, on the other side, 
action must be taken with utmost severity against possible agi- 
tators. In any case, in the future a difference must be made 
between real prisoners of war and deserters. The deserters are 
to be provided with identification certificates, and in any case 
are to be treated better than the prisoners of war. Especially 
this measure should have far-reaching success in reference to the 
deterioration of the Red Army. 

I would appreciate an expression of opinion soon, and informa- 
tion of appropriate action. 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 084-PS 

Berlin NW 7, The 30 Sept. 

Hegelplatz 2 

Central Office \Z entrdlstelle] for Members of Eastern Nationals . 

In (ZO) 

Concerning : Present Status of the question of Eastern Laborers. 

The commitment and treatment of foreign laborers, who have 
been brought into the Reich from occupied Eastern territories, 
depicts a proceeding which will not only be of significant impor- 
tance to the German war production and the securing of food, 
but also for the carrying out of German administrative interests 
in a former Soviet area. Two large fields of action are affected 
by the way in which the problems connected with the inclusion of 
millions of Eastern nationals in the Reich are solved: 1. De- 

velopment of the war situation 2. The enforcement of the Ger- 
man claim to leadership in the East after the ivar. 

When the call for labor in Germany was increased in January, 
1942 among the occupied Eastern territories, this set up a situa- 
tion among those classes of Russian and Ukrainian civilians 
concerned which had by all means the appearance of a risk. Even 
if one group (the volunteers) set excessive hopes on the journey 
into the Reich under the impression of irresponsible promises 
while the other (forced laborers) left their homes reluctantly or 
at least with misgivings because of memories of former Bolshevist 
deportations as well as planted anti-German rumors, the fact re- 
mains that the trip to Germany had to be felt as journey into the 


130 


084-PS 


unknown not only by the two concerned but also by those relatives 
who remained behind because of the isolation of the USSR from 
Europe for decades. The public judgment of the Reich and its 
leadership would be dependent upon the outcome of this measure 
taken by the German military and civilian authorities in the oc- 
cupied Eastern territories. The employment in Germany offered 
an unusual opportunity to learn to know by personal experience, 
which no propaganda could replace. The greater German Reich 
was much slandered by the Soviet press, and the National Social- 
istic position to the working class and thus to gain a basis of 
comparison to the corresponding Communistic doctrines and 
methods. This meant no more nor less, than that the draft of 
Eastern laborers would be of importance in the development of 
political opinions among the Eastern nationals towards the power 
which was presently occupying the region which would aid meas- 
ures taken to accomplish the recruitment, the housing etc., in the 
Reich, which should have been taken into consideration from the 
start, since in view of the necessity to keep the aid of the native 
inhabitants in the huge areas behind the front, factors which 
cannot be controlled by regulations or orders, namely the frame of 
mind, which is of war potential value, must be considered. 

Instead of taking consideration of this, the drafting and the 
employment as well as the housing, treatment etc. of the so-called 
Eastern laborers has so far been taken care of exclusively accord- 
ing to labor, technical and the security police points of view, with 
the result that the headquarters responsible for this were able to 
report the due numerical fulfilment of the program as well as the 
security of the German nationality and of the businesses. At the 
time, however, facts had to be hushed which could have been 
avoided not only in the interests of German prestige and to the 
satisfaction of the occupied Eastern territories but which even 
today cost the lives of thousands of German soldiers by their ef- 
forts. The facts which up to the fall of 1942, have undergone 
only part or incomplete changes, among others, the following. 

1. The concept of the workers from the occupied territories 
of the USSR was narrowed down to the labor- and social-legal 
term “Eastern Laborers”. A labor condition among “Foreigners” 
was hereby created in a segregated “Employment under Special 
Conditions” which had to be looked upon by those affected, as 
degrading. 

2. The drafting of Eastern workers and women workers often 
occurred without the necessary examination of the capabilities 
of those concerned, so that 5-10 out of a hundred, sick and chil- 


131 


084-PS 


dren, were transported along. On the other hand, in those places 
where no volunteers were obtained, instead of using the lawful 
employment obligations, coercive measures were used by the 
police (imprisonment, penal expedition, and similar measures.) 

3. The employment in businesses was not undertaken by con- 
sidering the occupation and previous training but according to 
the chance assignment of the individual to the respective trans- 
ports or transient camps. 

4. The billeting did not follow the policies according to which 
the other foreigners are governed, but just as for civilian pris- 
oners in camps which were fenced in with barbed wire and were 
heavily guarded, from which no exit was permitted. 

5. The treatment by the guards was on the average without 
intelligence and cruel so that the Russian and Ukrainian workers, 
in enterprises with foreign laborers of different nationalities, 
were exposed to the scorn of the Poles and the Czechs among 
other things. 

6. The food and care was so bad and insufficient in the camps 
for the Eastern Laborers being employed in the industry and 
in the mines that the good average capability of the camp mem- 
bers dropped down shortly and many sicknesses and deaths took 
place. 

7. Payment was carried out in the form of a ruling in which 
the industrial worker would keep on the average 2 or 3 RM 
each week and the farm laborers even less, so that the transfer 
of pay to their homes became illusory, not to mention the fact 
there had been no satisfactory procedure developed for this. 

8. The postal service with their families was not feasible for 
months because of the lack of a precautionary ruling ; so that 
instead of factual reports, wild rumors arrived in their coun- 
tries,— among other means by means of emigration. 

9. The promises which had been made time and time again in 
the areas of enlistment stood in contradiction with those facts 
mentioned under 3-8. 

Apart from the natural impairment of the frame of mind and 
capabilities which these measures, as well as conditions, brought 
w ith them, the result w 7 as that the Soviet propaganda took over 
the matter and evaluated it carefully. Not only the actual con- 
ditions and the letters which reached the country, in spite of 
the initial blockade, as well as the stories of fugitives and such, 
but also the clumsy publications in the German press of the legal 
rulings relative to the matter gave them enough to manipulate 
with. Commissar for Foreign Affairs Molotov in his note to the 


132 


084-PS 


enemy powers referred already in April 1942 to this, especially 
in para. Ill of this document in which among others it is stated : 

“The German administration is treading under its feet the 
long recognized laws and customs governing war, in that it has 
given the orders to the troops to take into captivity all male 
civilians and in many places even the women, and to use against 
them those measures which the Hitlerites have introduced to- 
wards prisoners of war. This does not only mean slave labor 
for the captured peaceful inhabitants but in most cases it also 
means inescapable starvation or death through sickness, corporal 
punishments, and organized mass murders. 

“The deportation of peaceful inhabitants to the rear, which has 
been widely practiced by the German-Fascist army, begins to 
take on a mass character. It is carried out under direct rulings 
of the German High Command (OKW) and its effects are espe- 
cially cruel in the immediate rear areas during a retreat of the 
German army. In a series of documents, which have been found 
with the staffs of destroyed German units, there is a directive to 
the order of the High-Command under Nlr. 2974/41 of 6 Dec. 
1942 which directs that all grown men are to be deported from 
occupied populated points into prisoner of war camps. From 
the order to the 37th Infantry Regiment of the 6th Division of 
2 Dec. 1941 under the heading “About the deportation of the 
Civilian Population” it can be deduced that for the period from 
the 4 to the 12 Dec the capture and forceful deportation of the 
total population of 7 villages to the German rear areas was 
planned, for which a carefully worked out plan was proposed. 

Sometimes all the inhabitants were deported, sometimes the 
men were torn away from their families or mothers were sepa- 
rated from their children. Only the smallest number of these 
deported people have been able to return to their home village. 
These returnees report terrible degradations, heaviest forced 
labor, abundant deaths among inhabitants because of starvation 
and tortures, and murder by the Fascists of all the weak, 
ivounded, and sick.” 

Further, there are even today announcements in the Soviet 
newspapers as well as radio about the treatment of Eastern 
laborers which might have as an effect a strengthening of the 
moral power to resist in the Red Army. Further, there is men- 
tioned the text of a letter which arrived in Ordshonikidsegrad 
from a Russian girl and which was published in a “Proclama- 
tion” of the police administration of the North-Western Front 
of the Red army under the heading of “A Russian Girl in 
Cologne”, attaching in connection with it an effective propaganda 
viewpoint about the “Fascist Forced Laborers” in Germany. 

“Do you know” — , it goes on at the end of the proclamation, — 
“that every one of us who goes to Germany will meet the same 
fate as Olga Selesnewa ! Do not forget that the German monster 


133 


084- PS 


will make each and every one of you, who has remained behind, 
a slave on your own soil or drag you to eternal forced labor in 
Germany ! Dear brothers and sisters . . . Go to the partisan 
detachments! Injure the German occupants at every step. Hit 
the Hitler thieves everywhere and continuously. The Russian 
soil shall become their graves!” 

The effects of this large scale documentary proven radio-press- 
and leaflet propaganda, operating even into German administered 
territories, must be considered as one of the main reasons for 
this year’s stiffening of the Soviet resistance as well as the 
threatening increase of guerilla bands up to the borders of the 
General Government. 

In the meantime, after a betterment of the condition of the 
Eastern laborers had been insisted upon, not only by the main 
office for politics in the Reichs ministry for the Occupied Eastern 
Territories, which has been able to find support in the repeated 
requests by the High Command of the Armed Forces, but also 
by the gentleman charged with the responsibility for all labor 
employment as well as the Department of Labor Employment in 
the German Labor Movement, which has the supervision of the 
Eastern Laborers — those previously existing legal and police 
rulings have been mitigated and the conditions in the 8-10,000 
camps in the Reich have, on the whole, been improved. Thus 
those fixed wages, which have been determined by the tables of 
compensation in a ruling of the Council of Ministers, upon which 
deductions were made up to 75%, have been replaced by new 
tariffs. The Eastern Laborers were left free of duty according 
to it, and the taxes were paid in a form of an Eastern Laborer 
Tax by the owner of the enterprise (Ruling of Council of Min- 
isters for the Defense of the Reich of 30/6/42). Thus after 
many months of negotiations, with the cooperation of the Central 
Economic Bank in Rowno, a salary transfer, in the form of a 
savings stamp procedure, was regulated. Thus, the ruling of 
the Reichs Chief of the SS of 20/2/42 prescribing barbed wire 
has been dropped by a supplementary ruling of 9/4/42 and at 
the same time, in exceptional cases, groups were permitted to 
go out under German guards, of late, it has. even been permitted 
under their own supervision. The food supply was adjusted by 
a special delivery letter of the Reichs Food minister dated 
17/4/42, to a degree where the “Soviet Civilian Laborer”, as well 
as the prisoners of war received a uniform ration. This was 
still not enough compared to the normal amount of food given 
to those employed in the industry and in the mines, besides it 
was still much less and worse than that for the Poles, but it was 


134 


084-PS 


an improvement compared to former conditions. Furthermore 
the postal communication has been adjusted for those Eastern 
Laborers who come from the civilian administered as well as 
those who are from the regions directly to the rear of the army, 
— at least theoretically — . On account of the burden placed on 
the censorship office for foreign countries the High Command 
of the Armed Forces has recently asked again for a reduction of 
this measure. 

In spite of the improvements mentioned as well as others, 
which in many cases can be traced back to the personal inter- 
vention of the Deputy General of Labor Employment, the total 
situation of the Eastern Laborer (sampling date: 1 October 
1942) must still be considered unsatisfactory , namely, not only 
in respect to the differences in the treatment of industrial 
workers and farm laborers but in the differences found in the 
different States and enterprises. On the average there are still 
about 40% of the lodgings for Eastern laborers which would not 
meet the requirements even if all the wartime restrictions were 
considered. Among these are a frightening number of camps 
whose conditions are such as to destroy the success of the at- 
tempt of improving relationship and the corresponding radiating 
uplift of the morale within the Eastern territories. Not even 
to mention the fact that the marking OST (East), an identifica- 
tion ordered by the police, is being felt as degrading there re- 
mains such a quantity of grievances and problems that it would 
be impossible to relate them now. Only the following points are 
to be mentioned : 

1. The Enlisting and Employing of persons of German Parent- 
age , as Eastern laborers . Several observations made by the 
commission from the central office to inspect camps, as well as 
petitions which have reached them, show that persons of Ger- 
man parentage were enlisted, — against regulations, — as Eastern 
Laborers. Even if they are not recognized people of German 
parentage according to the “RKFestigung”, they are, however 
persons of German descent and with German names, as Mr. 
Middelhauve could establish in a camp near Berlin. It is to be 
doubted that the branch offices of the suboffice for Germans 
living in foreign countries had enough qualified help who could 
separate these persons capable of becoming Germans again. 

2. Enlisting and Employing as Eastern Laborers of Tartars 
from the Crimea . To increase the fighting numbers of the Tar- 
tar legions it would be indispensable to return all those Tar- 
tars, who have been employed in the Reich as Eastern Laborers, 


135 


084-PS 


to their homes before the coming of winter; a similar report 
to the “GBA” is being prepared. Besides climatic reasons, the 
necessity for this return is to intensify the wine and tobacco 
growths in the Crimea by experienced help and at the same time, 
to prevent the invasion of Greek and Bulgarian planters and 
traders. To prepare this return as well as to deal with other 
Tartan problems a commissioner, namely a Crimean Tartar, has 
been installed by the “ZO”. In the meantime, difficulties have 
arisen because of the effect of the furloughing of Tartan Eastern 
Laborers for participation in the Mohammedan festival during 
the 4th and 5/10/42 as well as the procurement of the meat and 
millet supply needed for this occasion. The authority in these 
and similar matters will have to be voiced, at the time of their 
return, by those White Ruthanian Tartars who have been selected 
for resettlement. 

3. Enlisting and Employing as Eastern Laborers of Ukrainians 
from Transnistrian. During an inspection of the camps for muni- 
tion workers at Topchin (Kreteltow) into which the Central Office 
was induced because of an escape which became known to them, 
it was found that the Eastern Laborers employed there were en- 
listed January 1942 in Odessa. They do not come according to 
para. I of the Rulings of the Council of Ministers dated 30/6/42, 
under the category of Eastern Laborers. But will have to be 
termed, because of the fact that the State of “Transnistrian” was 
placed in the Fall of 1941 under Rumanian sovereignty, as state- 
less members of the Kingdom of Rumania. To clarify this point 
for all times, negotiations have been made with the GBA and the 
Foreign Office as well as the Feldzeuginspektion of the Office for 
General Affairs in the High-Command of the Army. 

4. Employment of Skilled Laborers in Occupations foreign to 
their skills. Up until recently petitions have continually come to 
the publishers of camp newspapers to the Reichs Ministry for the 
occupied Eastern territories, to the German Workers Front and 
in error also to the bureau for foreign nationals in the Reich from 
Eastern laborers, men and women who are in occupations foreign 
to their skills or inferior to their skills, without the transfer pro- 
posals, which were approved by the central office as well as by 
other offices, having led to success— except in rare cases. Gau- 
leiter Sauckel, who has repeatedly disclosed— the last time at the 
conference in Weimar on the 10 and 11 / 9 / 42 — that the “inner 
arrangement” of the occupational employment would be his next 
point on the program, does not seem to be informed about the real 
conditions in which doctors, engineers, teachers, qualified skilled 


136 


084 Ps 


laborei’S and such are employed as unskilled workers, mechanics, 
as farmers, and farmers as industrial workers. In any case, one 
of his close associates, the Gauamtsleiter Orr Escher received the 
information about this which was given him by Dr. Thiell, in ac- 
cordance with instructions of the Central Office, with unusual in- 
terest. 

5. Separation in employment of members of one Family. The 
repeated separation of family members who have come to the 
Reich as Eastern Laborers and Eastern Women Workers (married 
couples, parents, brothers and sisters, and children) seems utterly 
contrary to the usual customs governing other employments of 
foreigners. The bringing together of those relatives who have 
been mistakenly separated during the transport is principally de- 
sired just as much as is the employment of family members in the 
same location. It does however, in practice, encounter some diffi- 
culties. In order to make possible at least the transfer of infor- 
mation from both parties, the Reichs Ministry for the occupied 
Eastern territories in August 1942, in conjunction with the Reich 
Main office and Reich Security Service has allowed the limited 
publication of encoded advertisements seeking information. Be- 
sides this an agreement has been made in September 1942 between 
the Central Office and the German Red Cross in accordance with 
which this organization will take over the communication between 
these Eastern Laborers separated in the Reich, keeping the place 
of employment secret however. 

6. Disregarding the Nationality in Employment and Billeting. 
The plan of the Herr Reichsmarshall to create special “Enter- 
prises for the Russians” could not be accomplished as yet on ac- 
count of reasons of wartime economy. The demands for a joint 
employment by the members of Eastern nationalities, according 
to their racial background could not be carried out in practice to 
any great degree. In addition to the reasons of business, the 
usual variegated composition of the transports coming from the 
great realms of the Reichs Commissariate Ukraine opposed it. 
Basically, a regrouping to racial membership might be possible 
after completion of an examination of this membership which 
would have to be made in conjunction with the issuance of em- 
ployment permits for Eastern Laborers, especially when a group 
of foremen has been found among the Eastern Laborers based on 
partial pre-training independently of the solution to this question, 
the commissions from the Central Office will be striving to effect 
a rough sifting of the camps according to racial membership, and 
to house them accordingly in special barracks. The supplying of 


137 


084-PS 


experienced interpreters for this job and then systematic instruc- 
tion has been begun. 

7. Distinctive, Mostly Insufficient Food Rations. The inade- 
quate food ration for Eastern Laborers is important not only in 
the matter of performance but also politically, since the majority 
of the help coming from the occupied Eastern territories were 
previously accustomed to better rations. After using up all the 
food supplies which had been brought along, a general lowering 
of the ability to work and of the morale was noticeable. The 
written request to the Herr Reichs Food-Minister on the matter, 
to examine the food quotas in respect to the fact that the Eastern 
Laborer was in a worse position in the matter of nourishment 
than the Poles, was ansv/ered by a telephone communication from 
the respective Chief of Section, that to his knowledge the Rus- 
sians were better off than the Poles. With this ignorance of the 
condition decisive measures could hardly be expected on the part 
of the Reichs Food Ministry. Nevertheless Gauleiter Sauckel has 
declared, in Weimar as a part of his program, that the feeding of 
the German as well as the foreign laborer inside of Germany 
w r ould be shortly adapted to the requirements in accordance with 
their performance — here he supported his program on an utter- 
ance of the Fuehrer — . In connection with this a conference took 
place in the Reichs Food Ministry on 29/9/42 in which an im- 
proved food quota of the Eastern Laborer -was decided upon. The 
decree which is being co-signed by the High Command of the 
Armed Forces and the GBA, [?] upon which the “Special Delivery 
Letter” of the 17/4/42 will be nullified, provides for laborers of 
all types an additional 1750 grams of potatoes, for workers in 
heavy industry and additional 200 grams, and for the group, to be 
newly instituted, of “overtime” and “night” workers a weekly 
2600 grams of bread, 300 of meat, and 150 of fat. Besides this, in- 
stead of the tasteless bread made of turnips the usual kind will be 
delivered in the future. Even though a complete equality of food 
rationing with the other foreigners should be aspired to, this new 
measure, whose enforcement is imminent, will counteract the in- 
testinal diseases and swelling of the stomach, as well as the send- 
ing of bread from relatives in the Ukraine, which can not be hin- 
dered on political grounds. 

8. Pavtly insufficient, and Unjust Payment of Wages. The wage 
adjustments for Eastern laborers and Eastern women workers 
must still be considered unsatisfactory even after the new wage 
scales, by the ruling of the Council of Ministers dated 30/6/42, as 
well as the lower evaluation of those agricultural workers who 


138 


084-PS 


are quartered and fed free. The determining factor in keeping 
the net salary down is the necessity even today of maintaining the 
natural lower social level as compared to the German laborer, and 
to protect the German produce market as well as — in the case of 
transfer accounts — the enterprises in the domain of the Reichs 
Commissariate from an accumulation of surplus purchasing power. 
The Central Office took the viewpoint, in the conferences con- 
cerned with this matter, that it is far better to keep the wage 
level, as such, down than later to lower a nominally higher net 
salary to about half by means of the forced savings plan, report- 
edly proposed by the Reichs Finance Minister. The change of the 
hourly pay scale, as well as pay on contracts and pay by means of 
premiums is therefore closely connected with the success of the 
voluntary stamp savings plan, which was installed in September 
1942. This on the other hand will depend upon the fact that the 
saved amount, which has been sent to the respective home banks 
of the relatives in the form of savings books — a system which has 
finally been introduced by the Herr Reichs Commissar for the 
Ukraine — will at least be redeemable in cash to half of the amount 
shown, even if no interest is paid on it at the time. A change in the 
question of wages, considering that this is the first time in bank 
technological procedure that savings and transfer accounts have 
been joined together, would have prospects only if an eventual 
rearrangement does not materially raise the total wage increase 
of Eastern Laborers. A throttling measure would otherwise be 
necessary eventually which would shatter the trust in the honesty 
of the German social methods and would give irresponsible ma- 
terial to the Soviet propaganda. A way to correctness in the 
matter of pay within the limitations determined by this view- 
point, could be seen in the proposal of the Reichs Trustee Dr. 
Kimmich, who expounded it in a short report in Weimar on 
11/9/42. In accordance with this a plan for arranging salaries 
should be carried out by the industries by inserting increasing 
measures for part time, apprenticeship, and instructional work, 
to bring into prominence the principle of pay according to per- 
formance even in the occupied territories. The foundation for the 
pay scale based on this will be the evaluation according to eight 
categories of difficulty in the performance of work, the use of 
which would exclude the evaluation of previous preparatory train- 
ing (in the judging of differences) in favor of the success in per- 
formance. The complete stoppage of wages would thereby be 
abolished with finality and the offering of work premiums be made 
possible to foreign laborers. This, — as Dr. Kimmich characterizes 


139 


084- PS 


it, — “Re-establishment of a just salary and contract” will have 
as an effect a general increase in performance which will be ad- 
vertised as “The thanks of the German laborer to the combat 
soldier.” Should these principles shortly be made obligatory in 
all the states, this would also bring, in connection with the meas- 
ures of the project of occupational instruction, an improvement 
to the former Soviet specialist without having impaired the pre- 
eminence of the German specialist. The safeguarding of the su- 
periority of the latter is in spite of the wartime needs among 
other things thereby guaranteed by the fact that the Herr Reichs 
Minister for armament and ammunition has been able to carry out 
through the High Command of the Armed Forces on September 
1942, that these 500,000 German war industrial workers, who are 
going to be inducted during the winter half year, will only receive 
an eight week training, after that they will, however, be returned 
to their key-positions in the plants. How far the coming change 
of wage structure will affect not only the leading position of the 
German specialist as opposed to the Eastern Laborer but also the 
relationship between these and the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Es- 
tonian workers is not to be seen in advance without further infor- 
mation. First of all, the Herr Reichs Minister of Finance will 
examine at the instigation of the Reichs Minister for the occupied 
Eastern Territories, if and in how far the increase of the so- 
called “Salary Equalizing Tax” as an addition to the Income Tax 
on the Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian in the Reich in spite of 
the low rate of 15% will in many cases place them worse off than 
comparable Eastern Laborers. This would be all the less tolerable 
as the employment of Eastern Laborers in the General Territory 
of Estonia- leads up to the opposite problems. 

9. Insufficient Equipping of clothes and shoes . The clothing 
of almost all Eastern Laborers, men and women, must be consid- 
ered as insufficient. Transports were arriving even in the last 
days of the month of September whose occupants did not carry 
any winter clothing with them. The recruiting agents seem to 
leave the workers in the opinion that there is no winter in Ger- 
many and moreover, that the Eastern Laborers would receive 
everything they need. In view of the coming cold months and of 
the inadequacy of many quarters a catastrophe must arise on ac- 
count of the existing lack of clothing and shoes, if a successful 
remedy is not found immediately. The main difficulties in the 
supplying of missing equipment, which has already led in our 
large industrial plant to the loss of 10% of its employees,— lies 
in the fact that the clothing set aside from the collection of tex- 


140 


084- PS 


tile goods, does not even come close to covering the demand and 
that the available booty as well as confiscated goods in occupied 
territories will not be handed out by the competent management 
without the delivery of the existing ration cards. Since the East- 
ern Laborer does not possess the latter this could then only be 
carried out if the enterprises would requisition the needed clothing 
for the German workers and would offer those to the Eastern La- 
borers, — unfortunately however, deducting it from their wages 
from time to time. The sending of clothing, coats and shoes by 
the families of Eastern laborers by means of individual shipment 
can not be carried out without further directives on account of the 
necessity of delousing the garments at the border, wherefore a 
measure was proposed after previous negotiations of the Central 
office with the deputy of the Generalarbeitsfuehrer Kretschman 
at the GBA under the direction of the Reichs Ministry for the 
occupied Eastern territories; in accordance with this measure 
collective addresses will be sent to the occupied territories by the 
enterprises in collaboration with the censorship office and special 
collection offices set up there. The success of this action must 
remain in doubt at present. During the meeting in Weimar it 
was then announced that from January 1943 on, uniform work 
clothes will be made of cellulose material which, however, will not 
be of very good quality and would look baggy after a short wear. 
Independently of this creation of work clothes, which naturally 
can not be considered a costume or uniform, the Central Office has 
made it one of its tasks to help with the action to provide clothes 
to help decrease to a minimum the expected lowering of perform- 
ance, loss of morale, increased escapes, and cases of freezing. 

10. Insufficient Supervision of the Eastern Laborers Employed 
in Agriculture. According to ruling No. 4 of the Deputy General 
for Labor of 7 May 1942, the supervision of those Eastern work- 
ers and women workers employed in agriculture is delegated to 
the Reichs Food Administration. Practical supervision in the 
rural areas by the state, regional and local authorities of the 
Reichs Peasant Leader must be considered as illusory with re- 
spect to the lack of knowledge and to the insufficient knowledge 
of these people as well as to the fact that the seizing of Eastern 
Laborers in the midst of all the foreign workers in the rural areas 
can only be carried out with difficulty. To inform at least the 
rural superintendent of the principles which govern the treatment 
of the Eastern laborers, the publication department of the Reichs 
Food Administration has, in accord with the Reichs Minister for 
occupied Eastern territories sent out guiding instructions for the 

693256 — 46—10 

141 


084-PS 


present enlightenment campaign during the fall quarter. No 
objections can so far be made against a strict observance of these 
guiding instructions since, on account of the shortage of labor 
in the rural areas during the past months, a pampering of the 
Eastern workers and women workers was noticed, which was not 
only a threat towards the temporary transfer of 200,000 agri- 
cultural workers into industry but also in respect to the damage 
of a lack of migration into other areas. To intensify the super- 
vision in the rural enterprises, a policy forming meeting took 
place in August 1942 with the representatives of the Reichs Food 
Administration during which among other things the sending of 
interpreters by the Reichs ’ Ministry for the occupied Eastern 
Territory to the Reichs Peasant leader was taken into considera- 
tion. Since the Reichs Food Administration was only willing to 
approve in the latter part of September, the taking over of the 
payment of special supervision with a knowledge of the language, 
in spite of exemption from payment of contributions on the part 
of Eastern laborers, and since there is still at the present time no 
clear settlement of the number and conditions for this it will be 
necessary to balance the lack of activity of the Reichs Food Ad- 
ministration with an appropriate initiative action on the part of 
the Central Office of the Reichs Ministry for the occupied Eastern 
territories. 

11. Insufficient Recreation . In spite of repeated efforts for a 
satisfactory and meaningful organization of the recreation period 
for the Eastern laborer the German Arbeitsfront has still not 
been able to create and carry out a satisfactory recreational pro- 
gram. While the enterprises have organized excursions in groups 
because of necessity, the recreational program in the camps have 
so far lacked a uniform outline. The showing of moving pictures 
often runs into difficulties since the theaters, which have been 
created for this purpose, are only accessible to German workers 
and the Eastern laborer could not enter because of the danger of 
contamination of lice. The daily radio program in Russian and 
Ukrainian language which in the beginning was proposed by the 
Reichsminister of Enlightenment and Propaganda has still not 
been carried out because of several reasons. The performance of 
several artists is only possible in exceptional cases among the 
Eastern races because of the existing travel difficulties. What 
drawbacks and difficulties are connected with this can be shown 
in the circumstances under which a Ukrainian group of artists, 
who are now stationed in the Reich after an agreement was made 
between Gauleiter Sauckel and the Commissioner General of Kiew, 


142 


084-PS 


are performing. After this group was barely sufficiently housed 
in an Eastern Labor Camp near Halle for a period of two weeks, 
a meeting took place in the RAM in which it was decided upon a 
suggestion by the representative of the Reichs Ministry, for the 
occupied Eastern territories, that the National Socialistic Organ- 
ization should send three organizational trustees, the Reichs Min- 
istry for Enlightenment and Propaganda three propaganda trus- 
tees, and the Reichs Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territo- 
ries three political trustees, to Halle. By the combined efforts of 
these trustees it was finally possible to employ the group of artists, 
who were made up of three separate groups, in several of the 
central German States [Gaue], during which the management, 
even in organizational matters, soon went to the member of the 
Eastern office who was sent by the Central Office of the Reichs 
Minister for the Occupied Eastern territory. Until 30/9/42, on 
which day the Central office in Berlin sponsored an afternoon 
reception for the 38 Ukrainian artists, the Reichs Minister for 
Enlightenment and Propaganda had still not decided upon the 
amount of wages, which had accrued because of the performances, 
still less who was to pay for it, so that a temporary solution by 
using an agent who would carry out the bare essential down pay- 
ment had to be found. Because of this lack of clarity, the wish 
of the Deputy General for the Arbeitseinsatz to retain the group 
in the Reich during the winter months can not be supported. 

12. Return under Unworthy Conditions of Eastern laborers and 
women laborers ivho are not fit for ivork. The carelessness during 
the enlistment and reception of millions of Eastern laborers and 
women laborers has resulted in the fact that, — according to a 
careful estimate, — about five percent of the persons transported 
into the Reich have proved not to be capable of work. That means 
nothing less than that about 80 to 100,000 returnees will stream 
into the occupied Eastern territories in the coming days. The 
dangers included in this returning process can be seen in the fact 
that this deals with sick, crippled, mothers-to-be, as well as such 
persons whom the enterprises are glad to reject and who because 
of that are not being taken care of. The mood of these returnees 
is temporarily forced to be anti-German, and nothing has been 
done, in spite of repeated suggestions in the Reichs Labor Min- 
istry to reconcile the returnees with at least a few favorable 
impressions of Germany. During the latter part of September 
1942, a collecting camp in Berlin-Blankenfelde, which was quar- 
tered with Eastern laborers who were destined for return, was in- 
spected upon the instigation of the Central Office by a commission 


143 


084-PS 


consisting of different authorities, at which time revolting con- 
ditions were met. Among other things a shot was fired by the 
guard at an Eastern laborer who was caring for his natural needs, 
without the President of the States Employment Office who was 
present making any protest against it. All of the camp inmates 
gave an impression of neglect. Since the returning of these 1600 
persons as well as a further 4400 returnees from other camps, 
could not be reconciled politically with respect to the danger of 
contaminating their native districts with reports of horror, and 
since the postponement of a necessary re-quartering of the col- 
lecting camps could no longer be provided (in the meantime) the 
chief of the branch offices of the Central Police-Vice-counsel in re- 
tirement Miller — Dr. of Law Boywidt and Mrs. Miller were sent 
at the same time to Brest-Litowsk, to stop the transport at least 
at this point and to carry out according to the situation a quaran- 
tining of the people or, belatedly to take care of them. How 
necessary this interference was is shown by the fact that this 
train with returning laborers had stopped at the same place where 
a train with newly recruited Eastern laborers had stopped. Be- 
cause of the corpses in the trainload of returning laborers, a 
catastrophe might have been precipitated had it not been for 
the mediation of Mrs. Miller. In this train women gave birth to 
babies who were thrown out of the window's during the journey, 
people having tuberculosis and veneral diseases rode in the same 
car, dying people lay in freight cars without straw, and one of the 
dead was thrown on the railway embankment. The same must 
have occurred in other returning transports. To end these terri- 
ble conditions, it is intended to create special transient camps in 
the Reich area for returning workers where those who contracted 
diseases in the Reich will be separated from the chronically sick. 
They will be sent to an organization caring for the sick. Those 
finally chosen to return would receive medical and psychological 
treatment for at least a week. The chief of the Reich health pro- 
gram and his chief of liaison with the GBA, resp., have approved 
this central office plan of giving aid to returning workers, which 
aid should also be extended during transport. The directorate of 
the German Red Cross wants to share in the execution of this plan 
by making available trained personnel, among other things. The 
first of these transient camps for returnees could be established at 
Bad Frankenhausen in Thuringia where, according to the state- 
ment of the local mayor, suitable area is available. 

To solve these and numerous other problems, as well as the 


144 


084-PS 


removal of the described difficulties and abuses, two things are 
advised. 

I. Consultation of the Reich minister with the Fuehrer -with the 
purpose of asking him for personal energetic intervention; this 
conference will have to include among others the following re- 
quests as laid down in the note 1 f 5 of 6/7/42 : 

1. Treatment by the police. The Fuehrer should beseech 
the Reichs Leader of the SS in a personal consultation, to repeal 
the General Regulations of 20/2/42 including the supplementary 
Decree of 9/4/42. that is Section A of the General Regulations. 

Laborers from the former Soviet Russian territory and to 
replace them and among other things with new regulations which 
are to be voted upon in conjunction with the GBA (2) and the 
Reichs Ministry for the occupied Eastern territory. 

2. Direction of people. The Fuehrer should direct the 
Chancellor of the party as well as the Reich propaganda office 
of NSDAP to adjust suitable urgent measures in agreement 
with the Reich Ministry M.G.A.B. and respectively with the 
Z.O. to enlighten those party members who are handling the 
supervision of the relations between Germans and foreigners 
about the scope of the employment of the Eastern laborers and 
furthermore to inform the entire German population of the po- 
litical mission which history has bestowed upon them by the 
taking in of millions of former Soviet citizens. 

3. The competences of the R.M.fdBO. The Fuehrer 
should inform the supreme authorities of the Reich, if possible 
through the Reich Minister and the chief of the Reichs chan- 
cellory that not only those measures of theirs, which concern 
themselves with occupied Eastern territories but also those that 
affect the labor from these territories employed in the Reich 
may only be decided in every action with the Reich ministry 
for the occupied Eastern territories. 

II. Further expansion of the Ceneral Office for member Races, 
so that an extended arm of the R.M.fdBO in the Reich and 
as a representative of the foreign people from the occupied 
Eastern territories living here it can quickly perceive its in- 
structed interests. The following would be essential for this. 

(1) Commitment of a special Commissioner. The appoint- 
ment of a special commissioner for the Reich ministeries pro- 
vided with specific authority to take care of the interests of the 
central office, should serve especially tv r o purposes ; to take an 
active influence upon the handling of enlistments inside the 
occupied eastern territories. 


145 


084 PS 


(2) To carry out definite aims of the central Office by culti- 
vating a personal contact with Gauleiter Sauckel. 

(3) Reinforcing of the Branch Officers. The commissions 
which serve under the chief of the branch officer and which are 
employed to inspect the camps, urgently need reinforcements; to 
be able to work successfully in thousands of camps for this pur- 
pose about 50 interpreters are needed besides liaison agents to 
the country employment offices and those trustees of the Gau 
who worked in an honorary capacity, the chief of the commis- 
sions need a uniform. 

(4) Reinforcing the Sections. The four sections of the Cen- 
tral Office, (Matters of organization, legal and information serv- 
ice, supervision aid, and psychological training) need to be im- 
mediately filled by at least six representatives. On account of 
the avalanche of problems brought to the Central Office, urgent 
questions remain otherwise unsolved and hundreds of transac- 
tions unsettled in spite of the twelve hour day and sometimes 
several hours of night work, as well. Of what far reaching 
importance it is to see to it that a political use is made of the 
stay of several million Eastern laborers in the Reich. That on 
8/9/42 their members already amounted to 1,737,000 is lower 
as from many other reasons by a glance at the present condi- 
tion of the German censored figures. In spite of all measures 
to Germanize and re-Germanize people who are unfortunately 
confronted by increased war casualties the future of the Ger- 
man people when measured against the breadth of age levels 
placed on top of each other as characterized by a population pyra- 
mid whose outlines deviate from the biologically normal picture 
of a bell, if one compares the present curve of the future profes- 
sionals with the similar curves of the Eastern peoples it will be 
frighteningly apparent that especially during the decisive dec- 
ades after this war the number of German people of the Harz 
areas in the East wnich will be required for a normal administra- 
tive development will not be on hand, the willingness and coopera- 
tion of members of the Eastern peoples is herewith an unavoidable 
necessity, wherefore the years commiting an army of millions 
of Eastern laborers in the Reich are not only seen from the view- 
point of overcoming the problems concerned but actively must 
be used to create a reliable propaganda army which after its 
leturn home will perhaps one day will be just as decisive for 
the German fate in the East as the victory of our weapons. 

signed: DR. GUTKELCH. 


146 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 089-PS 


NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY 
The Deputy of the Fuehrer Chief of Staff 

Munich 33, Brown House, at present Berlin w8 

Wilhelmstr. 64, March 8, 1940 
III-DR Kl/Gf 
Persona] 

Chancellory Rosenberg 
Receipt Nr 705. 14 Mar 40 

To Mr. Reichsleiter Rosenberg 
Berlin w 35, Margaretenstr. 17 

Concerns : Confessional writing 

In the enclosure I am sending you a carbon copy of my letter 
of today to Reichsleiter Amann for recognition. 

signed: M BORMANN 

Enclosure 


NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY 
The Deputy of the Fuehrer Chief of Staff 

Munich 33, Brown House, at present Berlin w8 

Wilhelmstr. 64, March 8, 1940 
III-DR Kl/Gf 
Personal 

To Mr. Reichsleiter Amann 
Munich, Thierschstr. 11 

Concerns: Confessional writing. 

I am referring to the discussion of my expert, party member 
Dr. Klopfer, with party member Dr. Rienhardt, and inform you 
once more of the fact that according to a report I have received, 
only 10% of the over 3000 protestant periodicals in Germany, 
such as Sunday papers etc. have ceased publication for reason 
of paper saving. Party member Dr. Rienhardt has already 
informed my expert that at present the distribution of any paper 
whatsoever for such periodicals was barfed. 

I urge you to see to it in any redistribution of paper to be con- 
sidered later that the confessional writing, which according to 
experiences so far gathered, possesses very doubtful value for 
strengthening the power of resistance of the people toward the 
external foe, receives still sharper restrictions in favor of litera- 
ture, politically and ideologically more valuable. 

Without doubt the draft of an order “for fulfillment of the 


147 


089— PS 

organizational duty by the production of writings , presented 
upon your request, will be a suitable means for this purpose. 

signed : M BORMANN 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 090-PS 

18 September 1940 

2474-R/Dt. 


SECRET 

To the Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP 
Reich Director F. X. Schwarz, 

Munich S3. 

Dear Party Member Schwarz, 

Thanks for your helpfulness in regard to the safeguarding of 
scientific materials in the occupied territories. I deduce from this 
that you are interested in this work and would therefore like to 
inform you about several matters. 

It took some time until we found by and by the several treas- 
ures, and until we could ascertain that a lot had been abducted 
from Paris into other towns. Thus the treasures of the Roths- 
childs, robbed together from all parts of the world, are being se- 
cured by us not only in Paris but also in the various castles of the 
Rothschilds (Bordeaux, Deauville and so on). Legal doubts arose 
and I have discussed them with the Fuehrer. Subsequently he 
caused a new order to be issued by the Chief of the Supreme Com- 
mand of the Armed Forces which I enclose in duplicate. Thus the 
Seminary (Hohe Schule) will still receive a Polish library of 130,- 
000 volumes. This will include the complete history of the East, 
probably a large Slavic library and many other items. Together 
with a lot of scientific material many extremely valuable objects 
uf art have been found in cases at the residence of the Rothschilds. 
This has been secured and the Fuehrer will decide at a later date 
as to the final disposal. 

In Brussels and Amsterdam we are on the track of valuable 
objects too. I believe that we shall be able to bring quite some 
material from there to Germany. 

You see that we are industrially endeavoring to exploit the 
present moment. Such an, opportunity will hardly present itself 
again. I am trying to keep the Staff for Special Purposes down 
to a minimum. Nevertheless it is unavoidable that a number of 
experts have to work at various places. And the work takes 
longer than was anticipated in the beginning. 


148 


090— PS 


Once more many thanks. If I should come to Munich in the 
near future I hope to meet you. 

Heil Hitler! 

28 January 1941 

8581/R/dt 
[initials] Sch 


To: The Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP 

Reich Director F. X. Schwarz 
Munich 33 

Subject: Staff for Special Purposes in Paris 
Dear Party Member Schwarz, 

About the work of my Staff for Special Purposes in France, 
Holland and Belgium I can inform you that the major part of the 
work in France will be finished by the end of February. Then 
only a few men have to remain in Paris. — However, in Belgium 
and Holland extensive research work has still to be carried out. 
I hope nevertheless to wind up the main part of the work there 
within a measurable space of time. The arrangement and regis- 
tration of the large art treasures claimed a lot of special work. I 
had these treasures confiscated simultaneously with the scientific 
material. The Fuehrer is going to decide what to do with them 
shortly. As I informed you previously the values involved will 
come close to a billion dollars according to expert estimates. 

I told you already verbally that the largest Jewish library of 
the world, consisting of 350,000 volumes, will be placed in the in- 
stitution which is going to be opened at Frankfurt on the Main 
within a short time. Another 200,000 volumes will be added from 
Holland. 

The library of the Ilnd International about the history of the 
social movements cannot be transferred for the moment to Ger- 
many due to lack of space. Two will have to take charge of it in 
Amsterdam where scientific work can start immediately. This 
library consists of 130,000 volumes. 

The account of the expenditures up till now will be submitted 
to your deputy by the administrative branch of my office. How- 
ever, I have to request that you put another amount of 100,000 
Reichsmark at my disposal so that I can complete the work satis- 
factorily. At the same time I propose once more that you have 
parts of those sums reimbursed — be it from the Reich Marshal 
or from the Fuehrer’s funds for cultural purposes. There is no 


149 


090-PS 


doubt that I also have collected treasures which will not benefit 
the Seminary directly. 

Once more I want to express my deepest thanks for letting us 
have the Schrenck-Notzing-Palais in Munich for our institution. 
Prof. Harder, the future director of this institution, is extremely 
pleased with it and will soon get in touch with your deputy. 

A depiction of the situation regarding the branch offices of the 
Seminary in the various cities is just being completed and will be 
submitted to you within a short time. 

Once more many thanks for your generous support. 

Heil Hitler 
Yours 
[in pencil] Sch 


[SYNOPSIS] 

Letter of 22 May 1941, 4592/4863/R/Ma 

To the Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP, Reich Director Schwarz, 
Munich 33. 

Written by Rosenberg 


Letter of 9 May 1941, K IV/te. 4363 H. [Initialed] Sch 
To the Deputy of the Fuehrer for the supervision of the complete 
mental and doctrinal [Weltanschaulich] education of the NSDAP 
Mr. Reich Director Alfred Rosenberg, Berlin W 35, 17 Mar- 
gareten Str. 

Written and signed by the Reich Treasurer of the Party Schwarz. 


Letter 19 April 1941 from the Office for Jewish and Masonic Prob- 
lems. 

Frankfurt on the Main, 1 Schwindstrasse ; Schi/Fl. 

To the Deputy of the Fuehrer for the supervision of the complete 
mental and doctrinal training and education of the NSDAP, atten- 
tion Adjutant, Berlin W 35, 17 Margaretenstr., Party member 
Koeppin. 

Written by Chief Reich Director (Oberreichsleiter) Schimner and 
signed by him. 


Letter of 3 April 1941, K IV/kr. 

To the Deputy of the Fuehrer for the supervision of the complete 
mental and doctrinal education of the NSDAP, 

Reich Director Alfred Rosenberg, Berlin W 35, 17 Margareten Str. 
Written and signed by the Reich Treasurer of the Party Schwarz. 


150 


090 PS 


Copy of a letter of 28 March 1941, from the Reich Commissar for 
the occupied territories of the Netherlands, General Commissar 
for Special Purposes, Section ro. international organizations, Den 
Haag, Fluweelen Burgwal 22; SCH/R. 

To F. J. M. Rehse, Munich 2 M, 1 Residenzstrasse (residence) 
Written by Schwier, authenticated by Kretzer. 


Copy of a letter from NSDAP, Collection FJM. Rehse, 2 April 
1941, Munich, 1 Residenzstr. 

To the Reich Treasurer Schwarz, Munich, Administration Building 
Written by F. J. M. Rehse, Authenticated by Reigl 


[The five previously enumerated letters all deal with the request 
of party member Rehse to obtain the furnishings, parapher- 
nalia and books of a masonic lodge for the party collection Rehse. 
This was finally granted in the letter of 22 May 1941 by Rosen- 
berg.] 


11 June 1942 
R./K. 1035/42 


To the Reich Treasurer of the NSDAP, 

Reich Director Franz Xavier Schwarz 
Munich 33 

Dear Party Member Schwarz, 

The work of my staff for special purposes has been hampered 
through lack of personnel. Nevertheless, the tabulating of the 
cultural objects secured from France has progressed so far that 
an exhibition of selected paintings can be arranged in the castle 
Neuschwanstein. The overall catalogue will be ready for type- 
setting in a few weeks. I would enjoy it tremendously if the two 
of us could be the first ones to visit this exhibition. We could then 
decide which objects and tapestries to suggest to the Fuehrer to 
be used for the furnishing of the Seminary [Hohe Schule] re- 
spectively of my office. The Fuehrer will hardly be able to visit 
the exhibition due to the fact that he is presently overburdened 
with work. However I shall ask him to visit it later and shall in- 
form you w T hen the Fuehrer will be able to come. 

Once more I thank you for your generous support extended to 
my staff for special purposes. I am convinced that a large num- 
ber of most’ valuable cultural objects have been secured for the 
German people. 


151 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 091-PS 


11 Sept 1944 R/U/K 2500/44 

To the Reich’s commissar for the Netherlands 
Reich’s minister Dr. Seyss-Inquart 

Subject: Removal of the library of the social institute of Am- 

sterdam 

Dear esteemed Party Member Dr. Seyss-Inquart! 

The development of the military situation in the West has 
caused me to instruct my special purpose staff in Amsterdam, to 
remove the library of the social institute there, to the Reich by 
the quickest way. However, great difficulties have arisen to that 
effect due to the proximity of the front lines. I have therefore put 
at the disposal of the Chief of my main work division Nether- 
lands, SS Major Schmidt-Staehler, the special purpose chief Gum- 
mert with full powers for the execution of this task. Since this 
library is mainly composed of a unique collection of the writings 
of the European Marxism, it is therefore irreplaceable for our 
ideological-political struggles. 

I request therefore sincerely from you to be of assistance to 
my deputies Schmidt-Staehler and Gummert, with your authority 
as Reich’s commissar for the Netherlands, in case the difficulties 
arising by the removal of the library cannot be surmounted by 
them. 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 098-PS 

NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN LABOR PARTY 

Munich, 33, Brown house 
at present Berlin, 22 Feb 40 

Deputy of the Fuehrer 
Staff Leader 

Mr. Reich leader Alfred Rosenberg 
Berlin W 35 
Margareten Str. 17 

Chancellery Rosenbery, 24 Feb 40 

r ec. No. 555 copy AR and Urban St 
Subject: Directions for the administration of classes in religion 

Dear Party Member Rosenberg : 

lhe deputy of the fuehrer has heard from different sources, 
that Reich Bishop Mueller tells everywhere, that he received a 
commission from you to work out directions for formulating the 
teaching of religion for the schools. 


152 


098— PS 


I have not been able to examine the statements of Reich Bishop 
Mueller as to their correctness. The question, having come up 
for discussion again by the statements of Reich Bishop Mueller, 
is however in my mind of such fundamental importance for the 
future ideological position of the party, that I find it necessary, 
already now to point out to you the serious objections I have in 
regard to such a commission. 

The ministry for education of the Reich has repeatedly indi- 
cated its desire in the course of the past few years for new 
directions for formulating the teaching of religion, which would 
also be acceptable to the NSDAP. 

With your agreement, this request has repeatedly been refused 
by the Fuehrer’s deputy. Just as your ministry did, so the deputy 
of the Fuehrer took the position based on the assumption, that 
it could not be the task of the party to give directions for the in- 
struction of the teachings of Christian religions. 

Christianity and National Socialism are phenomona which 
originated from entirely different basic causes. Both differ fun- 
damentally so strongly, that it will not be possible to construct 
a Christian teaching which would be completely compatible with 
the point of view of the national socialist ideology; just as the 
communities of Christian faith would never be able to stand by 
the ideology of national socialism in its entirety. The issuing 
of national socialist directions for the teaching of religious classes 
would however be based on a synthesis of national socialism and 
Christianity which I find impossible. 

If the directions should really be permeated by the spirit of 
national socialism, some very fundamental articles of faith of the 
Christian teachings could not be recognized. I am referring here 
only to the position of the Christian churches to the race question, 
to the question of hindrance or destruction of life not valuable, its 
position to marriage, which speaks for the celibacy of priests and 
the toleration and furtherance of orders for monks and nuns, the 
teaching, contradictory to German feeling, of the immaculate 
conception of Mary, etc. 

No matter how these directions may be formulated, in no case 
will they ever simultaneously find the approval of the church and 
the party. 

In addition to this, the religions themselves cannot agree on 
the contents of the Christian teachings; as far as the Protestants 
themselves are concerned, there are not only the followers of the 
confessional church in the Reich and the German Christians, but 
also the adherents of a teaching, which is endeavoring to create 


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a new Lutheran Christendom of a particular kind approximately 
in the shape which seems desirable to the Reich Minister of 
churches, party member Kerri. The party thus would have to 
decide first which of these directions of faith it would give pref- 
erence, or if it should even decide for a fourth. I do not think it 
entirely impossible that the Reich Bishop may take this latter 
road, since according to his last publication he himself has al- 
ready turned sharply away from conceptions which up to now 
have been part of the faith of the German Christians. 

But if directions for the instruction of religion should ever be 
worked out, it will not be enough, to my mind, to make them for 
Protestants only; respective directions should also be worked out 
for Catholics. To work out directions for instructions of Catholic 
faith, the Reich Bishop is hardly the suitable person, and one 
would probably have to choose a Catholic. Of course the direc- 
tions for both faiths would differ in fundamental questions, each, 
however would lay claim to the fact that it really contained the 
truly authentic interpretation of article 24 of the party program. 

By issuing directions nothing would therefore be improved in 
the present situation in the field of the churches. The fight be- 
tween the faiths would be carried on in the old form and spread 
into the lines of the party. Yes, all faiths and Christian groups 
would attack state and party, because they had assumed to en- 
croach upon their own territory, that of teaching the Christian 
faith and to try to reform it. 

The churches cannot be conquered by a compromise between 
national socialism and Christian teachings, but only through a 
new ideology, whose coming you yourself have announced in your 
writings. Because of this conviction we have always been care- 
ful, not to exert a reforming influence on the Christian dogma in 
any shape nor to exert any influence on the church directives for 
religious teachings. In complete mutual agreement we have re- 
jected the intention of the Reich Minister for churches who, 
against the objection of the party, always tried anew to renew 7 
the church life in the' frame of national socialist spirit, in search- 
ing for a compromise between Christian teachings and the ide- 
ology of national socialism. 

Should, however, any one personality emanating from the life 
of the church, be charged now to w 7 ork out directions for the teach- 
ing of the Christian religion, the party would thereby basically 
approve and accept for itself the position of the Reich Minister 
for the churches previously opposed by it as there is no basic dif- 
ference between a position which wants to reform and reorgan- 


154 


098— PS 


ize the church life in its entirety, and one which aims at this goal 
solely in the realm of the education of youth. 

So far we have always been in accord, that by taking such a 
step the party would leave the soil on which it is firmly planted 
and would step on the swaying ground of the controversial 
Christian doctrines. It would enter into the domain of the inter- 
pretation of the teachings of Jesus, and there would doubtless 
be subordinate to those who for centuries have done nothing but 
interpret and rewrite the words and deeds of Jesus of Nazareth 
as written in the old books about the actual wording of which 
the scientists fight even today. When in later decades and cen- 
turies the German people’s soul liberated by national socialism 
should once again be choked and crippled by Christian doctrines, 
it could be possible that it may have been caused by today’s at- 
tempt to effect a synthesis between national socialism and Chris- 
tianity. 

On the other hand, of course I am also of the opinion that it -is 
not possible to eliminate the religious instruction in schools 
without replacing it with something better for the moral edu- 
cation of youth. 

Religious instruction as given in schools today does not only 
comprise the instruction in the Christian doctrines of faith, the 
teachings of the creation of the world and of the life thereafter ; 
besides, the children receive also instructions in the ten com- 
mandments, which for most comrades of the people to this day 
still are the only directives for their moral behavior and for an 
orderly collective life in the people’s community. If this instruc- 
tion is taken from the children without replacing it with some- 
thing better, the objection can be made — in my estimation not 
without reason, that, as many contend, the present degradation 
of youth is in part caused by the lack of religious instruction in 
schools. 

What, in my opinion, is therefore necessary is the preparation 
of a short directive about a national socialist life formulation. 
We need for the work of education in the party, especially also 
in the Hitler Youth a short resume in which the ethical prin- 
ciples are documented, to respect which each German boy and 
girl, who at one time will be representatives of the national 
socialistic Germany, must be educated. In such a directive for 
instance belongs the law of bravery, the law against cowardness, 
the commandment of love for the soulful nature in which God 
makes himself apparent also in the animal and the plant, a com- 
mandment to keep the blood pure; many principles also belong 


155 


098-PS 


here which are for instance also contained in the decalogue of 
the Old Testament, as far as they can be regarded as moral 
principles of all people’s life. 

The publication of such a directive can and must only come 
out of our national socialist conduct of life. Its commandments 
of customs need to be explained by reference to any doctrines 
of faith about the creation of life and about life of the soul after 
death. 

They can and must originate beyond any confessional discus- 
sions. 

I take the publication of such a directive to be of utmost im- 
portance, because the German boys and girls must once be told 
what they can and must do, and what is forbidden for them to 
do. I don’t even think it necessary to introduce this directive 
immediately into the schools as a text; it would be sufficient if 
for the time being it would be introduced into the party and its 
affiliations. Later it could also be taken over by the schools just 
as the little Catechism also was not created by the school boards, 
but first taught by the Church and later taken over by the schools. 

As far as the religious instructions in the schools is concerned, 
I do not think that anything has to be changed in the present 
situation. No fault can be found with any national socialist 
teacher, who after the unmistakenly clear instructions of the 
Fuehrer’s deputy, is ready to give school instructions in the 
Christian religion. For the contents of this instruction, however, 
the directives should still be binding which have in former years 
been made by the churches themselves. In the circular of the 
Fuehrer’s deputy No. 3/39 of 4 Jan 1939 it is stated explicitly 
that the teachers charged with religious instruction are not to 
choose from the material on biblical history at their own discre- 
tion, but have the obligation to teach the entire biblical instruc- 
tion material. Interpretations, explanations and separations in 
the sense of several attempts of particular church directions 
have to be omitted. The pupils must be given the entire picture 
of the biblical instruction material. 

However, the teachers have the right to present this material 
as property of biblical thought and not as that of Germany or 
national socialism. If thus in some cases comparison will be 
drawn, this, according to /che circular, corresponds only to the 
duties of the educator. Against such instruction of x'eligion the 
churches cannot have any objections. 

When, sometime later, the proposed directive for a new Ger- 
man conduct of life first to be used in the educational work of 


156 


098 -PS 


the party, will have found entry into the schools, it shall in no 
way supplant classes in religion. It may perhaps be used- as a 
foundation for some classes in German and must have validity 
for all pupils, without consideration of their religious affilia- 
tions. Against such educational procedure the churches could 
not object, either because it would really be a matter of additional 
education, which would take place next to the religious instruc- 
tion and without any connection with it. On the contrary, the 
churches would have reason to be thankful to the state because 
it is not satisfied with the religious instruction according to the 
very insufficient moral education based on the ten command- 
ments, but that it is giving youth an additional Education, which 
makes much higher demands on its moral conduct. 

Parallel to that the desire of the parents for the instruction 
in the doctrines of faith may thus well go on. The stronger and 
more fertile our positive educational work in the schools will be 
formulated, however the more certain it is that instruction of 
religions will be losing in importance. 

If the youth which is now being educated according to our 
moral laws will later have to decide if it is still willing to have 
its children brought up in the far inferior Christian doctrines, 
the decision will in most cases be negative. 

I would think that today, seven years after taking over the 
power, it should be possible to set up principles for a national 
socialist conduct of life. They have long been apparent to the 
people from the numerous early fighters for the national socialist 
idea. 

As long as we do not master this task, however, it will always 
be pointed out from various sides, and rightly so, that children, 
not taking part in religious instruction, are no longer taught even 
the most simple moral laws which are a standard for the com- 
munal life of all nations. 

The Fuehrer’s deputy finds it necessary that all these ques- 
tions should be thoroughly discussed in the near future in the 
presence of the Reich leaders, who are especially affected by 
them. I would appreciate it very much if you would let me know 
your position in this matter before the discussion. 

Heil Hitler! 

/&/■ M. Bormann 


693256 — 46—11 


157 


PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 099-PS 

National Socialist German Workers Party. 

The Fuehrer’s Deputy 
Staff leader 

Munich 33, Brown House, 

at present Berlin W 8, 9 Jan., 1940. Wilhelmstr. 64 III 

Dr. Kl/Gf. 

To Reichsleiter Party Comrade Alfred Rosenberg 
Berlin W 35 
Margareten Strasse 17 

Subject: Raising of a War Fund from the Churches. 

Enclosed, I forward to you the copy of a letter, sent today to 
the Reichsminister for Finance, for cognizance. 

Heil Hitler 
/s/ M. Bormann 
(M. Bormann) 

Enclosure. 


Berlin 19 Jan 1940 
Dr. Kl/Gf. 

To the Reichsminister for Finance 
Berlin W 8 
Wilhelmplatz 1-2* 

Subject: Raising of a War Fund from the Churches. 

As it has been reported to me, the war fund of the churches 
has been specified from the 1 November 1939 on, at first for the 
duration of three months at RM 1,800,000. — per month, of which 
Rm 1,000,000. — are to be paid by the Protestant church and 
RM 800,000. — by the Catholic church per month. 

The establishment of such a low amount has surprised me. I 
construe from numerous reports, that the political communities 
have to raise such a large war fund, that the execution of their 
tasks, partially very important for example in the field of pub- 
lic welfare, is endangered. In consideration of that, a larger quota 

from the churches appears to be absolutely appropriate. 

***** * * 

In my opinion, the determination of the amount cannot be af- 
fected by the argument that the fund could only have as a conse- 
quence a decrease of the material expenses, but not of the person- 
nel expenses of the churches. I consider it absolutely bearable, 
to decrease also the personnel expenses, especially for the Cath- 
olic clergymen. In contrast to all other German men, obliged to 


158 


099- PS 


serve, not one Catholic clergyman is in the field as the soldier; 
also none of the Catholic clergymen takes obligations unto 
himself voluntarily, like the ones which must be borne by every 
German family head. 

As far as the technical handling of the war fund to be deter- 
mined for the Catholic Church is concerned, in my opinion, the 
state does not have to bother to figure out the individual partial 
contributions, which must be raised by the various Orders and re- 
ligious associations. I would rather consider it correct if the 
amount is determined in one for the entire Catholic Church, and 
if one then leaves it to the Church to divide up this amount ac- 
cording to its own best knowledge. However, the state must be 
free to call upon the property and funds of the various individual 
parts and groups of the church arbitrarily to make its demands 
valid. 

As far as the Evangelical Church is concerned, for years the 
efforts of the Reichminister for Church Affairs have been in the 
direction to organize all the State Churches [Landeskirchen] of 
the Evangelical Church into one unified organization with a uni- 
fied leadership for the spiritual as well as for the financial af- 
fairs. Despite the objections, raised by the party, these plans 
were more and more elaborated upon ; even during the war, they 
were followed up without interruption. Therefore it is not un- 
just, to determine in one for the Evangelical Church the war fund 
to be raised according to the same principles, which have been 
developed for the Catholic Church. 

It should be left up to the State Churches [Landeskirchen] and 
religious associations, who consider such treatment unjust, to 
demonstrate in an easily perceptible manner, that they are not in 
any dependent relationship to the leadership of the German Evan- 
gelical Church, and do not desire to come under the latter’s do- 
minion. 


I would be thankful to you, if you could inform us very soon, 
how high the amount of the war fund of the churches has been 
set at. The sum, calculated for the duration of the first three 
months, of which, 'as I understand, the churches have not paid one 
penny, may not correspond in any way to the capability, as fig- 
ured from the entire fortune and from the contribution and/or 
tax income of the Churches. 

Heil Hitler 

By order 

M B (M. Bormann) 


159 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 100-PS 


NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY 

Munich 33 Brown House 
at present Berlin, 18 Jan 40 Bo/Si 
The Deputy of the Fuehrer, Chief of Staff 

Mr. Rosenberg, member of the executive board of the Party 
[Reichsleiter] 

Berlin W 35 
Margaretenstr. 17. 

Office Rosenberg No of entry 196. 20 Jan 40 
submitted to RL Rosbg 1/20 Copies AR and Urban 
Dear Party Member Rosenberg: 

A few days ago you expressed to the Fuehrer at the Reich 
Chancellory that Reich Bishop Mueller had written an excellent 
book for the German soldier. I am of different opinion. This book 
familiarizes a new soldier who has already given up Christianity 
with partly camouflaged trains of thought. 

As I have written to you already, I consider it the most essen- 
tial demand of the hour that NS publications worth reading for 
the German soldier should be written immediately by your Office 
and other qualified National Socialists. This opinion has been 
confirmed by many regional Party leaders. Thus we set against 
the sale of Christian pamphlets the highly increased sale of na- 
tional socialist publications which are popular. 

Heil Hitler: 

Yours 

Signed: BORMANN 

(M. Bormann) 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT I0I-PS 

National Socialist German Workers’ Party 

Munich 33, the Brown House 
At Present, Berlin W 8, 

17 Jan. 1940 

Wilhelmstrasse 64 III — Dr. Kl/Gf 
Rosenberg Chancellory 
Entry No. 187— [ ? ?] 18 Jan. 40 
Reich Director Rosenberg 

— Shown 189 
— Copy[??] 

The Deputy of the Fuehrer Staff Director 
To Reich Director Party Member Rosenberg 
Berlin W 35 Margaretenstr. 17 

Nearly all the districts report to me regularly, that the Churches 


160 


1 0 1 -PS 


of both confessions are administering spiritually to members of 
the Armed Forces. This administering finds its expression es- 
pecially in the fact that soldiers are being sent religious publica- 
tions by the spiritual leaders of the home congregations. These 
publications are in part very cleverly composed. I have repeated 
reports that these publications are being read by the troops and 
thereby exercise a certain influence on the morale. 

I have in the past sought by sounding out the General Field 
Marshall, the High Command of the Armed Forces and Party 
Member Reich Director Amann, to restrict considerably the pro- 
duction and shipment of publications of this type. The result of 
these efforts remain unsatisfactory. As Reich Director [Reichs- 
leiter] Amann has repeatedly informed me, the restriction of 
these pamphlets by means of the printing paper rationing has not 
been achieved because the paper used for the production of these 
writings is being purchased on the open market. Publications can 
only be confiscated by special police measures because they are 
designed to weaken the morale of the troops. Such police meas- 
ures are really unsatisfactory and in their final execution very 
much disputed. 

Likewise, the prior censorship of all writings by the High Com- 
mand of the Armed Forces which takes place at the distribution 
points of the Armed Forces service bureau, is not sufficient in my 
opinion, to guarantee that the soldiers are not given an undesired 
influence by the Churches. A publication, the contents of which 
are clearly tied to the Christian dogma and which do not contain 
attacks 'against Party, State or the Armed Forces, can not in 
general be refused permission by this examining commission. 

If the influencing of the soldiers by the Church is to be effec- 
tively combatted, this will only be accomplished, in my opinion, 
by producing many good publications in the shortest time possible 
under the supervision of the Party. These publications should 
be so composed that the soldiers will really prefer to read them, 
and at the same time, indoctrinate the soldiers with a National 
Socialist World philosophy, not the Christian viewpoint. 

Thus at the last meeting of the deputy Gauleiters complaints 
were uttered on this matter to the effect that a considerable 
quantity of such publications are not available. This is the 
reason I believe, that the publication by your expert, Office 
Director [Amtsleiter] Party Member Ziegler, “Soldier Belief — 
Soldier HonoB’ [Soldatenglaube — Soldatenehre] has had so great 
a sale in a short time. 

I maintain that it is necessary that in the near future we 


161 


IOI-PS 


transmit to the Party Service Offices down to local group direc- 
tors [Ortsgruppenleitern] a list of additional publications of 
this sort which should be sent to our soldiers by the local groups, 
Party military units [Sturme] or their adherents and friends 
in the field. I should not regard it as necessary or even good if 
the majority of these publications should have a spiritual or 
philosophical character. Rather I should regard it as much 
preferable if these publications in their finished form were 
styled in as varied a manner as possible, thus having an appeal 
to all members of the Armed Forces, regardless of their occupa- 
tional or professional achievements, regardless of their interests 
and their background. 

I should be very appreciative if you would devote your very 
special attention to this task, in the near future. My expert, 
Party Member Dr. Klopfer, is available to you for consultation 
about the material on hand here which is at your disposal at any 
time upon your call. 

As the production of these publications (which at the moment 
are not in existence) will take a certain amount of time, and as, 
on the other hand, I believe that the supplying of the troops with 
good publications ought not to be delayed a day, I should be in- 
debted to you if you would transmit to me a list of the already 
existing publicatipns which the deputy of the Fuehrer can recom- 
mend to the Party Service Offices as suitable for dispatch to the 
Armed Forces. 

Heil Hitler! 

[Signed] M. BORMANN 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 107-PS 

NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY 
Munich 17 June 1938 The Brown House 
Deputy of the Fuehrer Staff Leader 

CIRCULAR LETTER NR. 72/38 
To all Reichsleiter and Regional Directors [Gauleiter] 

Enclosed please find, for your information, a copy directions 
for participation of the Reichsarbeitsdienstes in religious celebra- 
tions. 

■Signed: M. BORMANN 

Rosenberg Chancellory In Nr. 226601 on 21 June 38 
Certified true copy 
M 

1 inclosure . 


162 


1 07— PS 


Copy 

Directions for the participation of the Reichsarbeitsdienstes in 

religious celebrations. 

The Reichsarbeitsdienst is a training school in which the Ger- 
man youth should be educated to national unity in the spirit of 
National Socialism. 

This problem can only be solved, if all the ideas which at one 
time were directed to the breaking up of national unity, are sub- 
dued in Reichsarbeitsdienst. Therefore it is forbidden to have 
any class, professional and religious barriers in the Reichsarbeits- 
dienst. 

What religious beliefs a person has is not a decisive factor, but 
it is decisive that he first of all feels himself a German. 

Every religious practice is forbidden in the Reichsarbeitsdienst 
because it disturbs the comrade-like harmony of all working men 
and women. 

On this basis every participation of the Reichsarbeitsdienst in 
churchly, that is religious, arrangements and celebrations is not 
possible. 

A religious creed will strive within the German people for pre- 
dominance. The Reichsarbeitsdienst in all its male and female 
leaders, working men and women strive for the indissoluble bind- 
ing of the whole people. 

Therefore not only allowing the members of the Reichsarbeits- 
dienst to attend church in a body, but also participation by the 
members of the Reichsarbeitsdienst in religious celebrations for 
example, weddings or funerals, violates the educational task 
which is facing the organization. 

As little as it is the affair of the Reichsarbeitsdienst to forbid 
its individual members to have a church wedding or funeral, so 
definitely must the Reichsarbeitsdienst avoid taking part as an 
organization in a festival which is strictly religious, that is, which 
excludes Germans of other beliefs. 

It is therefore, in any case, necessary to execute a clear tem- 
poral separation between the churchly celebration and the debut 
of the Reichsarbeitsdienst. 

The Reichsarbeitsdienst does not participate in religious cele- 
brations, but rather turns her support to the marriage or burial 
of a member before or after the churchly celebration. 

The participation of the musical band of the Reichsarbeitsdienst 
in classical churchly concerts (for example, production of the 
“Schoepfung” by Haydn) is not to be regarded as a partaking in 


163 


1 07— PS 


a religous celebration, and is always to be decided according to 
the local conditions. 

Signed: HIERL 

Authenticated : 

REISMEIR 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT II3-PS 

Rosenberg 

[in pencil] 


NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY 
The Deputy of the Fuehrer Chief of Staff 

Munich, Brown House, 27 July 1938 


III Entered 11 Aug 38 6691 

[Stamped] 


Rosenberg Chancellery 
[Stamped] Entry No. 2896k 3 Aug 38 
REGULATION NR 104/38 
(Not to be published) 

Requested to be returned from III, Returned 22 Aug 

[in pencil] 

With regard to the constantly emphasized neutrality of the 
party with the churches, it is pertinent to eliminate, as far as 
possible, the existing frictions. Since pastors, as political and 
subordinate leaders have shown in the past that they were not 
able to make decisions when the job of trusteeship was added to 
the danger of having them drawn into church conflicts, the 
Deputy of the Fuehrer has decreed the following: 

1. Pastors are to be released immediately from their party 
function as standard bearers [Hoheitstraeger] . 

2. Pastors are to be interchanged little by little according to 
replacements at hand as political or subordinate leaders of the 
congregations. 


3. As of now, it is forbidden to continue appointments of pas- 
tors to positions in the Party, to their congregations, and to 
groups associated with church activities. 

Signed: M. BORMANN 

Certified true copy: 

Friedrichs 
Distributor: II b 


164 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT II6-PS 


SECRET 
Copy Dt. 

National Socialist German Workers Party 
The deputy of the Fuehrer Staff Director. 

Munich, 24 January 1939. 
Ill D— Es 3230/0/15—4278 g. 

Rosenberg Chancellery 
Receipt Nr. 6007-31 Jan 3 

To the Delegate of the Fuehrer for the surveillance of the whole 
spiritual and world political philosophy schooling and educa- 
tion of the Nazi Party. 

Reich Director [Reichsleiter] Party Member Alfred Rosenberg, 
— or representative. — 

Berlin W. 35. Margarethenstr. 17 

Concerning : Theological Faculties. 

My dear Party Member Rosenberg: 

I am transmitting to you by the attached enclosure a copy of 
a letter I have written today to the Reich Minister for Knowl- 
edge, Education and Popular Education. I request that you take 
cognizance of the same. 

Heil Hitler. 

Your very devoted, 

(signed) M. BORMANN. 

I Attachment. 


SECRET 
Copy Dt. 

National Socialist German Workers Party 
The Deputy of the Fuehrer 

Munich, 24 January 1939 
III D-Fs 3230/0/15-4278 g 

To the Reich Minister for Knowledge, Education and Popular 
Education. 

To the Attention of Government Counsel Jahnert — or representa- 
tive in the Office. 

Berlin W. 8 Unter den Linden 69. 

Concerning: Theological Faculties. 

In regard to your letter of 28 Nov 38 — (Office Chief W) — 
and the conference between Mr. State Minister Dr. Wacker and 


165 


1 1 6 — PS 


my expert party member Wemmer, I would like to again inform 
you of the stand the Party is taking. 

Fundamentally, theological inquiry cannot be placed on the 
same footing as the general fields of knowledge in the Universi- 
ties as it represents less a free field of knowledge than a confes- 
sional (i. e. religious) aim of research, No doubts exist on this 
ground if the theological faculties in the German High schools 
are appreciably restricted. 

In this case, as you have likewise pointed out in your letter, 
the clause of the Concordat and the Church Treaties are to be 
taken into consideration. In the case of certain faculties, which 
are not mentioned by a specific clause in the Concordat and 
Church Treaties, as for example Munich and a few others, a 
suppression can be begun without further to do. This is equally 
true of the theological faculties in Austria, Vienna and Graz. 

But also, in the case of the faculties which are specifically men- 
tioned in the Concordat or Church Treaties, there now exists a 
special legal situation which has been created by the general 
change in circumstances. Particularly, the introduction of mili- 
tary service and the execution of the Four Year Plan must be 
considered. By virtue of these measures, and in addition by vir- 
tue of the fact of an extraordinary lack of replacement men in 
contrast to the earlier numerous replacement men available, it 
will be necessary to execute a certain reorganization of the Ger- 
man High Schools. Thus economics and simplifications are nec- 
essary. I should like to refer particularly once more to these 
questions on the basis of the oral discussion between Mr. State 
Minister Dr. Wacker and my expert. Because of this I would 
appreciate it very much if you would restrict the theological 
faculties insofar as they cannot be wholly suppressed in accord- 
ance with the above statement. In this event the matter con- 
cerns not only the theological faculties in the universities, but also 
the various state establishments which still exist in many places 
as institutes of high learning exclusively devoted to theology and 
without connection with a university. 

I request in this instance the omission of any express declara- 
tion to the churches or to other places as well as the avoiding of 
a public announcement of these measures. Complaints and the 
like must be answered (if they are to be replied to) in the fashion 
that these measures are being executed in the course of the eco- 
nomic plan of reorganization and that similar things are happen- 
ing to other faculties. 

I would appreciate it very much if professorial chairs, thus 


166 


1 1 6— PS 


vacated, can be then turned over to the newly created fields of 
inquiry of these last years, such as racial research, archeology 
studies, etc. 

Heil Hitler ! 
as representative 
Signed: M. BORMANN 

Certified true copy 

Signed : Engel 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT II7-PS 

National Socialist German Workers’ Party 
The delegate of the Fuehrer Chief of Staff 

Munich 28 Jan. 1939 
III D— Es 2240/0/21 3400 g. 
Personal 
Secret 

To: The Fuehrer’s delegate for the supervision of the entire 
mental and doctrinal teaching and education of the National 
Socialist German Worker’s Party 
Reichsleiter Rosenberg. 

Berlin W 35 Margarethenstr. 17. 

Chancellery Rosenberg 
In: Nr. 6231—10 Feb. 39. 


Subject: Armed Forces and Church 

Dear Esteemed Party Member Rosenberg, 

I sent to you in the annex for your reference a copy of my letter 
of to-day to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. 

Heil Hitler 
Your very devoted, 

Signed: BORMANN. 

1 Enclosure. 


SECRET 

National Socialist German Workers’ Party 
Carbon copy 

28 January 1939 
III D Es 2240/0/21—34 g. 

The Fuehrer's Deputy. 

To : The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. 

To: Captain Thomee or his representative. 

Berlin W 35 Tirpitzufer 72-76 


167 


1 1 7— PS 


Subject: Armed Forces and Church 

In reference to the conference between Brigadier General 
Reinecke and my expert party member. Chief Councillor to the 
Government Wemmer, of Wednesday the 11th of this month, 1 
want to explain to you once more in order to confirm the arrange- 
ments made by my expert, the attitude of the party with regard 
to these questions. 

In the last years, the party had to announce its position, 
time and time again, to the plan of establishing a State Church, 
or of a closer connection between the State and the Church. 
The party has repudiated these plans with all its force and for 
the following reasons. In the first place it would not be com- 
patible for the doctrinal demands of National Socialism to unite 
the State with the churches as the outer organization of the 
religious communions which do not have as aim in all their fields 
the carrying out of the National • Socialist principles. In the 
second place, considerations of a political nature oppose such an 
outer unity. At present, the churches, the Protestant as well as 
the Catholic one, are disunited internally, and partly externally 
too, seen from an organizational point of view, they do not form 
a unity any longer. A union of these churches with a State built 
on a strong close leadership and on any National Socialist prin- 
ciples is bound to* fail. Such a union, furthermore, would result 
in constant arguing between Church and State. Furthermore, 
competence quarrels would arise constantly there, where meas- 
ures have to be taken concerning either the State or the Church ; 
in this case also one must always count with the difficulty that 
the Churches would refuse such decisions out of dogmatic rea- 
sons. Numerous examples of such an attitude can be found there, 
where out of historical reasons, there still is a union between 
State and Church, such as for instance in the case of the School. 
But even there where the State has recently tried to bring order 
in the affairs of the Church by making decisions such as for 
instance the setting up of a State’s finance committee for the 
Church administration, experience has been made that one por- 
tion of the churches thought these decisions were necessary, 
but another portion thought, for dogmatic reasons, that this was 
an intolerable meddling with the church life. With such unfor- 
tunate circumstances, there is always a danger for the State that 
it has to execute its decisions forcibly if these are not being 
carried out; this particular condition must be prevented for 
several reasons. 

For these reasons of doctrinal and political nature, the deputy 


168 


1 1 7— PS 


of the Fuehrer has opposed the setting up of a State Church; he 
has also rejected the attempts to make use of the authority of the 
State for a different kind of union between the State and Church 
and to settle outer organizational matters which should be the 
task of the Church. The party, therefore, would regret very 
much if contrary to this attitude, the Armed Forces would con- 
tinue with their plans to set up a private consistory for the 
Armed Forces, that is to say to create a private church for the 
Armed Forces. The Armed Forces Church would indeed be 
nothing else but a State Church within the Armed Forces. To 
supplement this I would like to bring out the following points : 

1. A great portion of the ministers of both churches stand, in 
accordance with the attitude of the churches, in concealed and 
also open opposition to National Socialism and the State led by it. 
In these questions a different judgment of the case is presented 
as it would have been before or during the World War when the 
churches were in a more positive relationship to the State. To- 
day, however, the churches and the ministers, should a crisis arise 
for this National Socialist State, would pass from concealed to 
open opposition. They will not in times of crisis support or help 
this state but at best leave it to its own fate. That they will even 
fight this State in these times in order to regain lost fields is 
clearly demonstrated by the Protestant beseeching prayer in refer- 
ence to the Sudetenland crisis; I want to bring this incident to 
your attention once more. This high treasonlike beseeching prayer 
proves that the churches have only been waiting till the National 
Socialist State found itself, at least in their opinion, in a moment 
of uneasiness, to take up the fight against the State with their 
whole psychological influential means. In my opinion this fact 
deserves special attention, because this beseeching prayer clearly 
demonstrates in which spiritually extraordinary successful way 
these churches try to influence the individuals. I do not think that 
the ministers of these churches will be a support to the fighting 
troops, but that on the contrary, they will be to a great extent 
dangerous destroyers of the spiritual fighting strength in the de- 
cisive moment. 

I want to emphasize that at that time this beseeching prayer 
was approved by most of the country’s churches and that it was 
only later on, once these trying days were put to a good end, and 
often drawn out negotiations from the part of the Reich’s church 
ministry had been ended, that some of the country’s churches an- 
nounced their disapproval ; this disapproval, however, in the mean- 
time was in part repudiated. A separate church from the Armed 


169 


1 1 7-PS 


Forces even though it might free itself, as to its organization, 
from the other country’s churches, will not be spared from this 
danger. The Armed Forces church would have to get its recruits 
from the other churches. Even if one would go as far, and this in 
my opinion is practically impossible, as to how the Armed Forces 
form their own ministery from youth on, this separation of an 
Armed Forces church from the rest of the churches will not be 
possible because their church faith ideas will remain the same 
because they are all based on dogmatic principles. 

2. It is known to me that certain disputes arose when the 
Armed Forces tried to bring about a union between the Protestant 
and Catholic churches; furthermore, that certain organizational 
measures such as for instance the combining of the Church song 
book, the creation of a unified Church service etc. would be ap- 
propriate. But according to experiences which the party and the 
State encountered in these questions, the difficulties, instead of de- 
creasing, on the contrary increase when these matters are taken 
in hand by authorities other than the church. But the party, by 
its logical attitude towards these matters, wanted to spare the 
State from these difficulties and arguments within the churches, 
that are always led back on dogmatic principles. It should re- 
main up to the church if they can, want or do not, to accomplish 
these desirable organizational measures and unifications. The 
State or the party would furthermore oppose an inevitable devel- 
opment in this field by meddling in church matters ; namely a de- 
velopment which would lead to leaving these affairs to forces 
which still want to be in connection with the Church. 

The Fuehrer’s Deputy has therefore considered it as his duty, 
after the basic decision to reject a union between State and Church 
had been made, ‘to see to it that the basic ideological freedom of 
faith and conscience be also practically realized in all the State’s 
decrees, decisions etc. Everywhere the church matters have been 
left up to the church, but also every religious constraint, wherever 
present, was removed. At the same time, those who wanted to 
busy themselves, with Church and religious matters in a correct 
carrying out of the basic faith and conscience freedom were given 
the possibility to do so. 

The Fuehrer’s Deputy would welcome it if the Armed Forces 
would act in these essential ideological decisions, after the same 
principles as the party and also now the State have laid out for 
themselves, instead of pursuing the plans for a creation of an 
Armed Forces Church or any other closer union between the 
Armed Forces and the church. I am convinced that in a short 


170 


I 17-PS 


time there will be no more difficulties for the Armed Forces either, 
which difficulties had been brought about by the plan to create 
a separate Armed Forces Church. In fact the Armed Forces have 
already taken a position to these questions and basically also in 
the sense of accomplishing freedom of faith and conscience. It 
should be decisive, however, in this respect to note that these in- 
structions are in many cases not always completely carried out. 
To assure a right execution of this principle of freedom of faith 
and conscience it would be in my opinion necessary to observe the 
following points: 

(1) The orders stating that no constraint can be exercised in 
the attendance of church services during the free evening hours 
in army camps would really have to be complied with. The carry- 
ing out of these orders should not, as in reality it sometimes is, 
be left up to the discretion of some higher or lower ranking su- 
periors. In most cases, no direct constraint is exercised but in 
some cases the non-assistance of church services is punished by 
extra duty etc. Such incidents should lead in the future to dis- 
ciplinary action. 

(2) The duty of Army Chaplains, if they are available in the 
Armed Forces, should be to give an opportunity to those members 
of the Armed Forces who have a need to talk things over with 
them. They could hold religious services if there is a need for it 
and if the members of the Armed Forces cannot attend the reg- 
ular services. But the attendance would have to be on a voluntary 
basis for everybody. 

It is evident that in the Armed Forces which grasp all German 
men, there will be a need to a certain extent for attendance of 
Church services. These members of the Armed Forces should be 
given an opportunity, provided it does not interfere with the serv- 
ice, to visit churches and ministers on their own. But further 
than that, Army chaplains should not be used to hold church 
services, to arrange evening hours etc. and to exercise any con- 
straint to that effect. They should only be available in order to 
be present there where a need arises for them. 

(3) Special officer ranks of the church service and similar in- 
stitutions should be abolished. 

(4) The building of own Armed Forces Churches should also 
be discontinued. I hardly think that there will be many cases 
where the members of the Armed Forces will not have the possi- 
bility to visit a church, outside of the Army, just like everybody 
else. 

(5) No formation Church attendance should take place. 


17] 


1 1 7— PS 


(6) Church organizations should have nothing to do with the 
Armed Forces. Everything should be left up to the individual 
in his field. 

In conclusion, I think I can say that with these and other 
measures, namely with the complete and exact accomplishment 
of the principle of freedom of faith and conscience, in a short 
time the technical difficulties which might have arisen here and 
there could be overcome. I want to point once more to the order 
dated 13.12.1938, issued by the Chief of the Supreme Command 
of the Armed Forces. According to this order, military cele- 
brations are not to be connected any more with a religious bene- 
diction at the time the recruits are being sworn in. The at- 
tendance of Church services of the soldiers, which takes place 
possibly right after they are sworn in, is voluntary. The church 
services are to be held separately from the swearing in cere- 
monies. 

It would, in my opinion be very necessary, it would also be in 
accordance with the basic attitude of the Fuehrer’s deputy that 
these principles contained in this order would be applied 
wherever the question of the relationship between the Armed 
Forces and the church arises. Such a correct and exact accom- 
plishment of the principle of freedom of faith and conscience 
would present the proof that the Armed Forces cannot be accused 
of being anti-Church or anti-Christian; on the other hand, it 
would also prove that the Armed Forces are not based on differ- 
ent ideological principles than the ones represented and executed 
by the State, the National Socialist Workers’ Party and its af- 
filiation. In this way it would be made certain that the same 
educational principles exist in all the organizations as well as the 
teaching institutions of our German people, namely the Armed 
Forces, the Hitler Youth, School labor service and affiliations of 
the party. I think that this fact would do much more for the 
spiritual integrity of the German soldier than if the young Ger- 
man would find himself confronted, during the various stages of 
his education, with various attitudes toward these questions. 

Hell Hitler 

1 Enclosure. Signed: M. BORMANN 


172 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 122-PS 


NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKERS PARTY 
Deputy of the Fuehrer Chief of Staff 

Munich, 17 April 1939 Brown House 
[Rubber stamp] : 

Receipt Rosenberg Chancellory 24 Apr 39 
III/16— Tho 3230/0/15 270 g 

To the Official appointed by the Fuehrer for the Supervision 
of spiritual and philosophical schooling and education of the 
NSDAP. 

Attention of office director Kerksiek or his deputy in the office. 
Berlin W 35 Margaretenstrasse 17. 

[Rubber stamp] 

SECRET 

[handwritten note: submitted to Pg Bradmann for comment — R] 
Subject: Theological faculties. 

I send you the enclosed photostatic copy of a plan suggested 
by th? Reichs Minister for Science, Education and training, for 
the combining of theological faculties with a request for your 
cognizance and prompt action. 

Heil Hitler ! 

Signed : M. BORMANN 

1 enclosure - 


[SYNOPSIS OF DOCUMENT] 

Berlin W 8, 6 April 1939 

Letterhead of Reichs Minister of Science, Education and Training 

The plan which I expect to put into operation at the begin- 
ning of the winter semester 1939/40 presents the following 
picture. 

In the East the following faculties will be maintained: Koe- 
nigsberg (Evangelic), Braunsberg (Catholic), Breslau (Evan- 
gelic and Catholic), Vienna (Evangelic and Catholic). I have 
already ordered the combination of the Catholic faculty in Graz 
with the one in Vienna which will remain the only place in 
Austria with both faculties. 

In Bavaria after closing the Munich faculty there will re- 
main the Catholic faculty at Wurzburg and the Evangelic faculty 
at Erlangen. The continuation of these is important but the 
five state theological institutes of Bavaria should be reduced to 
three. I ask you to suggest the two to be closed. 


693236 - 46—12 


173 


122-PS 


In the Southwest regions I suggest the removal of the Evan- 
gelical faculty in Heidelberg to Tubingen and of the Catholic 
faculty in Tubingen to Freiberg. That will provide an exchange 
between Wurttemberg and Baden based on the Catholic pre- 
dominance in Baden and Evangelic predominance in Wurttem- 
berg. 

In West Germany a similar exchange between Bonn and Muns- 
ter is proposed but which shall be designated Catholic or Evan- 
gelic is a difficult question. A decision I should like to postpone 
a little time. 

A similar question arises with the proposed transfer of the 
faculty from Giessen to Marburg. Since the closing of the for- 
estry faculty at Giessen this university has not many students. 
The reversal of transfer is perhaps the solution but that is not 
feasible at this time because of the newly organized Institute 
for Religious Science. Professor Frick who is to head this in- 
stitute has pointed out that his transfer from religious to philo- 
sophical endeavors may be viewed as a tendency against reli- 
gion. I have suggested a gradual transfer of activity and con- 
sider the final time of transfer to be the propitious moment for 
such a transfer of the Evangelic faculty of the University of Mar- 
burg to that of the University of Bonn. Until* that time it will 
be best to maintain the faculty at Gottingen since its influence in 
the Anglican world is great. 

In the central German regions I propose a transfer of the Leip- 
zig faculty to the University of Halle. The small faculty at Jena 
I should like to maintain because of its German-Christian stand. 

In north German regions a combination of the Evangelic facul- 
ties of Rostock and Kiel at Kiel is planned. 

Finally I should like to combine the faculties of Berlin and 
Griefswald in Greifswald. A double purpose would be achieved. 
Griefswald’s weak enrollment would be improved and the Berlin 
faculty would not have to be included in the new university city 
of Berlin. I am sure this proposal will rouse the Berlin faculty 
but believe I can handle that problem. 

lo recapitulate this plan would include the complete closing of 
theological faculties at Innsbruck, Salzburg and Munich, the 
transfer of the faculty of Graz to Vienna and the vanishing of 
four Catholic faculties. 

a. ( losing of three Catholic theological faculties or Higher 
Schools and ot four Evangelic faculties in the winter semester 
1939 / 40 . 


174 


1 22— PS 


b. Closing of one further Catholic and of three further Evan- 
gelic faculties in the near future. 

I ask your comments at your earliest opportunity. I propose 
then to give the Ministry of Churches this information. 

By direction: 
ZSCHINTZSCH 

(Authenticated). 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 123-PS 

Copy 

NSDAP 

The Deputy Fuehrer, Chief of Staff 

Munich, 23 June 1939, Brown House 
III D-ES 3230/0/15 2131 g.A.E 50/39 

SECRET 

To the Fuehrer’s Commissioner for the supervision of all spiritual 
and political instruction and education of the NSDAP. 
Attention: Verwaltungsleiter Kerksiek or deputy 

Berlin W. 35, Margarethen St. 17 

Chancery Rosenberg Receipt No. 29 June 39 8487 

Subject: Theological Faculties 

With regard to the Conference of Specialists on the Liaison 
Staff of the NSDAP please find enclosed a copy of my letter of 
today to the Reich Minister for Science, Education and National 
Education for your information. 

I would like to request you to inform me in due time as to your 
further wishes regarding the point of view cited in my letter. I 
will also arrange that conferences on this subject take place in 
an inter-party form in order to put the wishes of the party offices 
before the Reichs Ministry of Education as soon as possible. 

Heil Hitler! 

Signed: M. Bormann 

1. Enclosure 


175 


1 23— PS 


Copy 

NSDAP 

The Deputy Fuehrer 

Transcript 

Munich 23 June 1939 
III D-ES 3230/0/15 2131 g.A. 

CONFIDENTIAL 

TO : The Reich Minister for Science, Education and National 

Education 

Attention : Regierungsrat Jaehnert or Deputy 

Berlin Unter den Linden 69 

Subject: Theological Faculties. 

I have noted statements regarding the combining of the theo- 
logical faculties at the German Universities, in your letter of the 
6 April 1939 — W. A. No. 76/39g. Concerning this subject a 
conference has taken place between all the party offices con- 
cerned, in which the principal points of view for the party as 
well as your statement were discussed. I would therefore like 
to inform you in detail of the Party’s decisions as a result of this 
comprehensive discussion : 

1. The Evangelical faculty of the Koenigsberg University must 
remain for the time being as it is, since it is the only one of this 
type for East Prussia as well as for the whole northeast area. 

2. In future there will no longer exist any necessity for the 
preservation of the state Catholic educational institution in 
Braunsberg. I request you, therefore, to combine this institu- 
tion with the Catholic faculty of the University of Breslau. 

3. Regarding Breslau, the Protestant as well as the Catholic 
faculties must be retained for the time being. 

4. Similarly both faculties of the University of Frag must re- 
main for the present as at this time it would not be advisable to 
reduce the University of Prag in any manner. Although in re- 
gard to a dispersal of the theological faculty in Prag there would 
be no difficulties with the Concordat, I do not deem it advisable 
at the moment to initiate measures of this sort there. Action 
regarding the University of Prag must still be retarded for a 
time. 

5. The situation at the University of Vienna is very similar. 
Vienna is the only university of the Ostmark, at which the the- 
ological faculty is still in existence. I request, therefore, that 


176 


1 23— PS 


you reserve any decisions in this matter a little longer, until the 
situation in regard to the University of Prag has been further 
cleared up. Nevertheless I would like to emphasize now that at 
a later date the dissolution of the theological faculties of the Uni- 
versities of Wien and Prag will also be necessary in my opinion. 

6. I request you to combine the Protestant theological faculty in 
Rostock with the Protestant theological faculty in Kiel, in con- 
formance with both the arrangements described in your message 
and the proposal that I have already put forward. 

7. In regard to the theological faculty in Berlin I am in com- 
plete agreement with you in that under no circumstances should 
this faculty be included in the new University Town [Hochschul- 
stadt]. The theological faculty of Berlin must disappear in the 
near future. I do not deem it advisable, as you suggest should 
next be done to transfer this faculty to Greifswald. Funda- 
mentally it is inadvisable to shift the theological faculty of a large 
city to a small town. The possibility must not be allowed to 
arise of such a large number of theological students, as would 
come to a small university city as a result of such a transfer, 
giving this character to this city, and even perhaps to the whole 
region. Since this danger does not exist in a large city, I request 
you to leave the theological faculty in Berlin for the time being. 
I do not deem it necessary to determine the future of this faculty 
today, since the new university town will presumably not be com- 
pleted for several years. 

8. Since three theological faculties in the German Baltic area 
are not necessary, I request you to transfer the theological 
faculty of the University of Greifswald as well as that of Rostock 
to Kiel. The theological faculties in Koenigsberg and Kiel should 
be quite sufficient. I do not believe special consideration for 
Greifswald in regard to the northern states to be necessary since 
the university of Kiel has made the furthering of ties with the 
north its particular mission. 

9. For Bavaria I request that more extensive measures be car- 
ried out than were provided for in your communication of the 
6.4.1939. In the future the preservation of the five state philo- 
sophic-theological universities in Bavaria will no longer be neces- 
sary. In so far as these are to be theological faculties in the 
future, the training of theologians is to be carried out by them 
and not by any state universities serving the church exclusively. 
I would ask you therefore not only to reduce these institutions to 
three, but also to break them up completely in the shortest pos- 
sible time, if it is not possible to do so immediately. Above all, 


177 


1 23 — PS 


I request you to dissolve the universities in Passau, Pvegensburg 
and Bamberg in the aforementioned order, because they are the 
cores of extremely strong confessional activity against National 
Socialism. 

10. In addition there is also in Bavaria the Church’s own In- 
stitution in Eichstadt for training bishops which receives con- 
siderable state subsidies. Even though there is no question of 
dissolving this church institution, nevertheless, I would like 
you to ensure that the State subsidies to this institution cease 
immediately. 

11. I request that the Catholic faculty of the university of 
Wuerzburg be retained until further notice. 

12. In the same manner the Protestant faculty of the Univer- 
sity of Erlangen will have to be retained. 

13. Regarding the south German area, I do not agree with 
your plan to transfer the Protestant faculty in Heidelberg to 
Tuebingen. Tuebingen has already become a confirmed Protes- 
tant-theological center. It is feared that the transferring of the 
Heidelberg Protestant faculty to Tuebingen would only still fur- 
ther emphasize this characteristic of the university town. I wish, 
therefore, that the Protestant faculty of Tuebingen be combined 
with that in Heidelberg. 

14. May I 'give you my decision later regarding your plan to 
transfer the Catholic faculty from Tuebingen to Freiburg, since 
the necessity has arisen to reconsider this matter. 

15. In western Germany, I do not deem your projected ex- 
change between Bonn and Muenster expedient. I wish you to 
combine both theological faculties in Bonn. 

16. Furthermore, I would request you to transfer the Protes- 
tant faculty of the University of Marburg to Giessen. I do not 
consider that the ideas which you asserted regarding working 
with foreign Forscher (odd sects) at the institute for Religious 
Science which will be established in Marburg, solve the problem. 

17. In addition, I wish you to transfer the theological faculty 
of Goettingen to Giessen. 

18. The theological faculty of Jena would probably have to be 
retained until further notice. 

19. Also the theological faculty in Leipzig should be combined 
with that in Halle. 

In the above I have informed you of the Party’s wishes after 
thorough investigation of the matter with all party offices. I 
would be grateful if you would initiate the necessary measures 
as quickly as possible, in regard to the great political significance 


178 


1 23— PS 


for the Gau concerned, which will be the result in every single 
case of such a combination. 

I would like you to always keep in contact with me when in- 
stituting these measures, in particular with regard to the ar- 
ranging of the actual time, since I am in touch with the compe- 
tent Gau administrations. Furthermore, I would like you to take 
into consideration the following in connection with the mergers 
which we have planned: 

1. As a result of these mergers a rather large number of pro- 
fessional chairs will become vacant. I believe it of the utmost 
importance that these positions should not remain unfilled, but 
that they should be occupied again or at least the greater portion 
of them. When doing this, those branches of science must be 
primarily considered which have been able to prove that they 
formerly had too few professional chairs. I would like to reserve 
the opportunity of getting in touch with you again regarding de- 
tails. 

2. Furthermore, as a result of these mergers a large number of 
institutes, libraries, buildings, etc. will be vacated. I do not deem 
it wise to place all these accommodations at the disposal of the 
new theological faculties connected with these mergers. The 
necessity will probably arise of dealing specially with each sep- 
arate case according to the circumstances. Here I would also like 
to request that you consult me when making decisions. 

3. Above ail, I request that you keep me continually informed 
regarding the individual arrangements to be carried out by you in 
order that I be able to inform the party offices interested and 
especially the appropriate Gau administration, which is mainly 
concerned, in time. 

Heil Hitler! 

I.Y. Signed: M. Bormann 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 129-PS 


Reich Minister Kerri 

Berlin W 8, 6 September 1939 
CONFIDENTIAL 

Dear Mr. Stapel! 

I have received your letter of 31 August and in no wise 
neglected your memorandum on the situation of the Evangelical 
Church in Germany, but read it through immediately. I must 
tell you that I agree with the portrayal of the situation down to 
the last word, although I must assume that the “inflation of prin- 
ciples” is also aimed at me. However that did not annoy me, I 


179 


1 29— PS 


understand your idea rather completely. So that you understand 
me too, I want to continue your memorandum with my reasons. 
You close with the absolutely correct conclusion : 

The State should neither combat existing religion nor introduce 
a new religion. It should allow Christianity to prove by itself that 
it still has vital force. It should confine itself to spiritual affairs 
and only exercise compulsion in the production of a legal and ad- 
ministrative unity of the Evangelical Church. 

Correct ! 

My action is determined however by the following situation: 

As you know r from the speech of the Fuehrer in the Reichstag 
on 30 January 1939, every power in exercising compulsion in the 
production of a legal and administrative unity of the Evangelical 
Church was completely withdrawn from me. The Fuehrer con- 
siders his efforts to bring the Evangelical Church to reason, un- 
successful and the Evangelical Church with respect to its condi- 
tion rightfully a useless pile of sects. As you emphasize the Party 
has previously carried on not only a fight aginst the political ele- 
ment of the Christianity of the Church, but also a fight against 
membership of Party Members in a Christian confession. 

I am of the opinion that in this situation it can very easily 
eventuate that the “Organization of German Understanding of 
the Christian Religion Through Luther” will collapse of its own 
accord, if, as in Austria and in the Sudetan Gau, the privileges, 
namely of collecting taxes and state subsidies are entirely re- 
moved from the Evangelical Church. If it comes to that then 
from the collapse of the organization of the Evangelical Church 
the advantage will redound not to the State but to the Catholic 
Church which cannot receive a mortal blow through such meas- 
ures in its well-aimed unified, basically political organization. 

The Catholic Church will and must, according to the law under 
which it is set up, remain a thorn in the flesh of a Racial State. 
An effective combatting of it cannot ensue from a State which 
thanks to its secure ideological basis desires and must refrain 
from every intervention into religious things. The National So- 
cialistic State can therefore put nothing positive or new in the 
place of that which it must perhaps destroy and from the col- 
lapsing Evangelical Church the people somewhat deceived about 
their religion would in large numbers stream into the Catholic 
Church, and this Church would then divide the people into two 
mutually hostile groups in a much more regrettable manner than 
has happened through the confessions. 


180 


1 29— PS 


In addition every negative struggle, which cannot in a positive 
manner replace that which has been destroyed, is anyhow con- 
demned to failure. 

In this factual situation I see an unheard of danger for the 
religious peace of the German people approaching and, all my ef- 
forts — you will understand that — have previously been only di- 
rected at eliminating this danger. But that is only possible if the 
Party learns to distinguish in the clearest manner between reli- 
gion and ideology and thus, as Luther established and Kant scien- 
tifically proved, realizes, that ideology must limit itself to the 
area of experience, where alone reason can become knowledge. 
It must further realize that knowledge based on reason alone 
cannot satisfy the human being here on earth, but, that he (the 
human being) according to the structure of the “world of freedom 
within himself”, or let us say, according to “the Kingdom of 
God within himself” cannot overcome the compelling moral ne- 
cessity to attain certainty concerning the essence of God. The 
human being is now no “purely moral being” , but the torture and 
the happiness of his earthly life consists in moving about in flesh 
and blood. Therefore however we have power over the inevi- 
table weakness of not always being able to harmonize moral 
thought and deed. To be sure we do not need to be ashamed of 
original sin or to find our body despicable, for it, and thereby 
original sin is from God and we are no gods, but human beings. 
But how could we, who must believe in the moral importance of 
our life and the world, get along, because we without being sure 
of our immortality would not be able to yield our bodily life in ful- 
fillment of our duty itself, without a religion going beyond the 
boundaries of reason? How could we who ourselves are right- 
eous, doubt the fact that God must be just, and how could we de- 
mand of him the all-knowing, who knows our thoughts, that he 
confer on us immortality, if our righteousness condemns the 
one whom it recognizes as acting against his better moral con- 
viction. Our life here on earth would be senseless, if we could 
find out nothing about the true essence of God, if we were not 
in some way certain that it is not righteousness but divine love. 
But we cannot find it out through knowledge based on reason, 
but only by the power of faith which we can get for ourselves 
through the personality of Christ, therefore from the true Chris- 
tian religion, for which in no wise is the presentation of the 
priests standard, but only Christ himself. 

The “Foundation of the Religion of Christ” rests in our own 
inner being. The Evangelical Church of today has not been able 


181 


1 29— PS 


to lead us to this real “Religion of Christ”. This Religion of 
Christ is only to be grasped if not only the genius of a Luther, 
but everybody has learned to distinguish the domains of reason 
and faith. It depends neither on sacred orders nor on sacra- 
ments, but one finds the way to it only if one has learned to doubt 
reason, as this reason has most accurately become acquainted 
with its magnitude and its narrow boundaries, and only Priests 
who have grasped that with reason and heart, can penetrate from 
pseudo-priesthood to the true priesthood and thus fill the hearts 
of the people with true faith. 

Therefore for 15 years I have been working on a book which 
explains to everybody the scientific basis of National Socialism 
in such a way that one learns to recognize the extent and the 
boundaries of reason as well as of ideology and the necessity of 
the religion of Christ, and comprehends, that in this area Party 
and State can do only one thing: to completely take one's own po- 
sition and to renounce any claim to a decision. 

I believe I can finish this work at this time; its publication 
however will not be possible until the return of peace. 

However, in order that meanwhile these conclusions mentioned 
above which would lead to the destruction of the organization of 
the Evangelical Church, might not occur, it was my most impor- 
tant job to see to it that today's pile of sects in the Evangelical 
Church would consolidate of their own accord into an organ at 
least filled with a desire for unity. 

Therefore, as I was no longer allowed to issue orders under 
the State I tried again and again to exercise influence on the dis- 
trict church leaders even though they seemed to be powerless 
according to your statements approved by me in your memo- 
randum, at least to create this condition for the possibility of 
preserving the organization of the Lutheran Church. These ef- 
forts have at least reached a certain conclusion and become fruit- 
ful to such an extent that it was possible to aim at a unity among 
them over three men, who as a confidential council of the 
church chancellery now possess the possibility of finding by posi- 
tive ivork confidence of the people who feel united in the Evan- 
gelical Church. 

If these men, Bishop Mardahrens, Bishop Schultz of Mecklen- 
burg and Oberkonsistorialrat Hymmen apprehend the command- 
ment of the hour, then by positive work they can line up the direc- 
tion of the Evangelical Church with the goals desired by me into a 
complete legal and administrative unity. If they do not under- 
stand how to direct this positive work correctly, then both of us 


182 


129-PS 


will have to bury the hope of a preservation of the organization 
of the Lutheran Church, because only the success of such a work 
can give the Fuehrer the justification of giving us full power 
in the direction desired by us. 

You can imagine that I would much prefer to see you among 
these three men, because i would then know that the work was 
being actively and successfully lined up with the goal jointly 
desired by both of us. However I shall pursue this aim with all 
the energy in my power as long as I am in my job and the de- 
cision of the Fuehrer gives me approval or disapproval. 

These are difficult times into which our people are now enter- 
ing, but I believe that Providence even here has correctly guided 
everything. It has through the Fuehrer created for conditions 
for the inevitable battle, as they cannot be found more favorable. 
If the German people maintain themselves — and what justifies 
us in doubting it — everything must come to a good and victorious 
end, and thereby would be created just the proper condition for 
the extension of the Third Reich externally in tranquil safety 
and in well-aimed work at home, but then would be created just 
the right soil for the possibility of nationalistic church work in 
the congregations, which you rightfully consider the most im- 
portant thing. 

Please be convinced that I am always happy to think of you 
and rejoice at every communication from you. 

I know that you are a man who has already accomplished ex- 
traordinary things for the spiritual enlightenment of the Ger- 
man people and I am convinced that you will still accomplish in 
the future fruitful things in this work. 

I need not emphasize to you that this letter is confidential. 
However, I shall make accessible to the Confidential Council 
copies of your splendid memorandum as well as copies of this 
letter for confidential cognizance. I would be especially glad if 
in the near future I found the opportunity to discuss orally with 
Reich Minister Hess your memorandum and my answer. 

With hearty greetings and with 

Heil Hitler ! 

Yours 

[Signed] Kerri 


183 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT I3I-PS 


NATIONAL SOCIALIST GERMAN WORKER’S PARTY 
The Deputy of the Fuehrer Chief of Staff 

Munich, 12 December 1939 Brown House 

III— So./Eis. 3230/0 

To : The Deputy of the Fuehrer for the supervision of the com- 
plete mental and doctrinal training and education of the NSDAP 
Reich Leader A. ROSENBERG 
Berlin W 35 Margareten Strasse 17 

Ministerial-Director Mentzel has recently informed us ver- 
bally that you intend to take over the seven existing professor- 
ships of the former catholic-theological faculty at the University 
of Munich. These are to serve as a fundament for the Seminary 
(Hohe Schule) for National-Socialism. Gauleiter Adolf Wag- 
ner is supposed to have agreed to this. 

I would appreciate it if you would confirm the correctness of 
the information given by Ministerial-Director Mentzel. 

Heil Hitler! 

Signed: M. BORMANN 
(M. Bormann) 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 136-PS 

Copy 

Information to all Sections of Party and State. 

The “Hohe Schule” is supposed to become the center for na- 
tional socialistic ideological and educational research. It will be 
established after the conclusion of the war. I order that the 
already initiated preparations be continued by Reichsleiter Rosen- 
berg, especially in the way of research and the setting up of the 
library. 

All sections of party and State are requested to cooperate with 
him in this task. 

(Signed) ADOLF HITLER 

Berlin, 29 January 1940 ' 

Certified a true copy 
Berlin 15 Dec 1943 
Dr. Zeiss 

Stabseinsatzfuehrer 


184 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 137-PS 


The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces, No. 2850/40 
secret Adj. Chief OKW 

(Please indicate above file number, the date and short contents 
in the answer) 

Berlin W 35, Tirpitzufer 72-76 5 July 1940 

Telephone: Local 218191 
Long distance 218091 

To the Supreme Commander of the Army, the Supreme Com- 
mander of the Armed Forces in Holland. 

Reichsleiter Rosenberg has requested from the Fuehrer to have : 

1. The State libraries and archives searched for documents 
which are valuable for Germany. 

2. The chanceries of the high church authorities and lodges 
searched for political activities which are directed against us, and 
to have the material in question confiscated. 

The Fuehrer has ordered that this plan should be complied with 
and that the Secret State police — supported by the keepers of the 
archives of Reichsleiter Rosenberg — should be entrusted with the 
search. The Chief of the Security Police, SS Lt. General Heydrich, 
has been notified; he will get in touch with the responsible mili- 
tary commanders to carry out this order. 

This measure should be carried out in all the territories of 
Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and France which are occupied 
by us. 

It is requested that the subordinate agencies should be notified. 
The Chief of the Supreme Command 
of the Armed Forces. 

(Signed) KEITEL 

To Reich leader Rosenberg 
Copy for information 
(Signed) [Illegible] 

Captain [Rittmeister] and executive officer. 


t 


185 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 138-PS 


Copy 

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 
Berlin W 35, Tirpitzufer 72-76, 17 Sept 1940 

Tel: 21 81 91 

2 f 28. U W.Z. No. 3812/40 g 

To the Chief of Army High Command for the Military Admin- 
istration in Occupied France. 

In supplement to the order of the Fuehrer transmitted at the 
time to Reichsleiter Rosenberg to search lodges, libraries and ar- 
chives in the occupied territories of the west for material valu- 
able to Germany, and to safeguard the latter through the Gestapo, 
the Fuehrer has decided : 

The ownership status before the war in France, prior to the 
declaration of war on 1 September 1939, shall be the criterion. 

Ownership transfers to the French state or similar transfers 
completed after this date are irrelevant and legally invalid (for 
example, Polish and Slovak libraries in Paris, possessions of the 
Palais Rothschild or other ownerless Jewish possessions). Res- 
ervations regarding search, seizure and transportation to Ger- 
many on the basis of the above reasons will not be recognized. 

Reichsleiter' Rosenberg and/or his deputy Reichshauptsellen- 
leiter Ebert has received clear instructions from the Fuehrer 
personally governing the right of seizure ; he is entitled to trans- 
port to Germany cultural goods which appear valuable to him and 
to safeguard them there. The Fuehrer has reserved for himself 
the decision as to their use. 

It is requested that the services in question be informed cor- 
respondingly. 

Signed: KEITEL 

For information : 

Attention : Reichsleiter Rosenberg 

certified true copy 
Berlin 15 December 43 
(Dr. Zeiss) 

[Rosenberg special purpose staff seal] 


186 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 139-PS 


Copy 

SUPREME COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES 

Berlin W 35 Tirpitzufer 72-75 10 October 1940. 

Tel: Local Service 21 81 91 

Long Distance 21 80 91 

Az 2 f 28 J (la). 

No. 1838/40 g. 

Reference: Chief Supreme Command Armed Forces 
No. 3812/40 g WZ of 17 September 1940. 

To : Supreme Army High Commander. 

As supplement to the above-mentioned letter, addressed to the 
Military Administration of Occupied France, it is requested 
that corresponding directions be given also to the Military Ad- 
ministration in Belgium. 

Chief of the Supreme Command 
of the Armed Forces 

By Order 

Signed: REINECKE 

For Information : 

Attention Reichsleiter ROSENBERG’s Adjutant. 

Reference : 2606/ a. 

Rosenberg’s special purpose staff seal. 

Certified true copy 
Berlin 15 December 1943 
(Dr. Zeiss) 

Chief special purpose Staff. 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 140-PS 

SECRET 

Copy 

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 
Az.Zf.285 (G-3) Nr. 1838/40 

Berlin W 35, Tirpitzufer 72-76 30 Oct. 1940 

Tel. local 218191, long distance 218091 
To: The Armed Forces Commander in the Netherlands 

In supplement to the order of the Fuehrer transmitted, under 
Nr 2850/40 secret Adj. Chief of the Supreme Command of the 
Armed Forces, of 5.7.1940, to Reichsleiter Rosenberg, to search 
lodges, libraries and archives of the occupied territories of the 
West, for material valuable to Germany, and to safeguard the 
latter through the Gestapo, the Fuehrer has decided: 


187 


140-PS 


The ownership status before the war in France, prior to the 
declaration 'of war on 1 Sept. 1939, shall be the criterion. 

Ownership transfers to the French state or similar transfers 
completed after this date are irrelevant and legally invalid (for 
example, Polish and Slovak libraries in Paris, possessions of the 
Palais Rothschild or other ownerless Jewish possessions). Reser- 
vations regarding search, seizure and transportation to Germany 
on the basis of the above reasons will not be recognized. 

Reichsleiter Rosenberg and/or his deputy Reichshauptstellen- 
leiter Ebert has received clear instructions from the Fuehrer per- 
sonally governing the right of seizure, he is entitled to transport 
to Germany cultural goods which appear valuable to him and to 
safeguard them there. The Fuehrer has reserved for himself the 
decision as to their use. 

It is requested that the services in question be informed cor- 
respondingly. 

The Chief of the Supreme Command 
of the Armed Forces 

By order 

Signed: REINECKE 

Certified a true copy 
Berlin 15 Dec 1943 

' (Dr. Zeiss) 

Chief of special purpose staff 

For information: 

Attention Adj. of Reichleiter Rosenberg 
Re Nr 2606/Ma 

signed Reinecke 

[Rosenberg’s Special Purpose Staff SEAL] 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT I4I-PS 

In conveying the measures taken until now, for the securing 
of Jewish art property by the Chief of the Military administra- 
tion Paris and the special service staff Rosenberg (The Chief of 
the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 2 f 28.14.W.Z.Nr 
3812/40 g) , the art objects brought to the Louvre will be disposed 
of in the following way : 

1. Those art objects about which the Fuehrer has reserved 
for himself the decision ds to their use. 

2. Those art objects which serve to the completion of the 
Reichs Marshal’s collection. 

3. 'Those art objects and library stocks the use of which seem 
useful to the establishing of the higher institutes of learning and 


188 


1 4 1 —PS 


which come within the jurisdiction of Reichsleiter Rosenberg. 

4. Those art objects that are suited to be sent to German mu- 
seums, of all these art objects, a systematic inventory will be 
made by the special purpose staff Rosenberg; they will then be 
packed and shipped to Germany with the assistance of the Luft- 
waffe. 

5. Those art objects that are suited to be given to French 
museums or might be of use for the German-French art trade, 
will be auctioned off at a date yet to be fixed ; the profit of this 
auction will be given to the French State for the benefit of those 
bereaved by the war. 

6. The further securing of Jewish art property in France will 
be continued by the special purpose staff Rosenberg in the same 
way as heretofore in connection with the Chief of the military 
administration Paris. 

Paris, 5 November 1940 

I will submit this proposal to the Fuehrer. Those instructions 
are in effect until he has reached a decision. 

Signed: GOERING 

Certified true copy: 

Berlin 15 Dec. 1943 
(Dr. Zeiss) 

Chief of special purpose staff 

[Rosenberg’s special purpose staff seal] 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 145-PS 

The Reichs Minister for the Occupied Eastern Territories 
Berlin W 35, Rauch Street 17/18, 20 Aug 1941 

Tel: 21 95 15 and 39 50 46 
Cable address: Reichminister East 

Na 369/R/H 

Director of the Reichs Main Office UTIKAL [Reichshauptstellen- 
leiter] 

Berlin 

Subject: Safeguarding the cultural goods in the occupied East- 

ern Territories 

I have instructed the Reichs Commissioner for the Eastland 
and his subordinate general and district commissioners to secure 
all cultural goods in the Reichs Commissariat of the East which 
are appropriate in general for national-socialistic research as 


693236 — 16—13 


189 


145-PS 


well as research of the activities of the opponents of National- 
Socialism. I delegate you to carry out with an “Einsatzstab” to 
be formed for this purpose this work of the Reichs Commis- 
sioner, the General, Main and Regional Commissioners, for their 
support. During the execution of this mission you will remain 
directly subordinate to Main Division II of my ministry whose 
directors will provide you with additional instructions. The 
orders issued by the Fuehrer for the “Einsatzstab” in the West 
remain also the same for the East. 

The execution of your job will be financed, as in the occupied 
western territories, through the Reichs treasurer of the NSDAP. 
A later accounting between him and the ministry for the oc- 
cupied eastern territories, respectively with the Reichs Commis- 
sariats is held in reserve. 

I am including a letter of mine to the Reich Commissioner of 
the Eastland. 

Heil Hitler! 

Signed: ROSENBERG 

1 inclosure 


PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 149-PS 

FUEHRER DECREE 

Jews, freemasons and the ideological enemies of National So- 
cialism who are allied with them are the originators of the present 
war against the Reich. Spiritual struggle according to plan 
against. these powers is a measure necessitated by war. 

I have therefore ordered Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg to ac- 
complish this task in cooperation with the chief of the High Com- 
mand of the armed forces. To accomplish this task, his Einsatz- 
stab for the right occupation territories has the right to explore 
libraries, archives, lodges, and other ideological and cultural es- 
tablishments of all kinds for suitable material and to confiscate 
such material and for the ideological tasks of the NSDAP and 
for scientific research work by the university [Hoch Schule]. The 
same rule applies to cultural goods which are in the possession or 
aie the property of Jews, which are abandoned or whose origin 
cannot be clearly established. The regulations for the execution 
of this task with the cooperation will be issued by the Chief of 
the High Command of the armed forces in agreement with Reichs- 
leiter Rosenberg. 

In necessary measures for the eastern territories under German 


190 


149-PS 


administration will be taken by Reichsleiter Rosenberg in his ca- 
pacity as Reich Minister for occupied eastern territories. 

(Signed) A. HITLER 
Fuehrers Headquarters, March 1942 

To all Bureaus of the Armed Forces, the Party and the State. 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 1 5 1 -PS 

The Reichsminister for the occupied Eastern territory 

Berlin W 35, Kurfuerstenstrasse 134 7 April 1942 

Tel. 21 99 51 

N. 1/1/13/4.2 

To: Reich Commissioner for the Ostland, Riga 
Reich Commissioner for the Ukraine, Rowno 

SUBJECT: Safeguarding of Cultural Goods, Research Material 
and Scientific Institutions in the Occupied Eastern 
Territories. 

I 

I have assigned Reichsleiter Rosenberg’s Einsatzstab for the 
Occupied Territories with the seizure and uniform handling of 
cultural goods, research material and scientific apparatus frbm li- 
braries, archives, scientific institutions, museums, etc., which are 
found in public, religious or private buildings. The Einsatzstab 
begins its work, as newly directed by the Fuehrer’s decree of 1 
March 1942, immediately after occupation of the territories by 
the combat troops, in agreement with the Quartermaster General 
of the Army, and completes it in agreement with the competent 
Reich Commissioners after civil administration has been estab- 
lished. I request all authorities of my administration to support 
as far as possible the members of the Einsatzstab in carrying 
out all measures and in giving all necessary information, espe- 
cially in regard to objects which may have been already seized 
from the occupied Eastern territories and removed from their 
previous location, and information as to where this material is 
located at the present time. 

Any activity for the purpose of safeguarding cultural goods can 
be permitted only if it is carried out in agreement with Reichs- 
leiter Rosenberg’s Einsatzstab. The Einsatzstab will be con- 
stantly informed concerning the method and extent of investiga- 
tions, work projects and measures. 

All authorities of my administration are hereby instructed that 
objects of the afore-mentioned type will be seized only by Reichs- 


191 


1 5 1 —PS 


leiter Rosenberg’s Einsatzstab, and to abstain from arbitrary 
handling as a matter of principle. 

Insofar as seizures or transports have already taken place 
contrary to these provisions, Reichsleiter Rosenberg’s Einsatz- 
stab, Berlin-Charlottenburg 2, Bismarckstrasse 1, telephone : 
34 00 18, will be informed without delay, with an exact list of the 
objects as well as indication of the current storage place and per- 
sons entitled to dispose of them. 

II 

In exceptional cases immediate measures may be taken to safe- 
guard or transport objects to a safe place in order to avoid 
threatened danger (for example, danger of collapse of buildings, 
enemy action, damage by weather, etc). In all cases a written 
report will be submitted immediately to my Einsatzstab. 

Decision regarding exceptions lies with the Reich or General 
Commissioners in agreement with the commissioners of the staff. 

III 

I have sent copies of this order directly to the General Com- 
missioners. 

By order 

Signed/t/ Dr. LEIBBRANDT 

OFFICIAL: 

/s/ [Illegible] i 
Office Employee 

Authenticated copy 
Berlin Dec 15, 1943 
signed: ZEISS 

(Dr. Zeiss) 

Leader of Stabseinsatz 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 153-PS 

Copy /B 

Reich Ministry for the Occupied Territories of the East 

Enclosure 1 
Berlin 27 April 1942 

To- 
rn Commissar of the Reich for the East Riga 
b. Commissar of the Reich for the Ukraine Rowno 
Subject: Formation of a control unit for the seizure and secur- 
ing of objects of cultural value in the occupied eastern terri- 
tories. 

There has been established in the Reich Ministry for the occu- 


192 


1 53— PS 


pied eastern territories a “central bureau for the seizure and 
securing of objects of cultural value in the occupied eastern ter- 
ritories” to last for a limited period as a special reference de- 
partment within department I (Political) . As head of the cen- 
tral bureau I designate the chief of staff of the “Einsatzstab of 
Reichsleiter Rosenberg for occupied territories”, Party member 
Utikal. He is directly under the authority of Department I 
and will carry on this task in addition to his other duties. 

On the central bureau devolves the general planning of all 
projects connected with the seizure and securing of objects of 
cultural value in the occupied eastern territories and also the 
supervision of the measures already taken. 

Apart from exceptional cases in -which the securing of objects 
of cultural value is exceptionally urgent, the bureau does not 
concern itself primarily with the securing of objects of cultural 
value, but rather makes use for the execution of measures of 
seizure and securing of the “Einsatzstab” of Reichsleiter Rosen- 
berg for the occupied territories; the Einsatzstab will carry on 
its activities as before in close contact with the competent author- 
ities of the civil administration that come under my jurisdiction. 

With the commissars of the Reich a special department within 
Department II (political) has been set up for a limited time for 
the seizure and securing of objects of cultural value. This office 
is under the control of the head of the main work group [Haupt- 
arbeitgruppe] of “Einsatzstab” of Reichsleiter Rosenberg for the 
occupied territories. The head of this special department is 
directly responsible to the chief of Department II. 

Signed: ROSENBERG 

Certified true copy 
Berlin 13 Dec. 1943 
(Dr. Zeiss) 

Chief of Staff 

[Seal of “Einsatzstab” of RL Rosenberg] 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 154-PS 

The Reichminister and Chief of Chancellery. 

Berlin W 8, Voss-strasse 6, 5 July 1942 

Present Headquarters of the Fuehrer 

To: The Highest Reich Authorities and 

The Services directly subordinate to the Fuehrer. 

The Fuehrer has delegated Reichsleiter Rosenberg in his ca- 
pacity of commissioner of the Fuehrer to supervise the total 


193 


1 54 — PS 


spiritual and philosophical indoctrination and education of the 
NSDAP in the spiritual battle against Jews and Free-Masons as 
well as against the affiliated philosophical opponents of National 
Socialism, who are the cause of the present war. For this purpose, 
the Fuehrer has ordered that Reichsleiter Rosenberg’s Staff 
should be authorized, in the occupied territories under military 
administration and in the occupied Eastern territories under civil 
administration (exclusive of the General Gouvernement), to search 
libraries, archives, lodges and other philosophical and cultural in- 
stitutions of all types for relevant material for the execution of 
his task and to request the competent Wehrmacht and police serv- 
ices to seize the material found in order to support the NSDAP 
in fulfillment of its spiritual task and for the later scientific re- 
search work of the “Hohe Schule”, whereby police files concerning 
political activities will remain with the police, and all others be 
transferred to Reichsleiter Rosenberg’s Staff. The staff is au- 
thorized to make the same request with regard to cultural goods 
that are owmerless goods or the ownership of which cannot be 
readily determined. The Chief of the Army High Command, in 
agreement with Reichsleiter Rosenberg, will issue regulations 
governing the cooperation with the Wehrmacht. The necessary 
measures within the Eastern territories under German adminis- 
tration will be taken by Reichsleiter Rosenberg in his capacity as 
Reichsminister for the occupied Eastern territories. 

I inform you of this order of the Fuehrer and request you to 
support Reichsleiter Rosenberg in the fulfillment of his task. 

/s/ Dr. Lammers 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 155-PS 

Army High Command, General Staff of the General Headquarters 
Headquarters Army High Command 30/9/1942. 

Az. Dept. W ar Administration 

No. 11/11564/42 

SUBJECT: Deployment of Special Units of the Special Service 

Staff of Reischleiter Rosenberg, for the occupied Eastern areas. 

I. Tasks: 

The Fuehrer, in his decree of 1/3/1942, has delegated Reichs- 
leiter Rosenberg in his capacity as “Commissioner for the su- 
pervision of the entire spiritual and philosophical indoctrination 
and education of that NSDAP’’, w T ith the spiritual battle against 
Jews, Free-Masons and the affiliated philosophical opponents of 


194 


1 55— PS 


National Socialism, who are the cause of the present war. The 
planned spiritual battle against these powers was declared es- 
sential to the war effort by the Fuehrer. For this purpose, the 
Fuehrer has ordered, among other things, that the “Special Pur- 
pose Staff of Reiehsleiter Rosenberg for the occupied areas” 
should be authorized in the occupied areas under military admin- 
istration and in the occupied Eastern territories under civil ad- 
ministration — exclusive of the General Government — to 

a. Search libraries, archives, lodges, and other philosophical 
and cultural institutions of all kinds, for material suitable to the 
accomplishment of his task, and to have this material seized. 

b. To cause the seizure of cultural goods which are owned by 
Jews, or without ownership, or the owner of which cannot readily 
be determined. 

c. The Reich minister of the occupied Eastern territories has 
established on 12/6/1942 a “Central Office for the seizure and safe- 
keeping of cultural goods in the occupied Eastern Territories.” 
Disregarding exceptional cases, in which the safeguarding of en- 
dangered cultural goods is urgent, it is desired to keep these goods 
in place for the present. This has been agreed upon, according to 
the agreement reached between Armed Forces High Command 
General Staff of the General Headquarters, and the Special Pur- 
pose Staff of Reiehsleiter Rosenberg. 

d. In the Eastern Theatre of operations, also such cultural 
goods as do not fall under §fr — especially museum pieces — are to 
be concealed, respectively safeguarded, to save them from dam- 
age or destruction. 

For the accomplishment of the missions named in la, b and c, 
the “Special Purpose Staff Reiehsleiter Rosenberg” employs spe- 
cial units. With the consent of Reiehsleiter Rosenberg, the de- 
ployment of these special units is regulated as follows : 

1. For the central steering of the Special Units, according to 
need, a delegate of the Special Purpose Staff of Reiehsleiter is 
employed, who is director of the Special Units in the Army Group 
area, respectively the Army area. This man is obligated to inform 
the Supreme Commander of the Army Group respectively Army 
in time, of the directives he has received from Reiehsleiter Rosen- 
berg or from the staff leader. The Supreme Commander is au- 
thorized to give the delegate directives which are necessary to 
avoid disturbing the operations. These directives supersede 
all others. The delegates depend upon steady and close co- 
operation with the G-2 (Intelligence Officer). The Special Unit 
authorities can demand the furnishing of a liaison man by the 
delegate to the G-2. The G-2 has to coordinate, the missions of 


195 


I 55-PS 


the Special Purpose Units with the military intelligence 
[Abwehr] and the secret field police. For the cooperation with 
the defense officers, respectively defense offices, the decisions 
reached in the talks between Special Purpose Staff Rosenberg 
and Armed Forces High, Command/Foreign intelligence, will 
apply. 

2. The Special Units of Reichsleiter Rosenberg carry out their 
work in their own responsibility and according to the directives 
given by Reichsleiter Rosenberg. 

3. For the accomplishment of the missions described in la, 6, 
c, the Special Units Reichsleiter Rosenberg have the right to 
search buildings in the theater of operations for relevant material 
and confiscate it. The secret field police is to be informed of the 
confiscations. The secret field police furnishes official aid to the 
Special Units if necessary. 

4. The demarcation line between the working territory of the 
Special Units Reichsleiter Rosenberg and the Special Units of the 
Chief of the Security Police and the security service is regulated 
by direct agreement between both service offices. 

5. a. The Special Units belong to the Armed Forces. They wear 
brown uniforms with the swastika insignia. 

6. The Special Units have a strength of 20-25 men, their clothes 
and equipment, together with a corresponding number of vehicles, 
is secured by the Special Purpose Staff, Reichsleiter Rosenberg. 

c. The Special Units are always subordinated, to the service 
branches to which they are attached for the execution of their 
mission, with respect to care, march, accommodation and rations. 

d. The members of the Special Units are identified by a “serv- 
ice-book” of the Special Purpose Staff Reichsleiter Rosenberg, 
which corresponds to the pay-book. This service-book is to con- 
tain always the rank of the owner. It is further noted there, how 
the owner is to be treated in comparison (E.M., NCO, Officer). 
The service branch, which receives a Special Purpose Unit, has 
to certify on a special sheet, provided for this purpose by the 
service office, the fact and duration of the deployment with this 
branch as members of the Armed Forces. The service-book counts 
as identity card. 

e. The Special Units are eligible for medical care. They are to 
be vaccinated according to the orders given to the Army. 

/. Distribution of a fuel contingent is always to be arranged 
with the chief quartermaster of the Army with which a special 
unit is placed. Vehicles are to be cared for by the H.K.P. 

g. Field postal service of the Special Units during movement, is 


196 


155-PS 


carried by way of the field post number of the service branch 
which has a Special Unit attached. By transformation to long, 
permanent work, application for their own field post number can 
be made with the army field postmaster concerned. 

h. Under priority of military necessity the Special Units have 
the right to use Armed Forces telephone and telegraph lines for- 
ward, and, when possible also to the rear. Within the area of the 
military administrations, connection with the Armed Forces 
telephone net is to be made possible. 

i. With regard to the use of means of transportation, the rules 
decreed for the army also apply to the Special Units. Armed 
Forces driving licenses are to be furnished by the service branch, 
to which a Special Unit is attached. 

It is to be made certain, that the above regulations are always 
made known to the commanding authorities, which receive Spe- 
cial Units for deployment. 

The Special Units Reichsleiter Rosenberg are to be supported 
in every way in the execution of their mission. Particularly, in- 
sofar as operations permit, deployment directly with the fighting 
troops is to be made possible. 

IV. Independent of the missions of the Special Units Reichs- 
leiter Rosenberg, in accordance with paragraph la, b, c, the 
troops and all military service offices employed in the theater of 
operations, are directed to save valuable art monuments when- 
ever possible, and safeguard them from destructions or dam- 
ages. 

The preliminary safeguarding of cultural goods, museums etc. 
by the troops and military service units under subsequent agree- 
ment, respectively yield to Special Units Reichsleiter Rosenberg, 
wins particular significance in the occupied Eastern territories 
where, in contrast to the West and South East no organizations 
for the protection of art have been designated by Armed Forces 
High Command/General Staff of the Army/Generals’ Quarters. 

By direction 

/s/ Wagner 

Distribution 

All High Commands of the Army Groups with signal co’s 
[Nachrichtenabteilung] 5; each for all field commanders of 
the Army territory. 

All Army High Commands and Panzer Army High Commands 
with signal co’s [Nachrichtenabteilung] each, Staff Don 
with 3 signal co’s [Nachrichtenabteilungen]. 


197 


I 55-PS 


(with each 6 Signal co’s 
[Nachrichtenabteilung] ) 


Military Commander in France, 

Paris 

Military Commander in Belgium 
and Northern France, Brussels 
Army Territory (W.B.) South East 
With each 2 signal co’s for Commander, General and 
Military Governor of Serbia 
Military Governor of Soloniki-Agnis 
Military Governor Southern Greece 


With each 1 Signal Co’s for the Commander of the Fortress 
Crete, Foreign branch Armed Forces High Command/Gen- 
eral headquarters South, Armed Forces High Command/ 
Armed Forces Command Staff. 


With each 2 Signal Battalions for Military Governor Eastland, 
Military Governor Ukraine. 

Reichsminister for the occupied Eastern territories Berlin, 
with each 2 Signal Co’s [Nachrichtenabteilungen]. 

Special Purpose Staff Reichsleiter Rosenberg for the occupied 
territories, Berlin-Charlottenburg, Bismarckstr. i. 

Center — Force — East. 


8/10/1942 

Special Purpose 'Staff Rosenberg for the occupied territories. 
Berlin-Charlottenburg 2, Bismarckstr. 1. 

To all Chief Labor Groups, Labor Groups, Special Units and 
Liaison Agencies in the Special Purpose Staff Reichsleiter 
Rosenberg 

High Command of the Armed Forces 
3 a 5U Armed Forces Command Staff /Org. (Ill) 

Reference: No. 0655/42 Secret Armed Forces Command Staff/ 
Quarter (II) of 28/2/42. 

SUBJECT: Special Purpose Staff Rosenberg. 

In carrying out the relevant order, it has been determined : 
The material from libraries, archives, lodges and similar 
things, safeguarded by the Special Purpose Staff Rosenberg in 
the execution of its mission, is to be treated like Armed Forces 
goods. 

All other goods are expressly excluded from this. 

The Chief of the High Command 
of the Armed Forces 

By direction, 

/&/ MUENCH 


198 


1 55 PS 


Distribution : 

General Staff of the Army — General Quartermaster Navy High 
Command 

High Command of the Air Force — General Staff — Gen. Qu. 

Armed Forces High Command — A Foreign Intelligence 

OGW II — Intelligence III. 

Chief of the Army Transport System. 

Armed Forces Command Staff /Quartermaster Org. (Ill) Draft 
Ktb. 

Informatory: Special Purpose Staff Reichsleiter Rosenberg for 
the occupied territories. 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 158-PS 

Berlin W 35, Margaretenstr. 17, 1 June 1944 

22 95 51 St— U/Sz 

MESSAGE 

The Einsatzstab of Reichsleiter Rosenberg for the occupied 
territories has dispatched a Sonderkommando under the direc- 
tion of Stabseinsatzfuehrer Dr. Zeiss, who is identified by means 
of his Service Book Number 187, for the accomplishment of the 
missions of the Einsatzstab in Hungary described in the Fueh- 
rer’s Decree of 1 March 1942. 

According to the Fuehrer’s Decree of 1 March 1942 (trans- 
mitted to the Supreme Reichs authorities by means of a letter 
of the Reichs Minister and Chief of the Reichs Chancellory RK 
9495 B) in connection with the Army High Command Order 
#11 11564/42 General Army Staff (Gen d H)/General Quarter- 
master-Az (Gen Qu-Az) Section K Administration (Administra- 
tion) of 30 Sept 42, all offices are requested to support and help 
the Sonderkommando. 

initial : U [Utikal] 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 159-PS 

Berlin 6 June 1944 
Movement Order 

Colonel-Einsatzfuehrer H. W. Ebeling is traveling to Denmark 
and Norway in order to carry out a special mission of Reichsleiter 
Rosenberg in harmony with the person authorized by the Reich 
in Denmark and the Reichs Commissar in Norway in conjunction 
with the Feuhrer’s decree of 1 March 1942 (distributed to the 
highest Reich authorities through correspondence of the Reichs 
Minister and the Chief of the Reich Chancellery RK 9495 B) and 


199 


I 59-PS 


the Supreme Army Command order Nr. 11/11564/42, General 
Staff of the Army/General Quartermaster Az. Section K Admin- 
istration of the 30th Sept. 42. 

As long as it is necessary for him to stay, all the offices of the 
State and the Army are directed to support the activities of the 
person mentioned on the basis of the Fuehrer decree of the 1 
March 1942, the Supreme Army Command order of the 30 Sep- 
tember 1942, and the Einsatz directive of the Head of the Security 
Police and Security Service of the 1st July 1942. 

initialled: U [Utikal] 

Chief of the Einsatzstab 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT I7I-PS 

Library for Exploration of the J eivish Question 

“Hohe Schule”, District Office, Frankfurt/Main. 

Institute for Exploration of the Jewish question 

On 26 March 1941 Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg inaugurated 
as the first district office of the “Hohe Schule” in Frankfurt/Main 
the Institute for Exploration of the Jewish Question (Frankfurt/ 
Main Bockenheimer Landstrasse 68). 

According to the order of the Fuehrer from 29 Jan 1940 the 
“Hohe Schule” is supposed to represent “the center of the na- 
tional-socialist doctrine and education.” At the same time 
Reichsleiter Rosenberg was authorized to make all necessary 
preparations for the foundation of the “Hohe Schule” in the 
realm of research and organization of libraries. 

The district office in Frankfurt/Main, activated under those 
preparatory measures, competent for the domain of the Jewish 
question, contains besides a research-department and archives, 
a voluminous library whose stock shall be the subject of this ar- 
ticle. 

The basis for the library for exploration of the Jewish ques- 
tion is made up of the libraries from occupied territories, confis- 
cated by the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg, in accordance 
with the orders of the Fuehrer from 5 July 1940, 17 Sept 1940 
and 1 March 1942. This material is derived from Jewish prop- 
erty, now centrally collected to serve the research, doctrine and 
education of the German people. 

The most significant book-collections today belonging to the 
stock of the “Library for exploration of the Jewish question”, 
are the following: 


200 


1 7 1 -PS 


1. The library of the Alliance Israelite Universelle. Among 
the approximately 40,000 volumes of this library from Paris 
(mainly Judaica and Hebraica) are numerous volumes of maga- 
zines, voluminous pamphlet material, a very detailed literature 
and collection of clippings from newspapers regarding the affair 
Dreyfus, about 200 Hebrew manuscripts and 30 manuscripts in 
other languages, about 20 incunabula. 

2. The stock of the Ecole Rabbinique consists mostly of Ju- 
daica and Hebraica, altogether about 10,000 volumes . The Jew- 
ish texts of this Rabbi-school in Paris offers valuable Talmud- 
material and complete magazine series. 

3. The library of the Federation de Societe des Juifs de France 
(about 4000 volumes) contains besides general literature about 
Jewry mostly Russian literature about the Jewish question. 

4. The stock of the Jewish bookstore in Paris Lipschuetz 
(about 20,000 volumes) contains in its most valuable part bibli- 
ographical works, Hebraica and so on. 

5. The various collections from former property of the Roths- 
childs of Paris generally are of no more than common interest, 
but they also show that the various members of the Rothschild 
family collected Jewish literature for their own orientation. The 
collections in question are the following : 

a. Collection Edouard Rothschild (about 6,000 volumes) 

b . Collection Edouard and Guy Rothschild (about 3,000 
volumes) 

c. Collection Maurice Rothschild (about 6,000 volumes) 

d. Collection Robert Rothschild (about 10,000 volumes) 

e. Collection of the Rothschild family from hunting lodge 
Armainvilliers (about 3,000 volumes) 

These Rothschild collections contain, besides the valuable book 
stock, important archive material which gives information on 
connections between Jews and non-Jews in France and abroad. 
In this connection it should be mentioned that the district office 
Frankfurt/Main also is in possession of the archives of the last 
100 years of the Parisian bank of Rothchild (760 boxes). 

6. The Rosenthaliana from Amsterdam with 20,000 volumes 
(mostly German language literature on the Jewish question) . 

7. The library of the Sefardic Jewish community in Amster- 
dam with about 25,000 volumes (mostly Hebraica). 

8. The large amount of books secured in the occupied eastern 
territones (prevalent Soviet- Jewish and Polish- Jewish literature, 
voluminous Talmud literature) are from collecting points in 
Riga, Kauen, Wilna, Minsk and Kiev (about 280,000 volumes). 


201 


i 7 1 —PS 


9. Book collections from Jewish communities in Greece (about 

10.000 volumes) . 

10. Book material from a “Sonderaktion” in the Rhineland 
(collecting point Neuwied) with about 5,000 volumes. 

11. The book collections mentioned under 1-10 were turned 
over to the Library for Exploration of the Jewish Question by 
the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg and are constantly being 
filled up by new shipments from the Einsatzstab. Besides that, 
some 100,000 volumes which were obtained from other sources 
(finance offices and so on) by the district office, belong to the li- 
brary for exploration of the Jewish question. Therefore, the 
library for exploration of the Jewish questions contains as of 1 
April 1943: 

Approximately 550,000 volumes (about 3,300 book boxes) in- 
cluding 325 boxes (approx. 24,000 volumes) earmarked for the 
district office but still kept in Berlin with the Staff, and including 
approx. 220,000 volumes (about 650 boxes) prepared for ship- 
ment to Frankfurt/Main at the various collecting points of the 
Einsatzstab and partly packed. 

In detail, these stocks deposited in Berlin cover the material of 
the above under Nos. 3, 5b, d and e mentioned libraries (about 

17.000 volumes), furthermore parts of the collections mentioned 
under Nos. 5a 'and c (about 7,000 volumes) ; all the books at the 
collecting points ready for shipment to Frankfurt/Main cover the 
whole stock as the collections mentioned under Nos. 6 and 7 
(about 50,000 volumes), part of that material secured in the 
East (compare No. 8 above; there are in Minsk about 20,000 vol- 
umes, in Wilno about 50,000 volumes and in Kiev about 100,000 
volumes). The stocks mentioned here which are still in Berlin or 
at the collecting points, make up approximately another 2^0,000 
volumes. The district office in Frankfurt/Main has received so 
far approximately 300,000 volumes (about 2,325 boxes) . 

Of these, approximately 2,325 book boxes which arrived at the 
library for exploration of the Jewish question, were so far un- 
packed and put on bookshelves : 

567 boxes of the Alliance Israelite Universelle (out of 656 
boxes) 

165 boxes of the Ecole Rabbinique (out of 243 boxes) 

50 boxes of the book store Lipschuetz (out of 197 boxes) 
84 boxes of the collection Edouard Rothschild (the re- 
maining 75 boxes are still in Berlin) 

23 boxes of the collection Maurice Rothschild (the re- 
maining 39 boxes arc still in Berlin) 

159 boxes of the collection point Riga (the whole stock) 


202 


1 7 1 —PS 


Thus 1,048 book boxes (about 150,000 volumes) were unpacked 
that is half of the book boxes, so far received in Frankfurt/Main. 

27,848 volumes were catalogued in Frankfurt Main from 1 
May 1941 (beginning of cataloguing) to 31 March 1943 (cata- 
logued according to authors and subjects). According to the same 
principle the new publication which were put into the library 
for the exploration of the Jewish question since 1941, were cata- 
logued — 9,325 volumes. 

Apart from the actual importance of the Jewish question, the 
library for the research of the Jewish question assumes a high 
position in the realm of German libraries with its present col- 
lection of about 550,000 volumes because this Frankfurt library 
could be brought to such a degree of completeness as regards the 
literature on the Jewish question as never before in Europe or 
elsewhere. In the New Order of Europe Organization the library 
for the Jewish question not only for Europe but for the world 
will arise in Frankfurt and Main. 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 176-PS 

REPORT 

On the activities of the Einsatzstab of the Bureau of the Reichs- 
leiter Rosenberg in the occupied Western Territories and 
The Netherlands. Working Group Netherland 

The Working Group" Netherland of the Einsatzstab Reichsleiter 
Rosenberg began its work in agreement with the competent repre- 
sentative of the Reichskommissar during the first days of Septem- 
ber. 1940. The execution of the past, conforming with the Fueh- 
rer's orders, coordinated itself with the liquidation, that is confis- 
cation, according to civil law, of the various subversive institu- 
tions — as set forth in the circulars of the OKW (A2 Nr. 2850/40g 
Adj. Chief OKW). dated 5 July 1940. and of the Chief of the 
OKW to the Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht in France 
(2 f 28.14WZ Nr. 3812/40g) dated 17 September 1940. as well as 
to the Commander in Chief of the OKW in the Netherlands. (Az 
2 f 28 J (IA) Nr. 1338/40g) dated 30 October 1940. The screen- 
ing of the material of the various Masonic lodges was taken care 
of primarily, and the library and the archives of the following 
lodges were sifted and all useful material was packed. 

Droit Humain: 

Lodge “v. Volmaking", Amsterdam 
Lodge “George Martin IF', Amsterdam 
Lodge “Nr. 4”, Amsterdam 


203 


176 PS 


Lodge “Washington Nr. 53”, Amsterdam 
Lodge “Hiram Abif”, Amsterdam 
Lodge “Eenheid”, Amsterdam 
Lodge “De drie zuilen”, Amsterdam 
Lodge “George Martin I”, Den Haag 
Lodge “St. Germain”, Den Haag 
Lodge “v. Volmaking”, Den Haag 

Groot Oosten der Nederlande 

Lodge “Jacob vanCampen”, Amersfoort 

Lodge “La Bien Aimee”, Amsterdam 

Lodge “La Charite”, Amsterdam 

Lodge “La Paix”, Amsterdam 

Lodge “Concordia V.A.”, Amsterdam 

Lodge “Willem Frederik”, Amsterdam 

Lodge “Post Nobila Lux”, Amsterdam 

Lodge “Nes Vincit Libertas”, Amsterdam 

Lodge “Eendracht”, Amsterdam 

Lodge “De Geldersche Broederschap”, Arnhem 

Lodge “In Vrijheid Een”, Bussum 

Lodge “Silentium”, Delft 

Lodge “L’Union Royale”, Den Haag 

Lodge “IJiram Abitf”, Den Haag 

Lodge “L’Union Frederic”, Den Haag 

Lodge “Groot Nederland”, Den Haag 

Lodge “De Oude Plichten”, Den Ha&g 

Lodge “L’Union Provinciale”, Groningen 

Lodge “Vincit Vim Virtus”, Haarlem 

Lodge “Kennermerland”, Haarlem 

Lodge “Ad Lucem et Pacem”, Haarlem 

Lodge “Willem Frederic Karel”, Den Helder 

Lodge “De Gooische Broederschap”, Hilversum 

Lodge “La Vertu”, Leiden 

Lodge “Sint Lodewijk”, Nijmegen 

Lodge “De drie Kolommen”, Rotterdam 

Lodge “Frederic Royal”, Rotterdam 

Lodge “Acacia”, Rotterdam 

Lodge “Concordia”, Rotterdam 

Lodge “Ultrajectina”, Utrecht 

Lodge “Anna Paulbwna”, Zaandam 

I. 0. 0. F. 

Victorie — Lodge No. 50, Alkmaar 
Paradijs — Lodge No. 1, Amsterdam 
Mount Sinai — Lodge No. 2, Amsterdam 


204 


1 76— PS 


Ware Bataven — Lodge No. 4. Amsterdam 

Concordia — Lodge No. 5, Amsterdam 

Amstel — Lodge Xo. 12, Amsterdam 

Spinoza — Lodge Xo. 13, Amsterdam 

Eensgezindheids — Lodge Xo. 17, Amsterdam 

Patria — Lodge Xo. 26, Amsterdam 

Excelsior — Lodge Xo. 32, Amsterdam 

Broederschaps — Lodge Xo. 47. Amsterdam 

Wilson — Lodge Xo. 51, Amsterdam 

Mozart — Lodge Xo. 55, Amsterdam 

Rebekkah — Lodge “Hollandia” Xo. 1. Amsterdam 

Gooische — Lodge Xo. 28, Bussum 

Humanitas — Lodge Xo. 23, Den Haag 

Charitas — Lodge Xo. 24, Den Haag 

Fidelitas — Lodge Xo. 53, Den Haag 

Rebekkah — Lodge “Acacia"’ Xo. 3. Den Haag 

Rebekkah — Lodge “Yrede”, Xo. 4. Den Haag 

Drie Schakels — Lodge Xo. 7, Groningen 

St. Maarten — Lodge Xo. 15, Groningen 

Kennemer — Lodge Xo. 27, Haarlem 

Eem — Lodge Xo. 36, Hilversum 

Sleutel — Lodge Xo. 57, Leiden 

Maas — Lodge Xo. 16, Rotterdam 

Luctor et Emerge — Lodge Xo. 48, Rotterdam 

Rebekkah — Lodge, “Omhoog.” Xor. 2, Rotterdam 

Sic Semper — Lodge Xo. 43, Utrecht 

Amicitia — Lodge Xo. 54, Utrecht 

Rebekkah — Lodge, “Tolerantia." Utrecht 

Zaan — Lodge Xo. 20, Zaandam 

Harmonie — Lodge Xo. 38, Zaandam 

Czaar Peter Club, Zaandam 

Rebekkah — Lodge, “Humanite” Xo. 5, Zaandam 

Rotary Club 

Rotary Club Xo. 3521, Alkmaar 
Rotary Club Xo. 3533, Amersfoort 
Rotary Club Xo. 1336, Amsterdam 
Rotary Club Xo. 3233, Arnhem 
Rotary Club Xo. 5180, Bussum 
Rotary Club Xo. 4079, Delfo 
Rotary Club Xo. 1919, Den Haag 
Rotary Club Xo. 3013, Groningen 
Rotary Club Xo. 2299, Haarlem 
Rotary Club Xo. 2943, Hilversum 


693 ' 25 < 5 — 16— 14 


205 


1 76- PS 


Rotary Club No. 2386, Leiden 
Rotary Club No. 3467, Nijmegen 
Rotary Club No. 1879, Rotterdam 
Rotary Club No. 1481, Utrecht 
Rotary Club No. 4721, Zaandam 

All together 470 cases combining material from the here men- 
tioned lodges and from organizations of a similar status were 
packed and transported to Germany. Furthermore, everything 
the temple of the lodge in Nijmegen and the temple of the I. 0. 
0. F. in Haarlem contained, was sent to Germany. Also, steel- 
shelves for about 30,000 books were taken from the building 
belonging to the Grooten Oosten in Den Haag where they have 
so far been used for the Bibliotheka Klossiana, containing parts 
of one library of the Grooten Oosten, and the library of the 
Vrijmetselar-Stichting, Amsterdam, are of great value. And 
so are the archives of the Grooten Oosten in Den Haag, contain- 
ing all the historical documents of the lodges affiliated with the 
Grooten Oosten. 

To estimate the value of the Bibliotheka Klossiana, containing 
many rare pieces, it is to be remembered that in 1930 the Grooten 
Oosten der Nederlande was offered $5,000,000 for the Bibliotheka 
Klossiana by Freemasons in the U. S. 

A particularly valuable discovery was made by the working 
group searching the altars in the building of the Grooten Oosten 
in Den Haag. The Master-Hammer of the Grooten Oosten, made 
of pure gold, with which some of its members had presented to 
the Grooten Oosten on its 60th Anniversary, fell into our hands. 
It is a piece of high quality whose money-value alone is estimated 
to be 3,000 Reichsmark. 

The Working Group took over the International Institute for 
Social History in Amsterdam with its library and archives, boxes 
of extraordinary value. It seems that this institute was founded 
in 1934 with the intention of creating a center of intellectual re- 
sistance against National Socialism. Its employees were mainly 
Jewish refugees from Germany. The contents of its library and 
its archives with many very valuable items were brought together 
from all over the world. In the library, there are about 160,000 
volumes, though most of them will have to be catalogued. Of par- 
ticular interest is the German, French and Russian Department. 
According to the decision made by Reichsleiter Rosenberg, the 
Institute was taken over in its entity. A member of the Dienstelle 
was nominated as director of the Institute — he, together with his 
collaborators will arrange the books, catalogue the scientific ma 


206 


I 76-PS 


terial and get the Institute ready for the work of the Party. What 
may be said already is that the scientific value of the library and 
the archives is that they contain a complete collection of material 
on the social and socialist movements in certain countries. 

The libraries of the Societas Spinozana in Den Haag and of the 
Spinoza-House in Rijnsburg also were packed. Packed in 18 
cases, they, too, contain extremely valuable early works of great 
importance for the exploration of the Spinoza problem. Not with- 
out reason did the Director of the Societas Spinozana try, under 
false pretenses which we uncovered, to withhold the library from 
us. 

Then the library of the Alliance Francaise, Den Haag, was 
packed (6 cases) as well as the German publication of the refugee- 
publishers Aller de Lange, Querido, Fischer-Beerman, Forum- 
Zeek, of the Kultura Bookshop and the publications of the Pe- 
gasus-Verlag, all in Amsterdam, a total of 17 cases. After that, 
the Working Group concentrated on packing the newspaper and 
magazine stocks of the International Institute for Social History. 
The very exclusive racks which had been brought together from 
all over the world were kept at the Institute in complete disorder 
and left to self-destruction; they were properly packed into 776 
cases and stored, for the time being, in the Working Group’s store- 
houses. It is very strongly suggested that these newspapers and 
magazines be bound and the volumes be put up in proper libraries 
as fast as possible ; otherwise, an irreparable loss will be the result 
since these newspapers and magazines are from all over the world. 

A large unknown amount of material classified as “Enemy 
Goods” and coming from the so-called “Overseas-Gifts”, that is; 
household goods of Jewish refugees, is falling into our hands 
daily. These gifts are being kept at the so-called “House in Hol- 
land”, and so far 43 cases were packed there, including the private 
library of the former Minister of the Eisner-Government, Neu- 
rath. 

In agreement with the Commander-in-Chief of the Wehrmacht 
in the Netherlands, all libraries in houses of Jewish refugees and 
confiscated by the Wehrmacht, are being turned over to the Work- 
ing Group. So far, the library of the Jew De Cat in Haarlem 
was packed into 4 cases. 

An extremely valuable library, containing inestimable works 
in Sanskrit, was confiscated when the Theosophic Society in Am- 
sterdam was dissolved, and packed into 96 cases. 

A number of smaller libraries belonging to the Spiritists, Es- 
peranto Movement, the Bellamy Movement, the International 


207 


176-PS 


Biblical Research and various other minor international organi- 
zations were packed into 7 cases; texts belonging to various minor 
Jewish organizations were packed into 4 cases, and a library of 
the Anthroposophic Society in Amsterdam into three. 

It is safe to say that the racks of books confiscated, packed and 
so far sent to Germany by the Working Group are of extraordi- 
nary scientific value and shall contribute an integral part of the 
library of the “Hohe Schule.” The money-value of these li- 
braries, as shown in the case of the “Klossiana”, can only be esti- 
mated, but surely amount to 30-40,000,000 Reichsmark. 

For the coming months, action is planned on the following, 
enumerated here in chronological order: 

1. The libraries of the Theosophic Society and similar organi- 
zations in Den Haag, Rotterdam and several other places. 

2. Continuous sifting of objects confiscated in the “House in 
Holland” and other buildings. 

3. Screening of several archives with Press-photos, consisting 
altogether of 2.6 million pictures which shall be turned over to us 
by the Reichskommissariat. 

4. The Jewish private libraries in Amsterdam, particularly : 

A. The Israelite Library Beth-Hamidrasch Etz Chaim, Am- 
sterdam, Rapenburgerstraat 109. This library, founded in 1740, 
contains about 4,000 volumes, particularly Jewish theology. 

B. Library of the Netherland Israelite Seminar, Amsterdam, 
Rapenburgerstraat 177. It contains 4,300 volumes of Hebraica 
and 2,000 volumes Judaica. At the time, it took over the library 
of the Jewish Society for Literature, Thoelet (1830-1837) and 
valuable Jewish private collections. Amongst other things, it 
contains precious old prints from the years 1430 to 1560 and 
some manuscripts. 

C. The Portuguese-Israelite Seminar, Amsterdam, Jonas Dan- 
iel Meyerplein 5. There are 25,000 volumes, 450 manuscripts, 
600 prints [Inkunablen] and numerous Exlibris, coins and the 
like and the famous material on Talmud Literature. 

D. The so-called Rosentaliana, primarily a foundation by the 
Jew Rosenthal from Hannover. From there, it was at the time 
transferred and affiliated with the local university library. In 
the meantime, it has on account of donations, grown consider- 
ably. Technically, it belongs to the Municipality of Amsterdam, 
but in the Catalogue of Libraries in the Netherlands of 1931, it 
is designated as “Private”. According to the catalogue, it con- 
tains 25,000 volumes and 300 manuscripts. However, the 
amount of volumes reaches 100,000 indeed. 


208 


1 76— PS 


The libraries mentioned under 4. ought to be of particular in- 
terest for the history of Western Europe. It is very likely that 
hitherto unknown facts may be brought into the open, on the 
era of Cromwell and that of the glorious Revolution of 1688 and 
the resulting personal union between England and the Nether- 
lands. In particular, light may be thrown on Cromwell’s atti- 
tude towards the Jews, possibly even on the Jewish influence on 
the development of the Secret Service. 

The temple and the museum of the Grooten Oosten der Neder- 
lande. At present, both are needed for exhibitions on behalf of 
the Dienststelle of the Reichskommissar. With the end of the 
exhibition temple furnishings and museum shall be turned over to 
us. 

A very conservative estimate of the value of the objects enum- 
erated in 1. to 5. may be about three times as much as that of 
the libraries already packed. Therefore, it is safe to say that 
the library of the Hohe Schule shall, with very little effort, re- 
ceive an extraordinary amount of treasures which shall give it a 
unique position in the realm of questions regarding Judaism and 
Free-Masonism. 

The Working Group, in executing the afore-mentioned tasks 
is bound strictly to the pace set by the Reichskommissar for the 
handling of the Jewish questions and that of the international 
organizations. This pace again is determined by the political 
evolution w 7 hich is taking shape according to decisions made on 
a higher level, and which must not be hampered by individual 
acts. Work that has been authorized to be done by the Working 
Group, but has not yet been accomplished should now, wflth twice 
as much personnel as before, be finished within 2 to 3 months. 
It may be mentioned that the Working Group has been working 
overtime for weeks now, and also is working, as is done on the 
battlefield, on Sundays. 

The leader of the Working Group Netherland. 

Schimmer 

Oberbereichsleiter. 


209 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 197-PS 

Berlin, 27 August 1941 

Notes 

Concerning the conference that has taken place on the OKH 
concerning the transfer of a part of the L kraine to the civil 

administration. 

On 25.8.1941, a conference took place in headquarters OKH/ 
Quartermaster General regarding preparation for the transfer 
}f the Reich Commissary of the Ukraine to the civil administra- 
tion scheduled to take place on 1.9.41. 

Besides myself and the expert of the Q. M. General, the follow- 
ing took part in the conference: 

Major i. G. Altenstadt Chairman 

Ministerialdirigent Dr. 

Danckwarts Chief of the Administrative 

Branch within the Army Ad- 
ministrative Group. 

Colonel i. G. von Krosigk Chief of the General Staff of 

the commander of the sout- 
horn Army Zone Rear. 

Chief of Staff of the Com- 
mander of the Office of 
the Armed Forces. 

Regierungspraesident 

Dargs Representative of Reich Com- 

missar Koch. 

Oberregierungsrat Dr. 

Labs 

Captain Dr. Braeutigam ... Representative of the Minis- 
try for the East. 

Major Wagner. 

The letter first explained the boundaries of the Reich Com- 
missariat Ukraine as of the 1.9.41. In Bessarabia and Buko- 
vinia Rumania is in accord with the 0. K. W. and has already 
set up the civil administration, although until now there has 
been no official surrender of the area to Rumania. The official 
assignment to the Rumanian administration is expected in the 
next few days. The area around Brest is still at present, under 
the military commander of the General Government; the re- 
mainder of the Reich Commissariat Ukraine is under the com- 
mander of the Southern Army Zone Rear. At the time that 
a civil administration was inaugurated on the 1.9.1941, these 
areas (which apply to the military sector) were transferred 


210 


1 97— PS 


to the jurisdiction of the commander of the Wehrmacht in the 
Ukraine. 

The area to be transferred is for the most part pacified. 
Only in the region of the Pripet Marshes is there still unrest 
produced by Partisan groups. The rather strong forces there 
at present of the Southern Army Zone Rear have been con- 
centrated and recently destroyed 8 out of 10 Partisan battalions 
(strength of each battalion approximately 100 men). Should 
the Partisans not be wholly liquidated by the 1.9.1941, forces 
of the above mentioned commander will remain in the area for 
this purpose. 

The security of the part of the Reich Commissary Ukraine 
to be set up on the 1.9.1941, will be carried out in the south by 
a Hungarian Division (2 brigades), connected in the north with 
a Slovakian security division besides 4 battalions of militia. 
All units, including the Hungarian and Slovakians are under 
the command of the commander of the IVehrmacht. In the 
area are two district commands and five town commands, and 
the district commands are in Luck and Kamenez-Podolsk. The 
units of the transport and intelligence services remain directly 
under the command of the O.K.W. Furthermore the economic 
inspection of the south remains with the commander of the 
Army Zone Rear. The economic command in Kiev placed under 
this inspection has its seat for the time being in Shitomir. This 
command is responsible for the civil administration in the whole 
area to be transferred. 

Near Kamenez-Podolsk, the Hungarians have pushed about 
11,000 Jews over the border. In the negotiations up to the pres- 
sent it has not been possible to arrive at any measures for the 
return of these Jews. The higher SS and Police leader (SS- 
Obergruppenfuehrer Jeckeln) hopes, however, to have completed 
the liquidation of these Jews by the 1.9.1941. 

Ministerialdirigent Dr. Danckwarts asserts that both district 
commands have confined themselves to the fulfilment of all the 
most necessary projects in the administrative field. In the com- 
munities for the most part Volksdeutsche or Ukrainians have 
been placed in office as Burgermeister. According to experiences 
up to date these people are scarcely in a position to administer 
to their communities independently, but require in every single 
case instruction and guidance from the German units. 

Colonel von Krosigk states that the military units in many 
towns of the region have set up a Ukrainian militia, which it is 
agreed would now be taken over by the higher SS and Police 
leader as auxiliary police. 


211 


1 97— PS 


In this militia strong efforts for independence have been no- 
ticed since this militia is in part composed of active elements 
(members of the Bandera National independentist movement) . 
The populace is in general obliging but wholly intimidated and 
uneasy. They have made themselves deserving by their search- 
ing for Russian paratroopers who were dropped almost every 
night by the Russians, especially around the main railroad lines. 
These paratroops are harmless, since they are badly armed and 
instructed. They are for the most part in civilian clothes. From 
the directive for the treatment of the collective question great 
success in the field of propaganda is promised in military circles. 

In many Ukrainian districts the Ukrainians themselves have 
put their burgermeisters in office. These men had with them 
quantities of written messages and statements from national 
Ukrainian parties. The Wehrmacht has not recognized such peo- 
ple, but took the statements from them and sent them home 
again. 

The administrative officials of the two district commands re- 
mains until the 15.9.1941 at the district commands in order to 
assist the units by their familiarity with the civil administra- 
tion, without their being engaged in the actual work of adminis- 
tration themselves. Particularly, Kriegsverwaltungsrat Schwarz, 
one of the two administrative officials of the commander of the 
southern Army Zone Rear still remained in the area and would 
go to Rowno in case the civil administration should desire it. 
The 454th division becomes the security division in the area of 
the Reich Commissariat insofar as the security was not taken over 
by the Rumanians. 


In a private conference between (Ministerialdirigent) Dr. 
Danckwarts, (Regierungspraesident) Darge, Captain Dr. Braeuti- 
gam and the undersigned, a few more administrative questions 
were briefly discussed. On this occasion (Ministerialdirigent) 
Dr. Danckwarts stated that the Rumanians in the southern part 
of the Ukraine would take over as far as civil administration was 
concerned, the old borders of Bessarabia, forming a zone as far 
as the Bug, including Odessa, without being promised the even- 
tual possession of this zone. 

Furthermore, with 15 divisions they would take over the se- 
curity of a larger portion of the Ukraine, which in this zone 
would be under the control of the German civil administration. 

Captain Dr. Braeutigam was requested by telephone by Dr. 


212 


1 97— PS 


Koeppen at the Fuehrer’s Headquarters to be careful that the 
Rumanians should not form a Ukrainian group under a former 
military attache in Berlin in the zone taken over by their civil 
administration. This question was discussed with Major Alten- 
stadt in my presence. He explained that the Wehrmacht has no 
administrative control in influencing the Rumanians in the zone 
under their civil administration ; this could only be done through 
the Foreign Office. 


In discussion with several officers who had recently been in 
the Ukraine, I learned that the prohibiting of army chaplains 
from conducting religious services for the civilian population 
and also the Ethnic Germans [Volksdeutsche] has led to de- 
pression and disturbance among the Volksdeutsche. One should 
not fail to realize that the church has been the common connect- 
ing-link of the Volksdeutsche in the Ukraine. Although not 
many Ukrainian clergy are present a few still hold religious 
services for the Ukrainians. The Volksdeutsche fail to under- 
stand why the only possibility of their caring for their souls, 
namely through the agency of Army Chaplains, is denied to 
them. 

LABS 

Oberregierungsrat 

[illegible] 

Ministerialdirektor. 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 199-PS 

COPY 

Reichs Ministry for the Occupied East 

Berlin 11 July 1944 
Correspondence 

To the General Deputy for the Labor Employment, Gauleiter 

Sauckel 
Berlin SFF 11 

I just learned that refugee camps for the White Russians in 
Bialystok, Krajewo and Olitai were closed for the recruiting for 
the war Einsatz Command middle. I call your attention to the 
following: 

1. That the war employment command [Kriegseinsatzkom- 
mando] formerly stationed in Minsk must continue under all cir- 
cumstances the calling in of young white Ruthenian and Russian 


213 


1 99— PS 


manpower for military employment in the Reich. In addition, the 
command has the mission to bring young boys of 10-14 years of 
age to the Reich. 

2. It deals here with a military employment approved by the 
Fuehrer, the measures of which will be increased in a newly re- 
leased directive by the Fuehrer. Such military missions must 
forego all others. 

3. Nothing changes these relative missions by the evacuation 
of these provinces in which the recruiting originally took place. 
The recruiting order does not pertain to certain territories but to 
the people living in these territories. 

4. I must reject every responsibility for the consequences aris- 
ing from the closing of the Refugee Camp and am compelled, upon 
further closing of camps, to request immediately a Fuehrer de- 
cision. 

The same principle must prevail in the recruiting of Air Corps 
helpers in Estonia and Lithuania. I carefully point to this fact 
should similar situations occur there. 

For. 

Signed: Alfred MEYER 

Copies to: 

Gauleiter bureau 

Chief group leader Berger 

Dr. Braeutigam 

Chief bannfuehrer Nickel 

Ministry director Beil. 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 200-PS 

Reich Ministry for the Occupied Eastern Territories 
P 719a/44g [ink note] 

Special Train, Gotenland 8.7. 1944 

CONFIDENTIAL 

TELEGRAM 

1. Chief of the Civil Administration, Bialystok 

2. Offices of the SS and Police Chiefs concerned, Bialystok 

3. SD Unit concerned, Bialystok 

Subject: HJ — Kriegseinsatzkommando Center. 

The HJ Kriegseinsatzkommando center, which until now has 
been stationed in Minsk, must under all circumstances continue 
its duties, as regards the enrollment of young White Ruthenians 
and Russians for a military reserve in the Reich. 


214 


200— PS 


The Command is further charged with the transferring of worth- 
while Russian youth between 10-14 years of age, to the Reich. 
The authority is not affected by the changes connected with the 
evacuation and transportation to the reception camps of Bialy- 
stok, Krajewo, and Olitei. The Fuehrer wishes that this activity 
be increased even more. 

I request that the Command of Bialystok be assisted in the exe- 
cution of its duties in every possible way. Should difficulties 
arise contrary to expectations, I request that I be informed im- 
mediately by wire. 

•Ministry for the East 

[signed] Berger 

Chief of the Command Staff for Politics 

4. Copies to: 

Offic6 of the Gauleiter 
Ministerialdirigent Dr. Braeutigam 
Hauptbannfuehrer Nickel 

initialled B 11/7 

PARTIAL SYNOPSIS AND TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 204-PS 

The City Commissioner in Kauen 

Kauen, 18 February 1944 

Release of Indigenous Labor for Purposes of the Reich 
[Translator’s Synopsis] 

After entry into Lithuania thousands of workers were recruited 
to work for a period of 6 months in Gau Ost Prussen. Contrary 
to all promises these laborers were not released even after twelve 
months, and their various connections at home received no com- 
pensations. They did not even get a short furlough home for a 
long time. Now it is intended to put them in the munitions in- 
dustry against their will. 

In the early part of 1942 another recruiting was made by the 
Wehrmacht for 7000 male transport-aides. They forced the Lithu- 
anians to register at an office and then locked them up in barracks 
as they came in. Naturally they dislike the Germans almost as 
much as the Russians. 

Recently the recruiting drives for new volunteers for the army, 
police and labor service, and for laborers in the munitions industry 
within the Reich have been started. However the Russians re- 
moved 40,000 professional personnel in 1941, and more than 100,- 
000 were removed from work, so many positions cannot be filled 
now. 


215 


2 04- PS 


After the recruiting campaigns the populace did not trust any 
further proclamations or measures as far as working within Ger- 
many was concei-ned. Furthermore the Lithuanians do not feel 
that they have in their state a political unit. Because of previous 
unsettled political conditions, the Lithuanian does not think much 
about politics. Since he pays little attention to his own laws, he 
heeds ours even less. They do not attend the musterings and must 
be brought by the police. 

Although the civilian administration promised to produce the 
labor, they were not too successful, as the following will show: 

1. Seizure of the age classes of 1919/24 

This was ordered by the Reichs Commissar for the East, but 
due to the inefficiency of the officials, it was only partially suc- 
cessful. 

The actual seizui’e was done by members of the Wehrmacht, 
police, local administration and the labor office. Energetic prop- 
aganda campaigns were initiated to induce the male members of 
the age groups to register at the designated offices. 

Soon however opposition arose on the part of the Lithuanian 
intelligentia. To counteract this the following measures were 
taken. 

, [Translation] 

Renunciation of the formation of a Lithuanian legion, closing of 
the native universities, and arresting of a number of members of 
the Lithuanian intelligentia. 

[Translator’s Synopsis] 

These measures were not pi'acticable ; consequently the General 
Commissar ordered another registering, with severe penalties for 
non-appearance. Although every effort was made, the results 
were still unsatisfactory. From an expected total enrolment of 
5800 men, only 47% appeared, and among this percentage were 
many of no use to us for vai'ious reasons. 

[Ti’anslation] 

2. The completely unsatisfactoi'y experience of the previous ac- 
tion made a further seizure of the age group 1912/18 and also of 
the female age group 1914/22 necessary. These two further ac- 
tions also brought no satisfactory result. In a lecture which the 
Plenipotentiary for the Ai’beitseinsatz Gauleiter Sauckel made on 
18 July 1943 in Kauen, and in an official conference following it, 
between Gauleiter Sauckel and the General Commissar, the pool 
of labor in the Reich was again brought up urgently; Gauleiter 
Sauckel again demanded that Lithuanian labor be furnished in 
greater volume for the purposes of the Reich. As the minutes of 


216 


204-PS 


this conference show, the General Commissar described very 
forcibly the very great difficulties opposing the preparation of in- 
digenous labor forces, and asked urgently for the preparation of 
a larger number of German police forces. SS-Obergruppenfuehrer 
von dem Bach promised explicitly at that time “a real strengthen- 
ing of the police force in Lithuania”. This real strengthening of 
the police force in Lithuania meanwhile was not carried out in the 
course of further actions. 

[Translator's Synopsis] 

3. Sauckel wanted 30,000 workers. Although the civilian ad- 
ministration did their best, conditions were in confusion and only 
8200 of the 30,000 were on hand. 

4. Then Sauckel made a new requisition, this time for 100,000 
workers. Although fulfillment of this requisition would vacate 
many positions in the country, the General Commissar promised 
to fill the order. However, many difficulties will arise. In the 
country it is easier to recruit labor because it is possible to study 
the labor situation in more detail than in a large city like Kauen. 
In the country the administration has a closer tie with the popu- 
lace for one thing. 

To fulfill the requisition of labor made on Lithuania, assistance 
from the German Civil Administration is a necessity. The police 
force will have to be increased temporarily, severe treatment in 
case of sabotage, a temporary increase in the allotment of motor 
fuel, and the use of the quartermaster facilities of the Wehr- 
macht ; all these measures will be necessary if the required amount 
of labor is to be supplied. 

This new action of Sauckel’s will probably not work. The only 
w T ay of gaining any successes in this matter is to have at our dis- 
posal large numbers of German police. 

[signature illegible] 


217 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 205-PS 


National Socialist Labor Party 
Party Chancellory 

Fuehrer’s Headquarters 5 May 1943 
The Chief of the Party Chancellory 
Chancery Rosenberg 
Admit. No. 931 K 
24 May 1943. 

Circular No. 70/43 

Subject: Memorandum concerning the general principles for the 
treatment of foreign laborers employed within the Reich. 

The Reich Propaganda Ministry and the RSHA have together 
issued a memorandum concerning the treatment of foreign la- 
borers employees within the Reich. 

I request in the attached copy that the necessity for a firm but 
just treatment of the foreign workers be made clear to members 
of the Party and the People. 

A publication of this memorandum is not to be made. 

Signed: M. Bormann. 

Distribution : 

Reichsleiter 
Gauleiter * 

Verbaendefuehrer 

Kreisleiter 

Ortsgruppenleiter 

Index File Card: Foreign Laborers — Treatment — Behavior 


Memorandum concerning the general principles for the treatment 
of foreign workers employed within the Reich. 

The struggle of the Reich against the destructive forces of 
Bolshevism becomes more and more a European affair. There is 
an apparent practical result in the employment within the Reich 
of millions of foreign workers from almost all the European 
countries on the continent, in addition to a large number of 
members of the conquered forces of hostile nations. From this 
fact arise special obligations for the German people, which are 
submitted first of all in the following principles: 

1. Of primary importance is the security of the Reich. The 
Reichsfuehrer of the SS and his units settle all questions on meas- 
ures of the security police for the protection of the Reich and the 
German people. 


218 


205— PS 


2. The humane, production-increasing treatment of the foreign 
workers and the facilities granted them can obviously lead to the 
effacement of the clear lines of demarcation between the work- 
ers of foreign peoples and members of the German race. It 
is demanded of members of the German race that they ob- 
serve the difference between themselves and foreign nationals 
as a patriotic duty. By disregarding the fundamental principles 
of the National Socialist conception of blood [Blutauffassung] 
a member of the German race must be aware of being liable to 
the severest penalties. The knowledge, that the outcome will be 
either victory or a Bolshevist chaos, must cause every German 
to draw the necessary conclusions in dealings with workers of 
foreign nationalities. 

Everything is subordinated to the mission of ending the war 
victoriously. The foreign workers employed within the Reich are 
to be treated in such a manner that their reliability is retained 
and expedited; that consequences unfavorable to the Reich be 
limited to a minimum in their home countries and that full labor 
be retained at a future date for the German war economy, yes, so 
that even a rise in production ensues. The following is to be 
regarded here as decided : 

1. Everyone even the primitive man, has a fine perception for 
justice! Consequently every unjust treatment must have a very 
bad effect. Injustices, insults, trickery, mistreatment etc. must 
be discontinued. Punishment by beating is forbidden. The 
workers of foreign nationality are to be correspondingly informed 
concerning the severe measures for insubordinate and seditious 
elements. 

2. Winning someone to active cooperation for a new idea is im- 

possible, if his innate consciousness of value is insulted at the 
same time. From people who are described as beasts, barbarians 
and sub-humans, no great accomplishment can be demanded : In 

contrast to all opportunities that arise, positive characteristics 
such as the will to fight against Bolshevism, security of their own 
existence and of their country, readiness to enlist and the willing- 
ness to work, all are to be spurred on and expedited. 

3. Moreover everything must be done in order to further the 
necessary cooperation of the European peoples in the struggle 
against Bolshevism. The foreign worker is not to be convinced 
by words alone that a German victory is also favorable for him 
and his people. Supposition is a suitable treatment. 

Digressing from these view-points, the responsible plenipoten- 
tiaries for Arbeitseinsatz responsible for the recruiting and the 


219 


205— PS 


working conditions of the foreign laborers as well as the other 
bureaus concerned, have issued the necessary directives for the 
employment of foreign laborers within the Reich. From these 
instructions the following are especially to be stressed : 

a. If possible every foreign worker will receive a position for 
which he has the greatest ability according to his training and 
former employment. 

b. The quartering of foreign labor personnel is to be, as a rule, 
in camps. The accommodations must be provided with all the 
necessities in respect to orderliness, cleanliness and sanitation. 
Measures of imprisonment such as confinement and barbwire are 
forbidden. It is especially emphasized that in this quartering, 
the national customs of the foreign workers, (male and female) 
are to be given the utmost consideration in conformation with 
the possibilities conditioned by war. The foreigners are as much 
as possible divided into national groups, and are to be quartered 
together. The assistance of the foreign workers in the adminis- 
tration of the camp and the maintenance of order within the camp 
is to be secured. For all camps there are camp directives which 
outline in particular the duties and right of the camp and the 
leaders. 

c. At the time of enlistment the foreign workers are to be 
urged to bring clothing and foot gear with them to Germany. 
So far as this is not possible and so far as it has become neces- 
sary to replace articles of clothing that have become unusable, 
they are to be provided with clothing and footgear, considering 
limitations imposed by war, so that the necessary protection 
for the preservation of health against weather is guaranteed. 

d. The foreign workers are to receive, in reference to diet, 
the same ration allowance as the German workers from the 
Reich Minister for nutrition and agriculture. In this matter 
the usual cost will be considered. Care will be taken that sup- 
plies are issued to the foreign workers in accordance with the 
numbers placed at their disposal. Embezzlements, usurious 
prices etc. by supervisory bureaus or administrative officers will 
be punished as if the act were committed against Germans. 

e. Every foreign worker has claim to efficient sanitation 
measures. The regulations for prevention of epidemics and con- 
tagious diseases are not to be deviated from. Medical attention 
according to local conditions is to be assured by the doctors of 
the camp district or insurance [Kasse]. For permanent treat- 
ment in districts or hospitals the number of beds necessary are 
to be kept ready in a suitable manner. For nursing and mainte- 


220 


205— PS 


nance nursing personnel of the same nationality are if possible 
to be called up, and if circumstances permit doctors and army- 
surgeons of the same nationality. For pregnant workers obstet- 
rical necessities are to be provided; also peaceful accommoda- 
tions and nurseries of suitable size are to be supplied. Female 
members of the nationality concerned are to be used for care of 
patients. The return home [Rueckbefoerderungen] of pregnant 
workers is to take place only in extremely exceptional cases on 
the request of the party concerned. 

/. Recreation for the foreign workers is of the greatest im- 
portance for the conservation of working power and morale. 
Entertaining organizations, periods of free time, sports, etc. 
are of prime importance in the camp itself and are to be carried 
on by camp personnel. In addition, special performers and 
national groups of the various nationalities are to be used for 
the further development of this recreation. In addition insofar 
as possible their own moving picture films will be presented. 
Furthermore books, periodicals and newspapers translated into 
the various foreign languages are to be available in every camp. 
Language courses are to promote understanding in the place of 
work. For the various nationalities special dictionaries are to 
be published. 

In addition the workers from the East have at least the pos- 
sibility of going out on their free day. 

g. For all foreign workers recreation is possible, insofar as 
it is desired. For members of the Occupied Eastern Territorities 
care only from lay-priests is considered. Care from Russian and 
Ukrainian emigrants is forbidden. 

In case of death all foreigners will be buried in the public 
cemeteries. 

h. The political influence in directed mainly against Bolshe- 
vism and ought to be molded accordingly. 

The above-mentioned principles are considered binding as 
policies of conduct for all organizations, bureaus and personnel, 
since they have been published as directives by the respective 
bureaus. All units which are concerned with the employment 
and care of foreign workers and particularly factory and camp 
leaders, are responsible for these principles being put into prac- 
tice and being adhered to. They must understand quite clearly 
that violations of the forgiving fundamentals damage the Ger- 
man war economy and indirectly, the Front. Therefore they 
are not only punishable from the point of view of the non-politi- 
cal crime (for example, assault, embezzlement, usury) but also 
can be punished for treasonable crimes. Not only the author 


693256 — 46—15 


221 


205-PS 


of such an act can be held responsible but also the responsible 
office chief. Also defective instruction or supervision of 
subordinate offices can lead to an official punishment. 

All existing directives and instructions for the treatment of 
foreign workers will be tested by the bureaus concerned as to 
whether they conform to the principles set forth here. Where 
this is not the case, they will be immediately revised by suitable 
measures. 

Berlin, 16 April 1943 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 212-PS 

COPY 

Directions for the handling of the Jewish question 

1. In General. The competency of the Chief of the Security 
Police and Security Service, who is charged with the mission 
of solving the European Jewish question, extends even to the 
occupied eastern provinces. Accordingly, the offices under the 
Security Police for the purpose of handling the Jewish ques- 
tion in the occupied eastern provinces are qualified for their 
present sphere of activity. 

In the individual Reiehs commissariats, and within these, in 
the General commissariats, Jewry represents a portion of the 
population which is very varied in strength. For example, 
millions of Jews live in White Russia and in the Ukraine who 
have lived here for generations. In the central province of 
the USSR however, the Jews have moved in, for by far the 
greatest part, during Bolshevistic times. Those Russian Jews 
who followed in the wake of the invading Red Army of 1939 
and 1940 to East Poland, West Ukraine, West White Russia, 
the Baltic lands, Bessarabia, and Buchenland are one particular 
group. 

All measures for the Jewish question in the occupied eastern 
provinces must be met with the point of view that the whole 
Jewish question will be solved in general for all of Europe after 
the war at the latest. They are therefore to be instituted as 
preparatory partial measures and must be in agreement with 
those decisions which may otherwise be met in this field. This 
is especially true for the preparation of at least temporary 
reception centers for Jews from the Reich province. 

An eventual act by the civilian population against the Jews is 
not to be prevented as long as this is compatible with the main- 
tenance of order and security in the rear of the fighting troops. 


222 


212-PS 


Namely retaliatory measures are to be allowed against the 
Jews who come into the provinces which were newly occupied 
by the Red Army in the last few years. However, strict meas- 
ures are to be taken against street mobs and other evil elements 
for whom it concerns only plunder of Jewish stores and stealing 
Jewish property for their own personal gain. 

2. Definition of the term "Jew” . The peaceful settlement of the 
Jewish question requires the previous determining as to who 
is to be considered a Jew in the occupied Eastern provinces. In 
reference to the solving of the European Jewish question and 
to the strong influence which Jewry had upon the remaining 
Russian population until the invasion of German troops, and 
which it still exercises at present, it appears necessary from 
a political, as well as from a popular point of view, for the 
purpose of avoiding a later regaining of strength of the Jews, 
to grasp the term “Jew” in the most far-reaching sense. 

Therefore, he is a Jew, who belongs to the Jewish religion, 
or has been recognized as Jewish by other circumstances; he 
who has a parent who is a Jew in accordance with the above 
sentence is also a Jew. 

3. Comprehension, mark of recognition, suspension of the lights 
of freedom and segregation. The first main goal of the German 
measures must be strict segregation of Jewry from the rest 
of the population. In the execution of this, first of all is the 
seizing of the Jewish populace by the introduction of a regis- 
tration order and similar appropriate measures. Soviet Jewry 
has, constantly, attempted, since the Bolshevistic Revolution, to 
disguise itself in order to unobtrusively move into leading posi- 
tions, especially in the grain regions of the USSR. For this 
purpose many Jews have dropped their Jewish names and have 
taken Russian family names and Russian surnames. It is to 
be decreed, that the person who must register must report all 
changes of name by Jews during his lifetime, or as far as he 
knows during the time of his forefathers, to his superior and 
to make them retrogressive. The same goes for previous de- 
parture from the religious congregation and acceptance of other 
faiths (other manifold). The erasure of the Jewish deception 
will be easier in the Reich commissariat Eastland and Ukraine, 
where the larger part of the Jews have been living for genera- 
tions than in the other Reichs commissariats. The Soviet 
archive material, in so far as it is preserved, is to be brought 
to use for this. 

Then immediately, the wearing of the recognition sign con- 


223 


2 1 2— PS 


sisting of a yellow Jewish star is to be brought about and all 
rights of freedom for Jews are to be withdrawn. They are to 
be placed in Ghettos and at the same time are to be separated 
according to sexes. The presence of many more or less closed 
Jewish settlements in White Ruthenia and in the Lkraine makes 
this mission easier. Moreover, places are to be chosen which 
make possible the full use of the Jewish manpower in case 
labor needs are present. These Ghettos can be placed under 
the supervision of a Jewish self-government with Jewish of- 
ficials. The guarding of the boundaries between the Ghettos 
and the outer world is, however, the duty of the police. 

Also in the cases in which a Ghetto could not yet be estab- 
lished, care is to be taken through strict prohibitions and simi- 
lar suitable measures that a further intermingling of blood of 
the Jews and the rest of the populace does not continue. 

4. Removal of the Jeivish influence in political , economical 
cultural and social fields. Relative with the measures to segre- 
gate the Jews physically from the rest of the populace, every- 
thing necessary is to be used in order to eliminate every influ- 
ence of the Jewry upon the Russian people. This is to happen 
immediately in political and cultural fields, whereas in all other 
cases consideration is to be taken that the common interests 
are not impaired. This is especially true for the economic mis- 
sions which are important due to the demands of the war and 
those which concern the national economy. 

An entire reconversion of Jewish professional life must be 
brought about insofar as it does not deal with manual laborers. 
The group of State employees in the Russian government along 
with the strongest Jewish professional groups shall vanish en- 
tirely. Likewise, similar professional groups are to be divorced 
from the public life, whereby, however, the tempo of these 
measures must correspond with the general economical and social 
need. 

The entire Jewish property is to be seized and confiscated with 
exception of that which is necessary for a bare - existence. As 
far as the economical situation permits, the power of disposal 
of their property is to be taken from the Jews as soon as possible 
through orders and other measures given by the commissariat, 
so that the moving of property will quickly cease. 

Any cultural activity will be completely forbidden to the Jew. 
This includes the outlawing of the Jewish press, the Jewish 
theatres and schools. 


224 


212-PS 


The slaughtering of animals according to Jewish rites is also 
to be prohibited. 

5. Forced Labor. The present manpower shortage in the oc- 
cupied eastern territories as well as ideological-political con- 
siderations make the demand appear of basic significance to in- 
troduce forced labor commitment in the strictest form. This will 
have to take place move by move by the elimination of the Jews 
from their professional life although they are to be permitted 
to work in their own occupations if they fall within the scope of 
the labor commitment. Moreover, the Jewish manpower is to 
be used for heavy manual labor. 

The standing rule for the Jewish labor employment is the 
complete and unyielding use of Jewish manpower regardless of 
age in the reconstruction of the occupied eastern territories. The 
missions, which are to be given to the Jews in their labor em- 
ployment, are especially the highway, railroad and canal con- 
struction, as far as the ameliorations, etc. are considered. Also, 
it seems that agricultural employment above all, will be brought 
about under strict supervision. Nothing is to be done against the 
employment of the Jews in cutting of wood, production of straw 
shoes, brooms and brushes within the Ghettos. 

In the employment of the Jews, care is to be taken that Jewish 
labor is only so used in those productions which will later suffer 
no noticeable interruption in case of a rapid withdrawal of these 
labor forces, and which excludes a specialization of Jewish 
workers. It is to be avoided in every case that Jewish workers 
become indispensable in essential production. 

6. Violations. Violations against German measures, especially 
against the forced labor regulations, are to be punishable by 
death to the Jews. All violations are to be dealt with by courts- 
martial. 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 228-PS 

Circular No. 163/43 
(Not for Publication) 

Subject: Treatment of PWs 

Individual Gau-administrations often refer in reports to a too 
indulgent treatment of PWs on the part of the guard personnel. 
In many places, according to these reports, the guarding authori- 
ties have even developed into protectors and caretakers of the 
PWs. 

I informed the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of these 


225 


228 — PS 


reports with the comment that the productive German population 
absolutely cannot understand it, if, in a time in which the German 
people is fighting for existence or non-existence, PWs — hence our 
enemies — are leading a better life than the German working-man, 
and that it is an urgent duty of every German who has to do with 
PWs, to bring about a complete utilization of their manpower. 

The Chief of PW affairs in the Supreme Command of the Armed 
Forces has now given out the unequivocal order, attached hereto 
in copy form, to the commanders of PWs in the military districts. 
I request that this order be brought orally to the attention of all 
party office holders in an appropriate manner. 

In case that in the future complaints about unsuitable treat- 
ment of PWs still come to light, they are to be immediately com- 
municated to the commanders of the PWs with a reference to the 
attached order. 

Fuehrer — HQ, 25 November 1943 

(Signed) : M. Bormann 

Distribution: Distribution A and B 

File reference: Treatment — PWs — Guard personnel. 


Chief of PW affairs in the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 
Az. 2f24, 74f Kriegsgef. Allg. (Ia) No. 11082143 

Berlin, Badenschestr. 51, 26 October 1943 

To: the Commanders of PWs in the Military Districts I to XIII, 
XVII, XVIII, XX, XXI, Government-General 
with the commanders of the Armed Forces in the Ukraine 
and the East; the PW District Commandant with the Com- 
mander of the Armed Forces in Norway. 

For information: to the Commanders of PWs in the Operational 
Areas I to IV 

to the PW District Commandants in Italy and 
Serbia 

Subject: Treatment of PWs. 

I. The intention of treating non-Soviet PWs strictly according 
to the Convention of 29 and the Soviet PWs according to the 
special directions of the Supreme Commander of the Armed 
I orces, has in many cases led to forms, which are not in harmony 
with the total war forced upon us. 

The PW must according to the convention “be treated humanely 


226 


228 — PS 


and especially be protected against acts of violence, insults, and 
public curiosity”. This does not mean, however, that a similar 
care must be granted him, as is required for German soldiers. 

In the case of the Soviet PWs, insofar as their diet is brought 
into harmony with the work output expected of them and they 
have recovered from the unavoidable rigors of the Eastern war, 
the sharp health supervision originally necessary, in part con- 
sisting of continuous weight check-ups is as a rule no longer re- 
quired. Weight check-ups may only have the aim of determining 
undernourishment; they are only to be utilized in individual cases. 

The aerial terrorism of the enemy forces great parts of the 
German people into a way of life similar to that prevailing in the 
operational area. As a result of this, the treatment and conduct 
of PWs, who enjoy the protection of the convention of 29 and who 
are, moreover, through the receipt of packages, in many ways 
better nourished than their countrymen on the enemy side, are 
regarded critically. Especially, a too mild treatment of Soviet 
PWs will not be understood anywhere, as it is known what fright- 
ful sufferings German soldiers must endure, who have fallen into 
Soviet hands. 

The leaders of the labor detachments and the guard personnel 
must, moreover, receive unequivocal orders and it must continually 
be pointed out to them through teaching and instruction that 
their primary duty consists in keeping the PWs to the full output 
of their working energy, and in insuring that the lazy be appre- 
hended most rapidly through such measures as are permitted to 
the entrepreneurs or by the punishments reserved to the military 
superiors and that intractable elements be recognized and seg- 
regated. 

Leaders of labor detachments and guard personnel must be 
conscious of the fact that, in a time when unconditional and ex- 
treme effort is demanded from every member of the German na- 
tion, inferior production on the part of the PWs, which are trace- 
able to malevolence or carelessness can in no case be tolerated. 
The great labor battle of the homeland depends upon the work 
output of every individual and thereby also of every PW. 

The thought that PWs through their work primarily fill the 
wallet of the entrepreneur, and hence must be protected from 
him is erroneous. Entrepreneurs are now agents of the German 
people. They have exclusively to deliver things of importance to 
the war effort usually in a very limited time and for this to utilize 
completely all manpower at their disposal according to its best 
occupational suitability. The entrepreneurs know that manpower 


227 


228— PS 


cannot be replaced and must therefore for this reason too, have 
the greatest interest in the preservation of this power. 

Labor detachment leaders, guard personnel, entrepreneurs and 
German workers form one front and have a common goal: the 
attainment of victory! To this end they must, by putting aside 
all personal wishes, and in closest and most unified cooperation 
make use of the manpower of the PWs put at their disposal by 
the Reich. Whoever does not work for this goal or interferes 
with its attainment is harmful to the nation and injures our com- 
rades at the front. 

Hence, the treatment of the PWs employed at labor is to be ar- 
ranged solely to raise the labor output to the highest possible 
degree and immediately to take sharp action if the PWs are care- 
less, lazy, or recalcitrant. The PWs are not to be "cared for” but 
are to be handled in such a manner that the required highest de- 
gree of work output be attained. With this, needless to say, goes, 
besides just treatment of the PWs, the supplying of the PWs with 
the rations, clothing, etc., due them according to existing di- 
rectives. 

II. The development of the situation and the increasing re- 
quirements for PW labor power force us to bring more and more 
PWs into the Retch. Despite this it cannot be counted upon that 
the guard forces will be correspondingly increased, also the quality 
of the guard personnel will not on the average be able to be im- 
proved. 

In addition the problem becomes more difficult because the 
PWs erroneously believe that they can discern an advantage to 
themselves in the situation. Hence they become arrogant in many 
cases and attempt to escape to a greater extent. These symptoms 
can only be countered by immediately taking sharp measures 
against the PWs in case of recalcitrance or escape. 

Weaklings, who should express themselves to the effect that in 
the present situation one must assure oneself of "friends” among 
the PWs by means of mild treatment, are defeatists and are to be 
prosecuted on the charge of subversion of national defense. 

The PWs must not be in doubt for an instant that weapons will 
be ruthlessly employed against them, if they give any sort of pas- 
sive resistance or should try to mutiny. 

The commanding officers must take care that this policy con- 
cerning the treatment of PWs becomes the common property of 
all officers, officials, non-commissioned officers and enlisted men 
subordinated to them. This is not to be attained through written 
directives and pamphlets alone, but primarily by the spoken word 


228 


228— PS 


and by a persistent and conscientious education of subordinates in 
the spirit of these statements. 

I request that the local agencies of the National Socialist Party 
be, in a suitable manner, orally informed of this policy and that it 
be reported to the Commanders. 

I request that no reproduction of this document be made. 

[signed] v. Graevenitz 
Reprinting, even in part, forbidden. 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 232-PS 

National Socialist German Workers Party 
Party Chancellery 
The Chief of the Party Chancellery 

Fuehrer Headquarters, 13 Sep 1944 

Proclamation 

Chancellery Rosenberg, Rec’d No. 2594 K/ 19 Sep 44 
Presented to the Reichsleiter on the 20 Sept. Rdsdir. 

For the Information of : 

1. Staff leader [Init. ] 

2. Central Office 27 Sep 44 [Init.] 

3. Administration 27 Sep 44 [Init.] 

Returned to the Chancellery 

Subject: Treatment of Prisoners of War — Tasks of the guard 
units. 

The regulations, valid until now, on the treatment of Prisoners 
of War, and the tasks of the guard units are no longer justified 
in view of the demands of the total war effort. Therefore, the 
Supreme Command (OKW) of the Armed Forces, on my sug- 
gestion, issued the regulation, a copy of which is enclosed. 

The following is cited for its contents: 

1. The understanding exists between the Chief of the Supreme 
Command of the Armed Forces (OKW) and myself, that the 
cooperation of the party in the commitment of prisoners of rear 
is inevitable. Therefore, the officers, assigned to the prisoner 
of war system, have been instructed, to cooperate most closely 
with the bearers of sovereignty [ Hoheitstraeger] ; the comman- 
dants of the prisoner of war camps have to detail immediately 
liaison officers to the Kreisleiters. 

Thus the opportunity will be afforded the Hoheitstraeger, to 
alleviate existing difficulties locally, to exercise influence on the 


229 


232- PS 


behavior of the guard units and to better assimilate the commit- 
ment of the prisoners of war to the political and economic de- 
mands. 

2. The increase of performance [Leistungssteigerung] of the 
prisoners of war depends decisively on how the guard and auxil- 
iary units understand their task, and what position they take 
toward the prisoners of war. From this knowledge the necessity 
is derived, to orient them again and again politically and ideo- 
logically, to put the meaning of their mission constantly before 
their eyes. For that, in all base camps [Stalags] National So- 
cialist leaders from headquarters [hauptamtliche NS-Fuehrungs- 
offiziere] are being assigned. 

I request the Hoheitstraeger to support the commandants of 
the prisoners of war in the selection of capable officers. Above 
that, the Hoheitstraeger are to furnish the commandants of the 
prisoner of war camps with capable speakers for the orientation 
of the guard and auxiliary units. Collaborators of the offices for 
national questions [Volkstumfragen] are to be called upon espe- 
cially for that. 

Furthermore, a constant political orientation of the plant 
owner, who is invested now with special rights toward the pris- 
oners of war and toward the guard units, must take place in 
cooperation with 'the German Labor Front (DAF). 

/s/ M. Bormann. 

1 Enclosure! 

Distribution : 

Reichsleiter 

Gauleiter 

Verbaendefuehrer 

Kreisleiter, 

Authenticated: [illegible] 

Cross index file : Prisoners of war — Treatment — Guard units 
File No. 8810. 


230 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 254-PS 


Reichsminister for the occupied Eastern territories. 

II Pers c — 1 — Raab Berlin, June 29th 1944. 

SECRET 

To the Fuehrungsgruppe PI, 

Special Unit — “Gotenland,” 

Concerning : Burning of houses in the Wassilkow district. 

Reference: Your letter from May 24th 1944 — P 26 a/44 geh — . 

Enclosed I am sending you a copy of the point of view of 
Nachwuchsfuehrer Paul Raab. 

I don’t see any reasons for taking measures of any kind against 
Raab. 

By order: 

Signed : Jennes 
Certified Schrader 

Adm employee. 


SECRET 

Grambusch 7.6.44 

Paul Raab, Nachwuchsfuehrer 

Copy 

To the Reichsminister for the occupied Eastern territories. 

Berlin W 35, Kurfuerstendamm 134 

Concerning : Letter from June 2nd 1944 — II — Pers c 1 — Raab 
Diary # 81/44 g 

According to a charge by the supreme command of the armed 
forces I burned down a few houses in the territory of Wassil- 
kow/Ukr. belonging to insubordinate people ordered for work- 
duty [Arbeitseinsatzpflichtigen]. This accusation is true. 

I was committed as district commissioner in the information 
service in the territory of Wassilkow from May 5th 1942 up to 
December 28th 1944. Besides many work districts, I was made 
fully responsible by district commissioner Doehrer to completely 
fill the district quota of workers to be delivered to Germany. 
Although the task wasn’t agreeable to me, I carried it out con- 
scientiously, with skill, and w’here it was necessary with stern- 
ness. Up until the penetration of the Soviet Armies, this terri- 
tory delivered more than 31,000 workers to Germany. 

During the year of 1942 the conscription of workers was ac- 
complished by way of propaganda. Only very rarely was force 


231 


254-PS 


necessary. Only in August 1942, measures had to be taken 
against 2 families in the villages Glewenka and Salisny-Chutter, 
each of which were to supply one person for labor. Both weie* 
requested in June for the first time, but didn t obey although re- 
quested repeatedly. They had to be brought up by force, but 
succeeded twice to escape from the collecting camp, or when being 
on transport. Before the second arrest, the fathers of both of 
the men were taken into custody, to be kept as hostages and to 
be released only when their sons would show up. When, aftei 
the second escape, rearrest of both the fathers and boys was 
ordered, the police patrols ordered to do so, found the houses to 
be empty. 

That time I decided to take measures to show the increasingly 
rebellious Ukrainian youth that our orders have to be followed. 

I ordered the burning down of the houses of the fugitives. The 
result was, that in the future people obeyed willingly, orders con- 
cerning labor obligations. However, the measure of burning 
houses has not become known, for the first time by my actions, 
but was suggested in a secret letter from the commissioner for 
the commitment of labor as a forced measure, in case other 
measures should fail. This hard punishment was accepted by 
the population with satisfaction, previous to the measures, be- 
cause both families ridiculed all the other duty anxious families, 
which sent their children partly voluntarily to the labor com- 
mitment. 

The year 1943 brought about a new regulation concerning the 
commitment of labor, by way of regular yearly conscription. 
Previous to the coming of the conscription, I trained the staff for 
this task. I had the collecting camp in the territory of Wassilkow 
fixed to the best of possibilities with clean, light bedrooms, clean 
sanitary installations, good food, and entertainment. First of all, 
everything was done away with, which could have caused the 
Ukrainian to feel that he is being departed by force. A well 
meaning propaganda was put to work on all workers, right after 
their arrival into the camp and didn’t allow a low feeling to arise. 
I had reserved for myself the right of exemption on the basis of 
labor, political, and social reasons ; it was handled as big heartedly 
as the task permitted. Mostly after the start of the first con- 
scription period, the districts of Wassilkow received a local com- 
mander in the person of Count Griese. This officer, who caused 
already great quarrels in the district of Lodwiza and Gadjatsch 
on account of his arrogant behaviour, also created difficulties in 
Wassilkow between the armed forces and the civil administration, 


232 


254-PS 


up to then unknown. First of all he took care of the labor com- 
mitment and not only criticized measures taken by me, but re- 
ceived also at any time every complaining Ukrainian, and promised 
them help against the office of the district commissioner. Up to 
then I didn’t have to take serious measures, because the popula- 
tion was fairly willing. Only a few fugitives had to pay families, 
and until the money came in, I had secured more or less of their 
property according to the security of the case. The punished paid 
their penalties without exception and had their property returned 
to them. But before they got around to do so, one part com- 
plained to the local commander, who didn’t by any chance re- 
proach these people, but on the contrary, took care of all the in- 
terests of those people, in front of me, and sometimes ordered 
me with a commanding voice, to nullify my measures. I didn’t 
let it scare me, but carried out the task, for which I was respon- 
sible, according to my judgment. But the job was unbearably 
hard now, since it became known to the population, that the local 
commander accepts complaints against the district commissioner. 
After the initial successes, a passive resistance of the population 
started, which finally forced me to start again on making ar- 
rests, confiscations, and transfers to labor camps. After a while 
a transport of people, obliged to work, overran the police in the 
railroad'station in Wassilkow and escaped. I saw again the neces- 
sity for strict measures. A few ring leaders, which of course 
escaped before they were found in Plissezkoje and in Mitnitza. 
After repeated attempts to get a hold of them, their houses were 
burned down. Thereupon, military police were sent to the vil- 
lages by the local commander and extensive interrogations con- 
cerning this affair were made by him. Besides that he hired 
young Ukrainians as voluntary helpers, which were fugitives from 
the transient camp. Therefore, every work was made impossible 
for me, in this sector. 

It is not possible for me to give the exact dates of the mentioned 
happenings above, because after I was last committed in the dis- 
trict of Gaissin, I got into a Soviet ambush in March 1944 near 
Stanislau. I could only hide my weapons and had to burn my 
whole baggage including my diary. 

In conclusion, I want to point out the following : 

1. I had the responsibility within the territory of Wassilkow 
for the conscripting of the local workers for the Reich. The 
choice of means, which were used to execute my task, was to be 
left to me. 

2. I worked with the utmost patience and only reverted to 


233 


254-PS 


stricter punishments, when the success accomplished was in no 
comparison to the time used. 

3. Strict measures, like the burning down of houses, were only 
used in a few cases. By this means, it was accomplished — at least 
in 1942 — that the recruiting of workers didn’t tie down too many 
police forces, who because of other functions, couldn’t be used for 
that purpose all the time. 

4. I was entitled to use such measures by the secret labor- 
directive for labor commitment staff in the district of Kiew. 
They, therefor, don’t display by any means, any individual ac- 
tions. 

5. The delivery of 31,000 workers to the Reich is definitely im- 
portant to the war effort. Stern measures are definitely justified 
in order to prevent a failure of this action. 

6. My measures were thought to be just by the biggest part of 
the population. They only caused displeasure with the Germans, 
who had only small tasks to perform in the Ukraine, and therefore 
had too much time for philosophy. 

7. My actions against fugitive people obliged to work [Arbeit- 
seinsatz-pflichtige], were always reported to district commissioner 
Doehrer, in office in WassilkoAV, and to the general-commissioner 
[General kommiss.ar] in Kiew. Both of them know the circum- 
stances and agreed with my measures, because of their success. 

Heil Hitler ! 

Signed: Paul Raab. 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 265-PS 
SECRET 

Shitomir, 30 June 1943 

The Commissioner General 

Oral report on the situation in the general district Shitomir, by 
Commissioner General Leyser, delivered at an official conference, 

with Reichs Minister Rosenberg, in Winniza on 17 June 1943. 

Mr. Reichs Minister 

The employees of the civil administration in the General Dis- 
trict of Shitomir have, aside from their administrative work, 
been charged with the following special tasks: 

Agricultural production and collection 
Recruiting of workers for Germany and management of 
forests and timber. 

The above-mentioned tasks became virtually a problem due to 
the fact that the general district of Shitomir is particularly 


234 


265— PS 


“blessed” with bands. Regarding the agriculture, it should be 
primarily interesting to note that, in the year of 1942, altogether 
289 establishments were declared as agricultural cooperatives. 
In 1943 altogether 501 establishments were, respectively rvill be, 
proclaimed agricultural cooperatives. The allotment of farm- 
land amounted in 1942 to 18%, in 1943, so far, to 10.4% and an 
additional 10% are expected in the fall. 

As a consequenge of the strong activity of bands, only about 
40% of the acreage of the general district remain, at present, for 
the regular production and collection; approximately 60% are un- 
der the control of the bands. These actually supply the popula- 
tion, in part, with seed and have the fields cultivated by their 
order and naturally have the intention to take possession of the 
crop in the fall. 

In consequence of the activity of the bands we have access to 
only 36% of the cattle, 41% of the pigs and 28% of the sheep out 
of the total stock. As we have to supply particularly the front 
with meat, we are therefore forced to a certain waste of our cattle 
stocks. Due to the strong drainage on the substance, there can 
be no more regular breeding. And too, only 42 % of the milk total 
and 51% of the eggs could be salvaged. The spring cultivation 
has been performed thoroughly. It was amazing, nonetheless, 
that in spite of the strong drainage of labor forces into the Reich 
the tilling was executed with a rapidity which could not have been 
taken for granted. To judge by the present condition and the 
weather, an average crop can be expected. However, the secur- 
ing and salvage of the crop gives much reason to worry. It must 
be avoided under all circumstances, that the bands get hold of 
considerable parts of the crop, respectively destroy the farm 
products which have been brought to collecting points. Sufficient 
protection for the various collecting points is not provided, the 
previous experiences do not promise favorable results. 

The leaders of agriculture deserve particular praise for their 
self-sacrificing and dangerous work. In many cases they are only 
able to fulfill their duties by risking their lives daily. They made 
numerous sacrifices in blood, in particular lately. Nonetheless, 
they refuse to be prevented from fulfilling their duty. The pres- 
ent situation is best illuminated by the fact that at this time the 
agricultural leaders can only work at full, or approximately full, 
capacity in 5 out of 18 local areas. In all the other areas, we 
have been forced to withdraw the leaders of the strong points, 
and rally them at the local or district farmers. From there, they 


235 


265-PS 


are in most cases only able to perform their work under strong 
protection of the police or army. 

The symptoms created by the recruiting of workers are, no 
doubt, well known to the Reichs Minister through reports and 
his own observations. Therefore, I shall not report them. It is 
certain that a recruitment of labor, in the sense of the word, can 
hardly be spoken of. In most cases, it is nowadays a matter of 
actual conscription by force. The population has been stirred up 
to a large extent and views the transports to the Reich as a 
measure which does in no way differ from the former exile to 
Siberia, during the Czarist and Bolshevist systems. 

In the foreground stands, at the moment, the mobilization of 
the young classes of 1923 and 1925. To accomplish this, the 
active propaganda on our part was used to an extent previously 
unknown. Therefore, it can be stated that the action had been 
particularly well prepared and consolidated. In spite of that it 
did not lead to the desired success. It has to be added that, in 
the course of the action, the desired contingents had been raised 
by the Chief Plenipotentiary for the mobilization of labor. 1 
could not confine myself therefore to the classes of 1923 and 
1925 alone, but also called up the class of 1922. Beyond that, 
even other sections of the population which originally should 
have been spared had to be included. With this our propaganda 
became for the greater part illusory. But as the Chief Pleni- 
potentiary for the mobilization of labor explained to us the 
gravity of the situation, we had no other device. I consequently 
have authorized the commissioners of the areas to apply the 
severest measures in order to achieve the imposed quota. The 
deterioration of morale in conjunction with this does not neces- 
sitate any further proof. It is nevertheless essential, to win 
the war on this front too! The problem of labor mobilization 
cannot be handled with gloves. 

Up-to-date, almost 170,000 male and female workers have 
been sent to the Reich from the general district Shitomir. It can 
be taken for granted that, during the month of June, this num- 
ber is going to rise to approximately 200,000. 

Management of forests and timber is also one of the principal 
worries. The general district of Shitomir is very rich in woods. 
As an average, the wooded area amounts to 26% of the total 
acreage. In the north, large sections of the country are covered 
100% with woods. But this great abundance in woods is also 
the cause of the many bands. About 1,400,000 hectar of wood, 
that is 80% of the total, are controlled by bands. Like in the 


236 


265-PS 


agricultural sector, only a relatively small part of the wood re- 
mains for use. Our yearly production potential in timber 
amounts to 1,300,000 cubic meter. Presumably 1,000,000 cubic 
meter can be cut. The yearly potential in firewood amounts to 
900,000 cubic meter. We hope to achieve this. I may point out 
that the supply of wood for mines, RR ties, construction and 
heating purposes is especially important. The activity of the 
bands permits us at present to cut, on a larger scale, only in the 
more southern scantily wooded regions. Consequently, the old 
stock of wood there is being consumed rapidly. The final result, 
if no change in the condition occurs, will be the careless cutting 
down of woods, which is going to result in extensive waste land. 
The fact that we are cutting down wood on a larger scale only 
in the south, brought strong impetus to the timber industry in 
the region of Winniza. The time can be foreseen when this 
period of prosperity will end, and the timber industry in the 
south will succumb. Whether then a removal of the timber in- 
dustry into the northern part will be possible depends on the 
circumstances which at present cannot completely be foreseen. 

Regarding the activity of the bands I would like to refer to 
the numerous reports laid before the Reichs Minister. There 
can be said hardly anything else on this subject except that the 
situation is. becoming more unfavorable day by day. The situa- 
tion can be judged best by the fact that at present only one of 
the larger roads in the general district, the one leading from 
Shitomir to Winniza, can be used without convoy. Because the 
activity of the bands is now also growing daily in the south, it 
is not sure that we shall not be obliged to introduce, sooner or 
later, the convoy system here too. All other roads of the coun- 
try are at present passable in convoy only when rifles or machine 
pistols are held ready to shoot. The sacrifices brought to date 
in battle with bandits are very great. In about one year’s time, 
the losses through fighting with them in the general district of 
Shitomir on the German and allied side, including the natives in 
German service, amount up to now to 2,568 persons. The num- 
ber of missing could not be ascertained exactly, because among 
them are also people who have joined the bands voluntarily or 
have been recruited forcibly. Their number amounts to an esti- 
mated 2,000 persons. Experience shows that these missing per- 
sons all die miserably, so the total number of deaths in battle 
w r ith the bands in the course of the year can be given as about 
4,500. Opposing this is the following two demands: (1) Con- 

stant transfer of army units into those areas threatened respec- 


693256 — 16—16 


237 


265 PS 


tively occupied by the bands; (2) Unity of command. The de- 
mand to transfer units of the armed forces into the areas con- 
trolled by the bands, is supported by special instructions of the 
OKW [High Command of the Armed Forces] in order to fight 
the bands. It is regrettable that too frequently the opinion from 
the respective branches of the armed forces is that this demand 
cannot be executed on account of technical reasons concerning 
training. That this objection is always and everywhere true, 
does not seem credible to me. Frequent violations against the 
unity of command have been committed. The need for prestige, 
the quest for power, vanity, etc. have not become extinct as yet. 
I have to say with regret that so far I found the least under- 
standing for the necessity of our common struggle in the armed 
forces. At any rate, I have the impression that under the pres- 
sure of conditions they arrived at the conclusion, that one cannot 
take the responsibility anymore to lead an existence alone, but 
that the collection of all forces alone could only bring us victory. 

The struggle which has to be carried on, is hard and full of 
sacrifices. But it will and must be carried through. Vast 
psychic forces have been awakened in the members of the civil 
administration anew daily. The successes, which they were able 
to achieve so far are impressive particularly with regard to the 
resistance. May I therefore be permitted at the conclusion of 
this report to thank all my co-workers for their excellent work. 
They know that they are practically on the front. I can promise 
your excellency, that we all shall do our duty now, and in the 
future, as our Fuehrer has ordered — . 

Signed : LEYSER 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 285-PS 

The Reichs Commissar for the Sudetenland 
Stamped : Rosenberg Chancellory 

In Nr 4459 3 Nov 38 Shown to RL 3/11 

Reichenberg 31 Oct 1938 

Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg 

Berlin W 35 Margaretenstrasse 17 
[Handwritten note] : Copy to Himmler 

Dear party member Rosenberg! 

L nfortunately it was not possible for me to thank you for your 
friendly letter of the 15th of this month, because your news was 
forwarded to Asch. The technical transportation difficulties 
under which we had to suffer in the first days of the liberation 
of the Sudetenland have caused the late deliveries. 


238 


285 — PS 


I thank you very much for your invitation to visit you in 
Berlin at the next occasion. Thanking you, I accept your invita- 
tion. The important tasks before the elections and the super- 
vision of the reconstruction work keep me very busy. As soon 
as possible I will give you the date of my arrival in Berlin. 

For securing the Marxist, Jewish and confessional literature 
for your educational and instructional work, my coworker Dr. 
Suchy is instructed. He will report to your competent deputy. 

Heil 'Hitler! 

Signed: KONRAD HENLEIN 
TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 286 -PS 

15 October 1938 

4149/R 

lb 

To Konrad Henlein Commissioner [Reichskommissar] for the 

Sudeten-German territory, 

Asch, Egerland. 

Dear Party Comrade Henlein, 

Since the incorporation of Sudeten Germany into the Greater 
German Reich has finally been executed, I would like to heartily 
congratulate you on this success in your work. 

It is my wish that, in my capacity as Deputy of the Fuehrer for 
the supervision of the entire education and schooling of the 
NSDAP, both mentally and ideologically, I shall be able to estab- 
lish contact between your department and mine as soon as pos- 
sible. I assume that you will be in Berlin in the not too distant 
future and would appreciate your information about the date of 
your visit in order to ask you for the pleasure to be my guest; 
then we could discuss personally some elementary questions. 

However, the following matter has to be taken care of pri- 
marily : 

It can be assumed that, as a consequence of the retrocession, a 
larger amount of marxist, Jewish and also of religious literature 
is due to be confiscated. Such material offers invaluable resources 
to the library and the scientific research work of the “Hohe 
Schule” which is in the process of coming into being. Therefore, 
I am interested particularly in the decisive participation of my 
department in the screening of material, with the purpose to take 
over the material particularly of use to my work. 

I ask of you to appoint one of your coworkers with whom my 


239 


286 — PS 


representative can get in touch immediately about this particular 
question. 

Heil Hitler. 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 290-PS 


II Pers. c — Journal No. 322 
To Leadership Staff Politics 
Unter den Linden 63 

Berlin 12 Nov 1943 
Secret 

[pencilled note illegible] 
SECRET 

Chief of Leadership staff politics 
Journal No. P1755/43 g Rel. 15. II 1943 

Inclosure 

Subject: Encroachment by District Commissioner Government 
Councillor Fritz Mueller in connection with the national 
campaign for the utilization of labor. 

Reference: Your letter of 22 July 1943 — I 1006/43 g. 

In connection with my letter of 27 Sep. 1943 — n Pers, Journal 
No. 322 — I am sending you enclosed a copy of the teletype of RKU 
of 29 Oct. 1943 — I 7252 Journal No. 637/43 geh, for your infor- 
mation. 

According to the explanations of RKU, the conduct of govern- 
ment Councillor Mueller is no cause for disciplinary action against 
him, I therefore consider the case as closed. 

Your files are herewith returned. 

By order 

1. RKU wants to transfer district Commissioner Mueller for rea- 
sons which he will bring later. 

Await report. 

Signed: Jonnes 

[Rubber stamp] 

Ministry for occupied eastern territories 

2. Suspend until 10 Jan. ' 

Official Kreis Employees 


240 


Copy 

SECRET 


290-PS 


RKU Rowno 13-929 29 Oct. 1943— 1700- 

Ministry of Eastern affairs Berlin 

Subject: Alleged encroachment of district commissioner govern- 
ment councillor Mueller in Kremiancz in connection with 
the national campaign for the utilization of labor. 

Reference: Decree of 27 Sep 1943 — II Pers. c Journal No. 322 — 

For various reasons which I will report later, it is contemplated 
to replace government councillor Mueller as district commissioner 
in Kromianez in the n6ar future. 

The case on hand is by no means fit to be used for official ac- 
tions against District Commissioner Mueller. First of all, in my 
opinion Mueller is not to be considered guilty in this case. It 
cannot be established, either by the letter from the village Bilo- 
serka, which letter caused this investigation, nor by the conduct 
of district commissioner Mueller, himself, that he was present at 
the happenings in Biloserka. He therefore cannot be held per- 
sonally responsible. But even if Mueller had been present at the 
burning of houses in connection with the national conscription in 
Biloserka, this should by no means lend to the relief of Mueller 
from office. It is mentioned specifically in a directive of the 
Commissioner General in Lusk of 21 Sep 1942, referring to the 
extreme urgency of the national conscription. 

“Estates of those who refuse to work are to be burned, their 
relatives are to be arrested as hostages and to be brought to forced 
labor camps.” It is obvious that this decree was merely directive 
in nature and was not a binding order of the individual commis- 
sioner to decide according to his own discretion, when the interest 
of the conscription, such severe measures were to be applied. 

I request therefore to consider the case closed. 

Reich Commissioner Rowno I 7252 Journal No. 637/43 geh. 

My order signed: Paltzo 

to P i 755/439 [in pencil] 


241 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 294-PS 

Copy 

TOP SECRET 

Handwritten : 

II 1 1161/44/ g 

Memorandum 

In the East, Germany is carrying on a threefold war: a war 
for the destruction of Bolshevism, a war for the destruction of 
the greater Russian Empire, and finally a war for the acquisition 
of colonial territory for colonizing purposes and economic ex- 
ploitation. 

This threefold mission of the Eastern campaign has brought 
about the enormous resistance of the Eastern peoples. Were the 
war being conducted only for the smashing of Bolshevism, then 
it would have been decided long ago in our favor, for, as all ex- 
periences of this war have confirmed, Bolshevism is hated to 
the utmost by the Eastern peoples, above all by the great mass 
of peasants. Also the dissolution of the greater Russian Empire 
into its national components would not have provoked the re- 
sistance which we meet now. As the numerous prisoner interro- 
gations and other experiences show the shrewd Russians have 
a complete understanding that this war wdll end in territorial 
losses for them 'and the non-Russian peoples will break out from 
the confinement within which Russia has forced them. The re- 
duction of the power of resistance of the Red Army is the major 
portion of the third goal of our campaign. With the inherent 
instinct of the Eastern peoples the primitive man soon found 
out also that for Germany the slogan: “Liberation from Bol- 
shevism” w r as only a pretext to enslave the Eastern peoples ac- 
cording to her own methods. In order that there exist no doubt 
at all on the German war aim, however, German publicity refers 
openly to this intention in increasing measure. The conquered 
territory is claimed publicly not only for Germany as a coloniza- 
tion area, but even for Germany’s embittered enemies, the Dutch, 
Norwegians, and others. The economic exploitation is pro- 
claimed verbally and in print, and carried out with almost elimi- 
nation of the demands of the indigenous population, even with 
the greatest lack of consideration. 

T he populace has more, of an understanding of the measures 
and duties necessitated by war than the conquered peoples of the 
West. But the laborer and peasant, who were educated to the 
highest degree of self-consciousness by Bolshevism, soon per- 
ceived that Germany did not regard them as partners of equal 
rights, but considered them only as the objective of her political 


242 


294-PS 


and economic aims. That disillusioned them unspeakably, all the 
more since they had placed colossal hopes on Germany. 

The main department for politics of the Reich Ministry for 
the Occupied Eastern territories claims that it has been quite 
aware of this situation from the beginning. It was soon ap- 
parent that the war could not be decided in a short time by arms 
alone, because of the vast areas and the enemy’s inexhaustible 
reserves of manpower and material, but that as in all great wars 
of recent times a spiritual disintegration would have to come 
and the war would have to be changed at the final conclusion to 
a civil war, all the more since the German Wehrmacht does not 
intend to occupy completely the territory of the Soviet Union. 
The Russian collapse of 1917 and the German breakdown of 
1918 were actually not brought about by weapons alone, but 
primarily by political disintegration. What Lenin achieved in 
Russia, the 14 points of Wilson and the undermining effect of 
Marxism accomplished in Germany. In the Soviet Union we 
found on our arrival a population weary of Bolshevism, which 
waited longingly for new slogans, holding out the prospect of a 
better future to them. It was Germany’s duty to find such 
slogans, but they remained unuttered. The population greeted 
us with joy as liberators, and placed themselves at our disposal 
willingly and freely with body and life. Wherever Ukrainians, 
Russians, White Ruthenians and members of the Baltic peoples 
were enlisted in the German Wehrmacht or in the police they 
have proved themselves and fought excellently almost without 
exception. The Main Department for Politics tried every means 
of keeping this vast capital that had fallen into our lap, and of 
utilizing it for our purposes. To this purpose it was neces- 
sary that National Socialism separate itself from Bolshevism 
with a sharp line of distinction and open to the populace pros- 
pects of a new better life. All measures which the Main Depart- 
ment for Politics suggested were directed toward this one goal 
of preserving this capital. They have been many times attacked 
as the expression of a weak sentimental humanitarian attitude, 
of a form of German sentimentalism, and they were in reality 
only the expression of completely coarse material politics. For 
nothing else was contemplated than to preserve the mass millions 
of the Eastern area in the adjustment to us which was en- 
countered with, in order to draw from it the greatest possible 
use for Germany both militaristically, politically and econom- 
ically. Should this political policy succeed, the greatest reac- 
tions on the enemy troops were to be expected. For years the 
masses of the S. U. (Soviet Union) were stirred up against the 


243 


294-PS 


surrounding world by the most efficient propaganda machine that 
has ever existed. Until 1939 National Socialism had been the 
target of the most spiteful attacks. Day after day it was ham- 
mered into the laborers and peasants that the active masses in 
Germany were a sacrifice to the most terrible exploitation. With 
extreme tension workers and peasants looked forward to the 
German administration. To be sure they had not completely 
trusted the Bolshevist propaganda, but in spite of that they met 
the new masters with a certain feeling of doubt. 

As we all know, the peoples of the S. U. (Soviet Union) have 
gone through the hardest times. Consequently, they are of a 
simplicity inconceivable to us, even in the political sphere. A 
form of government which was not intent only on plundering 
and exploitation and which put aside the Bolshevist methods 
would have kindled the greatest enthusiasm and put at our dis- 
posal a mass of millions. And the enthusiasm in the occupied 
Eastern territories would have had its reaction on the force of 
resistance of the Red Army. It would have been easily attain- 
able to have the Red Army man say to himself : “I fight for a 
system that is throughout worse than that which awaits me in 
the case of a defeat. I will be better off in every respect among 
the Germans than I have been until now”. If the Red Army 
man had become convinced of his general well-being, the war 
would have been at an end very soon. 

Knowing this the Main Department for Politics believed it to 
be its primary duty to assist our combat troops with all their 
power by a propaganda campaign aimed at crippling the power 
of resistance of the Red Army and to shorten the war in this 
way. For the attainment of this goal there are, among the 
measures proposed, two of the utmost importance : The Agrarian 
Law and Religious Freedom, which is essentially distinct from 
that of the Bolshevists. 

Considering the exceptionally great significance which ap- 
proaches the agrarian question in the Soviet Union, the Main 
Department for Politics was demanding even before the begin- 
ning of the Eastern campaign, that the Kolchos be dissolved and 
an individual agrarian economy be introduced again. This pro- 
posal was turned down by the Four Year Plan with the remark 
that organic changes were not to be considered during the war. 
Not until August of 1st year was an increase of the farmland 
successfully put through. 

Before the realization could be carried out, however, the Four 
Year Plan had recognized that the impetuous pressure of the 
whole peasant population for the dissolution of the collective 


244 


294-PS 


would have to be reckoned with in some way in the interest of 
production itself. The proposal of the Main Department for 
Politics for the dissolution of the collective found its defeat in 
the new agrarian decree. A few months had been sufficient to 
make clear, not only to all Wehrmacht units down to the youngest 
lieutenant in the line farthest forward, but also to the units in 
the home country and the civil administration in the occupied 
Eastern territories, the need of reform in the Kolchos constitu- 
tion. The only exceptions in this knowledge were the two Reich 
Commissars, whose disagreement unfortunately caused a delay 
of several weeks. The new Agrarian Decree came out shortly 
before the spring planting and was greatly played up in the 
territories by the Press and Propaganda Dept, of Main Depart- 
ment I. Its direct success was a hitherto inconceivable, piece of 
work of the populace in the spring planting, which was able to 
be carried out in spite of unfavorable preliminary' conditions. 
In spite of this no lasting effect on the enemy has appeared so far. 
Naturally, the enemy propaganda countered our Agrarian Decree 
with every means. Their main argument was that in this it was 
only a matter of a promise which had as its purpose a momentary 
tactical success, that moreover Germany intended to make use 
of the land later for her own purposes. This argument found 
support in the very slow execution of the Agrarian Decree, which 
is to be attributed in part to objective reasons (lack of survey- 
ors, land registration, surveying instruments and so forth) . 

It has been foreseen that in 1942 in the Ukraine 20% of the 
general economy was to be changed to agriculture cooperatives. 
The increasing of the farmland, which forms the main criterion 
of the general economy and is carried through everywhere im- 
mediately, has still not been achieved to the extent of 10% of 
the general economy, although it was decreed, as has been men- 
tioned, in August 1941. The transformation to agricultural co- 
operatives has generally begun only a short time ago, and ac- 
cording to the directives of the farmer’s leader Koerner is not 
to reach more than 10% by the end of August of this year. In 
this state of affairs it is understandable that great sections of 
the Ukrainian peasantry are under the control of enemy propa- 
ganda and have lost belief in the earnestness of our intentions. 

The religious freedom was likewise to call forth a great propa- 
ganda effect. After monthslong negotiations, it was eventually 
decided not to announce the freedom of religion ceremoniously, 
but to let it come into existence as quietly as possible. The 
propaganda effect consequently slipped from the picture. 

When the Main Department for Politics noticed the hesita- 


245 


294 PS 


tion of decision in the church question, it searched for a substi- 
tute in another means of propaganda, in the question of return- 
ing property rights of the individual. In this the whole world 
could be clearly shown that National Socialism contrasts dis- 
tinctly with the Bolshevist expropriation measures and a n6w 
property law would be ushered in. The first display of this 
slogan for propaganda use would have been the immediate rais- 
ing of the expropriation measures in the Baltic states, which 
Bolshevism had not yet controlled for a year, and consequently 
it would have been possible to resume the former property situa- 
tion without further ado. To the unbounded astonishment of 
the populace, however, the German administration marched for- 
ward to play the role of receiver of the goods stolen by the 
Bolshevists. The necessity for the restoration of private owner- 
ship for the psychological treatment of the populace was referred 
to by all the General Commissioners in the Baltic states; this 
population, as everybody knows, ought to be won for German 
patriotism. Even after the Four Year Plan gave up its old 
ideas in recognition that a further protraction of the restoration 
of private ownership would damage even the German economic 
interests. The fundamental profession of the reinstallation of 
the pre-Bolsheyist property law did not follow, though it was 
against every political judgment and based only on the unfounded 
opposition of the Reichs Commissar. 

Again a real weapon for the disintegration of the enemy front 
had been twisted out of our hand, a weapon whose effect may not 
be undervalued. For the unrecompensed expropriation of private 
property- by the Bolshevists had aroused at the time not only 
the terror of Russian bourgeois circles including the more pros- 
perous peasants, but also of the entire civilized world. The 
world, including the laborers and peasants in the Soviet Union 
who were disillusioned by Bolshevism, awaited now a clear policy 
in this question on the part of Germany. This silence on the 
part of Germany obviously made itself of use to the enemy 
propaganda, which could reliably persuade the Soviet masses that 
Germany plans no restoration of individual ownership. 

The Main Department for Politics furthermore has always 
emphasized that the Eastern peoples must be told something 
concrete about their future. The Department refers to the fact 
that in case we should not oppose the propaganda of Stalin, the 
peoples would have to succumb to this propaganda, that is to 
say, they would believe in their own enslavement by Germany. 
The Main Department for Politics has accordingly often directed 


248 


294-PS 


the attention of Wehrmacht units to the expediency of having 
the Slavic Eastern peoples receive calming assurances regarding 
their future from the authoritative German quarters. As the 
best means, the establishment of a sort of counter-regime to 
Stalin with a captured Red general was indicated ; or, if the word 
government should be avoided, then just a rebellious general 
somewhat after the model of de Gaulle, who should become the 
point of crystallization for all the Red soldiers who are dissatis- 
fied with Stalin. The correctness of this conception has been 
confirmed in the time following its inception by countless state- 
ments of prisoners of war, who have all stated independently 
that the silence of Germany regarding the future of Russia 
allows the worst to be feared. Many would like to desert, but 
they did not know to whom they should go. Under the banner 
of a recognized counter-revolutionary leader they would gladly 
and bravely fight against the Bolshevist regime. 

All the suggestions concerning this were rejected in their es- 
sentials. Permission for front-line duty was effected only for 
groups of Turkish and Caucasian peoples and finally after sev- 
eral refusals also for the Estonians. Because of the difficulty of 
recruiting troops, the unit generally came to the point of impress- 
ing civilians and prisoners of war into their ranks, in the first 
line of rear-echelon services. But even in the foremost line they 
found employment and fought well. Only in the last few weeks 
under the pressure of danger from the partisans was the forma- 
tion of native units allowed and that only for combat with the 
bandits. But even this measure will remain ineffective as far 
as propaganda is concerned if a combat unit is not activated and 
a personality with a resounding name is not put at its head. 

The Main Department for Politics was compelled, for the sake 
of attaining the above-outlined goal, to rescind or at least greatly 
change measures from German quarters which would strengthen 
the enemy’s power of resistance. 

Of primary importance, the treatment of prisoners of war 
should be named. It is no longer a secret from friend or foe 
that hundreds of thousands of them literally have died of hunger 
or cold in our camps. Allegedly there were not enough food 
supplies on hand for them. It is especially peculiar that the 
food supplies are deficient only for prisoners of war from the 
Soviet Unions, while complaints about the treatment of other 
prisoners of war, Polish, Serbian, French and English, have not 
become loud. It is obvious that nothing is so suitable for 
strengthening the power of resistance of the Red Army as the 


247 


294-PS 


knowledge that in German captivity a slow miserable death is to 
be met. To be sure the Main Department for Politics has suc- 
ceeded here by unceasing efforts in bringing about a material 
improvement of the fate of the prisoners of war. However this 
improvement is not to be ascribed to political acumen, but to the 
sudden realization thaf our labor market must be supplied with 
laborers at once. We now experienced the grotesque picture of 
having to recruit millions of laborers from the occupied Eastern 
territories, after prisoners of war have died of hunger like flies, 
in order to fill the gaps that have formed within Germany. Now 
the food question no longer existed. In the prevailing limitless 
abuse of the Slavic humanity, “recruiting” methods were used 
which probably have their origin only in the blackest periods 
of the slave trade. A regular manhunt was inaugurated. With- 
out consideration of health or age the people were shipped to 
Germany, where it turned out immediately that far more than 

100.000 had to be sent back because of serious illnesses and other 
incapabilities for work. This system in no way considered that 
these methods would of necessity have their effect on the power 
of resistance of the Red Army, since these methods were used 
only in the Soviet Union of course, and in no way remotely re- 
sembling this form in enemy countries like Holland or Norway. 
Actually we have made it quite easy for Soviet propaganda to 
augment the hate for Germany and the National Socialist sys- 
tem. The Soviet soldier fights more and more bravely in spite 
of the efforts of our politicians to find another name for this 
bravery. Valuable German blood must flow more and more, in 
order to break the resistance of the Red Army. Obviously the 
Main Department for Politics has struggled unceasingly to place 
the methods of acquiring workers and their treatment within 
Germany on a rational foundation. Originally it was thought in 
all earnestness to demand the utmost efforts at a minimum cost 
of the biological knowledge has led to an improvement. Now t 

400.000 female household workers from the Ukraine are to come 
to Germany, and already the German press announces publicly 
that these people have no right to free time and may not visit 
theaters, movies, restaurants, etc. and may leave the house at 
the most three hours a week apart from exception concerning 
duty. 

In addition there is the treatment of the Ukrainians in the 
Reichs Commissariat itself. With a presumption unequalled we 
put aside all political knowledge and to the glad surprise of all 
the colored world treat the peoples of the occupied Eastern ter- 


248 


294-PS 


ritories as whites of Class 2, who apparently have only the task 
of serving as slaves for Germany and Europe. Only the most 
limited education is suitable for them, no solicitude can be given 
them. Their sustenance interests us only insofar as they are 
still capable of labor, and in every respect they are given to 
understand that we regard them as of the most minute value. 

In these circumstances the following can be determined: 

1. The resistance power of the Red Army and the strength 
of the partisan movement has mounted in the same degree as 
the population realized our true enlistment for them. The feats 
of arms of our noble army have been neutralized exactly as in 
1918 by an inadequate political policy. Our political policy has 
forced both Bolshevists and Russian nationals into a common 
front against us. The Russian fights today with exceptional 
bravery and self-sacrifice for nothing more or less than recogni- 
tion of his human dignity. 

2. Our political policy of utilizing the Ukraine as a counter- 
weight against mighty Russia, against Poland and the Balkans, 
and as a bridge to the Caucasus, has suffered complete ship- 
wreck. The 40 million Ukrainians who joyfully greeted us as 
liberators, are today indifferent to us and already begin to swing 
into the enemy camp. Should we not succeed in checking this 
situation in the last moment, then we run the danger from day 
to day of having a partisan movement in the Ukraine, which not 
only eliminates the Ukraine as a furnisher of food, but also ties 
up the reinforcements of the German army, endangers its exist- 
ence and accordingly involves the danger of a German defeat. 

If this danger which threatens the German people is to be pre- 
vented in the last moment, then the following is necessary. 

1. For the Ukraine an absolutely positive political policy must 
be carried out in every respect. The Ukraine must not be merely 
an objective of exploitation to us, but the populace must sincerely 
feel that Germany is its friend and liberator. The German eco- 
nomic agencies must be responsible for assuring the populace a 
minimum on which they can exist. A compulsory conscription of 
labor in the occupied Eastern territories must be restrained im- 
mediately. The treatment of Ukrainians and other Eastern 
peoples within the Reich must be fair and human. In publicity, 
both oral and written, everything must be avoided that is in any 
way cognizant of the fact that we regard this territory as an ob- 
jective of exploitation. The Russian people must be told some- 
thing concrete about their future, particularly because Germany 


249 


294-PS 


does not have the intention nor the power to occupy the whole 
Russian area. 

2. The policy of the officials of the Reichs Commissar for the 
Ukraine is in general the exponent for the above described policy, 
which has not recognized the role of the Ukraine in world politics, 
and has succeeded in throwing away the friendship of 40 million 
people ; and which is guilty in this way of strengthening the power 
of resistance of the Red Army and prolonging the war with all its 
consequences. These officials see their only mission as the eco- 
nomic exploitation of the country. The longer the war lasts, how- 
ever, the more political forces must be interposed. Therefore it 
would be opportune to place at the head of the Reich Commissariat 
a personality who also possesses sufficient political ability. 

If we do not accomplish this change of course at once, then one 
can say with certainty that the power of resistance of the Red 
Army and of the whole Russian people will mount still more, and 
Germany must continue to sacrifice her best blood. Yes, it must 
be openly stated that the possibility of a German defeat ap- 
proaches in a tangible proximity, all the more so if the partisan 
movement for which Stalin is striving with every means, should 
spread over a greater part of the Ukraine. One should protest 
that in the South Ukraine such a danger does not exist because of 
the lack of swamps and forests. The bandit leader Machino needs 
to be remembered, he who for about 2 years terrorized the Ukraine 
and knew how to avoid all persecutions. One should also not place 
his hopes on the economic collapse of the Soviet Union. Certainly 
the losses in fertile land, raw materials and industrial projects are 
very significant. On the other hand the Soviet Union still has 
the Ural territory, fabulously rich in raw materials of all kinds, 
which for fourteen years has been industrially developed with all 
power, as well as rich Siberia. Finally we know that the Soviets 
have systematically carried on an economic policy of hoarding re- 
serves, and we cannot completely tie up the English-American 
reserves. 

However, if we accomplish the proposed change in policy, then 
it can be believed certain that the decomposition of the Red Army 
will also succeed. For the power of resistance of the Red Army 
man is broken the moment that he becomes convinced that Ger- 
many brings him a better life than he has led under the Soviets, 
and that Germany has a small bit of consideration for his national 
qualities, in other words does not intend to rob him of his soul. 

1 he problem is too serious to be allowed to remain undecided. 
Here it is a question of the future of the German race, under cir- 


250 


294-PS 


cumstances concerning even its existence or non-existence. The 
permanent thesis of the Main Department for Politics has proved 
itself true, that a quick victory cannot be attained entirely by the 
aid of arms, but only in conjunction with the application of a 
great political offensive. That the administration of the occupied 
Eastern territories is composed almost entirely of personnel not 
acquainted with Russia is probably one of the reasons why this 
thesis has not been carried out. The gentlemen slowly grope their 
way into the problem, for which the majority still require inter- 
preters. Nevertheless it is today already confirmed that wide 
circles of the lower administrative chiefs in the Ukraine are 
plainly frightened of the policy commanded by the higher echelon. 
However, they are not in a position to have their way. So much 
the more reason one should trust the interpretation of the Main 
Department for Politics based on the best technical and social 
knowledge; the Department is even today convinced of a speedy 
victorious conclusion of the war, insofar as its political directives 
are followed. 

Berlin, 25 October 1942 
Signed: BRAEUTIGAM 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 315-PS 

Copy 

Berlin W 8, Wilhelmstr. 72, 12 March 1943 
Reich Ministry for Food and Agriculture 
Current No. . . IV/la - 907 

Note 

on a meeting held in the Reich Ministry for Public Enlightenment 
and Propaganda on 10 March 1943 

Presiding: State Secretary Gutterer 

For the participating agencies see invitation list of 5 March, 
among others 

Oberregierungsrat Hucho (GBA) 

Reich Council for Agriculture Dr. Hatesaul 
Referent Schwarz RNSI 

Oberregierungsrat Dr. Brendler {Ministry for Food) 

Subject: Directives for treatment of foreign workers employed 
in the Reich. 

In his introductory remarks, State Secretary Gutterer said that 
at the suggestion of Reich Minister Dr. Goebbels the Fuehrer has 
decided that out of political considerations a uniform treatment 


251 


315-PS 


of the problems concerning foreigners will have to be secured 
immediately in all agencies and a corresponding education of the 
German people will have to be instituted. 

The consolidation of the new Europe and the increased anti- 
communist trend which have been played up by the foreign propa- 
ganda office demand that in the treatment of foreign workers in 
the Reich immediately every material which would be an incen- 
tive. for a hostile attitude on the part of the foreign workers 
should be eliminated. This is particularly necessary in the treat- 
ment of the workers from the East. In this instance the hitherto 
prevailing treatment of the Eastern workers has led not only 
to a diminished production, but has most disadvantageously in- 
fluenced the political orientation of the people in the conquered 
Eastern territories and has resulted in the well-known difficulties 
for our troops. In order to facilitate military operations the 
morale has to be improved by a better treatment of the Eastern 
workers in the Reich. 

In a decree issued 15 February to all district leaders [Gau- 
leiter] and Reich directors [Reichsleiter] , Reich Ministry Dr. 
Goebbels has given corresponding directives to party agencies. 
In order to instruct all other agencies, managers and trade union 
members who gre concerned with Arbeitseinsatz, the Reich Min- 
ister for Enlightenment and Propaganda has planned directives ; 
these directives, issued in a draft (see enclosure), served as a 
working basis for discussion. 

In general the following is to be said about these directives : 

The treatment of foreigners which until now was markedly 
different for subjects of Western and Eastern countries will be 
put on a uniform basis as much as possible, particularly the living 
standards of the Eastern workers will be raised. The change in- 
troduced herewith in the treatment of the foreigners will mainly 
affect the hitherto prevailing Security Police measures of the 
Reichsfuehrer SS and of the Main Security Office. The measures 
introduced by the management will be less influenced. In general, 
the decrees which have been issued by the GBA already and which, 
among others, are dealt with in the note for the managers will be 
less affected. However, an increased repudiation of mistreatment 
and beatings will come into effect. Accordingly, a more severe 
punishment is planned for those supervisors and under officials 
who commit such offenses. During the meeting considerable 
doubts were voiced by the representatives of the Main Security 
Office of the Reich and of the Party Chancellery. The former ex- 
pounded the necessity for the strict security police measures for 


252 


315-PS 


the protection of the German population and for the security of 
the Reich. The representative of the party chancellery par- 
ticularly pointed out the controversies which already are appear- 
ing and which would result for the German population if more 
freedom were granted to the foreigners. 

The Reich Food Ministry is particularly interested in the fol- 
lowing points of the directives: 

Under Point 5 it is declared that it is desired to accommodate 
the various nationalities separately in factories and camps. It 
was pointed out by representatives of the GBA and Reichsnaehr- 
stand that in the future this cannot be carried out fully in agri- 
culture too, because of reasons of the Arbeitseinsatz. However, 
with the warning that this measure is to be “striven for” in the 
future, permission has been given to avoid changes in personnel 
beyond those hitherto exercised and that this principle will be 
considered by the GBA in cases of new draftees, just as it was 
done before. 

Point 7: In principle, the foreign workers should receive the 
same food rations. To this, the undersigned remarks that the 
rations are varied according to nationalities (Eastern workers, 
Poles, other foreigners) in order to account for the home cus- 
toms. Also the rations are varied according to the types of work 
performed (camp rations, agricultural workers who provide 
their own food and special rations for individual employees of 
the factory) . The rations of the foreign agricultural migrant 
labor differ insofar that on the basis of state contracts various 
allowances in kind are given to them for a part of their pay. A 
uniformity is being striven for. For the above mentioned 
reasons, however, a complete uniformity on the basis of the Ger- 
man allowances is impossible. The validity of these arguments 
was recognized and the passage was deleted. Instead, clauses 
were added to the effect that “full rations, as laid down in the 
regulations, should be distributed” and that “the rations for 
those performing heavy and extremely heavy work should be 
handed out only if the production is accordingly great”. Against 
these additional clauses no opposition was voiced, final decision 
however was withheld. 

Point 8: The demanded new basis for wages of the Eastern 
workers has been discussed already by the departments. A cor- 
responding draft of the GBA, equalizing the wages of Eastern 
and Polish workers, will reach the departments in the near 
future. This new regulation would fulfill an old wish of the 
Reich Food Ministry to equalize the wages of the Polish and 

693256 - 46—17 


253 


315-PS 


Eastern workers in order to increase production and simplify 
the pay procedure. 

Point 9: Sick and pregnant female workers will not be re- 
turned anymore since they usually spread negative propaganda 
in their country. Erection of dispensaries will meet with less 
difficulty in the industry than in agriculture. However, they will 
be required in agriculture too in order to free the farms from 
the care of foreign workers. For the same reason, collective 
accommodations are necessary for foreign children who were 
born in the Reich. Appropriate negotiations are now in progress 
in the GBA. 

On page 7 of the draft, all the above directives for all organi- 
zations, agencies and individuals are declared as binding; the 
agencies will be held responsible for the execution of these di- 
rectives in an orderly fashion. The latter seems to be an ex- 
tremely far-reaching demand, since the execution of a great part 
of these directives does not depend on the wish of the agencies 
but on the limited possibilities during the 4th year of the war, 
such as providing adequate clothing, erection of barracks for the 
sick and for the foreign children born in the Reich. 

Also the suggested stricter punishment of infringements 
against these directives seems to be objectionable. The arrogant 
and recalcitrant attitude of some of the foreigners frequently 
forces the managers and their representatives to use sharp 
measures in order to keep up the production of the foreign work- 
ers. Insofar as certain abuses will emerge in this process and 
these are punished not only as unpolitical criminal actions but 
as acts of sabotage and in some cases as high treason, the posi- 
tions of the managers and their representatives will be consider- 
ably weakened before the foreigners, and uncertainties will re- 
sult in regard to the treatment of the foreigners. These will 
lead to a marked lack of discipline on the part of the foreigners. 
It would be desirable that the final decision should be against 
this clause. 

State Secretary Gutterer asked for comments on the draft by 
16 March at the latest. The Reich peasant leader [Dr. Hatesaul] 
agreed to deliver to us the comments of the Reichsnaehrstand im- 
mediately. 

Dead line matter, 15 March 1943 ! 

To the Referat II B 2, II B 3, IV 9 in this building 

Herewith I forward above copy of notes on a meeting held 
10 March and a copy of the draft with the request for comment. 


254 


315-PS 


I ask for a prompt reply in view of the deadline set by the Min- 
istry for Enlightenment and Propaganda. 

Referat IV I a 
Signed: DR. BRENDLER 

certified 

Signed: ROTZOW 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 318-PS 

I 

Main Bureau for Science 
Chief of the Main Bureau 
Ha/Sch. 2370 

Berlin, the 5th December 1941 
To Record Office for Cultural Policy 
Attention Party Member Dr. Killer ! 

Inter-office Communication 

Concerns: National Socialist German Association of University 
Lecturers 

Most Honored Party Member Dr. Killer! 

After long negotiations we succeeded in reorganizing and fix- 
ing the relations of the National Socialist German Association of 
University Lecturers to one bureau. All details are in the en- 
closed photostatic copy. 

Heil Hitler ! 

.. " Haertle 

1 Enclosure Entrusted with the leadership 


Principles concerning relations of the National Socialist Ger- 
man Association of University Lecturers to the Fuehrer’s Com- 
missioner for the supervision of the whole intellectual and ideo- 
logical training and education of the NSDAP as well as to the 
Chief of the Seminary [Hohe Schule] . 

1. The Chief of the National Socialist German Association of 
University Lecturers is bound by orders and directives of Reichs- 
leiter Rosenberg in all questions concerning intellectual and 
ideological training, research and education. 

2. The main task of the National Socialist German Associa- 
tion of University Lecturers is to present the university lecturers 
a picture of the history, the formation and the tasks of the Na- 
tional Socialist movement, and to coordinate them in accordance 
with our ideology with the great political aims of the Reich. The 


255 


318-PS 


training has to correspond with the requirements of the body of 
university lecturers. 

3. Insofar as beyond this general education a supplementary 
training, through working communities, university camps, etc. 
is required — these training measures may be carried out with 
the provision that the tasks mentioned in Art. 6 are not en- 
croached upon. 

4. The National Socialist German Association of University 
Lecturers is obliged to submit to the Reichsleiter all plans for 
working communities, conferences, camps, etc., with designation 
of topics and names of the participants, always in time enough 
that the possibility of his changing them in accordance with his 
duty as a leader is assured. His objections and directives result- 
ing from this are binding and authoritative for the National So- 
cialist German Association of University Lecturers. This ap- 
plies accordingly to the work of the Association done abroad also. 

5. Publications will be limited to the above mentioned tasks 
and are to be submitted to the Main Bureau for Science 14 days 
before publication. All publications have to bear a remark that 
the scientific responsibility for the individual contributions lies 
exclusively updn the author, — in order to avoid the impression 
of an official party opinion. Reichsleiter Rosenberg will make 
the decision as to whether the publications of the National So- 
cialist German University Lecturers Association are to be pub- 
lished by the Hoheneichen press. 

6. When Reichsleiter Rosenberg plans for his mission, espe- 
cially for the seminary [Hohe Schule], the collection of profes- 
sional groups in the different fields of science, or the organiza- 
tion of scientific meetings of university lecturers — the organiza- 
tional measures will be carried out by the National Socialist Ger- 
man Association of University Lecturers. 

7. Judgments and opinions of the National Socialist German 
Association of University Lecturers concerning the appoint- 
ments, assignments and transfers of university lecturers are to 
be submitted to the Main Bureau for Science and, at the same 
time, to the party chancery. 

8. The appointment of the educational director of the Na- 
tional Socialist German Association of University Lecturers will 
take place with the approval of Reichsleiter Rosenberg. He will 


256 


318-PS 


be called into the Reich working community as a member for 
the education of the whole NS movement. 

Munich, the 2nd December 1941 

Rosenberg 

Fuehrer’s Commissioner for the supervis- 
ing of the whole intellectual and ideological 
training and education of the NSDAP and 
Chief of the Seminary [Hohe Schule] 
[Signature illegible] 

Chief of the Party Chancellery 

[Signature illegible] 

Chief of the National Socialist German 
Association of University Lecturers. 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 327-PS 


DRMfdbO. 

II 1 c 1183/44g. 

Copies for the Political Main Staff Str. 19/10 
Q 19/x: 20/10 Dr. Wetzelz.k W 21/10 

Pi P 2 

with request for acknowledgment, Dr. Kinkelein n.r. 

Z.d. A. Str. 31/10 
Pencilled Notes 
Berlin, 17 October 1944 

Copy 

SECRET 

To: The Chief of the Party Chancellery Reich Leader Martin 
Bormann 

Berlin W 8 Wilhelmstr. 63/64 

[Stamp] 

Political Main Staff 
Journal No. P1011 a/44g 
Received 18 Oct. 1944 
end. 

Subject: Actions against civilians in rear echelons. 

Your circular No. 309/44 of 9 Oct. 1944. 

Dear Party comrade Bormann: — 

In order to prevent difficulties and delay — which is of course 
not desired by you — in the liquidation of the companies under my 
supervision, I have today dispatched the following telegram to 
the Gau Leaders because of the particular urgency: 

In order not to delay the liquidation of companies under my 
supervision, I beg to point out that the companies concerned are 


257 


327— PS 


not private firms but business enterprises of the Reich so that 
also actions with regard to them just as with regard to govern- 
ment offices are reserved to the highest authorities of the Reich. 
I supervise the following companies: 

(a) Zentralhandelsgesselsehaft Ost fuer landwirtschaft- 
lichen Absatz und Bedarf m.b.H. (ZO). (Central Trad- 
ing Company East for Agricultural Marketing and Re- 
quirements Limited) 

(b) Landbewirtschaftungsgessellschaft Ostlund und 
Ukraine (Agricultural Development Company Eastern 
Territories and Ukraine) 

(c) Beschaffungsgessellschaft Ost m.b.H. 

(Supply Company East Limited) 

( d ) Pharm. — Ost G.m.b.H. 

(Pharmaceutics — East Company Limited) 

The following banks under my supervision are also not private 
firms: 

(e) Zentralnotenbank Ukraine 
(Central Exchange Bank Ukraine) 

(/) Notenbank Ostland 

(Exchange Bank Eastern Territories) 

( g ) Zentralwirtschaftsbank Ukraine 
(Central Commercial Bank Ukraine) 

( h ) Verband der Wirtschaftsbanken in der Ukraine. 
(Association of Commercial Banks in the Ukraine) 

(i) Genteinschaftsbank Ostland und Weissruthenien. 

(Cooperative Bank Eastern Territories and White Ru- 
thenia) 

The liquidation of these companies and banks has been discussed 
with the Reich Plenipotentiary for total war effort and will be 
brought to a close not later than by the end of this year. Assets 
suitable for restitution of the companies have already been ear- 
marked for the armed forces and war economy. Therefore, any 
intervention with regard to stocks and personnel does not only 
impede the liquidation of business which is inevitably necessary 
but also delays the supply of goods to the armed forces and war 
industry. For this reason I beg, to refrain from any intervention. 

The Chief of the Party Chancellory has a copy hereof. 

Enclosed I am sending you a copy of my letter of today to the 
Reich Plenipotentiary for total war effort from which you will 
note that the liquidation of the companies under my supervision 
has been agreed upon with the Reich Plenipotentiary and will be 
concluded at a relatively close date considering the vast operations 
which are indispensable for the liquidation in the interest of an 
orderly war economy. Restored property not yet surrendered has 
already been earmarked for the armed forces and war economy, 
so that any delay of the liquidation or perhaps even independent 
confiscation of the property by the Gau Leaders would impair or 
destroy an organized plan, something that should not be done 


258 


327— PS 


without a compelling reason in the interest of war economy. In 
order to give you an idea of the past and present problems of 
these companies, I am attaching enclosed a corresponding survey. 

I beg you to acknowledge receipt of the telegram to the Gau 
Leaders. 

Finally, I want to point out also that in my mind it is not cor- 
rect to simply order the Gau Leaders under the heading “actions 
against civilians in rear echelons” to press the speeding up of the 
liquidation of offices and establishments which have been brought 
back from the occupied territories. Without doubt cases have 
occurred where such pressure was warranted by all means. On 
the other hand, it has been proven that, for instance, thousands 
of decent men and women as well as firms, who have done their 
duty under the most difficult conditions there, have been brought 
back from the occupied territories and have recognized the need 
of the hour immediately, but can simply not complete their work 
still necessary for the liquidation at present from one day to the 
other. As far as the Eastern territories are concerned, the above 
applies to the majority of the people assigned, so that I am ob- 
liged to regret that you also associate these people with the most 
ill-reputed term of rear-echelon. 

Heil Hitler 

Yours 

Signed: A Rosenberg 


SECRET 

(1). Zentralhandelsgessellschaft Ost fuer landwirtschaftlichen 
Absatz und Bodarf m.b.H. (Z.O.). (Central Trading Company 
East for Agricultural Marketing and Requirements Limited). 

The following has been the mission of the Z.O. as a monopoly 
company for the Eastern Territories: 

(a) Collection of all agricultural products as well as 
commercial marketing and transportation thereof. 
(Delivery to armed forces and the Reich), 

(b) Trusteeship of enterprises dealing with food sup- 
plies, 

(c) Providing enterprises dealing with food supplies 
with special equipment, supplying the agriculture 
with means of production and the rural population 
with commodities (premium goods) . 


259 


327— PS 


The following is the present mission of the Z.O.: 

( aa ) Winding up of transactions relative to commodi- 
ties and finances, particularly utilization of evacu- 
ated goods brought back from the Eastern Terri- 
tories and goods which did not come into use there 
any more, 

( bb ) Collection of goods brought back from the agricul- 
ture and food industry of other occupied territories 
(General Government West), 

(cc) Remaining current business, 

(a) Fulfillment of the original assignments in the 
remainder of the Eastern Territories, 

( b ) Inter -territorial exchange of machines for 
the agriculture as well as for the dairy in- 
dustry and inter-territorial exchange of seeds 
according to directives of the Plenipotentiary 
for the Four Year Plan — business section 
food. 

The actual significance of the Z.O. and the volume of its trans- 
actions can be seen from the following : 

(l) 30' offices with 200 agencies were subordinated to 
each main office for the Eastern Territories, the Cen- 
tral District and the Ukraine. 

(2) 11 subsidiary companies of the food industry with 
130 branches were founded in the Ukraine. 

(3) The Z.O. including its subsidiary companies em- 
ployed at the peak of its business during the summer 
of 1943 about 7,000 German party members of the 
Reich and in addition has set up about 250 German 
firms of the Reich. 

(4) The total turn-over of the Z.O. amounted to about 
5.6 milliard Reichsmark, from its foundation until 
the 31st of March 1944. 

(5) During this period, the Z.O. together with its sub- 


sidiaries has collected : 

Grain 9,200,000 tons 

Meat and meat products 622,000 tons 

Linseed 950,000 tons 

Butter 208,000 tons 

Sugar 400,000 tons 

Fodder 2,500,000 tons 


260 


327— PS 


Potatoes 3,200,000 tons 

Seeds ... 141,000 tons 

Other agricultural products 1,200,000 tons 

Eggs 1,075 million eggs 

The following was required for transportation: 

1,418,000 railroad box cars and 472,000 tons of boat ship- 
ping space. 

(6) A total of 32,900 box cars of evacuated goods has 
been brought back by the Z.O. of which 
22,400 are grain, linseed and other seeds, etc., 

9,000 are agricultural machines, other machines, 
etc., and 

1,500 are goods for supply and consumption. 

While the utilization of the evacuated agricultural products 
has been completed in the main part in spite of all difficulties by 
means of transfer to the Reich Agencies, it has not been possible 
to effect the utilization of the remaining goods (machines, fur- 
niture, supply goods etc.) in the same time and with as little 
friction. The utilization of these goods is being effected with the 
cooperation of the Commissioner for utilization of goods, Dr. 
Kemna, for the Reich Minister of Economy and the Reich Min- 
ister for Armament and War Production. Moreover, part of 
these goods which are composed of thousands of types of different 
goods must first be overhauled and repaired. 

The number of personnel of the Z.O. and its subsidiary com- 
panies has already been reduced from 7,000 to 681 employees, 
exclusive of 50 workers who are still working in the Eastern 
Territories. 

(2). Landbezvirtschaftungsgessellschaft Ukraine. (Agricul- 
tural Development Company, Ukraine) 

The Landbewirtschaftungsgessellschaft Ukraine (LBGU) had 
the following missions (Figures according to status of 1st July 
1943) : 

(c) Supervisory management of almost 31,000 collective 
farms and agricultural cooperatives [former Kol- 
hoze] with 1.7 million farms, of almost 540,000 in- 
dividual farms with an area used for cultivation of 
maximum 38 million hektars (93.9 million acres) — 
24.5 million hectars (60.5 million acres) during 
summer 1943 — , 

(6) Managing trusteeship of 1875 state-owned estates 
with an area used for agriculture of 2.8 million hec- 
tars (6.9 million acres), 


261 


327— PS 


(c) Managing trusteeship of 72 breeding stations with 
an area of 124,000 hectars (306,400 acres), seed 
reproducing areas of 424,000 hectars (1,047,700 
acres), 

Trustee management of 17 offices for distribution of 
seeds of 270 seed distribution points and of 619 seed 
depots with a seed capacity of 192,000 tons. 

( d ) Managing trusteeship of 900 machine and tractor 
stations (MTS) with 49,600 tractors. 

The LBGU maintained 1 central business office, 6 district of- 
fices (with 5 branch offices), 114 regional offices, 431 county of- 
fices, 2,870 base offices and 400 supervisory bodies. 

The LBGU has already completed the liquidation of the fol- 
lowing affairs: 

(1) Management of the general enterprises (see above 
under a), 

(2) Management of the state-owned estates (see abov§ 
under b), 

(3) Sheep-breeders association Ukraine, 

(4) Financial liquidation (balance-sheet of liquidation 
as of 1st July 1944 will be completed on 20th Oct. 
1944). 

At present the LBGU still attends to the following matters: 

( a-a ) Utilization of still remaining 5,400 tons of highly 
valuable, evacuated seeds (a total of 98,000 tons 
have been brought back), most of which will be 
transferred to the Landbau-Gesellschaft m.b.H. 
(Land Development Company Limited) founded 
recently by the Commissioner for the Four Year 
Plan, — termination by the end of this year — , 

(bb) Utilization of the rolling stock, parts of equipment 
and similar matters confiscated by the armed 
forces. 

( cc ) Realization of the MTS evacuation depots and work 
shops. The personnel used in connection with this 
(90 civilians, 34 military personnel) occupied 
mainly with new problems regarding the employ- 
ment of agricultural machines and the repair 
thereof. The transfer of these machines to the 
above mentioned Landbau-Gesellschaft has been 
projected in the near future. 

The number of personnel employed by the LBGU has been re- 
duced from 4,500 German and Dutch workers as of 30 June 1943 
to 410 as of 1st Oct. 1944. 


262 


327-PS 


Of these latter 248 were made available for other important 
war jobs, especially in the general government, by way of orders 
and leaves from present jobs. 28 employees are assigned to 
supervise 50,000 Ukrainian workers in key-positions and skilled 
laborers of the LBGU. Another 90, as mentioned, are em- 
ployed for the problems of utilizing agricultural machines and 
for the repair thereof (see above cc). Consequently, only 44 
persons are employed to wind up the remaining affairs. 

(3). Beschaffungsgesellschaft Ost vi.b.H. (BGO). (Supply 
Company East Limited) 

The BGO has been founded with the purpose to procure ma- 
chines and other investment goods for the economy of the East- 
ern Territories as well as to perform special assignments. 

Today, it has the following assignments: 

(a) Winding-up of concluded business-contracts (50 mill. 
Reichsmark of a total procurement in the value of 
115 mill. Reichsmark), according to which deliveries 
will be made within the next 9 months ; 

(b) Procurement of machine tools and wood-working 
machines by order of the Reich Minister for Arma- 
ment and War production. 

(c) Collection and utilization at economic assets evacu- 
ated from the Eastern Territories and the General 
Government wdiereby the BGO acts as an executive 
company for Dr. Kemna, the Commissioner for the 
utilization of goods for the Reich Minister for Econ- 
omy and the Reich Minister for Armament and War- 
production (see Annex (1) and (2)). 

( d ) Liquidation of the Steine und Erden Ost G.m.b.H. 
(Stone and Soil East Company Limited). 

To (a): According to orders by the Reich Minister for Arma- 

ment and War production the machines which are being deliv- 
ered in agreement with current business contracts are being 
transferred particularly to German industries damaged by bomb- 
ing. The other deliveries are being disposed of in accordance 
with orders of the OKH/Chief H Ruest u.BdH. (Supreme Com- 
mand Army) as well as of the economic administrative agencies 
and of the Planning Commissioners. 

To (b): This procurement is also done for the German in- 

dustry. 

To (c): The execution of these assignments is in full swing, 

and the w r ork connected with it is steadily increasing. So far 
the BGO has collected about 1,000 carloads of evacuated goods. 


263 


327— PS 


One part of these is directed by the B.G.O. to agencies charged 
with their utilization which operate under its management. An- 
other part — particularly machines and investment goods — are 
stored in own depots, repaired, catalogued and catalogue sub- 
mitted to the Office of Armament Supplies as well as to Special 
Agencies [Sonderringe — Committees set up by Speer to organize 
the production of component parts of the armament industry] 
and apportioned according to their directions to the Armament 
Industry. 

The number of personnel employed at present by the BGO is 
118 employees of whom 55 are male employees. 

(4). Pharm-Ost G.m.b.H. (Pharmaceutics — East Company 
Limited). 

The company had the assignment to supply the Eastern Terri- 
tories with medicines and other drugs within the range of human 
and veterinary medicines as well as with all equipment for medi- 
cal and veterinary requirements, hospital requirements, etc. 

Apart from supplying the remainder of the Eastern Terri- 
tories, the company’s main assignment at present is essentially 
to direct the evacuated goods to other consumers, the armed 
forces in particular, its stocks and those goods which are to be 
delivered according to business contracts already concluded, while 
observing the necessary financial liquidation procedure. 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 342-PS 

Reichs Commissioner for the East [Ostland] Sect. II h 
Directions concerning the Treatment of Jewish Property in the 

Reich Commissariat Ostland of 13 October 1941 

Par. 1 

The total, movable and immovable properties of the Jewish 
population in the territories governed by the Reich’s Commis- 
sioner for Easfern areas are placed under confiscation by the 
administration for the commission and the seizure according to 
the following regulations. 

Par. 2 

Property is defined as movable and immovable objects along 
with all accessories, claims, commissions, rights and interests of 
all types. 

Par. 3 

1. The confiscation will be carried out by the Reich’s commis- 
sioner for the East or those officers who have been authorized 
by him. It can be carried out by directives to individual per- 
sons or in general by a proclamation and can be limited to in- 


264 


342-PS 


dividual objects of wealth. 

2. The following shall be excluded from confiscation : 

a. That part of the household furniture which will take care 
of the base essentials of life. 

b. Cash, bank and savings credit, as well as bonds, up to a total 
value of one hundred Reichsmarks. 

Par. 4 

1. With the confiscation the previous owner loses all rights to 
dispose of the confiscated property. 

2. Whoever has confiscated property in possession or custody, 
will administer it until further notice. The changing or dis- 
posal of the property or of its profits will only be allowed inside 
the bounds of orderly management. All other measures taken 
beyond this will need the approval of the Reichs commissioner 
for the East or those agencies authorized by him. 

Par. 5 

1. The property that is placed under confiscation can be 
brought under the administration of the commission, so far as 
it is necessary for orderly management. 

2. The assuming of control by the administrative commission 
will at the same time be looked upon as confiscation. 

3. The Reichs commission for the East will issue directives 
about the arrangement and management of this administration. 

Par. 6 

1. Confiscated property can be called in by the Reichs com- 
missioner for the East or by the agencies authorized by him. 

2. The disposal of the confiscated property will be left to the 
authorized agencies. 

3. These agencies will decide with finality, using adminis- 
trative means, on the debts which belong to the confiscated prop- 
erty. The responsibility will be limited to the sales value of the 
confiscated property. 

Par. 7 

Bids for the purchase of the property which comes under con- 
fiscation can be publicly advertised. 

Par. 8 

The responsible authorities can demand information from 
everyone to carry out their task. 

Par. 9 

1. The following will be punished with a prison sentence and 
monetary fine or one of those punishments. 

a. Those who will undertake to withdraw an object of value 
from the offices of the civil authorities or those installed with 


265 


342— PS 


the authority for disposal, or in any other manner to thwart, to 
evade, or to impair the action of confiscation. 

b. Those who intentionally or carelessly do not fulfill in due 
time or completely one of those directives imposed upon him 
such as an order of execution or other directive of execution, 
and the report and information obligations concerning it. 

2. In severe cases the punishment is penal servitude. If the 
accused is charged with willful disobedience or should it be any 
other especially severe case the death sentence is authorized. 

Par. 10 

The Reichs commissioner for the East will issue the necessary 
measures to carry out those directives. 

Par. 11 

The directive will go into effect on the day of its publication. 

Riga, the 13 October 1941 
The Reichs Commissioner for the East 

Signed: LOHSE 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 343-PS 


Field Marshal Milch 

Berlin, — W 8, Leipzigerstrasse 7, 31 Aug 1942 
Dear Mr. Himmler! 

I thank you very much for your letter of the 25 Aug. I have 
read with great interest the reports of Dr. Rascher and Dr. 
Romberg. I am informed about the current experiments. I 
shall ask the two gentlemen to give a lecture combined with the 
showing of motion pictures to my men in the near future. 

Hoping that it will be possible for me to see you at the oc- 
casion of my next -visit to Headquarters I remain with best re- 
gards and 

Heil Hitler! 

yours 

[signed] E. Milch 

Mr. Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police Himmler 
Berlin 517 11. 


SECRET 

Field Marshal Milch 

Berlin W 8, Leipzigerstrasse 7, 20 May 1942 

Dear Wolffy! 

In reference to your telegram of 12 May our sanitary inspector 
reports to me that the altitude experiments carried out by the SS 
and Air F orce at Dachau have been finished. Any continuation 


266 


/ 


343-PS 


of these experiments seems essentially unreasonable. However 
the carrying out of experiments of some other kind, in regard to 
perils at high seas, would be important. These have been prepared 
in immediate agreement with the proper offices; Major (M.C.) 
Weltz will be charged with the execution and Capt (M.C.) Ras- 
cher will be made available until further orders in addition to his 
duties within the Medical Corps of the Air Corps. A change of 
these measures does not appear necessary, and an enlargement 
of the task is not considered pressing at this time. 

The low-pressure chamber would not be needed for these low- 
temperature experiments. It is urgently needed at another place 
and therefore can no longer remain in Dachau. 

I convey the special thanks from the supreme commander of 
the Air Corps to the SS for their extensive cooperation. 

I remain with best wishes for you in good comradeship and with 

Heil Hitler! 

Always yours 
[Signed] E. Milch 

Mr. SS-Obergruppenfuehrer Wolff 
Berlin 517 11 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 347-PS 


Copy of a Copy 
I Ju 3 D 9 Tgb No 783/449 


18 April 44 [in pencil] 


To the Reich Youth Leader Artur Axmann 
Berlin-Charlottenburg 9 
Kaiserdamm 45/46 


Dear Party Member Axmann : 

My chief of the department youth, Obergebietsfuehrer Lueer 
has proposed to me the plan to let the youth of the Latvian and 
Estonian peoples participate in complete age groups in the mili- 
tary education camps of the Hitler Youth. 

I thank you, party member Axmann, for the generous invitation 
of the Hitler Youth to the Youth organization of the Baltic dis- 
tricts [General Bezirken]. I agree with you in the expectations, 
which we connect with the enlargements of the camps, begun with 
such success in East-Prussia. 

The experience of Germany is best able to liberate the youth 
from thinking about small states and to explain to them the un- 
derstanding for the European obligation. Furthermore, I expect 


267 


347-PS 


especially through the conscription of entire age groups, that the 
military education will make itself felt in the military aspect. Only 
the education of an entire age group has influence on the reserve 
situation. The reserve situation of the Estonian and Latvian 
Legion is marked especially by the lack of noncommissioned of- 
ficers and instructors. If we can eliminate this lack by the uni- 
versal military education of the growing age groups, that will 
mean for the future a considerable inner strengthening of not 
small parts of our Northern front. 

The first General directors as well as state directors in Estonia 
and Latvia in the meantime have been instructed, to create the 
legal basis, which are necessary for the execution of required 
military education. Obergebietsfuehrer Lueer could assure me 
that the inner readiness exists on the part of the youth. Also the 
organization and leaders of the youth will never close their ears 
to this commitment. However, I must draw your attention to the 
doubts, which are in the way of the military education of the 
Latvian and Estonian youth on German soil; I have consciously 
refrained from issuing the necessary orders on my own com- 
petence, but have asked Commissioner General to cause the coun- 
tries own administration to publish the appropriate orders. Be- 
cause of their awn orders, these agencies will also have to issue 
the specific orders for the individual commitments. This is ac- 
cording to our policy, to relieve the German authorities from all 
the more technical and administrative problems, which touch little 
on our leadership and educational mission, and to leave to the 
countries own administration freedom of action. 

However, according to the conferences which have taken place 
so far, it cannot be expected that General Dankers or Dr. Mae will 
order their youth organizations on their own, to conduct the mili- 
tary education not in Latvia or Estonia, but in East-Prussia or in 
Warthegau. This viewpoint is partly caused by the more or less 
expressed fear, to be suspected by reactionary circles to favor a 
so called Germanization. General Dankers and Dr. Mae can also 
point out, that the transfer of the Latvian and Estonian pre- 
military education of the youth contradicts the above-mentioned 
principles, which we customarily observe in the realm of the re- 
maining administration. I . cannot include a camp education, which 
primarily is to alleviate the most dire needs of an inadequate 
recruit training as a matter of our basic German educational mis- 
sion. In the military education camps, the young Latvians are 
trained under Latvian leaders in the Latvian language, — not be- 
cause this is our ideal, but because absolute military necessity de- 


268 


347— PS 


mands this. If General Dankers or Dr. Mae express the wish, and 
they have done so, to conduct such camps on Latvian or Estonian 
soil, I am not able to oppose them with any serious reasons. 

I consider the arrangement of the most necessary suppositions 
for the future military service an immediate and simply practical 
mission of the countries own youth activity. The permission, that 
the countries own youth organizations, even if only in part and 
under German leadership, can carry out the military education in 
the country, gives them a considerable power toward those circles, 
still opposing, and is also able to increase the enthusiasm, es- 
pecially of the youth. Our policy must adapt itself in the neces- 
sary extent toward this immediate goal, to rouse the Baltic peoples 
to the highest war effort of all forces. I am sure that the adap- 
tability and educational capacity of the youth demand other meas- 
ures from us, than those which can be advocated by us in our 
policies toward the adult parts of the population. However, politics 
and the education of the youth must perform in common according 
to the necessities of war, which gives us the problem to mobilize 
all available forces for victory. Even under these conditions, 
there are enough possibilities for Germany to exercise influence. 
The universal execution of the military education based on com- 
pulsory service with regard to the location of the camp gives us 
the possibility to increase the share of the German camps. Two 
or three camps in Estonia and Latvia therefore act as advertising 
for the camps within Germany; for in contrast to the Germanic 
peoples of the West, the military education is no longer to be car- 
ried out through voluntary enlistments, but through legal con- 
scription. The camps in Estonia and Latvia as well, will have to 
be under German leadership, and as military education camps of 
the Hitler youth, they must be a symbol of our educational mis- 
sion beyond Germany’s borders. 

I consider the execution of the military education of the Es- 
tonian and Latvian youth not only a military necessity, but also 
a war mission of the Hitler youth especially. I would be thankful 
to you, party member Axmann, if the Hitler youth would put 
itself at our disposal with the same readiness, with which they 
have so far supported our work in the Baltic Area. 

Heil Hitler! 

[signed] Lohse 


693256 — 46 — IB 


269 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 351-PS 


LIST OF THE MEMBERS OF THE REICH CABINET SINCE 

30 JANUARY 1933 

Reichs Chancellor Adolf Hitler, appointed 30 January 1933 
Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor since 2 August 1934 


Name 

Ap- 

pointed 

Reap- 

pointed 

Resigned 

The Deputy of the Reichs Chan- 
cellor von Papen 

30.1.1933 


30.7.1934 

1. The Deputy of the Fuehrer 
Hess, Reichsminister without 
portfolio 

1.12.33 



2. Reichs Minister of Foreign 
Affairs — Freiherr von Neurath 

2.6.32 

30.1.33 


3. Reichs and Prussian Minister 
of the Interior — Dr. Frick 

30.1.33 



4. Reichs War Minister and 
Supreme Commander of the 
Armed Forces — von Blomberg 

30.1.33 



5. Reichs Minister for Finance — 
Graf Schwerin von Krosigk 

2.6.32 

30.1.33 


6. Reichs and Prussian Minister 
of Economy — Dr. Hugenberg — 
Dr. Schmitt 

30.1.33 

29.6.33 

* 

** 

29.6.33 

30.7.34 

30.1.35 

Commissioned : 

President of the Reichs Bank Di- 
rectorate — Dr. Schacht 

30.7.34 

30.1.35 

Tempo] 
6 me 
Until furt 

rary or 
inths 

her notice 

7. Reichs and Prussian Minister 
for Labor — Seldte 

30.1.33 



8. Reichs Minister of Justice — 
Dr. H. C. Guertner 

2.6.32 

1.2.33 


9. Reichs Postmaster General 
and Reichs and Prussian Min- 
ister of Transportation — Frei- 
herr von Eltz-Ruebenach 

1.6.32 

30.1.33 



* 30.7.34 Relieved from the Office of the Reichs Minister for 
Economy for 6 mos. 

** 30.1.35 Relieved of his offices. 


270 


35 1 -PS 


Name 

Ap- 

pointed 

Reap- 

pointed 

Resigned 

10. Reichs and Prussian Minister 
for Food and Agriculture — 

Dr. Hugenberg 
Darre 

30.1.33 

29.6.33 


29.6.33 

11. Reichs Minister for Enlight- 
enment and Propaganda — Dr. 
Goebbels 

13.3.33 



12. Reichs Minister for Aviation 
— Goering 

Reichs Minister without port- 
folio 

Reichs Minister for Aviation 

30.1.33 

5.5.33 



13. Reichs and Prussian Minister 
for Science and Education — 
Rust 

1.5.34 



14. Reichs and Prussian Minister 
for Church Affairs — Kerri 
Reichs Minister without port- 
folio 

Reichs and Prussian Minister 
for Church Affairs 

16.6.34 

16.7.35 



15. Reichs Minister without port- 
folio 

19.12.34 



State Secretary of the Reichs 
Cabinet : 




Dr. Lammers, State Secretary and 
Chief of the Reichs Chancellory 

30.1.33 



Press Chief of the Reichs Cabinet 
— Funk 

30.1.33 



Director of the Ministry 

30.1.33 



State Secretary in the Reichs 
Ministry for Enlightenment 
and Propaganda 

13.3.33 




35 1 -PS 


Present at the First Session of the Cabinet of Adolf Hitler 
on 30 January 1933 at 5:00 p.m. 


Present : 


Reichs Chancellor 

Hitler 

Deputy of the Reichs Chancellor 
and Reichs Commissar for the 
State of Prussia 

von Papen 

Reichs Minister of Foreign Affairs 

Freiherr von Neurath 

Reichs Minister of the Interior 

Dr. Frick 

Reichs Minister of Finance 

Graf Schwerin 
von Krosigk 

Reichs Minister of Economy 

Dr. Hugenberg 

Reichs Minister of Labor 

Seldte 

Reichs Minister of Justice 


Reichs Defense Minister 

von Blomberg 

Reichs Postmaster General and 
Reichs Minister for Transporta- 
tion 

Freiherr von 
Eltz-Ruebenach 

Reichs Minister and Reichs Com- 
missar for Aviation 

Goering 

Reichs Commissar for Procure- 
ment of Labor 

Dr. Gercke 

State Secretary in the Reichs 
Chancellory 

Dr. Lammers 

State Secretary in the Office of 
the Reichs President 

Dr. Meissner 

Reichs Press Chief, Director in the 
Ministry 

Funk 

Responsible for the Protocol Coun- 
sellor in the Ministry 

Wienstein 

Reichs Minister for Food and Ag- 
riculture 

Dr. Hugenberg 


272 


35 1 —PS 


Subject: The Political Situation. 

The Reiclis Chancellor opens the session and explains that mil- 
lions of people within Germany would joyfully greet this day on 
which a Reich Cabinet under his leadership had been appointed 
by the Reich President. He asked the members of the Cabinet 
to give him their confidence as he himself had confidence in each 
member of the Cabinet. 

Then the Chancellor stated that he intended to suggest to the 
Reich President the appointment of the Counsellor in the 
Ministry, Dr. Lammers, to the post of State Secretary in the 
Reich Chancellor in place of the retired State Secretary Planck, 
and the appointment of the member of the Reichstag. Walter 
Funk, to the post of Director in the Ministry and Director of the 
Press Office in place of the retired Director in the Ministry, 
Marcks. 

The Reich Cabinet took note of this. There were no objections 
against his proposal. 

The Reich Chancellor then opened a discussion about the po- 
litical situation. 

Reich Minister Goering stated that he had contacted the Center 
Party. The Center Party felt offended because they had not been 
informed about the development of the situation. As he had 
been informed Reich Chancellor von Papen had not contacted 
the representatives of the Center Party. He, Reich Minister 
Goering, was under the impression that the Center Party ex- 
pected certain concessions from the present Reich Cabinet. 

The Reich Minister for Economy and Reich Minister for Food 
and Agriculture stated that it would be wise to avoid any brusque 
actions toward the Center Party. However, the representation 
of the Center Party in the Reich Cabinet was to be avoided since, 
in his opinion, it would endanger the unity of decisions of that 
body. 

The Reich Chancellor pointed out that adjournment of the 
Reichstag would be impossible without the collaboration of the 
Center Party. One might, however, consider suppressing the 
Communist Party to eliminate its votes in the Reichstag and by 
this measure achieve a majority in the Reichstag. Based on 
his experiences, however, such suppressions of parties were of 
no avail. He was afraid that heavy political fights and possibly 
a general strike might be the result of this contemplated sup- 
pression of the Communist Party of Germany. Surely the econ- 
omy of the count needed settled conditions. If, however, one 
discussed the question of the greater danger for the national 


273 


35 1— PS 


economy, the uncertainty and unrest connected with new elec- 
tions or a general strike, then one had to arrive at the conclu- 
sion that a general strike would be far more dangerous for the 
national economy. 

It appeared flatly impossible to suppress the 6,000,000 people 
who stood behind the Communist Party of Germany. It might 
be possible, however, to achieve a majority for the new Reich 
Cabinet after dissolving the Reichstag and the new elections 
which had to fall soon. The best thing, however, would be if the 
Reichstag should adjourn itself voluntarily. 

The Reich Minister for Economy and the Reich Minister for 
Food and Agriculture explained that he certainly has ilO longing 
for a general strike. In his opinion, however, it was impossible to 
avoid the suppression of the Communist Party of Germany. If 
that were not done one could not achieve a majority in the Reichs- 
tag, certainly not a majority of two-thirds. 

After the suppression of the KPD the passage of art enabling 
law through the Reichstag would be possible. He doubted that 
there would be a general strike after the suppression of the KPD. 
He preferred the suppression of the KPD to new elections. 

Reich Minister Goering stated that the Communists had 
planned a demonstration for this evening (30 January), which 
he had prohibited. On the basis of his investigations the KPD 
would not be prepared for a general strike at the present. The 
social democrats were pressing for a discussion in Reichstag. 

In his opinion it would be best to dissolve the Reichstag as soon 
as possible and to hold new elections. The Reich Chancellor had 
given his word that the present constellation of the Reich Cabinet 
would not be altered even after new elections. 

The Reich Chancellor confirmed the correctness of this state- 
ment. 

The Reich Minister for Labor declared that there was great 
joy in the ranks of the Steel Helmet [Stahlhelm] about the form- 
ing of the present Reich Cabinet. There was no more friction be- 
tween the Steel Helmet and the SA. 

In his opinion it would not be wise to let the first act of the 
present Reich Cabinet consist in the suppression of the KPD 
which might result in a general strike. 

The Deputy of the Reich Chancellor and the Reich Commissar 
for Prussia pointed out that the German nation needed a rest. 
In his opinion it would be best initially to request an Enabling 
Law from the Reichstag. If such a law would not be passed 


274 


351-PS 


the situation could be tackled anew. The Reich Chancellor de- 
clared that the general strike was not to be taken lightly. To 
suppress a possible general strike the Reichswehr should not 
be committed, if possible. 

The Reich Minister for Defense thanked the Reich Chancellor 
for this attitude and emphasized that the soldier is only used to 
thinking of his opponent as an enemy from outside. 

The Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs discussed the question 
of whether a suppression of the KPD with the possible conse- 
quence of a general strike were to be preferred to new elections 
for the Reichstag under foreign political consideration. He 
came to the conclusion that a suppression of the KPD with the 
possible consequence of a general strike w'ould be, by far, the 
more serious outlook. 

The Reich Minister for Finance pointed out that the financial 
status of the Reich, the States, and the Counties could only be 
adjusted through a slow improvement of the economic situation. 
He regarded the suppression of the KPD as a last political means. 
State Secretary Dr. Meissner proposed for the discussion whether 
an Enabling Law was to be proposed which would contain pro- 
visions for measures to be taken by the Reich Cabinet in the 
interest ' of combating unemployment. Such an Enabling Law 
would only require a simple majority in the Reichstag. 

Reich Commissar Dr. Gereke stated that the Center Party 
would not tolerate the Cabinet. Speedy new elections to the 
Reichstag would become necessary. The Deputy of the Reich 
Chancellor and the Reich Commissar for the State of Prussia 
suggested that the Reich Chancellor, in an interview, would 
state at the earliest opportunity that the rumors about the 
danger of inflation and the rumors about the danger of the rights 
of civil servants are untrue. The Reich Chancellor agreed to 
this. He further informed the meeting that he would contact 
representatives of the Center Party in the morning of 31 January. 

A new meeting of the Ministers is to take place on 31 January 
at 4 :00 p. m. 

The Reich Cabinet took note of this. 

Signed: Wienstein 31.1. 


275 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 352-PS 

Copy 

THE REICH MINISTER AND CHIEF OF THE REICH 
CHANCELLERY 
Rk. 8008D 

Berlin, 14 June 1942 
Fuehrer’s Headquarters 

To the Plenipotentiary for the Reich Administration [General 
bevollmaechtigter die Reichs Norwaltung] 

Subject: The Jurisdiction of the Council of Ministers for the 

Defense of the Reich [Ministerats fuer die Reichsverteidigung] 

Your letter of 3 June 1942— CBV Nr. 493/42/2882—. Recently 
the Fuehrer announced in accord with the opinions of the Reich 
Marshal of the Greater German Reich as shown in my letter of 
20 Feb. 1940-RK. 624B- that he believes it practical to reserve 
certain legislative missions for the Reich Cabinet. With this he 
has not limited the competency of the Council of Ministers for 
the defense of the Reich but given a directive as to how legisla- 
tion should be handled under the point of view of practicability. 
I have no doubt that the Fuehrer, as well as the Reich Marshal, 
have not changed their point of view, in particular regarding the 
fact that at the present there should be only legislation impor- 
tant in the cause of war, and that they will stress the fact that 
the Fuehrer himself and the Reich Cabinet should not be elimi- 
nated from the powers of legislation. It will have to be tested 
from time to time what measures will be reserved for the Reich 
Cabinet. My letter of 20 February 1940, and the opinions of the 
Fuehrer therein expressed may serve as a directive even if the 
limitations indicated by me are no longer applicable in their full 
meaning. I would therefore suggest not basing the discussions 
with the Reich Minister of Finance on the question of competency 
of the Reich Cabinet or the Council of Ministers for the defense 
"of the Reich, but on the question of whether it would be prac- 
tical to achieve settlement through either Reich law or a Decree 
from the Council of Ministers for the defense of the Reich in the 
sense of the opinions voiced by the Fuehrer. 

Signed: Dr. Lammers 


276 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 374-PS 


Berlin Nr 234404 9.11.2355 

To all state police offices and state police administrative offices. 
— To director or his deputy. 

This teletype message is to be transmitted immediately in the 
most rapid way. 

1. Actions against the Jews and in particular against their 
synagogues will occur in a short time, in all of Germany. They are 
not to be- hindered. However, it is to be made certain, in agree- 
ment with the ordinary police, that plundering and similar law 
breaking will be held to a minimum. 

2. Insofar as important archive material is present in the 
synagogues, it is to be secured by immediate measures. 

3. The seizure of some 20 to 30 thousand Jews in the Reich is 
to be prepared. Wealthy Jews above all are to be chosen. More 
detailed directives .will appear in the course of this night. 

4. If, in the course of this action, Jews are found in possession 
of arms then the sharpest measures are to be employed. Special 
troops of the SS as well as the general SS can be drawn into the 
total action. In any case the direction of the actions through the 
State police is to be assured by proper measures. 

Addenda for State Police Cologne: 

In the synagogue of Cologne there is especially important ma- 
terial. This is to be made safe, immediately, by the quickest meas- 
ures in agreement with the Security Services. 

Gestapo I Mueller 

This teletype is secret 


SECRET 

Blitz Munich 47767 10,11.38 0120 

To all State police administrative offices and State police offices. 

To all Security Service O.A. and W.S. 

Subject: Tonight’s measures against Jews. 

On the basis of the attack upon Legation Secretary v. Rath in 
'Paris demonstrations against the Jews are to be expected in the 
entire Reich tonight 9 to 10 November 38. The following orders 
are issued for the treatment of these incidents. 

1. The directors of the administrative offices of the State po- 
lice or their deputies have to take up, by long-distance phone, 
negotiations with the proper political directorates of their regions 


277 


374-PS 


— Gauleitung or Kreisleitung — immediately upon the receipt of 
this telegram and to unify a discussion of the carrying out of the 
demonstrations to which the proper inspector or commander of 
the regular police is to be drawn. In this conference the political 
direction is to be informed that the German police has received 
from the Reichsfuehrer SS and the Chief of the Police the fol- 
lowing orders to which the measures of the political directorate 
should comply. 

2. Only such measures are to be taken, which do not entail a 
danger to German life and property (for example: burning of 
synagogues only if no fire hazard is present in the neighborhood) . 

3. As soon as the course of events tonight permits the use 
of the appointed officials for this purpose, as many Jews are to 
be seized, especially wealthy ones, in all regions as can be ac- 
commodated in the prisons at hand. Moreover, only healthy, male 
Jews of not too great an age are to be seized. After carrying out 
the seizure, negotiations are to be taken up at once with the 
proper concentration camps for the quickest accommodation of 
the Jews. 

Signed: HEYDRICH 

SS Gruppenfuehrer 


Police radio service — Radio Hannover 
Urgent — Secret 
SSD Berlin 133 10; 11 2110 
To all political authorities 

As soon as notices of the ending of the action arrive from the 
Gau administration take action that destroyed shops are so shut 
up with boards, etc., that the destruction is as little visible as 
possible. Have owners directed in certain cases to work under 
police orders to carry this out. Have the ruins of synagogues, etc., 
removed as quickly as possible. 

Chief of the regular police 

Special command staff of the High Command g. a. Nr 224/38 


278 


374-PS 


Appendix 

National Socialist German Workers Party 
Gau Coblenz — Trier 


Propaganda Department 


Coblenz June 7, 1933 


To all Kreis directorates 

Subject: List M. 18, Jew baiting Nr 2 

You will receive in the next few days a list of the communities 
of your districts in which you will find the Jewish firms and busi- 
nesses of your district. You will immediately check in your whole 
district whether the addresses given are correct or whether some 
have been forgotten. The highest importance is to be placed on 
accuracy since the list is to be printed. 

Subject: Jew baiting 

The district directorate will set up a committee which has the 
task of directing and supervising the communities in the whole 
district. The strength of this committee will be determined by 
the district directed. You are to inform the Gau-propaganda di- 
rectorate at once of the committees named. The Gau propaganda 
directorate will then set itself in coordinating with these com- 
mittees through you. 

Present tasks of the committees. 

The committee will form in all the local groups and support 
localities such committees whose names shall be known only to 
the district committee. The members of the sub-committees shall 
report to the district committee the names of those Party mem- 
bers and other Germans who buy from Jews. The district com- 
mittee will publish articles whose content is such that it will point 
out to the miscreant members of the nation the shamefulness of 
their deed, and will make them aware of the shame to which they 
would be subjected if they were proceeded against publicly. This 
article must be arranged so that only the addresses of those in- 
volved, the business and the time in which he made the purchase 
will be given. The article should bear no signature and will be 
posted on various posting spots. Further the committees have 
to secure female clerks from Jewish stores, who can then very 
easily name those who purchase in Jewish shops. This demands 
some caution and has to be done with the greatest secrecy. The 
names of these clerks shall in no case be mentioned. Negotiations 
are to be undertaken with the association for the employed middle 
class so that it will prepare the means for this action and will 
assume the responsibility of finding a new job in another shop 


279 


374— PS 


of equal importance in case the clerk loses her job. Her name 
must not be given, only the number. 

The district directorate will point out in all gatherings of mem- 
bers or in all public gatherings that the Jew in all countries is 
again carrying on a low attack which is greatly harmful to Ger- 
many. It must be made clear to the masses that no German may 
buy from a Jew. It is also to be demanded of the Party member- 
ship that it constantly bring this to the attention of its friends 
and acquaintances. The Party membership must go so far in the 
interest of the nation that it cease friendship with best acquaint- 
ances if the latter continue to purchase from Jews. It must go 
so far that no German will speak to a Jew if it is not absolutely 
necessary, and this must be particularly pointed out. 

German girls who go with Jews are to be made cognizant of 
the shamefulness of their actions. A member of our party must, 
in no way, have anything to do with such a person. 

Heil Hitler 
Signed : Bang 

Gau-Propagandaleiter 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 375-PS 

TOP SECRET 

Berlin, 25 August 1938 

General Staff of the 5th Section (German Air Force) 

(Genstb. 5. Abteilung) 

No. 28/38. TOP SECRET (G-2) 

For Commanders only [ CHEF-SACHE ] 

THROUGH OFFICER COURIER ONLY 

Subject: Extended Case Green [GRUEN — code for Czechoslo- 
vakia.] Estimate of the Situation with Special Consider- 
ation of the Enemy. 

A. Initial Political Situation: 

1. The basic assumption is that France will declare war during 
the Case Green. 

It is presumed that France will only decide upon war if active 
military assistance by Great Britain is definitely assured. 

2. The Soviet Union will probably side immediately with the 
Western Powers. 

3. It is not expected for the moment that other states will 
intervene against Germany. 

The Dutch-Bclyian area assumes in this connection much more 
importance for the prevention of the war in Western Europe 


280 


375— PS 


than during the World War. This mainly as an advanced base 
for the air war. 

4. The United States of America will immediately support 
the fight of the Western Powers with strong ideological and eco- 
nomic means. 

5. Italy, Nationalistic-Spain, Hungary and Japan are regarded 
as benevolent neutrals. 

B.. Initial Military Situation: 

1. The French-Czechoslovakian treaty provides for military 
assistance only in the case of an unprovoked attack. At least an 
agreement of the French and British views as to the legal aspect 
has to be achieved. If only for political reasons we have to con- 
sider the 2nd day as the earliest possible day of war on a Euro- 
pean scale. In cast of a 24 hour ultimatum it would be the 3rd 
day. 

2. It is further assumed that the actual commencement of hos- 
tilities will only take place after the French armed forces have 
been tactically deployed. That means within the fourth to 
eighteenth day. This to 

a. use the deployment as a means of political pressure, 

b. and to be able to deploy the troops undisturbed. 

3. The war aim of the Entente Powers is to be considered as 
the overcoming of Germany through attacking its war economy. 
With other words through a long war. 

4. The following are possible methods of operation for the 
French army: 

a. to man and hold the Maginot-line, 

b. to march into Belgium and the Netherlands at the be- 
ginning of the war with the aim of occupying the Ruhr- 
territory. 

All suppositions support the first alternative. 

5. The French Air Force will probably attack both economic 
and German Air Force targets as well as military and communi- 
cation objectives. Thus no concentrated effect will be achieved 
at any one place. 

6. The French Navy will probably cooperate through opera- 
tions with the British sea power to supplant the North Sea block- 
ade. The aim will be the maintenance of naval predominance in 
the Atlantic and the Western Mediterranean. 

7. The British Air Force is assumed to be committed from 
English bases against the Rhine-Westphalia industrial area and 
the North Sea ports. Sooner or later the Belgium-Dutch neu- 
trality will be violated. 


281 


375-PS 


A camouflaged aircraft reporting network in Belgium and the 
Netherlands has to be taken into account from the first day of 
the war. No transfer to France on the part of the British Air 
Force need be expected at the beginning of the war. Equally it 
is held to be out of the question for any large parts of the British 
armed forces to be transferred to France. 

8. Provision seems to have been made for the use of North 
French ground organizations during the course of the war at 
least by part of the attacking British Air Forces. 

The existence of a relatively large number of civilian airfields 
in Belgium and the Netherlands seem to indicate the intention of 
moving advanced elements of the air defenses of London (light 
fighters and reconnaissance aircraft) into this area after a while. 

9. Thanks to the expected neutrality of Poland, the active 
participation of Soviet Russia will be largely restricted to the 
prosecution of the war in the Baltic. 

Furthermore, air attacks against East Prussia and the Baltic 
coast are to be anticipated and occasional raids on Berlin are 
regarded as possible. 

10. The basic assumption in respect to our own prosecution of 
the war is that two war plane air forces will be available in the 
West at the beginning of hostilities. There will be five war 
plane air forces in all after three to four weeks.. The aim will 
be to bring about a decision by the defeat of the Western powers. 

C. Task of the German Air Force: 

The German Air Force has at present not all the forces neces- 
sary to seek a decision by attacking the enemy’s war economy 
with the aid of the navy. The prime responsibility of the Ger- 
man Air Force in the present situation must be to help the armed 
forces immobilized opposite a fortified front to achieve oper- 
ational freedom. 

D. Enemy War Plane Forces: 

1. The French Air Force will have on the 1st October some 640 
war planes in the front line units on French home territory of 
which not more than 120 to 150 attain a modern standard of 
performance. Available reserves total about 320 obsolete war 
planes. 

There are another 150 obsolete war planes in North Africa 
for use in colonial war or against Southern Italy. 

It is assumed that the French home war plane units will be 
deployed for the most part in the known areas of Eastern France 
at the beginning of the war. They will be employed against vari- 
ous targets (air force targets, industrial and communications 


282 


375— PS 


targets, military installations, Army targets) in the operational 
area as well as in depth according to the capabilities of their per- 
sonnel and equipment. 

Any transfer of more than insignificant forces to Czechoslo- 
vakia is regarded as outside the range of practical possibilities, 
as is the concentrated commitment of large formations against 
the armies fighting in Czechoslovakia. 

2. The British war plane force will consist of some 850 war 
planes on October 1st of which 300 to 350 can be regarded as 
modern. The majority of the front line aircraft as well as some 
200 to 300 reserve aircraft can be described as only conditionally 
serviceable in the face of modern defences. 

Due to their inadequate range the present British war plane 
formations are not in a position to carry on a vigorous air war 
from their home bases only without violating sovereign Dutch 
or Belgian territory. 

Even if Dutch and Belgian neutrality is ignored only the mod- 
ern war planes need to be taken into account as a serious threat 
to the Ruhr. 

A transfer of British Air Forces to Northern France is to be 
expected at the earliest, after several v r eeks of war. 

If the French Army Command decides to march through Bel- 
gium and the Netherlands the immediate influx of British fight- 
ers into this area becomes probable. 

Heavy attacks against the North Sea ports by carrier based 
aircraft need not be reckoned with : 

a. because the equipment and training of these aircraft is 
designed to fit them for specific naval tasks ; 
h. because aircraft carriers, due to their vulnerability, will 
be committed in the North Sea only for very pressing 
reasons, which do not exist in this instance. 

On the other hand occasional attacks by coastal aircraft forces 
against targets on the North Sea coast are feasible and probable. 

E. Enemy Aircraft Industries: 

1. The first aircraft put into mass production as a result of 
the expansion of French military aircraft industry during the 
years 1934 to 1938 are at present rolling off the assembly lines. 
At the moment the aero-engine factories are lagging behind with 
deliveries. 

In August 1938 forty single-engined and thirty twin-engined 
military aircraft were delivered to the French Air Forces. It 
must be assumed that these figures w r ill be increased during the 
coming months to 100 aircraft a month, 50 single-engined and 
50 twin-engined. 


283 


375— PS 


A further moderate increase in production is possible and to 
be expected from spring 1939 on. 

2. In Great Britain existing plants have been extended since 
1936 with the aid of State funds and the effect on the armament 
situation will begin to make itself felt increasingly from 1939 
on. If the present plans will be observed the program will be 
completely carried out by 1941. 

Present production (August 1938) is estimated at some 200 
aircraft of all types (commercial and military aircraft) a month. 
It must be noted that the import of training aircraft and long- 
range reconnaissance aircraft from the United States and Canada 
is intended. 

3. North American aircraft industry (United States and Can- 
ada) is at the moment fully occupied. No notable expansion has 
yet taken place but is possible. A possible expansion would have 
no practical effects in 1939. 

250 aircraft of all types (commercial and military) a month for 
the home and foreign market may be stated as the present pro- 
duction rate. Appreciably more aircraft engines are manufac- 
tured. 

F. Position ivith regard to preparation of target data: 

1. It is proposed to supply units on or before 5th October with 
the following target data for France: 

a. Air Force (airfields, air parks and equipment depots, 
air force fuel dumps). About 90% of existing installa- 
tions are included. 

b. Fuel Supply. 

100% of the refineries are included and 60% of the total 
storage capacity (including the above-mentioned Air 
Force fuel dumps). 

c. Ammunition Supply. 

An estimated 70% to 80% of the total productive ca- 
pacity of explosive and gunpowder factories and 17 
large supply dumps (main ammunition depots and am- 
munition depots, Army and Air Force) are included. 

d. Poiver Supply. 

All the large power plants are included. 

e. Key Industries. 

In particular the Paris aero-engine industry has been 
included. 

/. Targets in the Paris area. 

Further target data, particularly for essential industrial 

targets, are accumulating currently. 


284 


375— PS 


In addition, command authorities will receive maps of the 
tactical situation and of target groups on or before the 
above-mentioned date. 

2. Basic target maps of British ground organization (airfields) 
are approximately 90 fo ready. They have been passed on to Air 
Force Group 2 for printing and for the adding of sectional ex- 
cerpts of maps. They have been ordered to be ready by 15 Sep- 
tember. 

As far as essential industrial targets are concerned, work has 
been carried out on the food and crude oil supply systems and 
docks in the London and Hull areas (basic target maps, sector 
maps, partially covered also by aerial and ground panoramas) . 

These will be reproduced after the ground organization tar- 
gets have been printed. They cannot be expected to be ready 
before 20 October. 

Tactical maps and target maps of London and Hull will be 
issued to the command authorities prior to the end of September. 

3. The basic target maps of the Air Force objectives for Bel- 
gium and the Netherlands are ready for printing. Reproduction 
and distribution (including sector maps) will probably be pos- 
sible only during October. 

4. In general it must be emphasized that, unlike Czechoslo- 
vakia, there are relatively very few aerial photographs of West- 
ern European targets available. 

G. Recommendations for our own Prosecution of the Air War. 

1. A negative answer must be given to the question as to 
whether it is appropriate to postpone the massed commitment 
of our striking power until the spring. The balance of force 
would probably have altered by that time to our disadvantage 
due to further progress of French and British aircraft industry 
and imports from North America. 

2. From a climatological point of view the autumn offers our 
forces greater prospect of success than the enemy, due to our 
relatively good training in instrument flying. 

3. As our forces must be regarded as small, even if we accept 
the figure of 5 air forces as a basis, the task can only be fulfilled 
by concentrated blows directed against the enemy’s weakest 
points. 

For this purpose choice of targets must be made with the 
greatest care and must be restricted to the decisive points. 

4. As long as only 2 air forces are available prosecution of the 
war on the basis of gaining time is advisable. This is seen in 

693256— i6— 19 


285 


375— PS 


attacks against the enemy air forces in the airfields where they 
are deployed in Eastern France, with a view to prevent complete 
aerial predominance by the enemy. 

Attacks on Paris should only be carried out as a reprisal, 
especially as the air defences in and around Paris are strong. 
Such attacks must however be possible at all times. 

Direct cooperation with the Army is only considered desirable 
if the enemy deploys or advances in such strength as to endanger 
the Western German fortifications by a break through or out- 
flanking. 

Support for the Army will be supplied in this case by attacks : 

a. against transports, troop concentrations and movements, 

b. against enemy war planes, should these cooperate with 
his armed forces in great numbers. 

Should there be danger of a penetration of the Western fortifi- 
cations, a further measure would be to concentrate fighter forces 
scattered in the West on the decisive ground front. 

Attacks against objectives in the British Isles are to be re- 
garded as unjustifiable in view of the small numbers of our com- 
bat forces. 

Should the enemy remain on the defensive in the ground war 
and withdraw with his war plane forces to the West there will 
be no urgent reason for us to commit our own forces. In this case 
it would seem better to save our forces until reinforcements 
arrive. 

5. As soon as strong forces are freed for the prosecution of the 
war in the West, operations in the air must be directed without 
delay at reaching a decision. 

It would seem possible to achieve this end by attacking : 

a. fuel refineries and dumps; 

b. gunpowder and high explosive factories, main ammuni- 
tion depots and ammunition depots; 

c. the most important parks handling imports which are 
also centers for the transfer and reshipment of fuel 
and ammunition. 

Thus the enemy’s fuel and ammunition supply system for his 
ground and air forces would be paralyzed or at least curtailed 
to an intolerable degree. 

Assuming that the individual groups of targets are one after 
the other successively attacked until eliminated it would appear 
that by the use of 5 air forces "a sufficient measure of success 


286 


375— PS 


could be achieved to enable the Army to break through the ene- 
my’s fortified front. 

No large-scale operations against targets in the British Isles 
could be carried out in addition to this task. 

Everything should however be prepared to make reprisal at- 
tacks against London possible at any time. 

Considering the strength of the air defences in and around 
London success in such attacks is only likely if strong forces are 
committed. 

In addition occasional harassing attacks against targets in 
South and Southeast England may be worthy of consideration, 
particularly if the weather enforces a lull in France. A secondary 
aim of such attacks would be to pin down strong defence forces 
in Great Britain. 

6. Should still stronger war plane forces — at least 3 air forces 
— be available after the French targets had been successfully at- 
tacked, they might be committed to advantage in attacks against 
the food supply of Great Britain, notably of London. It must 
however be emphasized that it is only regarded as possible to 
achieve decisive successes if considerably stronger forces are 
committed and if the western ports are also subjected to air 
attacks. 

H. Requests to Armed Forces Supreme Command, Army and 

Navy: 

I. The use of the Condor Legion against the refineries in Bor- 
deaux and possibly against those in Marseilles would valuably 
supplement our attacks of the French fuel supply system. 

2. The ammunition situation has to be rendered precarious 
for the enemy as soon as possible. Therefore the armed forces 
should accompany the air attacks against the ammunition sup- 
plies with synchronized offensive thrusts. Special attention should 
be directed towards the ammunition supplies stored in the Mag- 
inot Line itself and accessible to air attack. 

3. The Navy should hamper imports through the French At- 
lantic ports to as great an extent as is compatible with its other 
tasks and the forces available. Especially for some 2-3 months at 
the beginning of the attack against the fuel supply of France. 

4. Belgium and the Netherlands would, in German hands, rep- 
present an extraordinary advantage in the prosecution of the air 
war against Great Britain as well as against France. Therefore 
it is held to be essential to obtain the opinion of the Army as to 


287 


375— PS 


the conditions under which an occupation of this area could be 
carried out and how long it would take. In this case it would be 
necessary to reassess the commitment against Great Britain. 

Signed: For: WOLTER 

1 inclosure 

Distribution: 

Chief of German Air Force Operations Staff 
General Staff/5th Section (Draft) 

1. copy with 1 inclosure 

2. copy with 1 inclosure 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 376-PS 

SECRET 

FUEHRER’S H. Q. 

29/10/40 

Major (General Staff) Freiherr von Falkenstein 
[Addressed to an unspecified General] “Chefsache” 

In order to supplement today’s telephone conversation of 10:00 
A. M. I take the liberty of submitting to you a brief resume of 
the military questions current here for your personal informa- 
tion before I go on leave. Major Queisner, my deputy, is in- 
formed of the questions touched on here and can supply further 
information if necessary. 

The exception is Gibraltar, General Warlimont having re- 
quested that all inquiries be made to him, as this territory is 
regarded as a particularly ticklish business. 

1. At the moment no intervention in Greece is intended. Nor 
for the moment is anything to be undertaken with regard to 
Crete. 

2. The question of beginning preparation in Libya in conjunc- 
tion with Italy is to be examined in the light of a report by 
General Ritter von Thoma, which will be received during the 
next few days. 

In the light of this report a proposal is to be submitted to the 
Fuehrer by Field Marshal Keitel with regard to strength re- 
quired, date of offensive, etc. Field Marshal Keitel and Marshal 
Badoglio will then meet in mid-November and will settle details. 
Large-scale preparations should not be expected before then. 

The Quartermaster-General (Colonel Langemeyer) has been 
informed by us of the necessity for timely disposal of special war 
material, equipment and clothing. 


288 


376-PS 


3. No orders respecting Case East [Fall Ost] have been given 
and no orders are to be expected at the moment. 

At the moment the Russian action against Rumania is dis- 
missed as a trifling matter. 

Transports to Rumania are proceeding according to plan as 
ordered by the Fuehrer and are not to be speeded up. 

4. No activity should be expected at present on the part of 
Spain. The conversation between the Fuehrer and Franco there- 
fore covered only economic collaboration and long-term develop- 
ments. 

The Gibraltar affair should not however be lost to mind though 
it will have to be treated with extreme care. 

The Army will shortly send a small reconnaissance staff [Er- 
kundungsstab] to Spain where it will cooperate with Admiral 
Canaris: this has been authorized by the Fuehrer. The GAF 
will request permission to participate on its own account. 

There will be further orders from the Armed Forces Supreme 
Command ; the details requested in teleprinter message 00 926/40 
are required for this purpose. 

5. The Fuehrer is at present occupied with the question of the 
occupation of the Atlantic Islands with a view to the prosecution 
of war against America at a later date. Deliberations on this 
subject are being embarked upon here. Essential conditions are 
at the present: — 

a. No other operational commitment, 

b. Portuguese neutrality, 

c. Support of France and Spain. 

A brief assessment of the possibility of seizing and holding air 
bases and of the question of supply is needed from the GAF. 

Major Queisner will fetch the documents for himself from 
Ic Kurferst (C. in C. GAF Rear Hq.). I would like to ask 
Colonel Schmidt to arrange that he be supplied with the informa- 
tion he desires. 

6. C. in C. Armed Forces Norway has expressed fears that as 
a result of the Order: Armed Forces Supreme Command, Armed 
Forces Operations Staff /Abteilung L. No. 35 331/40 top secret 
and Chefsache dated 22/10/40 greater activity on the part of the 
British will develop against Norway, and has requested naval 
and air force reinforcements. The question of moving Stuka 
Staffeln was touched upon. I expressed my opinion that Stuka 
units had at present to prepare for other tasks, but would how- 
ever request that the matter be further examined. 

7. General von Boetticher has made repeated reference, espe- 


289 


376— PS 


dally in his telegram 2314 dated 26/10, to the fact that in his 
opinion too many details of our knowledge of American aircraft 
industry are being published in the German press. The matter 
has been discussed at Armed Forces Supreme Command. 1 
pointed out that the matter was a specifically GAF one, but 
have taken the liberty of referring the matter to you on its own 
merits. 

[Signed] Falkenstein. 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 382-PS 

WRITTEN STATEMENT BY 
KORVETTENKAPITAN MOEHLE 
DATED 19th JULY, 1945 

A. Order of September, 1942 

In September 1942 (I can no longer recollect the exact date), 
the following W/T message was given to all U-boats and opera- 
tional flotillas by the Commander in Chief U-boats in officers’ 
cypher, i.e. Top Secret: — 

1. “All rescue measures such as righting of capsized lifeboats, 
going alongside, provisioning, towing to land, etc., are absolutely 
forbidden and must cease. 

2. Previous orders concerning the rescue and taking prisoner 
of masters and chief engineers remain in force since their inter- 
rogation is of the highest importance to the High Command. Boats 
should rescue as many as they can carry. 

3. All rescue measures contradict the most primitive demands 
of warfare that ships and crews should be destroyed. 

4. You must be hard and remember that the enemy in his 
bombing attacks on German towns has no consideration for 
women and children.” 

This W/T message was without any doubt sent out at the in- 
stigation of the Commander in Chief U-boats himself, i.e. Grand 
Admiral Doenitz. In view of my knowledge of the way in which 
the Staff of the Chief Command U-boats worked, I consider it 
quite impossible that an order of such importance could have been 
given without his knowledge. 

I do not know whether the order was given with the concur- 
rence or at the instigation of the Supreme Command, i.e. the 
Fuehrer’s headquarters, or at the instigation of the Fuehrer him- 
self after one of his many conferences with Grand Admiral Doe- 
nitz. 

As Senior Officer of the 5th U-boat Flotilla, it was my duty to 


290 


382 PS 


pass on these instructions of Commander in Chief U-boats to 
Commanding Officers of U-boats which were leaving on their war 
patrols. 

So far as concerns the order itself, it undoubtedly states, and in 
particular for those who know the manner in which Commander 
in Chief U-boats is wont to give his orders, that the High Com- 
mand regard it as desirable that not only ships but also their 
crews should be regarded as objects of attack, i.e. that they should 
be destroyed; at that time German propaganda was continually 
stressing the shortage of crews for enemy merchant ships and the 
consequent difficulties. I too understood this order in that way. 

Had the point of view of the High Command been otherwise 
the order would undoubtedly have been expressed in different 
words. It w T ould then only have stated that for reasons of se- 
curity rescue measures were to cease and this order would have 
been passed as a normal secret W/T message. It was perhaps 
even the intention that this order could be interpreted in two 
ways and the reason may be that in the first place, it contravenes 
international laws of warfare and secondly, that it was an order 
which must give rise to serious conflicts of conscience in com- 
manding officers. 

It was very difficult for me as senior officer of the Flotilla to ask 
for clarification of this order from the Commander in Chief 
U-boats since while I was senior officer (15.6.41 - 5.5.45) I could 
only, owing to lack of time, visit the Commander in Chief U-boats 
four or five times. I could not discuss this order with officers on 
my staff as all messages in officers’ cypher might only be received 
by me. I was moreover of the opinion that commanding officers 
who were uncertain as to the meaning of this particular point 
always had the opportunity (an opportunity which they often 
took on other points) to obtain a clear understanding of this point 
when they went for their instructions to the staff of Commander 
in Chief U-boats itself; these instructions by the staff of the 
Commander in Chief U-boats were for the great part given by 
very young officers with much more recent operational experience 
than I had — the officers on Commander in Chief U-boats’ staff 
changed frequently. Generally speaking, with very few excep- 
tions, commanding officers received their instruction from the 
staff of Commander in Chief U-boats after I myself had given 
them their instructions. Commanding officers were generally 
speaking in much closer personal contact with these young staff 
officers than they were with myself as senior officer of a purely 
transit flotilla. There were many commanding officers whom I 


291 


382— PS 


only saw and got to know for a few days in Kiel while they were 
fitting their boats out for operations. 

Having given considerable thought to the whole of this matter 
I now remember that during one of my visits to Commander in 
Chief U-boats’ staff in the winter of 1942/3 or the summer ’43, 
one of the staff officers, Korvettenkapitaen Hessler or perhaps 
more likely Korvettenkapitaen Kuppisch, with whom because of 
very close ties of friendship I used to converse intimately as long 
as he was Commander in Chief U-boats’ staff, told me of the fol- 
lowing occurrence (whether I broached the subject or how the 
matter came up I can no longer remember). 

A type VII boat (500-tonner) reported in her war log that when 
outward bound from a base in France, she met far out in the Bay 
of Biscay a raft with five enemy airmen, but was not able to take 
them on board owing to shortage of room (she had a complement 
of 54 and carried full provisions for 14 weeks). The boat there- 
fore proceeded without taking any notice of the survivors. 

This action of the U-boat was vehemently denounced by the 
Commander in Chief U-boats’ staff. It was stated that she would 
have acted more correctly in destroying this raft since it was 
highly probable that the enemy air crew would be rescued by the 
enemy and in the meantime might once more have destroyed a 
German U-boat. 

This occurrence made the views of the Commander in Chief 
U-boats clear to me. 

As concerns making the order known to commanding officers: 
the order was always passed on during a commanding officers’ 
conference while their boats were having their final overhaul or 
while they were being fitted out in Kiel for operational patrols; 
during these conferences I passed on to commanding officers once 
again all important orders about the equipping of their boats, pro- 
cedure on departure, in home waters and while in convoy to Nor- 
way. Operational orders were not given by the flotilla ; they were 
always given by the Commander in Chief U-boats himself or by 
Captain U-boats West on his behalf. 

I was wont to pass on this controversial and serious order with 
more or less the following words: — “I have now to inform you of 
a High Command order concerning conduct towards survivors. It 
is a very ticklish matter. Commander in Chief U-boats in Sep- 
tember 1942 gave the following order in an ‘officers only’ signal 
( . . . the exact words of the order were then read out) .” 

Since I am myself in my innermost conscience in disagreement 


292 


382— PS 


with this order, I was very glad that in most cases commanding 
officers raised no queries and I was therefore relieved of any 
further discussion on this point. 

Sometimes however queries were raised and I was wont to 
answer somewhat as follows : — 

“I will explain the viewpoint of the High Command, which gave 
this order, by reference to the following event” : I then mentioned 
the example of the Type VII boat in the Bay of Biscay together 
with the explanation and viewpoint expressed to me by Com- 
mander in Chief U-boats’ staff. I then went on to say, “Gentle- 
men, you must yourselves decide what is compatible with own 
consciences. The safety of your own boat must always remain 
your prime consideration.” 

Since the introduction of total underwater war (“Schnor- 
chel”), I have in this connection in various ways further stated 
that commanding officers were in a much easier position in this 
respect since they had no occasion to surface and that the order 
was therefore illusory for them. They had to keep clear of every- 
thing which was not worth the firing of a torpedo. 

I also remember that many commanding officers after the order 
of September 1942 had been read said, “That is quite clear and 
unequivocal however hard it may be”. Had this order been given 
to me as a commanding officer I would have taken note of it in 
silence but in practice would always have been able with a clear 
conscience not to carry it out since I consider I would endanger 
my own boat by acting in this way, (i.e., by shooting at life- 
boats) . 

If therefore U-boat commanding officers state that they had 
received from me the order to destroy life-boats, this does not 
correspond with the facts, but they received from me quite in- 
sufficiently clearly expressed instructions from the High Com- 
mand together with my personal views thereon. 

Before the order of September 1942 was issued I never dis- 
cussed this difficult question at a commanding officers’ confer- 
ence and the subject of conduct towards survivors was never 
broached. 

B. Conduct Towards Neutral and Hospital Ships 

On this matter, which I treated together with what has gone 
before, I gave commanding officers the following directions: 

There was an express order of the High Command, and Com- 
mander in Chief U-boats was adamant on this point and would 
relentlessly pursue the breach of it by court martial (i.e., he in- 


293 


382— PS 


sisted on the order being strictly obeyed), that no neutral or Red 
Cross ship might be molested even if the enemy misused neutral 
flags or the Red Cross. 

The political results of sinking a neutral were much more 
serious than would have been the usefulness of the tonnage sunk. 

I told commanding officers for their guidance in doubtful cases 
— in bad visibility, when neutral markings were not distinct, etc. 
— that it was better to allow five enemy vessels to go free than to 
sink one neutral. 

So far as concerns the stopping and examination of neutrals, 
an order was made in January 1944 that in particular Spanish 
and Portuguese steamers in the North and Central Atlantic were 
to be stopped and examined for contraband and members of 
enemy nations of military age. I told commanding officers “Don’t 
touch them. Stay underwater. You are endangering yourselves 
too much by that because you will certainly be reported by wire- 
less and we know from experience that when such examinations 
are made watchfulness is liable to suffer. You are only exposing 
yourself to the danger of being surprised. If a ship carries neu- 
tral markings let it go by unscathed.” 

Objection was often made that German hospital ships had 
often been destroyed by the enemy, as German propaganda had 
stressed for years. My answer was: That does not matter, how- 
ever unpleasant it may be. The order of the High Command is 
decisive and binding. Politics come before warfare. 

C. Rendering of Reports 

There was an order — I do not remember whether it was in the 
form of a written or verbal instruction — that no events during a 
war patrol which contravened established international agree- 
ments should be entered in the war log. I believe that the reason 
for this order was that eight copies were made of war logs and 
were available to many authorities; there was always the danger 
therefore that events of this nature would become known and it 
was undoubtedly undesirable for reasons of propaganda that this 
should be so. 

Events of this nature were only to be reported if asked for 
when commanding officers made their personal reports; these 
were invariably made after every patrol to Commander in Chief 
U-boats or later in certain instances to Captain U-boats. 

I also gave the commanding officers instructions on this point. 

To conclude, I can only stress that the order of September 
1942 appeared to me personally to go too far and I am in total 


294 


382— PS 


disagreement with it at heart. As a serving officer I had how- 
ever to carry out the command to pass on this order to command- 
ing officers for their instruction. 

During the long time that I was senior officer of the Flotilla 
no single commanding officer mentioned to me that he could not 
reconcile obedience to this order with his conscience and that he 
was therefore unable to carry it out. 

An order of this nature was never given by me, i.e. on my own 
initiative, and could not be given by me since, had I exceeded my 
authority in so serious a way, I would immediately and without 
question have been relieved. 

[signed] MOEHLE 

Korvettenkapitaen 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 386-PS 

Berlin, 10 Nov 1937 

NOTES on the Conference in the Reichskanzlei 
on 5 Nov 37 from 1615 — 2030 hours 

Present: The Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor 

The Reichsminister for War, Generalfeldmarschall 
v. BLOMBERG 

The C-in-C Army, Generaloberst Freiherr von 
FRITSCH 

The C-in-C Navy, Generaladmiral Dr. h. c. RAEDER 
The C-in-C Luftwaffe, Generaloberst GOERING 
The Reichsminister for Foreign Affairs Freiherr v. 

NEURATH 
Oberst HOSSBACH 

The Fuehrer stated initially that the subject matter of today’s 
conference was of such high importance, that its further detailed 
discussion would probably take place in Cabinet sessions. How- 
ever, he, the Fuehrer, had decided NOT to discuss this matter in 
the larger circle of the Reich Cabinet, because of its importance. 
His subsequent statements were the result of detailed delibera- 
tions and of the experiences of his 4V-> years in Government; he 
desired to explain to those present his fundamental ideas on the 
possibilities and necessities of expanding our foreign policy and 
in the interests of a far-sighted policy he requested that his state- 
ments be looked upon in the case of his death as his last will and 
testament. 

The Fuehrer then stated: 

The aim of German policy is the security and the preservation 


295 


386— PS 


of the nation, and its propagation. This is, consequently, a prob- 
lem of space. 

The German nation is composed of 85 million people, which, 
because of the number of individuals and the compactness of 
habitation, form a homogeneous European racial body which can- 
not be found in any other country. On the other hand, it justifies 
the demand for larger living space more than for any other na- 
tion. If no political body exists in space, corresponding to the 
German racial body, then that is the consequence of several cen- 
turies of historical development, and should this political condition 
continue to exist, it will represent the greatest danger to the 
preservation of the German nation [Volkstum] at its present high 
level. An arrest of the deterioration of the German element in 
Austria and Czechoslovakia is just as little possible as the preser- 
vation of the present state in Germany itself. Instead of growth, 
sterility will be introduced, and as a consequence, tensions of a 
social nature will appear after a number of years, because politi- 
cal and philosophical ideas are of a permanent nature only as 
long as they are able to produce the basis for the realization of 
the actual claim of existence of a nation. The German future is 
therefore dependent exclusively on the solution of the need for 
living space. Such a solution can be sought naturally only for a 
limited period, about 1-3 generations. 

Before touching upon the question of solving the need for living 
space, it must be decided whether a solution of the German posi- 
tion with a good future can be attained, either by way of an 
autarchy or by way of an increased share in universal commerce 
and industry. 

Autarchy: Execution will be possible only with strict Na- 

tional-Socialist State policy, w T hich is the basis ; assuming this can 
be achieved the results are as follows: 

A. In the sphere of raw materials, only limited, but NOT 
total autarchy can be attained: 

1. \\ herever coal can be used for the extraction of raw ma- 
terials autarchy is feasible. 

2. In the case of ores the position is much more difficult. Re- 
quirements in iron and light metals can be covered by ourselves. 
Copper and tin, however, can NOT. 

3. Cellular materials can be covered by ourselves as long as 
sufficient wood supplies exist. A permanent solution is not pos- 
sible. 

4. Edible fats — possible. 


296 


386— PS 


B. In the case of foods, the question of an autarchy must be 
answered with a definite “NO”. 

The general increase of living standards, compared with 30-40 
years ago, brought about a simultaneous increase of the demand 
for an increase of personal consumption even among the pro- 
ducers, the farmers, themselves. The proceeds from the produc- 
tion increase in agriculture have been used for covering the in- 
crease in demands, therefore they represent no absolute increase 
in production. A further increase in production by making greater 
demands on the soil is not possible because it already shows signs 
of deterioration due to the use of artificial fertilizers, and it is 
therefore certain that, even with the greatest possible increase 
in production, participation in the world market could NOT be 
avoided. 

The considerable expenditure of foreign currency to secure 
food by import, even in periods when harvests are good, increases 
catastrophically when the harvest is really poor. The possibility 
of this catastrophe increases correspondingly to the increase in 
population, and the annual 560,000 excess in births would bring 
about an increased consumption in bread, because the child is a 
greater bread eater than the adult. 

Permanently to counter the difficulties of food supplies by low- 
ering the standard of living and by rationalization is impossible 
in a continent which had developed an approximately equivalent 
standard of living. As the solving of the unemployment problem 
has brought into effect the complete power of consumption, some 
small corrections in our agricultural home production will be 
possible, but NOT a wholesale alteration of the standard of food 
consumption. Consequently autarchy becomes impossible, spe- 
cifically in the sphere of food supplies as well as generally. 

Participation in World Economy. There are limits to this 
which we are unable to transgress. The market fluctuations would 
be an obstacle to a secure foundation of the German position; 
international commercial agreements do NOT offer any guaran- 
tee for practical execution. It must be considered on principle 
that ' since the World War (1914-18) an industrialization has 
taken place in countries which formerly exported food. We live 
in a period of economic empires, in which the tendency to colonize 
again approaches the condition which originally motivated colo- 
nization; in Japan and Italy economic motives are the basis of 
their will to expand, the economic need will also drive Germany 
to it. Countries outside the great economic empires have special 
difficulties in expanding economically. 

The upward tendency, which has been caused in world econ- 


297 


386-PS 


omy, due to armament competition, can never form a permanent 
basis for an economic settlement, and this latter is also hampered 
by the economic disruption caused by Bolshevism. It is a pro- 
nounced military weakness of those States who base their exist- 
ence on export. As our exports and imports are carried out over 
those sea lanes which are ruled by Britain, it is more a question 
of security of transport rather than one of foreign currency, and 
this explains the great weakness in our food situation in war- 
time. The only way out, and one which may appear imaginary, 
is the securing of greater living space, an endeavor which at all 
times has been the cause of the formation of states and of move- 
ments of nations. It is explicable that this tendency finds no in- 
terest in Geneva and in satisfied States. Should the security of 
our food position be our foremost thought, then the space re- 
quired for this can only be sought in Europe, but we will not copy 
liberal capitalist policies which rely on exploiting colonies. It is 
NOT a case of conquering people, but of conquering agricultur- 
ally useful space. It would also be more to the purpose to seek 
raw material producing territory in Europe directly adjoining 
the Reich and not overseas, and this solution would have to be 
brought into effect in one or two generations. What would be 
required at a later date over and above this must .be left to sub- 
sequent generations. The development of great world-wide na- 
tional bodies is naturally a slow process and the German people, 
with its strong racial root, has for this purpose the most favor- 
able foundations in the heart of the European Continent. The 
history of all times — Roman Empire, British Empire — has 
proved that every space expansion can only be effected by break- 
ing resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable; 
neither formerly nor today has space been found without an 
owner; the attacker always comes up against the proprietor. 

The question for Germany is where the greatest possible con- 
quest could be made at lowest cost. 

German politics must reckon with its two hateful enemies, 
England and France, to whom a strong German colossus in the 
center of Europe would be intolerable. Both these states would 
oppose a further reinforcement of Germany, both in Europe and 
overseas, and in this opposition they would have the support of 
all parties. Both countries • w T ould view the building of German 
military strongpoints overseas as a threat to their overseas com- 
munications, as a security measure for German commerce, and 
retrospectively a strengthening of the German position in Europe. 

England is NOT in a position to cede any of her colonial pos- 
sessions to us owing to the resistance which she experiences in 


298 


386-PS 


the Dominions. After the loss of prestige which England has 
suffered owing to the transfer of Abyssinia to Italian ownership, 
a return of East Africa can no longer be expected. Any resistance 
on England’s part would at best consist in the readiness to satisfy 
our colonial claims by taking away colonies which at the present 
moment are NOT in British hands, e.g. Angola. French favors 
would probably be of the same nature. 

A serious discussion regarding the return of colonies to us 
could be considered only at a time when England is in a state of 
emergency and the German Reich is strong and well-armed. The 
Fuehrer does not share the opinion that the Empire is unshak- 
able. Resistance against the Empire is to be found less in con- 
quered territories than amongst its competitors. The British Em- 
pire and the Roman Empire cannot be compared with one another 
in regard to durability; since the Punic Wars the latter did not 
have a serious political enemy. Only the dissolving effects which 
originated in Christendom, and the signs of age which creep into 
all states, made it possible for the Ancient Germans to subjugate 
Ancient Rome. 

Alongside the British Empire today a number of States exist 
which are stronger than it. The British Mother Country is able 
to defend its colonial possessions only allied with other States 
and NOT by its own power. How could England alone, for ex- 
ample, defend Canada against an attack by America or its Far 
Eastern interests against an attack by Japan. 

The singling out of the British Crown as the bearer of Empire 
unity is in itself an admission that the universal empire cannot 
be maintained permanently by power politics. The following are 
significant pointers in this respect. 

a. Ireland’s tendency for independence. 

b. Constitutional disputes in India where England, by her 
half-measures, left the door open for Indians at a later date to 
utilize the nonfulfillment of constitutional promises as a weapon 
against Britain. 

c. The weakening of the British position in the Far East by 
Japan. 

d. The opposition in the Mediterranean to Italy which — by 
virtue of its history, driven by necessity and led by a genius — 
expands its power position and must consequently infringe Brit- 
ish interests to an increasing extent. The outcome of the Abys- 
sinian War is a loss of prestige for Britain which Italy is en- 
deavoring to increase by stirring up discontent in the Moham- 
medan world. 

It must be established in conclusion that the Empire cannot be 


299 


386— PS 


held permanently by power politics by 45 million Britons, in 
spite of all the solidity of her ideals. The proportion of the popu- 
lations in the Empire, compared with that of the Motherland is 
9:1, and it should act as a warning to us that if we expand in 
space, we must NOT allow the level of our population to become 
too low. 

France’s position is more favorable than that of England. The 
French Empire is better placed geographically, the population 
of its colonial possessions represents a potential military in- 
crease. But France is faced with difficulties of internal politics. 
At the present time only 10 per cent approximately of the na- 
tions have parliamentary governments whereas 90 per cent of 
them have totalitarian governments. Nevertheless we have to 
take the following into our political considerations as power 
factors : 

Britain, France, Russia and the adjoining smaller States. 

The German question can be solved only by way of force, and 
this is never without risk. The battles of Frederick the Great for 
Silesia, and Bismarck’s wars against Austria and France had 
been a tremendous risk and the speed of Prussian action in 1870 
had prevented Austria from participating in the war. If we 
place the decision, to apply force with risk at the head of the fol- 
lowing expositions, then we are left to reply to the questions 
“when” and “how”. In this regard we have to decide upon three 
different cases. 

Case 1. Period 1943-45. After this we can only expect a 
change for the worse. The re-arming of the Army, the Navy and 
the Air Force, as well as the formation of the Officers’ Corps, are 
practically concluded. Our material equipment and armaments 
are modern, with further delay the danger of their becoming 
out-of-date will increase. In particular the secrecy of “special 
weapons” cannot always be safeguarded. Enlistment of reserves 
would be limited to the current recruiting age groups and an 
addition from older untrained groups would be no longer avail- 
able. 

In comparison with the re-armament, which will have been 
carried out at that time by the other nations, we shall decrease 
in relative power. Should we, not act until 1943/45, then, depend- 
ent on the absence of reserves, any year could bring about the 
food crisis, for the countering of which we do NOT possess the 
necessary foreign currency. This must be considered as a “point 
of weakness in the regime”. Over and above that, the world will 
anticipate our action and will increase counter-measures yearly. 


300 


386-PS 


Whilst other nations isolate themselves we should be forced on 
the offensive. 

What the actual position would be in the years 1943-1945 no 
one knows today. It is certain, however, that we can wait no 
longer. 

On the one side the large armed forces, with the necessity for 
securing their upkeep, the aging of the Nazi movement and of 
its leaders, and on the other side the prospect of a lowering of 
the standard of living and a drop in the birth rate, leaves us no 
other choice than to act. If the Fuehrer is still living, then it 
will be his irrevocable decision to solve the German space problem 
no later than 1943-45. The necessity for action before 1943-45 
will come under consideration in cases 2 and 3. 

Case 2. Should the social tensions in France lead to an inter- 
nal political crisis of such dimensions that it absorbs the French 
Army and thus renders it incapable for employment in war 
against Germany, then the time for action against Czechoslovakia 
has come. 

Case 3. It would be equally possible to act against Czecho- 
slovakia if France should be so tied up by a w T ar against another 
State, that it cannot “proceed” against Germany. 

For the improvement of our military political position it must 
be our first aim, in every case of entanglement by war, to con- 
quer Czechoslovakia and Austria simultaneously, in order to re- 
move any threat from the flanks in case of a possible advance 
Westwards. In the case of a conflict with France it would 
hardly be necessary to assume that Czechoslovakia would de- 
clare war on the same day as France. However, Czechoslovakia’s 
desire to participate in the war will increase proportionally to 
the degree to which we are being weakened. Its actual partici- 
pation could make itself felt by an attack on Silesia, either 
towards the North or the West. 

Once Czechoslovakia is conquered — and a mutual frontier, 
Germany-Hungary is obtained — then a neutral attitude by Po- 
land in a German-French conflict could more easily be relied 
upon. Our agreements with Poland remain valid only as long as 
Germany’s strength remains unshakeable; should Germany have 
any setbacks then an attack by Poland against East Prussia, 
perhaps also against Pomerania, and Silesia, must be taken into 
account. 

Assuming a development of the situation, which would lead 
to a planned attack on our part in the years 1943-45, then the 

693256 — 46 — 20 


301 


386— PS 


behavior of France, Poland and Russia would probably have to be 
judged in the following manner: 

The Fuehrer believes personally that in all probability Eng- 
land and perhaps also France have already silently written off 
Czechoslovakia, and that they have got used to the idea that this 
question would one day be cleaned up by Germany. The diffi- 
culties in the British Empire and the prospect of being entangled 
in another long-drawn-out European War, were decisive factors 
in the non-participation of England in a war against Germany. 
The British attitude would certainly NOT remain without in- 
fluence on France’s attitude. An attack by France without Brit- 
ish support is hardly probable assuming that its offensive would 
stagnate along our Western fortifications. Without England’s 
support, it would also NOT be necessary to take into consider- 
ation a march by France through Belgium and Holland, and 
this would also not have to be reckoned with by us in case of a 
conflict with France, as in every case it would have as conse- 
quence the enmity of Great Britain. Naturally, we should in 
every case have to bar our frontier during the operation of our 
attacks against Czechoslovakia and Austria. It must be taken 
into consideration here that Czechoslovakia’s defence measures 
will increase in strength from year to year, and that a consolida- 
tion of the inside values of the Austrian army will also be effected 
in the course of years. Although the population of Czechoslo- 
vakia in the first place is not a thin one, the embodiment of 
Czechoslovakia and Austria would nevertheless constitute the 
conquest of food for 5-6 million people, on the basis that a com- 
pulsory emigration of 2 million from Czechoslovakia and of 1 
million from Austria could be carried out. The annexation of 
the two States to Germany militarily and politically would con- 
stitute a considerable relief, owing to shorter and better fron- 
tiers, the freeing of fighting personnel for other purposes and 
the possibility of re-constituting new armies up to a strength 
of about 12 Divisions, representing a new division per 1 million 
population. 

No opposition to the removal of Czechoslovakia is expected on 
the part of Italy; however, it cannot be judged today what would 
be her attitude in the Austrian question since it would depend 
largely on whether the Duce were alive at the time or not. 

1 he measure and speed of our action would decide Poland’s atti- 
tude. Poland will have little inclination to enter the war against 
a victorious Germany, with Russia in its rear. 

Military participation by Russia must be countered by the speed 


302 


386— PS 


of our operations; it is a question whether this need be taken 
into consideration at all in view of Japan’s attitude. 

Should Case 2 occur — paralyzation of France by a Civil War 
— then the situation should be utilized at any time for operations 
against Czechoslovakia, as Germany’s most dangerous enemy 
would be eliminated. 

The Fuehrer sees Case 3 looming nearer; it could develop from 
the existing tensions in the Mediterranean, and should it occur 
he has firmly decided to make use of it any time, perhaps even 
as early as 1938. 

Following recent experiences in the course of the events of the 
war in Spain, the Fuehrer does NOT see an early end to hostili- 
ties there. Taking into consideration the time required for past 
offensives by Franco, a further three years duration of war is 
within the bounds of possibility. On the other hand, from the 
German point of view a 100 per cent victory by Franco is not de- 
sirable; we are more interested in a continuation of the war and 
preservation of the tensions in the Mediterranean. Should Franco 
be in sole possession of the Spanish Peninsula it would mean the 
end of Italian intervention and the presence of Italy on the Bal- 
earic Isles. As our interests are directed towards continuing the 
war in Spain, it must be the task of our future policy to 
strengthen Italy in her fight to hold on to the Balearic Isles. How- 
ever, a solidification of Italian positions on the Balearic Isles can 
NOT be tolerated either by France or by England and could lead 
to a war by France and England against Italy, in which case 
Spain, if entirely in white (i.e. Franco’s) hands, could participate 
on the side of Italy’s enemies. A subjugation of Italy in such a 
war appears very unlikely. Additional raw materials could be 
brought to Italy via Germany. The Fuehrer believes that Italy’s 
military strategy would be to remain on the defensive against 
France on the Western frontier and carry out operations against 
France from Libya against North African French colonial posses- 
sions. 

As a landing of French-British troops on the Italian coast can 
be discounted, and as a French offensive via the Alps to Upper 
Italy would be extremely difficult and would probably stagnate be- 
fore the strong Italian fortifications, French lines of communica- 
tion by the Italian fleet will to a great extent paralyze the trans- 
port of fighting personnel from North Africa to France, so that 
at its frontiers with Italy and Germany France will have at its 
disposal solely the metropolitan fighting forces. 

If Germany profits from this war by disposing of the Czecho- 


303 


386— PS 


slovakian and the Austrian questions, the probability must be as- 
sumed that England — being at war with Italy — would not decide 
to commence operations against Germany. Without British sup- 
port a warlike action by France against Germany is not to be 
anticipated. 

The date of our attack on Czechoslovakia and Austria must be 
made dependent on the course of the Italian-English-French war 
and would not be simultaneous with the commencement of mili- 
tary agreements with Italy, but of full independence and, by ex- 
ploiting this unique favorable opportunity he wishes to begin to 
carry out operations against Czechoslovakia. The attack on 
Czechoslovakia would have to take place with the “speed of 
lightning” [blitzartig schnell]. 

Feldmarschall von Blomberg and Generaloberst von Fritsch in 
giving their estimate on the situation, repeatedly pointed out 
that England and France must not appear as our enemies, and 
they stated that the war with Italy would NOT bind the French 
army to such an extent that it would NOT be in a position to 
commence operations on our Western frontier with superior 
forces. Generaloberst von Fritsch estimated the French forces 
which would presumably be employed on the Alpine frontier 
against Italy to be in the region of 20 divisions, so that a strong 
French superiority would still remain on our Western frontier. 
The French would, according to German reasoning, attempt to 
advance into the Rhineland. We should consider the lead which 
France has got in mobilization, and quite apart from the very 
small value of our then existing fortifications — which was pointed 
out particularly by Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg — the 
four motorized divisions which had been laid down for the West 
would be more or less incapable of movement. With regard to 
our offensive in a South-Easterly direction, Feldmarschall von 
Blomberg draws special attention to the strength of the Czecho- 
slovakian fortifications, the building of which had assumed the 
character of a Maginot line and which would present extreme dif- 
ficulties to our attack. 

Generaloberst von Fritsch mentioned that it was the purpose 
of a study which he had laid on for this winter to investigate the 
possibilities of carrying out operations against Czechoslovakia 
with special consideration of the conquest of the Czechoslovakian 
system of fortifications ; the Generaloberst also stated that owing 
to the prevailing conditions he would have to relinquish his leave 
abroad, which was to begin on 10 November. This intention was 
countermanded by the Fuehrer who gave as a reason that the pos- 


304 


386— PS 


sibility of the conflict was not to be regarded as being so immi- 
nent. In reply to the remark by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
that an Italian-English-French conflict be not as near as the Fueh- 
rer appeared to assume, the Fuehrer stated that the date which 
appeared to him to be a possibility was summer 1938. In reply to 
statements by Generalfeldmarschall von Blomberg and General- 
oberst von Fritsch regarding England and France’s attitude, the 
Fuehrer repeated his previous statements and said that he was 
convinced of Britain’s non-participation and that consequently he 
did not believe in military action by France against Germany. 
Should the Mediterranean conflict already mentioned lead to a 
general mobilization in Europe, then we should have to com- 
mence operations against Czechoslovakia immediately. If, how- 
ever, the powers who are not participating in the war should 
declare their disinterestedness, then Germany would, for the time 
being, have to side with this attitude. 

In view of the information given by the Fuehrer, General- 
oberst Goering considered it imperative to think of a reduction 
or abandonment of our military undertaking in Spain. The Fueh- 
rer agreed to this in so far as he believed this decision should be 
postponed for a suitable date. 

The second part of the discussion concerned material arma- 
ment questions. 

(Signed) HOSSBACH 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 388-PS 

APPERTAINING TO WAR HISTORY 
[pencil note] 

S.O. Only 
“FALL GRUEN” 

CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
[ITEM 1] [ Handwritten notes ] 

* * * of the Fuehrer: [semi-illegible] 

1. Does Mussolini regard his work as completed or not. 

a. if so, close future boundary of Czechoslovakia, West; then 
wait and see. “Return with the bag empty.” 

b. if not, then the “Empire” of Africa. Impossible without 
German help. Czechoslovakia is a preliminary condition. “Return 
with Czechoslovakia in the bag.” 

2. Mussolini, who is no illusionist, can definitely assess Ger- 
many’s military potentialities. Therefore he will suit timing of 
his aims with that. 


305 


388— PS 


3. Against France and England problem of Czechoslovakia can 
be settled only if still allied with Italy. France and England will 
not intervene. (Only to overcome the four-week re-grouping 
period.) 

4. Living under a common fate. (Example, 1805 and 1806) 

5. State of Armament: comparisons relative but in our favor: 

a. Deliveries of ores : France — 600,000 tons ; Germany — 2 mil- 
lion tons. 

b. Britain has been arming for 9 months. Launchings not for 
2 years. 

c. Out of date air force equipment. 

6. No general staff conferences of the various branches of the 
Armed Forces. Would have to retract permission to the Army. 
Only through Supreme Command. Very important that actual 
intentions be kept secret. 

7. Arming progressing too slowly: Guns not only for consti- 

tuted units, but also in reserve for replacement. Fortifications. 
Range of guns. 

8. Replacement of officers doubtful. 
***** * * 

* Schm 

[Major Schmundt’s writing and initialled by him] 


[ITEM 2] [Typed notes ] 

S.O. Only Berlin, 22 April 1938 

BASES OF THE DISSERTATION ON “GRUEN” 

Summary of discussion between Fuehrer and General Keitel of 
21 April : 

A. Political Aspect 

1. Strategic surprise attack out of a clear sky without any 
cause or possibility of justification has been turned down. As 
result would be : hostile world opinion which can lead to a critical 
situation. Such a measure is justified only for the elimination of 
the last opponent on the mainland. 

2. Action after a time of diplomatic clashes, which gradually 
come to a crisis and lead to war. 

3. Lightning-swift action as the result of an incident (e.g. 
assassination of German ambassador in connection with an anti- 
German demonstration) . 


306 


388— PS 


B. Military Conclusions 

1. The preparations are to be made for the political possibili- 
ties 2 and 3. Case 2 is the undesired one since “Gruen” will have 
taken security measures. 

2. The loss of time caused by transporting the bulk of the di- 
visions by rail — which is unavoidable but should be cut down 
as far as possible — must not impede a lightning-swift blow at 
the time of the action. 

3. “Separate thrusts” are to be carried out immediately with 
a view to penetrating the enemy fortification lines at numerous 
points and in a strategically favorable direction. The thrusts are 
to be worked out to the smallest detail (knowledge of roads, of 
targets, composition of the columns according to their individual 
tasks). Simultaneous attacks by the Army and Air Force. 

The Air Force is to support the individual columns, (e.g. dive- 
bombers: sealing off installations at penetration points, hamper- 
ing the bringing up of reserves, destroying signal communica- 
tions traffic, thereby isolating the garrisons.) 

4. Politically, the first 4 days of military action are the de- 
cisive ones. If there are no effective military successes, a Euro- 
pean crisis will certainly arise.’ Accomplished facts must prove 
the senselessness of foreign military intervention, draw Allies 
into the scheme (division of spoils!) and demoralize “Gruen”. 

Therefore : bridging the time gap between first penetration and 
employment of the forces to be brought up, by a determined and 
ruthless thrust by a motorized army. (e.g. via Pi past Pr) [Pil- 
sen, Prague]. 

5. If possible, separation of transport movement “Rot” from 
“Gruen”. A simultaneous strategic concentration “Rot” can lead 
“Rot” to undesired measures. On the other hand it must be pos- 
sible to put “Fall Rot” into operation at any time. 

C. Propaganda 

1. Leaflets on the conduct of Germans in Czechoslovakia 
(Gruenland). 

2. Leaflets with threats for intimidation of the Czechs 
(Gruenen) . 

Schm 

[initialled by Schmundt] 

Written by an officer 
I The folloiving are handwritten notes ] 

22 April 

A. POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES 

1. Sudden surprise attack out of clear sky not possible. World 


307 


388— PS 


opinion can produce critical situation. Would be thinkable only 
for ultimate conflict without the threat of other opponents. 

2. Action after a period of tension and constant aggravation 
of the situation. 

3. Action as the result of an incident, (example) 

B. MILITARY NECESSITIES 

Cases 2 and 3 can be considered. In case 2 “security measures” 
will be taken. Duration of transporting by rail to be looked into. 

1. Invasion by columns ready to march at points which lie in a 
direction, strategically important. (Permanent fortifications 
must be known, columns assembled to suit particular situations, 
roads reconnoitred.) Simultaneous attack by Luftwaffe, cooper- 
ation with Luftwaffe, isolation of garrisons of the fortifications, 
cutting of communications. 

2. “Dead Space” in first 4 days prior to actual operation must 
be avoided under all circumstances. Must be bridged through 
motorized army. Penetrating via Pilsen. Hamper mobilization. 

3. Separation of transport movement “Rot” and “Gruen”, 

a. in order not to aggravate “Rot”, 

b. but also so as not to arrive late, if necessary. 

Basic Principle: Create Accomplished Facts so that 

a. help comes tdo late — other powers do not intervene 

b. Allies take part (like wolves also want something out of it) 

c. State collapse from within. 

Propaganda: Directions to Germans. Threats to others. 

Submit: 

1. Fortifications (strength in detail) 

2. Distribution of nationalities within Wehrmacht. 


[ITEM 3] [Four Telegrams ] 

MOS 1 16/5 0925 — 

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces ZEITZLER 
Most Secret — 1. Which divisions on the “Gruen” frontiers 
ready to march within 12 hours, in the case 
of mobilization? 

2. What .is the final day of mobilization? 

SCHMUNDT 

MOS 1 1930 MELDAU MBZ 
Lthe same also in Schmundt’s handwriting] 


308 


388— PS 


MOS No. 2 1115 — 

MBZ 02 16/5 1114 — 

Major Schmundt, Armed Forces Adjutant to the Fuehrer — 
Most Secret to Question 1, 12 of them — in garrisons 

to Question 2, Third day — Please state time of 
receipt. Teleprint left my room at 1110 — NN. 
ZEITZLER Oberstleutnant on the General Staff 


MOS 03 16/5 1155 

OKW for Oberstleutnant Zeitzler — Most Secret 

1. Teleprint received 1115 

2. Please send the numbers of the divisions. 

Schmundt 

1159 MOS 03 Wagner ( ?) 
[the same also in Schmundt’s handwriting] 


MBZ 04 16/5 1302 — 

Major Schmundt Armed Forces Adjutant to the Fuehrer — 
Most Secret to message 1155 7, 17, 10, 24, 4, 14, 3, 18, 28, 
8, armored and mountain. 

Zeitzler Oberstleutnant on the General Staff. 


[ITEM 4] [ Telegram ] 

MBZ 05 17/5 1505 

TO MAJOR SCHMUNDT, ARMED FORCES ADJUTANT TO 
THE FUEHRER — MOST SECRET 

IN ANSWER TO OBERST LEUTNANT ZEITZLER AND 
WITH REGARD TO MAP OF FORTIFICATIONS: 

FORTIFIED CONSTRUCTION CONSISTS OF FAIRLY LARGE 
NUMBER OF STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS AS 
WELL AS LIGHT, MEDIUM AND HEAVY MG EMPLACE- 
MENTS TO CLOSE GAPS BETWEEN FORTIFICATIONS. NUM- 
BER OF STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS VARIES 
FROM ONE TO NINE PER KILOMETER. POSITIONS CON- 
STRUCTED CONSIST OF LIGHT, MEDIUM AND HEAVY MG 
EMPLACEMENTS AND AN OCCASIONAL STEEL AND CON- 
CRETE FORTIFICATION IN BETWEEN. NUMBER OF MG 
EMPLACEMENTS VARIES FROM TWO TO NINE PER KILO- 
METER. BLOCK CONSTRUCTION CONSISTS OF LIGHT, 
SOMETIMES MEDIUM AND HEAVY MG EMPLACEMENTS 


309 


388— PS 


AT MAIN ROADS AND THOROUGHFARES. DEFENSIVE PO- 
TENTIALITIES : STEEL AND CONCRETE FORTIFICATIONS 
BULLET PROOF AGAINST ALL KNOWN CALIBRES. LIGHT 
MG EMPLACEMENTS BULLET PROOF AGAINST ALL CALI- 
BRES UP TO 10.5 CM., MEDIUM MG EMPLACEMENTS BUL- 
LET PROOF AGAINST CALIBRES UP TO 10.5 CM., HEAVY 
MG EMPLACEMENT BULLET PROOF AGAINST CALIBRES 
UP TO 21.00 CM., SOMETIMES AGAINST THE LARGEST 
CALIBRES. 

ZEITZLER OBERSTLEUTNANT ON THE GENERAL STAFF 


[ITEM 5] [Covering letter, ivith draft for Gruen attached ] 

MOST SECRET 

Berlin, 20 May 1938 

Tirpitzufer 72.76 

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 
L la No. 38/38 S. O. Only 


' S. O. Only 

access only through Officer 

Schm [initialled by Schmundt] 

My Fuehrer! 

Effective 1 October 1938 (beginning of the new mobilization 
year for the army) new strategic directives must be issued, 
whose political bases and stipulations you, my Fuehrer, yourself 
intend to make. 

For the meantime, however, it is necessary that the “Gruen” 
section of the strategic directives be replaced by a new version 
that takes into account the situation which has arisen as a result 
of the incorporation of Austria into the Reich and the newly- 
suspected intentions of the Czech General Staff. 

A draft of this kind is attached. It has not yet been discussed 
with the Commanders in Chief. I intend to do this only after 
this draft in its fundamental ideas has been approved by you my 
Fuehrer, so that it can then be resubmitted to be signed. 

Heil, my Fuehrer 

[signed] Keitel 


310 


388-PS 


L la to No. 38/38 S.O. Only 

written by an officer 
MOST SECRET 
S. 0. Only 

access only through officer 

Berlin, 20 May 1938 

DRAFT for THE NEW DIRECTIVE “GRUEN” 

3 Copies 
1st Copy 

(Provisional) -[pencil note] 

1. Political Prerequisites: It is not my intention to smash 

Czechoslovakia without provocation, in the near future through 
military action. Therefore inevitable political developments 
within Czechoslovakia must force the issue, or political events in 
Europe create an especially favorable opportunity and one 
which may never come again. 

2. Political Possibilities for the Commencement of the Action: 
An invasion without suitable obvious cause and without suffi- 
cient political justification cannot be considered with reference 
to the possible consequences of such an action in the present sit- 
uation. 

Rather will the action be initiated either : 

a. after a period of increasing diplomatic clashes and tension, 
which is coupled with military preparations and is made use of 
to push the war-guilt onto the enemy. Even such a period of 
tension preceding the war however will terminate in sudden mili- 
tary action on our part, which must come with all possible sur- 
prise as to time and extent, or 

b. by lightning-swift action as a result of a serious incident, 
through which Germany is provoked in an unbearable way and 
for which at least part of the world opinion will grant the moral 
justification of military action. 

“b” is militarily and politically the more favorable. 

3. Conclusions for the Preparations of “Fall Gruen” ; which 
must take into account the possibilities mentioned in 2 a and 2 b. 

a. For Armed War it is essential to create — already in the first 
4 days — a military situation which plainly proves to hostile na- 
tions eager to intervene, the hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian 
military situation, and gives the nations with territorial claims 
on Czechoslovakia an incentive to immediate intervention against 


311 


388— PS 


Czechoslovakia. In such a case the intervention of Poland and 
Hungary against Czechoslovakia can be expected, especially if 
France, due to Italy’s clearly pro-German attitude fears, or at 
least hesitates, to unleash a European war by her intervention 
against Germany. 

It is very probable that attempts by Russia to give military 
support to Czechoslovakia are to be expected. If concrete successes 
are not achieved as a result of the ground operations during the 
first few days, a European crisis will certainly arise. 

b. The Propaganda War must, on one hand, intimidate Czecho- 
slovakia by threats and reduce her power of resistance, on the 
other hand, give instructions to the national minorities for sup- 
porting the Armed War and influence the neutrals into our way of 
thinking. 

c. The Economic War has the task of employing all means at 
the disposal of economy to hasten the final collapse of Czechoslo- 
vakia. 

The opening of the Economic and Propaganda war can pre- 
cede the Armed war. I myself will determine the date. 

Z 

* [initialled at end by Zeitzler] 

[Paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of this draft are set forth with minor 

changes under ITEM 11.] 


[ITEM 6] [ Typescript ] 

Questions on “Gruen” 

1. Peace-time strength of divisions prepared for march readi- 
ness. 

2. Strength of mobile divisions. 

3. Composition of 2nd Armored Division in the case of mobili- 
zation. 

4. Strength, possibilities and composition of a motorized unit 
(motorized divisions) to be used for independent thrust. 

5. When can the field unit's be equipped with 15 cm. mortars? 

6. What calibres and how large a number of artillery pieces are 
available for combating fortifications such as fortresses? 


312 


388— PS 


MOST SECRET 

L la 

Berlin, 23 May 

Questionnaire of 23 May 

1. Peace-time strength of divisions prepared for march readi- 
ness. 

Strength of a peacetime division 14,000 men 

Strength of a division made ready to march 14,000 men 

(but composition is different from that of a peacetime 
division, i.e. some men are left out and others included) . 

2. Strength of mobile divisions. 

Strength of a mobile division 17,000 men 

3. Composition of the 2nd Armored Division in the case of Mo- 
bilization. In the case of mobilization the 2nd Armored Division 
is composed of 1 rifle brigade, one tank brigade and divisional 
troops. 

The rifle brigade has one Infantry regiment motorized of 2 
battalions and one motorcycle rifle battalion. 

The tank brigade has two tank regiments of two battalions. 

The Divisional Troops will include 1 Artillery Regiment motor- 
ized of 2 light Battalions, 1 Reconnaissance Battalion motorized, 
1 Anti-Tank Battalion, 1 Engineer Battalion motorized, and 1 
Signal Battalion motorized. 

Altogether the 2nd Armored Division (mobile) has 807 light 
Machine guns, 250 heavy Machine guns, 18 light mortars, 12 
heavy mortars, 8 light Infantry howitzers, 48 Anti-Tank guns, 
122 2 cm. guns, 16 37 cm. guns, 16 7.5 cm. guns and 24 light field 
howitzers. 

4. Strength:, possibilities and composition of a motorized unit 
(motorized divisions) for independent thrust. In the case of mo- 
bilization, C-in-C Army is in command of the motorized units. 
C-in-C Army must therefore be questioned as regards any new 
employment. 

Altogether the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Armoi’ed Divisions (rapid 
march readiness is intended) 4 motorized divisions and the light 
division (for the moment not yet intended for rapid march readi- 
ness ; presumably from 1 October) . 

5. When can the field units be equipped icith 15 cm. mortars? 
Mobilization of the infantry guns (=15 cm. mortars) planned 
only for the fall, as ammunition for them will only then be avail- 
able. For training purposes nearly all corps except the 3 corps 
have the heavy infantry guns at the moment without live ammu- 
nition, however. 

6. What calibres and how large a number of artillery pieces 


313 


388— PS 


are available for combatting fortifications such as fortresses? 
Only 21cm. howitzers. Altogether 23 (of which 8 are in East 
Prussia) with 16,000 rounds (of which 4,000 in East Prussia). 
[In Schmundt writing] : In general, single experimental artillery 

piece (guns). 


Z 


[Initialled by Zeitzler] 

******* 


[On next page the questions are put again, plus the following 
additional questions:] 

7. What do the individual types of Czechoslovakian permanent 
frontier fortifications look like? Profile? 

8. Is cooperation between infantry and bombers assured for . 
attacks against enemy strong points etc.? 

9. Can the construction of fortifications in the West, in the 
form of MG strong points and road blocks, be hastened by the 
employment of work columns of the Inspector of Road Construc- 
tion? 

10. What progress has been made in the howitzer (Moerser) 
programme? What progress has been made in the conversion of 
heavy naval guns? 

* * * * * * * 


[Next three pages contain the first 6 questions above and answers 
to them in a teleprint message, beginning: “I am answering sev- 
eral questions which the Fuehrer put to me during conferences. 
I request that you report the answers to the Fuehrer.”] 


[ITEM 8] [Telegram] 

1. INFORM GENERAL KEITEL: THE FUEHRER IS GOING 
INTO “GRUEN” IN DETAIL. BASIC IDEAS NOT CHANGED. 
SURPRISE ELEMENT TO BE EMPHASIZED MORE. CONFER- 
ENCE WITH PARTICIPANTS WILL TAKE PLACE AFTER 
RETURN, AT THE LATEST. CONFERENCE HERE NOT OUT 
OF THE QUESTION. RETURN PROBABLY BEGINNING 
NEXT WEEK. 

2. INFORM COLONEL GENERAL VON BRAUCHITSCH 
AND GENERAL KEITEL: 

A. THE FUEHRER, IN CONNECTION WITH HIS CONSID- 
ERATIONS ON 1, HIMSELF SUGGESTED THE HOLDING OF 
MANEUVERS TO PRACTISE TAKING FORTIFICATIONS BY 
SURPRISE ATTACK. I THEN REPORTED THAT C-IN-C 


314 


388— PS 


ARMY WAS PLANNING A CORRESPONDING TRAINING EX- 
ERCISE FOR SEPTEMBER. THE FUEHRER THINKS THAT 
MOMENT TOO LATE. HE HIMSELF WILL DISCUSS THIS 
WITH C-IN-C ARMY. 

B. THE FUEHRER REPEATEDLY EMPHASIZED THE 
NECESSITY OF PRESSING FORWARD GREATLY THE FORT- 
IFICATION WORK IN THE WEST. 

(NOTE FOR K. KPT. V PUTTKAMER: PLEASE DESTROY 
TEXT OF 1 AND 2 AFTER USE) 


[ITEM 9] [ Telegram ] 

REICH WAR MINISTRY/NAVAL SIGNAL SERVICE 

MOST SECRET 

CANARIS REPORTS ON EVENTS OF THE NIGHT: NO SPE- 
CIAL OCCURRENCES. THE MOBILIZATION MEASURES OR- 
DERED IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA CONTINUE. THE FOLLOW- 
ING HAVE BEEN DRAFTED : CLASSES 1913 AND 1914 COM- 
PLETE AND SPECIALISTS ONLY FROM CLASSES 1894 TO 
1911 LEAVING OUT CLASSES 04, 06, 09. I SHALL KEEP 
YOU FURTHER CONTINUALLY INFORMED. I CONSIDER 
IT NECESSARY THAT THE FUEHRER INFORM HIS C’S-IN-C 
OF HIS INTENTIONS SOON. HAVE YOU ANY FURTHER 
QUESTIONS? 


[ITEM 10] [Handivritten notes ] 

[ILLEGIBLE] 


[ITEM 11] [ Covering letter, with directive for Gruen attached ] 

Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces 
OKW No. 42/38 Most Secret S. 0. Only L I 

Berlin, 30 May 1938 
Copy of the 4th Copy 
S. O. Only 

Access only through Officer 

3 Copies, 1st Copy 


Written by an Officer 

By order of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, 
Part 2, Section II of the directive on the unified preparations 
for war of the Armed Forces dated 24 June 1937 (Ob.d.W. 


315 


388— PS 


No. 55/37 g.kdos Chefsache L la) (“Two-Front- War with main 
effort in the South-East-strategic concentration ‘Gruen’ ”) is to 
be replaced by the attached version. Its execution must be as- 
sured as from 1 October 38 at the latest. 

Alterations in the other parts of the directive must be ex- 
pected during the next few weeks. 

By order 

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 
1 Appendix 

sgd. Keitel 

To: C-in-C Army — Copy 1 
C-in-C Navy — Copy 2 
C-in-C Air Force — Copy 3 
OWK Section L — Copy 4-5 

Certified a true copy 
Zeitzler 

Oberstleutnant on the General Staff 


MOST SECRET 

Appendix to: Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces OKW 

No. 42/38 Most Secret S. 0. Only L la dated 30.5.38. 

Copy of the 4th Copy 
S. 0. Only 

Access only through Officer 

Written by an Officer 3 Copies, 1st Copy 

II. Two front war with main effort in the South East 
(strategic concentration “Gruen”) 

1. Political Prerequisites. It is my unalterable decision to 
smash Czechoslovakia by military action in the near future. It 
is the job of the political leaders to await or bring about the 
politically and militarily suitable moment. 

An inevitable development of conditions inside Czechoslovakia 
or other political events in, Europe creating a surprisingly fa- 
vorable opportunity and one which may never come again may 
cause me to take early action. 

The proper choice and determined and full utilization of a fa- 
vorable moment is the surest guarantee of success. Accordingly 
the preparations are to be made at once. 


316 


388— PS 


2. Political Possibilities for the Commencement of the Action . 
The following are necessary prerequisites for the intended in- 
vasion : 

а. suitable obvious cause and, with it 

б. sufficient political justification, 

c. action unexpected by the enemy, which will find him pre- 
pared to the least possible degree. 

From a military as well as a political standpoint the most fa- 
vorable course is a lightning-swift action as the result of an inci- 
dent through which Germany is provoked in an unbearable way 
for which at least part of world opinion will grant the moral 
justification of military action. 

But even a period of tension, more or less preceding a war, 
must terminate in sudden action on our part — which must have 
the elements of surprise as regards time and extent — before the 
enemy is so advanced in military preparedness that he cannot be 
surpassed. 

3. Conclusions for the Preparation of u Fall Gruen” . 

a. For the Armed War it is essential that the surprise element 
as the most important factor contributing to success be made full 
use of by appropriate preparatory measures, already in peace- 
time and by an unexpectedly rapid course of the action. Thus it 
is essential to create a situation within the first four days which 
plainly demonstrates, to hostile nations eager to intervene, the 
hopelessness of the Czechoslovakian military situation and which 
at the same time will give nations with territorial claims on 
Czechoslovakia an incentive to intervene immediately against 
Czechoslovakia. In such a case, intervention by Poland and Hun- 
gary against Czechoslovakia may be expected, especially if France 
— due to the obvious pro-German attitude of Italy — fears, or at 
least hesitates, to unleash a European war by intervening against 
Germany. Attempts by Russia to give military support to Czecho- 
slovakia mainly by the Air Force are to be expected. If concrete 
successes are not achieved by the land operations within the 
first few days, a European crisis will certainly result. This knowl- 
edge must give commanders of all ranks the impetus to decided 
and bold action. 

b . The Propaganda War must on the one hand intimidate 
Czechoslovakia by threats and soften her power of resistance, on 
the other hand issue directions to national groups for support in 
the Armed War and influence the neutrals into our way of think- 
ing. I reserve further directions and determination of the date. 


693256 — £ 6 — 21 


317 


388— PS 


4. Tasks of the Armed Forces. Armed Forces Preparations 
are to be made on the following basis : 

a. The mass of all forces must be employed against Czecho- 
slovakia. 

b. For the West, a minimum of forces are to be provided as 
rear cover which may be required, the other frontiers in the East 
against Poland and Lithuania are merely to be protected, the 
Southern frontiers to be watched. 

c. The sections of the army which can be rapidly employed 
must force the frontier fortifications with speed and decision and 
must break into Czechoslovakia with the greatest daring in the 
certainty that the bulk of the mobile army will follow them with 
the utmost speed. Preparations for this are to be made and 
timed in such a way that the sections of the army which can be 
rapidly employed cross the frontier at the appointed time at the 
same time as the penetration by the Air Force *before the enemy 
can become aware of our mobilization.* 

* For this, a timetable between Army and Air Force is to be 
worked out in conjunction with the OKW and submitted to me 
for approval.* 

5. Missions for the branches of the Armed Forces. 

a. Army. The 'basic principle of the surprise attack against 
Czechoslovakia must not be endangered by the inevitable time re- 
quired for transporting the bulk of the field forces by rail nor 
the initiative of the Air Force be wasted. Therefore it is first 
of all essential to the army that as many assault columns as pos- 
sible be employed at the same time as the surprise attack by the 
Air Force. These assault columns — the composition of each, ac- 
cording to their tasks at that time — must be formed with troops 
which can be employed rapidly owing to their proximity to the 
frontier or to motorization and to special measures of readiness. 
It must be the purpose of these thrusts to break into the Czecho- 
slovakian fortification lines at numerous points and in a stra- 
tegically favorable direction, to achieve a breakthrough or to 
break them down from the rear. For the success of this operation, 
cooperation with the Sudeten German frontier population, with 
deserters from the Czechoslovakian army, with parachutists or 
airborne troops and with units of the sabotage service will be 
of importance. The bulk of the army has the task of * frustrating 
the Czechoslovakian plan of defense, of preventing the Czecho- 
slovakian army from escaping into Slovakia, of forcing a battle,* 

[* — * Passages between asterisks occur only in this version, not in 
Item 5] 


318 


388— PS 


of beating the Czechoslovakian army and of occupying Bohemia 
and Moravia speedily. To this end a thrust into the heart of 
Czechoslovakia must be made with the strongest possible motor- 
ized and armored units using to the full the first successes of the 
Assault columns and the effects of the Air Force operations. 
The rear cover provided for the West must be limited in numbers 
and quality to the extent which suits the present state of forti- 
fications. Whether the units assigned this will be transported 
to the Western frontier immediately or held back for the time 
being will be decided in my special order. Preparations must 
however, be made to enable security detachments to be brought 
up to the Western frontier even during the strategic concentra- 
tion “Gruen”. Independent of this, a first security garrison 
must be improvized from the engineers at present employed in 
constructing fortifications and from formations of the Labor 
Corps. The remaining frontiers, as well as East Prussia, are to 
be weakly protected. But, always depending on the political sit- 
uation, the transfers by sea, of a part or even the bulk of the ac- 
tive forces of East Prussia, into the Reich must be taken into 
account. 

b. Air Force. While leaving a minimum of defensive forces 
in the West, the Air Force is to be employed in bulk in a surprise 
attack against Czechoslovakia. The frontier is to be flown over 
at the same time as it is crossed by the first section of the army, 
(see 5a) The most important task of the Air Force is the de- 
struction of the Czechoslovakian Air Force and their supply bases 
within the shortest possible time, in order to eliminate the pos- 
sibility of its employment as well as that of Russian and French 
air forces, should the occasion arise, against the strategic con- 
centration and penetration of the German army and against the 
German “Lebensraum.” Next to this the crippling of enemy mo- 
bilization, of the direction of the government and Armed Forces, 
as well as the delaying of the strategic concentration of the Czech 
Army by attacks on communication installations, mobilization and 
government centers can be of considerable importance to the in- 
itial success of the army. At points in the frontier area where 
stronger sections of the Czechoslovakian Army *or the depth of 
the defensive system* might make the success of the sudden 
breakthrough of the German Land-attack questionable, the em- 
ployment of adequate bomber forces. must be assured. Czecho- 
slovakian industrial installations are to be spared as far as the 
course of operations permits. Retaliatory attacks against the 
population will be carried out only with my permission. Centers 


319 


388— PS 


of air defense are to be created throughout Berlin, the central 
German industrial area and the Ruhr area *and gradually pre- 
pared even now in an inconspicuous fashion.* 

c. Navy. The Navy will assist the army operations by em- 
ploying the Danube-flotilla. For this purpose the flotilla will be 
under the orders of C-in-C Army. As regards the conduct of naval 
warfare at first only those measures are to be taken which appear 
to be necessary for the careful protection of the North Sea and 
the Baltic against a sudden intervention in the conflict by other 
states. These measures must be confined to the absolutely nec- 
essary extent. Their inconspicuousness must be guaranteed. It 
is of decisive importance that all actions, which might influence 
the political attitude of the European Great Powers unfavorably, 
be avoided. 

6. Tasks of the War Economy. In the war economy it is es- 
sential that in the field of the armament industry a maximum 
deployment of forces is made possible through increased supplies. 
In the course of operations, it is of value to contribute to the re- 
inforcement of the total war — economic strength — by rapidly 
reconnoitring and restarting important factories. For this reason 
the sparing of Czechoslovakian industrial and works installations 
— insofar as military operations permit — can be of decisive im- 
portance to us. 

7. *A11 preparations for sabotage and insurrection will be made 
by OKW. They will be made, in agreement with and according to 
the requirement of the branches of the Armed Forces, so that 
their effects accord with the operations of the Army and Air 
Force.* 

signed ADOLF HITLER 
Certified copy 
signed Zeitzler 

Oberstleutnant on the General Staff 


[ITEM 12] [ Typescript ] Berlin, 9 June 1938 

L I a H 

SHORT SURVEY OF ARMAMENT OF THE CZECH ARMY 
1. SMALL ARMS 

Armed uniformly with Mauser Rifle, Model 24, calibre 7.92 
mm (similar to German Rifle 98). Also grenade launcher 
for rifle grenades is attached to the rifle. 

[* * Passages between asterisks represent additions to the version in 

Item 5] 


320 


388— PS 


2. MACHINE GUNS 

Light MG Z.B. 26, weight 9 Kg, 20 round magazine. 

Heavy MG, temporarily the MG “Schwarzlose” which has 
been improved in range. Super-heavy MG, 20 mm MG, 
Oerlikon system has been introduced (especially for active 
air defence), other models are being tested. 

3. MORTARS 

8.1 cm Stokes-Brandt, range 3000 m. 

9cm light Skoda mortar, model 17, range 1200 m. 

14cm medium mortar, model 18, range 2500 m. 

26cm heavy mortar, model 17, range 2700 m. 

4. INFANTRY GUNS FOR ANTI-AIRCRAFT AND ANTI- 
TANK DEFENSE 

Several models are being tested, some of them twin barrel 
guns. 

Calibre 37 — 40 mm and/or 66 — 70 mm. 

5. ARTILLERY PIECES 

a. Light and Mountain Artillery: 

8cm field gun, model 17, range 10 km 
8cm field gun, model 30, range 13.5 km (can also be used 
as an AA gun) 

10cm light field howitzer, model 14/19, range 10 km. 
7.5 Mountain gun, model 15, range 7 km. 

10cm Mountain howitzer, model 16/19, range 10 km. 

b. Heavy Artillery: 

10.5cm gun, model 35, range 18 km. 

15cm howitzer, model 14/16, range 8 km. 

15cm howitzer, model 25, range 12 km. 

15cm gun, model 15/16, range 20 km. 

24cm gun, model 16, range 36 km. 

21cm howitzer (Moerser) gun, model 18, range 10 km. 
30.5cm howitzer (Moerser) gun, model 16, range 12.4 
km. 

Also in use are French 15.5cm howitzers. 

c. A A Artillery: 

9cm AA-gun, model 12/20 (stationary), range 12 km. 
8.35cm AA-gun, model 22/24 horizontal range 18 km, 
vertical range 12 km. 

7.65cm AA-gun, model 35, horizontal range 16 km, ver- 
tical range 11 km. 

6.6cm AA-gun, model is being tested. 

Z [Initialled by Zeitzler] 


321 


388— PS 


[ITEM 13] [T ypescri-pt] 

L I a 

Berlin, 9 June 1938 

MOST SECRET 

FUEHRER’S QUESTIONS ON 9 JUNE 1938 

Berlin, 9 June 1938 
2 copies 
1st copy 

MOST SECRET 

Question 1: Armament of the Czech Army? 

Answer: 

Arming and equipping of the Army with new means of war is 
progressing, thanks to the excellent production capacity of the 
Czech armament industry. 

The armament was built up from the weapons of the old Aus- 
trian Army. It is slowly and steadily being modernized. 

In Detail: 

Artillery: Light field artillery. At present the old armament 
from the Austrian Army predominates. Mountain Artillery : 
the same. Medium artillery. New armament predominates. 
Heavy artillery, old armament predominates. 

Infantry Weapons: The following are available: a uniform 

new infantry rifle ; a uniform new light MG ; a uniform old im- 
proved heavy MG. 

Equipment of heavy infantry weapons (AT-guns, Infantry 
Howitzers, Mortars) and tanks is modern, but still incomplete. 

A new modern AA-gun has been introduced, but is not yet 
available in sufficient numbers. 

Reserves of weapons and ammunition seem to be guaranteed. 

Summary: The Czech Army must be considered up to date as 
far as armament and equipment are concerned. 

Z [Initialled by Zeitzler] 


LI a 

Berlin, 9 June 1938 

MOST SECRET 

2 copies 
1st copy 

Question 2: How many battalions, etc., are employed in the 

West for the construction of emplacements? 


322 


388— PS 


Answer: 

Up to now the following have been employed on fortifications: 

The 36th Infantry Battalion 

The 10th Infantry Howitzer Company 

The 12th Anti-Tank Company 

The 10th Battery 

The 30th 1/3 Engineer Battalions 

In addition: 

The 78th German Labor Service Battalion, and later the 190th 
German Labor Corps Battalion. 

In addition, the Commander of Army Group 2 (General Adam) 
has the authority to draw still further troops from his 4th Corps 
for the construction of emplacements if he deems it necessary. 

Z [Initialled by Zeitzler] 

[Pencilled notes by Schmundt:] 

Number of troops 
Production possibilities 


L I a 


Berlin, 9 June 1938 


MOST SECRET 

2 copies 
1st copy 

Question 3: Are the fortifications of Czechoslovakia still occu- 

pied in unreduced strength? 

Answer: 

The troops have been withdrawn to some extent from the forti- 
fications and are housed in local billets. The fortifications them- 
selves are guarded. The barriers at the frontiers are opened. 

Z [Initialled by Zeitzler] 


L 1 a 


Berlin, 9 June 1938 

MOST SECRET 

2 copies 
1st copy 

Question U: Frontier protection in the West? 

Answer: 

In the West as at the other frontiers, the first frontier protec- 
tion is undertaken by the VGAD, then the Frontier Guard. 

This protection by the Frontier Guard is directly at the fron- 


323 


388— PS 


tier. At the same time as the Frontier Guard at the frontier, the 
fortification installations, which lie further back, receA e security 
garrisons (reserve personnel). 

Strength of the Frontier Guard on the Western Frontier: 
15,200 men with 1,250 light MG’s. 

For further details on the frontier guard see appendix. 

Z [Initialled by Zeitzler] 


[ITEM 14] [Typescript] 

L 1 a 

Berlin, 18 June 1938 

S. 0. Only 

Access only through Officer 
1. DRAFT FOR THE NEW DIRECTIVE 
(1st copy) 


In three parts. 


MOST SECRET 


Written by an officer. 

S. 0. Only 

Access only through Officer 
Part 1 


4 copies 
1st copy 


GENERAL GUIDING PRINCIPLES 

1. There is no danger of a preventive war by foreign states 
against Germany. 

Germany has not committed herself to any military alliances 
which would automatically force Germany into a warlike conflict 
of foreign powers. 

The immediate aim is a solution of the Czech problem by my 
own, free decision; this stands in the foreground of my political 
intentions. I am determined to use to the full every favorable 
political opportunity to realize this aim. 

Thereby, friends, interested parties and enemies can be called 
upon to take part in this scheme and other powers can remain 
indifferent even though they could not be previously placed with 
absolute certainty in one of these categories. 

However, I will decide to take action against Czechoslovakia 
only if I am firmly convinced as in the case of the occupation of 
the demilitarized zone and the entry into Austria that France will 
not march and therefore England will not intervene. 


324 


388— PS 


2. The preparations of the Armed Forces must cover: 

a. thorough preparation of the action against Czechoslovakia 
(“Fall Gruen”). See Fart 2. 

b. Maintenance of the previous “Fall Rot” (strategic concen- 
tration with the main effort against the West.) See Part 2. 

c. Special preparations, mainly in the form of studies and 
deliberations within the Supreme Commands. See Part 3. 

d. Preparatory measures, in case German territory is sud- 
denly and abruptly violated with hostile intent by a for- 
eign power. See number 3. 

3. If in the midst of peace, German territory is suddenly and 
abruptly violated with hostile intent by a foreign power, armed 
resistance will be offered without any special order. 

Therefore, the branches of the Armed Forces must empower 
their competent Commanders on the frontier or on the coast to 
take on their own authority, all measures necessary to repulse the 
enemy attack should such a case occur. (See Reich Defense Law 
(RVG) para. 2). 

In no event, however, may the German Reich frontier be crossed 
by troops or aircraft, nor any foreign territory violated, without 
my order. 

It will not be considered a violation of German territory (see 
1st sentence of this number) if single sentries or patrols cross 
the fi’ontier unintentionally and accidentally or through the over- 
eagerness of a subordinate commander, or if aircraft fly over the 
frontier due to faulty navigation, or warships sail in our German 
territorial waters with obviously no hostile intentions. 

4. This directive concerns the uniform preparation for war and 
the general strategic considerations applying to the outbreak of 
the war. It will be augmented as necessitated by the various 
strategic concentrations by regulations dealing with matters of 
Special Administration and War Economy. 

The directives necessary for the prosecution of the war itself 
w 7 ill be issued by me from time to time. 

K [Initialled by Keitel] 

Z [Initialled by Zeitzler] 


325 


388— PS 


MOST SECRET 


4 copies 
1st copy 

Written by an officer 

S. 0. Only 

Access only through officer 

Part 2 

STRATEGIC CONCENTRATIONS 

1. Action against Czechoslovakia (“Fall Gruen” ) 

The directive, issued as OKW Nr 42/38 Most Secret S. 0. only 
L I dated 30 May 1938, remains in force. Regulations dealing 
with special matters, Administration and War Economy relative 
to “Fall Gruen” are still to be issued. 

2. Two Front War with the main effort in the West (“Fall 
Rot”) 

Since even a war against us started by the Western Nations 
must, in view of the situation today, begin with the destruction 
of Czecho-Slovakia, the preparation of strategic concentration 
for a war with the main effort by the Army and Air Force 
against the West, is no longer of primary importance. 

The preparations made to date for the event (“Rot”), how- 
ever, remain in effect. They contribute, as far as the Army is 
concerned, towards camouflaging and screening the other strate- 
gic concentration and serve, in the case of the Luftwaffe, as a 
preparation for the shifting of the main effort from the East to 
the West, which may, under certain circumstances, suddenly 
become necessary. They also serve as preliminary work for 
future possibilities of war in the West. 

It is left to C in C Army to decide how far the Army strategic 
concentration “Rot”, prepared by OKH for the beginning of the 
new mobilization year 38/39, will be issued to subordinates. 

The tasks which arise for the Navy in “Fall Rot” will be the 
same as those should “Fall Gruen” be extended to include the 
Western European nations. The naval preparations are there- 
fore to be continued with the previous objective. 

J 

K [Initialled by Keitel and Jodi] 


326 


388— PS 


Written by an officer 

2. DRAFT 
MOST SECRET 

Berlin, 7 July 38 
2 copies 
1st copy 

S. 0. Only 

Access only through officer 
Part 3 

CONSIDERATIONS 

I. In connection ivith “Gruen”. 

How the political situation will develop during the execution 
or after the conclusion of “Gruen” cannot be predicted. There- 
fore the Armed Forces will confine themselves to the preparation 
of the measures given in Part I, Number 3, to “Fall Gruen” and 
“Fall Rot”. However, it seems expedient to make at least theo- 
retical considerations and calculations for several possible even- 
tualities, to avoid being mentally unprepared. These considera- 
tions w T ould have to cover : 

a. What would have to be done if other nations intervened 
against lis during the execution of “Gruen” — contrary to our 
expectations. 

b. What should be done after the conclusion of “Gruen”. 

To a. If, during the execution of “Gruen”, France intervenes 
against us, the measures provided in “Fall Gruen” come into 
force. The primary essential in this connection is to hold the 
Western fortifications, until the execution of the action “Gruen” 
permits forces to be freed. Should France be supported by Eng- 
land, in this it will have small effect at first on the land-war. It 
is the duty of the Air Force, the Navy, and the OKW (War Econ- 
omy Staff, Defense, Armed Forces Communications), however, 
to carry out farsighted deliberations in their sphere. 

Among the Eastern powers, Russia is the most likely to inter- 
vene. This, in the beginning at any rate, will probably consist of 
reinforcement of the Czech Air Force and Armament. However, 
the decision must not be neglected concerning what measures are 
to be taken if Russia were to come to the point of starting a 
Naval and Air war against us or even wish to penetrate into 
East Prussia, through the border states. 

In the case of a penetration by Poland, we must hold the East- 
ern fortifications and East Prussia, using the Frontier Guard and 


327 


3 88— PS 


other formations, until the conclusion of the action “Gruen” once 
more gives us freedom of movement. 

To b. If the action “Gruen” takes place still during this Mo- 
bilization year, we must be in the position after the conclusion 
of “Gruen” to put a provisional strategic concentration quickly 
into force. 

In connection with the latter, further to what was said in part 
1, number 3, it is of primary importance to safeguard the German 
frontiers, including the new addition by the Armed Forces, and 
still have the bulk of the Field Forces and the Air Force at our 
disposal. It would have to be possible to put such a future stra- 
tegic concentration, “Frontier Protection,” into force separately 
for the various frontiers. 

II. Independent of “Fall Gruen” 

Germany will not refrain from occupying the Memel-territory 
by a lightning blow in the case of a Polish-Lithuanian conflict 
occurring. The deliberations on this eventuality must cancel the 
directive issued 18 March 1938 (OKW Nr 472/38 g. Kdos L la). 

III. General 

The branches of the Armed Forces are still allowed to delib- 
erate further on the matter contained in Section I) and II). These 
however, may be carried out only as theoretical studies within 
the Supreme Commands without the participation of subordinate 
authorities. 

Z 

K [Initialled by Keitel and Zeitzler] 


[Item 15] 

[Six pages of mobilization schedules, not translated'] 


328 


388— PS 


[ITEM 16] [Covering memorandum, with report attached ] 

Berlin, 22 July 1938 

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 
No. 1233/38 Most Secret L la 

2 Copies 
1st Copy 

MOST SECRET 

To: Major Schmundt or deputy 

I enclose a conference report. Your attention is requested 
(e. g. the remark of Chief OKW) . 

Chief of the Supreme Command 
of the Armed Forces 

By order 

[Signed] Zeitzler 

Submitted to the Fuehrer on 1.8. 

Schm [pencil note by Schmundt] 

[Stamp] 

Adjutants’ Office of the Armed Forces to the Fuehrer and Reich 
Chancellor 

Reed. 26 July 1938 App. 1 
No. 82/38 Most Secret 


[pencil note:] Maj. Schmundt 
1 copy 3rd report to Fuehrer 
Berlin, 12 July 1938 

L la 

to L No. 1233/38 Most Secret 

2 copies 1st Copy 

Conference Notes 

K [Initialled by Keitel] 
MOST SECRET 

OKH issues new manoeuvre intentions for 1938. Reason for 
alteration : development of the western fortifications and spreading 
of the foot-and-mouth-disease. 

Details : 

1. Of the previously intended training manoeuvres, the follow- 
ing remain: 

Fall exercise for the I Army Corps 
Training exercise for the XI Army Corps 
Fortress warfare exercise for the 1st Army Group Com- 
mand 


329 


388— PS 


2. New training manoeuvres: 

a. Fighting for fortifications 

b. Coordination with the Air Force 

c. Cooperation between ground attack, airplanes and field 
units commencing 1 August in the exercise area. 

d. Mobilization exercises for the Staffs 

e. Supply and communications control 

/. Chemical defense and cleansing of contaminated areas 

3. Training Manoeuvres for armored divisions: 

1st Armored Division up to 24 October at GRAFENWOHR, 
Corps HQ of the XVI Army Corps will also be there 
2nd Armored Division remains in Austria 
3rd Armored Division up to 24 September in KOENIGS- 
BRUEK, from 25 September near BRESLAU West of the 
ODER 

4. Training Manoeuvres for motorized divisions ready to 

march: 

2nd motorized Division in exercise area A, from 28 Septem- 
ber, in NEUHAMMER 
29th motorized Division in exercise area B 
20th motorized Division in exercise area C 
13th motorized Division in exercise area D 
1st light Division in exercise area E 

Commencement of the exercises not before 12 September, the 
end 24 November. 

5. Terrain exercises for units ready to march: 

These take place in the following Wehrkreise : 

II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XIII, XVII, 
Commencement of terrain exercises : 20 September 

6. Training Manoeuvres for the mountain divisions composed 
as on mobilization: 

2nd Mountain Division in area STEYR— PICHL— WEGER 
3rd Mountain Division in area SEMMERING — BRUCK 
Commencement of exercises: 26 September, End: 24 No- 
vember 

7. Training Manoeuvres for Training Divisions (Reserve Di- 
visions ) : 

a. 15 August to 13 September: 

Training Division VII Army Corps (69th Division) Field 
units Exercise Area NEUHAMMER, 

Training Division IX Army Corps (52nd Division) Field 
units Exercise Area GROSSBORN, 


330 


388— PS 


Training Division III Army Corps (68th Division) Field 
units Exercise Area JUETERBOG. 

b. 9 September to 24 November: 

Training Division IV Army Corps (56th Division) Field 
units Exercise Area OHRDRUF 
Training Division VIII Army Corps (62nd Division) 
Field units Exercise Area SENNE 
Training Division XIII Army Corps (73rd Division) 
Field units Exercise Area MUENDINGEN 
Training Division XII Army Corps (79th Division) Field 
units Exercise Area WAHN 

From about 24 September these 4 divisions will train 
West of the RHINE. 

8. New dispositions : 

a. Truck Regiment 616, 20 September to 24 October dispo- 

sition by III Army Corps. 

b. Army Artillery: 

6 battalions : 15 August to 3 September disposition and 
training 

11 battalions: 9 September to 24 October disposition and 
training. * 

Of these, beginning 24 September : 

5 battalions, to Reserve divisions West of the RHINE 

6 battalions to Terrain exercises of troops “ready to 
march” 

c. Engineer Battalions: 

3 Engineer Battalions, 9 September to 24 October, 
disposition and training. 

of these 2 battalions, 20 September, to terrain training 
of troops “ready to march” 

1 battalion, from 20 September to Reserve Division West 
of the Rhine. 

d. Artillery Intelligence Regiments: 

4 battalions and 2 Telephone communications companies 
(motorized) 9 September to 24 November. 

Disposition and training; from 28 September, 
the battalions will be situated in the 
neighborhood of BRESLAU, GRAFENWOEHR, NEW- 
HAMMER, INGOLSTADT. 

9. Employment of Engineer Battalions on the Western forti- 
fications: 

Employment of Engineer Battalions extended for no 


331 


388— PS 


longer than 3 weeks, also 7 engineer battalions will be 
added. 

10. Reich Party Rally and Harvest Festival: 

Participation remains as intended. 

11. Foreign Military Delegations: 

The foreign military delegations as well as foreign mili- 
tary attaches will be invited to attend the fall exercises 
of the I Army Corps. 

Z [Initialled by ZEITZLER] 


[Item 17] [Typescript} 

Chief Section L 

Written by General Staff Officer 
MOST SECRET 

Berlin, 24 August 1938 


S. 0. Only 

Access only through Officer 


1 Copy 

TIMING OF THE*X-ORDER AND THE QUESTION OF 
ADVANCE MEASURES 

The Luftwaffe’s endeavor to take the enemy air forces by sur- 
prise at their peace-time airports justifiably leads them to oppose 
measures taken in advance of the X-order and to the demand 
that the X-order itself be given sufficiently late on X minus 1 to 
prevent the fact of Germany’s mobilization becoming known to 
Czechoslovakia on that day. 

The Army’s efforts are tending in the opposite direction. It 
intends to let OKW initiate all advance measures between X 
minus 3 and X minus 1 which will contribute to the smooth and 
rapid working of the mobilization. With this in mind OKH also 
demands that the X order be given not later than 1400 on X 
minus 1. 

To this the following must be said : ' 

Operation (Aktion) Gruen will be set in motion by means of an 
“incident” in Czechoslovakia which will give Germany provoca- 
tion for military intervention. The fixing of the exact time for 
this incident is of the utmost importance. 

It must come at a time when weather conditions are favorable 
for our superior air forces to go into action and at an hour which 
will enable authentic news of it to reach us on the afternoon of 
X minus 1. 


332 


388— PS 


It can then be spontaneously answered by the giving of the X 
order at 1400 on X minus 1. 

On X minus 2 the Navy, Army and Air Force will merely re- 
ceive an advance warning. 

If the Fuehrer intends to follow this plan of action, all further 
discussion is superfluous. 

For then no advance measures may be taken before X minus 1 
for which there is not an innocent explanation as we shall other- 
wise appear to have manufactured the incident. Orders for abso- 
lutely essential advance measures must be given in good time and 
camouflaged with the help of the numerous manoeuvres and ex- 
ercises. 

Also, the question raised by the Foreign Office as to whether 
all Germans should be called back in time from prospective enemy 
territories must in no way lead to the conspicuous departure from 
Czechoslovakia of any German subjects before the incident. 

Even a warning of the diplomatic representatives in Prague 
is impossible before the first air attack, although the consequences 
could be very grave in the event of their becoming victims of such 
an attack (e.g. death of representatives of friendly or confirmed 
neutral powers). 

If, for technical reasons, the evening hours should be consid- 
ered desirable for the incident, then the following day cannot be 
X day, but it must be the day after that. 

In any case we must act on the principle that nothing must be 
done before the incident which might point to mobilization, and 
that the swiftest possible action must be taken after the incident. 
(X-Fall) 

It is the purpose of these notes to point out what a great in- 
terest the Wehrmacht has in the incident and that it must be 
informed of the Fuehrer’s intentions in good time — insofar as 
the Abwehr Section is not also charged with the organization 
of the incident. 

I request that the Fuehrer’s decision be obtained on these 
points. 

J 26/8 

[Initialled by Jodi] 

Notes: [in Schmundt’s handwriting] 

Submitted on 30.8 

The Fuehrer will act on these lines. 

On 31.8 Col. v. S. Jodi notified. Schm 31.8 


693256 — 46—22 


333 


388 -PS 


[ITEM 18 J [In Schmundt’s handwriting ] 

CONFERENCE 

on 3 September 38 at the BERGHOF 

Present: The Fuehrer 

Generaloberst v. Brauchitsch 
General of Artillery Keitel 
Major Schmundt 

I. 

Gen. Ob. v. Brauchitsch 

Reports on the exact time of the transfer of the troops to “ex- 
ercise areas” for “Gruen”. Field units to be transferred on 28 
Sept. From here will then be ready for action. When X Day 
becomes known, field units carry out exercises in opposite di- 
rections. 

Fuehrer 

Has objection. Troops assemble; field units a 2-day march away. 
Carry out camouflage exercises everywhere. 

? 

OKH must know when X-day is by 1200 noon, 27 September. 

II. 

The Fuehrer 

Expresses different opinion on employment of troops for 
“Gruen”. Aspects for the 2nd Army (OS) are smallest. Strong- 
est Cz. fortifications there. Waste of troops; thrust in the 10th 
Army area, however, is promising. Roadblocks prepared every- 
where in addition also in 2nd Army area. No reason for hin- 
drance. The Czechs will stop opposite 2nd army and keep as- 
sault army ready east of Prague. A thrust against it into the 
heart of Cz. is to be made. Thrust in the 14th army area will 
fail because of means of transport. Therefore assemble all 
mot. and arm’d divisions with 10th army and employ in the 
thrust. Once we are through there, the South front, which is 
built up opposite our 12th army in 3 defense lines, will collapse. 
An army in the heart of Bohemia will bring about the decision. 
Possible repetition of Verdun in case of 2nd army. An attack 
there would mean bleeding to death for a task which cannot be 
accomplished. 
v. Brauchitsch 

Has objections because of the state of the mot. divisions, supply 
and untrained leaders. 

The Fuehrer: 

The course now planned corresponds to Cz. expectations. 


334 


388— PS 


Opposite the 10th Army the enemy is not always in con- 
crete emplacements. Possibility here of drawing in the Hen- 
lein people (uniforms). The line here is very far back. Co- 
operation between 10th and 12th armies. We must add motor- 
ized units to army. As formerly the “Prussian Cavalry.” How 
else can we gather experiences ? Decisive is the coordination of 
equal speeds. Breakthrough in sector of 2nd army not so rapid, 
so that a tactical success can be turned into a strategic one. 
The Fuehrer gives orders for the development of the western 
fortifications ; improvement of advance positions around Aachen 
and Saarbrucken. Construction of 300 to 400 battery positions 
(1600 artillery pieces). He emphasizes flanking action. 

Certified. 

SCHMUNDT, Major on the General Staff 

BERGHOF, 4 Sept 1938 

******* 

[In Schmundt’s writing] 
(ITEM 19] [In Schmundt’s handwriting ] 

S. O. Only 
MOST SECRET 
DISCUSSION 

Nurnberg, 9 Sept to 10 Sept, 2200 to 0330. 

Present: Fuehrer 

Generaloberst v. Brauchitsch 
General Haider 
General Keitel 
Major Schmundt 
Hauptmann Engel 
Hauptmann v. Below [ ?] 

General Haider states reasons for operational plan “Gruen”. 
Mission: to prevent retreat of Cz. Army from Moravia-Bohemia 
area. To beat army. To bring about rapid decision. Mission can 
be accomplished by pincer attack in the direction of Olmutz and 
Brunn to be undertaken by 2nd and 14th Armies. Difficult trans- 
port situation in Austria. Therefore main effort in 2nd Army 
area. Cz. frontier can only be lightly held. Withdrawal certain 
on part of Cz. forces. Several defensive lines favorable but ter- 
rain will delay second thrusts and allow time to be gained for a 
Cz. retreat, and so retain a rear position. This is to be avoided. 
The Bohemian Moravian heights which will confront the attacker 
in the last phase will favor probable Cz. line of action. The pincer 
attack makes a “rear attack” from behind these heights possible. 


335 


388— PS 


This operation will definitely succeed. Reserves at first mainly 
local. Further reserves near and south of Prague. Opponent 
won’t have time to form further reserves. Opponent does not 
possess closed armoured forces. They are distributed and consist 
of light units. 

2nd Army. Weaknesses opposite its sector recognized. Installa- 
tions only partly completed. Mostly lack armd cupolas. There 
are great gaps. Olmutz will be reached on the second day. Oppa 
is no obstacle, can be crossed by tanks as well as Inf. No armd 
forces opposing. Freudenthal only 35 men garrison. So-called 
light motorized forces on right flank are no danger. Consist partly 
of mounted units and will be engaged by adjoining Army. Were 
the attack, against expectations, to fail, then under no circum- 
stances “bleed to death” before the position. Strategic concen- 
tration to be flexible. Rear sections will then be brought up to 
the points where success has been achieved. Cz fears the Glaz 
mountain area. Only demonstrations to be staged in this area; 
there will be a tie up of Cz forces. To provide cover eastwards 
tanks will be valuable. 

On the rest of the mountain front: 4th (9?) Corps, and in the 
frontier sector demonstrations must be staged to tie up forces. 

12th and Hth Armies will work together. Their columns must 
necessarily support one another during the thrust and cause the 
front to collapse. Bohemia only weakly occupied at frontier: 1 
Division to 120 kms. Operation therefore promising. After the 
thrust in a northerly direction 12 Army forces east and “races” 
for Brunn. The enemy will not be able to employ reserves ac- 
cording to plan. 

10th Army faces Pilsen Riegel which is strongly fortified. Bad 
roads. Tanks must break through here and establish bridge- 
heads for following up farces. Forces of the next wave will be 
brought up by truck units. After the 3rd and 4th Mobilization 
day 6 further divisions will be brought up to the 2nd and 3rd line 
and can be employed where success is in the balance. 

The Fuehrer: We should not plan the action on the operations 
as we desire them, but take into consideration the probable course 
of action pursued by the enemy. With regard to his course of 
action two factors are decisive : 1. At the time of our rearma- 

ment between 1934 and 1938 our opponent must have endeavoured 
to secure himself against a tearing of the East-West Communica- 
tion, in his case probably between Trappau and Nikolsburg. 
Against us this would imply the building of fortifications on the 
Upper Silesian frontier. In the South an agreement with Austria 


336 


388— PS 


would achieve a defense north of the Danube, or an advance to 
the Danube to protect the Southern flank. 

2. The latter is no longer possible. Therefore, as a result of the 
situation created in March 1938, it is all the more probable that 
they have increased their fortifications opposite our 2nd army. 
The enemy must hold there — otherwise there is no sense in hold- 
ing the remaining front. Hence here the best regiments and 
fortifications are to be expected. Holding of the front facing 
the 2nd Army will decide the “To be or Not to be’’ of Cz. There 
is no doubt that the planned pincer movement is the most desir- 
able solution and should take place. But its success is neverthe- 
less too uncertain for it to be depended on. Especially as a rapid 
success is necessary from a political point of view. The first 8 
days are politically decisive; within that week a far-reaching 
territorial gain must be achieved. Our artillery (210cm Howitz- 
ers) not adequate against fortifications. Where an attack is ex- 
pected the element of surprise is ruled out. Besides from ex- 
perience it is difficult to refrain from an action that achieves only 
part-success. More and more units are thrown into breaks, and 
bleeding-to-death which one wanted to avoid sets in (Verdun!!) 
Tanks are used up and are not available for the subsequent terri- 
tory-gaining operation. The consequence is that motorized di- 
visions have to advance without tanks. (“Tables Turned”) 

Also the objectives of the motorized units are not too far-removed 
and can be gained without fighting, so that they could be equally 
well gained by infantry troops. The motorized divisions will 
not be able to influence a decision to any extent. It is the task 
of motorized forces to bridge areas free of the enemy. Where 
an attack opens up a large free space, the commitment of motor- 
ized forces is justified. Compare with the use of army cavalry 
at the beginning of the 1914 war. It is catastrophic for tanks 
to have to stop and wait for infantry. This contradicts all laws 
of logic. In the 14th army sector fortifications can only have been 
begun since March. Hence, thrust toward Brunn will be easier. 
2nd Pz Div can therefore be left there. However, this division 
should operate with the 29th motorized division. Therefore the 
29th must not arrive on the evening of the 2nd day. The 2nd Pz 
must constitute the advance column of the 29th Div (Mot.) Are 
the road conditions suitable for the 29th? The 13th Division, 
which has no prospects of success as a Mot. division with the 
12th Army, is to be transferred to the Reichenau Army together 
with 2nd Motorized Div. Thus 2 chances for victory will be 
created. 


337 


388— PS 


If pincer movement has no success, 10th Army will open way 
for 12th Army, bringing strong forces into the heart of the coun- 
try. If both operations are successful, this means the end of Cz. 
In place of the two motorized divisions it is preferable to mobilize 
two further divisions which are to be brought up in trucks and 
buses. For the 10th Army the turn Northeast toward Prague 
may become necessary. 

General Oberst v . Brauchitsch: Employment of motorized di- 

visions was based on the difficult rail situation in Austria and the 
difficulties in getting other divs. (ready to march) into the area 
at the right time. In the West vehicles will have to leave on the 
20th of Sept., if X-Day remains as planned. Workers leave on 
the 23rd, by relays. Specialist workers remain according to de- 
cision by Army Command 2. 

The Fuehrer: Doesn’t see why workers have to return home as 
early as X-ll. Other workers and people are also on the way 
on mobilization day. Also the HR cars, they will stand around 
unnecessarily later on. 

General Keitel: Workers are not under the jurisdiction of dis- 
trict commands (Bezirks Kdos.) in the West. Trains must be as- 
sembled. 

v. Brauchitsch : 235,000 men RAD [Labour Service] will be 
drafted. 96 Construction Bns will be distributed (also in the 
east). 40,000 trained laborers stay in the West. 

F uehrer: Trained men should be distributed among newly 

formed divisions on 2nd line. 

Brauchitsch: Will be investigated. Implies change of mobil- 
ization orders if war orders already in the hands of the people. 

General Construction Inspector Dr. Todt (late brought into the 
conference) : Delays in unloading of material through slow 

changeover in timetable of RRs only from 15 September. Trans- 
ports must be in their appointed positions by X minus 11. Air 
zone to take 2nd place to the Infantry zone. Build battery posi- 
tions. 

Certified 

/s/ SCHMUNDT 
Major on Gen. Staff 


33S 


388— PS 


[ITEM 20] [ Typescript ] 

Schm [initialled by Schmundt] 
Nurnberg, 10 September 1938 
[Stamp] 

Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the 
Fuehrer Reich Chancellor 

Received 19 September 1938 

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces 

TOP SECRET 

1. The whole RAD organization comes under the command of 
the Supreme Command of the Army effective 15 September. 

2. The Chief of OKW decides on the first commitments of this 
organization in conjunction with the Reichs Labor Leader 
(Reichsarbeitsfuehrer) and on assignments from time to time 
to the Supreme Commands of the Navy, Army and Air Force. 
Where questions arise with regard to competency he will 
make a final decision in accordance with my instructions. 

3. For the time being this order is to be made known only to 
the departments and personnel immediately concerned. 

[signed] ADOLF HITLER 
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 
No. 2038/38 Most Secret WFA/L lie 

T 9.9 

Distribution: 

C-in-C of the Army 

Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C of the Air Force 
C-in-C of the Navy 
Reichsminister of the Interior 

for the attention of Ministerial Director Dr. Danckwerts 
Head of Reich Labor Service through Admin Office (VOA) 

Distribution: 

Adjutant to the Fuehrer — 1st Copy 
WZ, WH, WR— 2nd to 4th Copies 
Armed Forces Ops. Dept. — 5th Copy 
Lla, lb, Ic, IV, VOA — 6th to 10th Copies 
WNV — 11th Copy 

Office for Ausl/Abwehr — 12th to 14th Copies 
General Armed Forces Office — 15th to 17th Copies 
Armed Forces Staff — 18th to 20th Copies 
Spare — 21st to 25th Copies 

25 Copies 1st Copy 
A true copy: 
Hofmann 
Oberst (Reserve) 


339 


388— PS 


[ITEM 21] [ Typescript ] 


Berlin, 14 September 1938 
12 Copies 


Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 
No. 2044/38 Most Secret WFA/L lie 

[Stamp] 

Office of the Adjutant of the Armed Forces attached 
to the Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor 

Received 19 Sept. 1938 
Reg. No. 198/35 
Despatched Schm 
Clerk [initialled by Schmundt] 


Subject: Employment of Reich Labor Service for Manoeuvres 
with Wehrmacht. 

I. Effective 15 September the following units will be under 

command of the C-in-C of the Army 

1. The RAD forces of the light road construction battalions. 

2. Those parent units of construction troops which are to be 
formed from personnel from 2 Gau Commands, 21 RAD 
Group Commands, and 91 RAD Battalions of Wehrkreis 
HQs VII, IX and XIII, and set up at Army Group HQ 2 
(Heeresgruppenkommando) for the purpose of carrying 
out exercises within the areas of Wehrkreis HQs V and 
XII. 

3. a. The staff of Labor Gau W (Arbeitsgaustab) and the 

section and group staffs of the RAD employed on the 
• construction of the Western fortifications and also 
RAD Battalions with the exception of those branches 
of the RAD attached to the Reich Minister for Air and 
the C-in-C of the Air Force (compare Section 8). 

b. Labor Gaus XXI, XXIV, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, and 
XXXII come under the Supreme Command of the 
Army only in matters affecting the defence of the 
country. Those RAD units from these Labor Gaus em- 
ployed at the moment for purposes of the country’s 
Kultur, etc., will retain these tasks for the time be- 
ing, Labor Service for Girls [AWJ] is excepted from 
coming under the control of the Supreme Command of 
the Army. 

c. It must be borne in mind, when allotting military tasks 
to those sections of the RAD named in a and b 
above, that in accordance with Appendix 7 to the Army 


340 


3 88— PS 


Mobilization Plan for Deputy Gau Commands, Deputy 
Group Commands and Guard Units will remain with 
the RAD if and when mobilization takes place. 

4. The C-in-C of the Army and Reichs Labor Reader are re- 
quested to discuss all details under 1 and 3 direct. 

II. 5. Light road construction battalions are training-units of 

the Army. Their members are regarded as having been 
drafted into the Armed Forces for manoeuvre purposes 
and are soldiers. 

6. The members of remaining formations as per 2 and 3 
who have been taken exclusively from the RAD will re- 
main RAD leaders or men until mobilization. 

But it is possible that they will have to be attached to the 
Army for administration or that the army must furnish 
money if difficulties are encountered in prompt payment 
of the men. 

The C-in-C of the Army and the Reich Labor Leader are 
requested to settle details by direct agreement. 

7. In case of mobilization the regulations laid down in Ap- 
pendix 7 of the plan for the mobilization of the army come 
into effect automatically and apply also to those exercise 
formations for which there have up to now been restric- 
tive regulations with regard to their coming fully under 
the command of the Army. 

III. 8. Those RAD staffs and Battalions made over to the Luft- 

waffe in the Limes area will be under command of the 
Reich Minister for Air and the C-in-C of the Air Force 
beginning September 15. The same regulations apply in 
essence to them. 


The Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 

By Order 

Signed Keitel 

Distribution: 

C-in-C of the Army — 1st to 3rd Copy 
Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C of the Air Forces — 4th 
to 6th Copy 

Head of Reich Labor Service — 7th to 8th Copy 
L la, II, IV — 9th to 11th Copy 
Draft (VO A)— 12th Copy 
Distribution 2: 25 Copies 

Adjutant to the Fuehrer — 1st Copy 
WZ, WH, WR— 2nd to 4th Copy 
Armed Forces Ops Dept — 5th Copy 


» 


341 


388— PS 


Armed Forces Ops Dept/L lb, Ic — 6th Copy 
Armed Forces Communications (WNV) — 7th Copy 
Office of Ausl/Abwehr — 8th to 10th Copy 
General Armed Forces Office — 11th to 13th Copy 
Armed Forces Staff — 14th to 16th Copy 
Draft — 17th Copy 
Spare — 18th to 25th Copy 

A true Copy: 
HOFMANN 
Oberst (Reserve) 

LITEM 22] [Typescript] 

MOST SECRET 

Berlin, 16 September 1938 
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 
WFA No. 194/38 Most Secret S. 0. Only L la 

S. 0. Only 

Access only through Officer 

7 Copies 5th Copy 
19.9.38 

, Schm 

Subject: Preparations on part of Reichsbahn etc. 

The Reichsbahn must provide trains of empty trucks in great 
numbers by September 28 for the carrying out of mobilization 
exercises. This task now takes precedence over all others. 

Therefore the train-loads for the Limes-job will have to be cut 
down after September 17 and those goods loaded previous to this 
date unloaded by September 20. 

The Supreme Command of the Army (5th Division of the Army 
General Staff) must issue further orders after consultation with 
the authorities concerned. 

However, in accordance with the Fuehrer’s directive, every ef- 
fort should be made to continue to supply the materials in as 
large quantities as feasible even after 20th September 1938, and 
this for reasons of camouflage as well as in order to continue the 
important work on the Limes. 

Reports should be submitted on what can be done in this direc- 
tion. 

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 

Signed Keitel 

Distribution: 

Supreme Command of the Army — 1 (Copy 1) 

342 


388— PS 


C-in-C of the Air Force (Ketz'nger’s staff) — 1 (Copy 2) 
General Inspector for Roads — 1 (Copy 3) 

Certified 

Zeitzler 

Oberst on the General Staff 

Major Schmundt 

[There is no ITEM 23 in the file] 


[ITEM 24] [ Typescript ] 

MOST SECRET 

• Berlin, September 16, 1939 

30 Copies 4th Copy 
T 9.9 

[Stamp] 

Schm 

[initialled by Schmundt] 

Office of the Armed Forces 

Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor 

Rec. 19th Sept. 1938, 
Enclosures 
Reg. No. 199138 
Despatched 
Clerk 

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 
No. 2120/38 Most Secret WFA/L lie 

Subject: Employment of the Reich Labor Service (RAD) 

1. The following RAD forces will receive military training; in 
accordance with the instructions of the C-in-C of the Army: 
From the area of the — 

Ilnd Army Korps (AKs) 7 Battalions 

Illrd 2 Battalions 

IVth 31 Battalions 

Vth 1 Battalion 

Vlth 78 Battalions 

Vllth 1 Battalion 

IXth 65 Battalions 

Xth 84 Battalions 

Xlth 33 Battalions 

For the time being these battalions are still part of the RAD in 
matters regarding personnel, administration, and discipline. 


343 


388— PS 


2. The C-in-C of the Army and Reich Labor Leader are re- 
quested to settle all details by direct agreement. 

For the Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 
By Order 

Jodi 

Distribution: 

Supreme Command of the Army — 1st Copy 
Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C of the Air Forces— 2nd 
Copy 

Head of Reich Labor Service — 3rd Copy 
WZ, WH, WR — 5th-7th Copies 
Armed Forces Ops Division — 8th Copy 
L fa, lb, Ic, IV, VOA — 9th-13th Copies. 

Armed Forces Communications Dept. — 14th Copy 
Office of Ausl/Abwehr — 15th-17th Copies 
General Armed Force Office — 18th-20th Copies 
Armed Forces Staff— 21st-23rd Copies 
Spare — 24th-30th Copies 


[ITEM 25] [ Telegram ] 

(Handwritten note] 

MOST SECRET 


S. 0. ONLY 

LAST NIGHT CONFERENCE TOOK PLACE BETWEEN 
FUEHRER AND OBERSTLEUTNANT KOECHLING. DURA- 
TION OF CONFERENCE 7 MINUTES. LT. COL. KOECHLING 
REMAINS DIRECTLY RESPONSIBLE TO OKW. HE WILL 
BE ASSIGNED TO KONRAD HENLEIN IN AN ADVISORY 
CAPACITY. HE RECEIVED FAR-REACHING MILITARY 
PLENARY POWERS FROM THE FUEHRER. THE SUDE- 
TEN GERMAN FREE CORPS REMAINS RESPONSIBLE TO 
KONRAD HENLEIN ALONE. PURPOSE: PROTECTION 
OF THE SUDETEN GERMANS AND MAINTENANCE OF 
DISTURBANCES AND CLASHES. THE FREE CORPS WILL 
BE ESTABLISHED IN GERMANY. ARMAMENT ONLY 
WITH AUSTRIAN WEAPONS. ACTIVITIES OF FREE 
CORPS TO BEGIN AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. 

[Pencil Note] 1045, 18 Sept 38 
RADIOED to Capt. 

Engel, Berlin. 


344 


388— PS 


[ITEM 26] [ Telegram ] 

[Handwritten note] 

MOST SECRET 
S. 0. ONLY 

[In Ink] 

18.9 

38 

1030 

vb 

GERMAN 2nd ARMY— COSEL— 7 Inf. Div’s, 1 Armd Div, 1 

Inf Div on trucks, 1 Light 
Div, of these the following 
arrive on 1st X day : Two- 
thirds of one Inf Div, 1 Armd 
Div, and 1 Inf Div on trucks. 
On 2nd X Day: one-third of 
one Inf Div. 

On 3rd X Day: 1 Inf Div 
On 4th X Day : 1 Inf Div 
On 5th X Day: 2 Inf Divs 
from 7th day on 1 Inf Div and 
one light Div. 

8th Army : — FREIBURG — 4 Inf Divs. The following is the time- 
table for arrival : 

On 2nd X Day: two-thirds of one Inf 
Div 

On 3rd X Day: one-third of one Inf 
Div 

On 4th and 5th X Day: One Inf Div 
each day. 

4th Army Corps— Herrenhut, 2 Inf 
Divs of which one will arrive on 
the 1st day, the other on the 3rd 
day. 

10th Army: — SCHWANDORF — 3 Inf Div’s, 1 Armd Div, 1 Light 

Div, 3 Mot Inf Divs. They will 
arrive as follows: 

On 1st X Day: 1 Inf Div and 1 
Armd Div. 1 Light Div, 2 Mot 
Inf Divs. 

On 2nd X Day: 1 Inf Div., 1 
Mot Inf Div. 

On 4th X Day. 1 Inf Div. 


345 


388— PS 

12th Army: — PASSAU — 7 Inf Div’s, 1 Mountain Div, 1 Inf Div 

on trucks, Regt. They arrive as follows : 
On 1st X Day: 1 Inf Div, 1 Mountain 
Div. 

On 2nd X Day : 2 Inf Div, 1 Inf Div on 
trucks 

On 4th X Day : 2 Inf Div’s. 

On 7th X Day: 1 Inf Div. 

On 8th X Day: 1 Inf Div. 

14th Army: — VIENNA — 1 Inf Div, 2 Mountain Div’s, 1 Armd 

Div, 1 Light Div, 1 Mot Inf Div. N N 
Mot [?] They will arrive as follows: 
On 1st X Day: one-third of one Inf 
Div, 1 Armd Div, 1 Mot. Div. 

On 2nd X Day: % of one Inf Div, 1 
Light Div. 

On 3rd X Day: 2 Mountain Divs. 

END 

Reich War Ministry/Naval Communication Service 

MOST SECRET 18.9 

Renewed attention is called to strictest observance of secrecy 
regarding following message. Noted. Message begins — 

[There follows a repetition of the above telegram in its exact 
form.] 

Any questions? 


[ITEM 27] [ Typescript ] 

Army Appointments Held 

Army Group Command: C-in-C: Gen. of Inf. Adam 

CofS : Gen. of Inf. Wietersheim 
G-3 : Lt. Col. Muller 

1st Army HQ : C-in-C : Gen. of Arty Beck 

CofS : Maj. Gen. v. Apell 
G-3 : Col. v. Greiffenberg 

2nd Army HQ: C-in-C: Gen. v. Rundstedt 

CofS : Brig Gen v. Salmuth 
G-3 : Lt. Col. Hasse 


346 


388— PS 


3rd Army HQ: 
4th Army HQ: 

5th Army HQ: 
7th Army HQ: 

8th Army HQ: 
10th Army HQ: 
12th Army HQ: 

14th Army HQ: 


C-in-C: Gen. of Arty v. Kuechler 
CofS : Brig. Gen. Hollidt 
G-3 : Lt. Col. Wagner 

C-in-C: Gen. (for special duties) 
v. Hamerstein 
CofS : Maj. Gen. Viebahn 
G-3 : Lieut. Col. Metz 

C-in-C: Gen. of Inf Liebmann 
CofS : Brig. Gen. v. Sodenstern 
G-3 : Col. Duvert 

C-in-C: Gen. of Inf. (for special 
duties) Baron Zeutter 
v. Lotzen 

CofS : Brig. Gen. Modi 
G-3 : Col. v. Witzleben 

C-in-C : Gen. v. Bock 
CofS : Brig. Gen. Felber 
G-3 : Col. Hauffe 

C-in-C: Gen. of Arty v. Reichenau 
CofS : Brig. Gen. Bernard 
G-3 : Col. Dostler 

C-in-C: Gen. Ritter (for special 
duties) v. Leeb 

CofS : Maj. Gen. v. Lewinsky, 
known as v. Manstein 
G-3 : Lt. Col. Blumentritt 

C-in-C : Gen. of Inf List ' 

CofS : Maj. Gen. Ruoff 
G-3 : Col. Wohler 


[ITEM 28 : One Page Mobilization Schedule, not translated ] 


Berlin, 21 Sept 1938 

[ITEM 29] [ Typescript ] 

Chief, OKW 

If the Czech Government accepts terms: 

a. Cession of Sudeten German territory 

b. Plebiscite in Czech-German territories, 


347 


388— PS 


The following military measures are to be considered : 

1. The withdrawal by the Czechs from this territory of troops, 
police and Gendarmerie and other military units. 

2. The immediate surrender of arms in these territories. 

3. The immediate surrender of all fortifications in the areas 
with all arms and equipment. 

4. The immediate evacuation of fortifications by the military 
outside the above territories. 

5. The withdrawal of all military power behind a security 
line, which will include the fortifications under (4) . 

6. The right of the German Wehrmacht to use all public trans- 
portation and communications, especially the railroads, for 
military purposes. 

7. The right to fly over the above territories and to maintain 
Air security up to the security line. 

8. The occupation of territories to be ceded including the 
adjoining railroad junctions, communications installations, 
towns, airfields, etc. inland beyond the last fortification 
line. 

9. Pacification and security of the Plebiscite Areas by : 

a. German Police (originally) 

b. International Police (later for plebiscite) 

10. Demobilization of the entire Czech armed forces in the 
remaining area of the country, discharge of all reserves, 
etc. 

11. Immediate discharge of all Sudeten-Germans in the armed 
forces from the whole of Czechoslovakia to be sent home 
into Sudeten-Germany. 

12. Closing down of entire armament industry until after the 
end of all negotiations. 

13. a. Prohibition of any new fortifications and field fortifica- 

tions opposite the security line. 
b. Destruction of all existing fortifications which are situ- 
uated beyond the future German borders. 

14. Demand further cession of territory on military grounds, 
namely the Pressburg bridgehead, the area northwest of 
Pilsen, the Eger sector west of the Elbe to Laun. 

15. Security line must be 25 km from the territory being 
ceded to Germany or the territory being put to the vote. 
(See number 5.) 

16. Cessation, immediately, of all military Intelligence work 
against Germany. Violation will be considered breach of 
neutrality. 


348 


388— PS 


17. Immediate pardon and release of all Germans and Sudeten- 
Germans, convicted of espionage. 

18. Transfer of all Czech Air Force personnel to their peace 
time garrisons and prohibiting of all military flying oper- 
ations. 

19. Prohibition of destruction or sabotage of any military in- 
stallations, including ground installations of the Air Force, 
in the territories to be ceded. 

20. The closing down and handing over to the German armed 
forces of all radio transmitters of a military, official or 
private nature in the areas to be ceded. 

21. The handing over of all Railroad networks including roll- 
ing stock, undamaged. 

22. The handing over of all Public Utilities (power houses, 
gas works, etc.) undamaged. 

23. No materials of any kind to be transferred (such as raw 
materials, provisions, livestock, etc.). 

24. Prohibition of import of war equipment of any kind. 

25. Demobilization of Danube patrol and security vessels. 


[ITEM 30] [Typescript] 

[Pencil note written by Schmundt :] 


Bayreuth 134 

Not sent off. Schm 


26 September 1938 

HEADQUARTERS OF THE SUDETEN-GERMAN 
FREE CORPS 

Herr Benesch has dissolved the Sudeten-German Party and 
believes that he will thus be able to destroy the unity of the 
Sudeten-German radical group and to deal the death blow to 
the Sudeten-Germans. Konrad Henlein knew the answer to this. 
He issued a call on 17.9.38 for the formation of a Sudeten-German 
Free Corps. Within a few hours, thousands of Sudeten-Germans 
had already rallied to the colors all along the border. Thousands 
who were burning to fight for their tortured homeland were 
forced, to their great disappointment, to remain at their places 
of work, because it was impossible, in such a short period of 
time, to induct, equip and arm the masses of enthusiastic volun- 
teers. For even in the first few hours after the appeal (probably 
the first instance in the history of the Free Corps) shock troops 
of the Free Corps began, in extremely daring operations, to secure 


693256 — 46—23 


349 


J88-PS 


the escape of their countrymen who had been hounded out of 
their homeland by their torturers. 

Since 19 Sept. — in more than 300 missions — the Free Corps 
has executed its task with an amazing spirit of attack (defense) * 
and with a willingness often reaching a degree of unqualified 
self-sacrifice. The result of the first phase of its activities : more 
than 1500 prisoners, 25 MG’s and a large amount of other weap- 
ons and equipment, aside from serious losses in dead and 
wounded suffered by the enemy (The Czech Terrorists).* 
Thousands of members of the Sudeten-German Free Corps 
stand shoulder to shoulder on the frontiers of Germany. They 
are inspired by but one desire: The freedom of the homeland 

within Adolf Hitler’s Greater Germany. 

For Konrad Henlein 
The Chief of Staff 

[*The superimposed corrections represent actual ink corrections 
on the original manuscript.] 


[ITEM 31] [Typescript] 

Adj to the Fuehrer 

. [Note in pencil] 

28/7 

Schm. 

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces Berlin 27.9.1938 


MOST SECRET 1920 hours. 

WFA/L No. 2305/38 Most Secret II 45 copies, 16th copy 
The Fuehrer has approved the mobilization without warning 
of the five regular west divisions (26th, 34th, 36th, 32, and 35th) . 
The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has 
expressly reserved the right to issue the order for employment 
in the fortification zone and the evacuation of this zone by 
workers of the Todt organization. 

It is left to the OHK — to assemble as far as possible first of 
all the sections ready to march and subsequently the remaining 
sections of the divisions in marshalling areas behind the western 
fortifications. 


CHIEF OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF 

THE ARMED FORCES. 

Signed: Keitel 

Distribution: II. 


350 


388— PS 


[ITEM 32] [ Typescript ] 

[Stamp] 

Office of the Armed Forces 

Adjutant attached 

To the Fuehrer and 

Reich Chancellor 

Reed. 3 Oct 1938 

Reg. No. 259/38 Most Secret 

[pencil note] Adjutant to the Fuehrer 
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 
No. 2288/38 Most Secret WFA/L II 

MOST SECRET 


Berlin, 27 Sept. 1938 


Subject: Mobilization Measures 

To : The Deputy Fuehrer, via Administrative Offices (J) 
The Reischsfuehrer SS and Chief of German Police 
attn: S. S. Oberfuehrer Petri. 

Express 
47 copies, 18th copy 


As a result of the political situation the Fuehrer and Chan- 
cellor has ordered mobilization measures for the Armed Forces, 
without the political situation being aggravated by issuing the 
mobilization (X) order or corresponding code-words. 

Within the framework of these mobilization measures it is 
necessary for the Armed Forces authorities to issue demands to 
the various Party authorities and their organizations, which 
are connected with the previous issuing of the Mobilization order, 
the advance measures or special code names. 

The special situation makes it necessary that these demands 
be met (even if the code w’ord has not been previously issued) 
immediately and without being referred to higher authorities. 

OKW requests that subordinate offices be given immediate 
instructions to this effect so that the mobilization of the Armed 
Forces can be carried out according to plan. 

Following are several examples of cases where previous mobil- 
ization measures were delayed and a recurrence of which might 
seriously endanger the mobilization of the Armed Forces: 

1. The SA in Wehrkreis XI refused to give up equipment 
requisitioned by the Armed Forces in accordance with 
mobilization regulations, because mobilization has not yet 
taken place. 


351 


388— PS 


2. Billets which were prepared for troops under mobilization 
regulations were not evacuated because mobilization has 
not taken place. (NSKK-School Kreischwitzsilesia) . 

3. Police authorities refused to give up Police Radio Stations 
for the A/C reporting network, although the A/C reporting 
service had already been called up. 

The Supreme Command of the Armed Forces further requests 
that all measures not provided for in the plans which are under- 
taken by Party Organizations or Police units as a result of the 
political situation, be reported in every case and in plenty of 
time to the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Only then 
can it be guaranteed that these measures can be carried out in 
practice. 

The Chief of the Supreme Command of the 

Armed Forces. 

Further : KEITEL 

Distribution II 


[ITEM 33] [ Typescript ] 


MOST SECRET 
MEMORANDUM 


28.9.38 


At 1300 September 27 the Fuehrer and Supreme Commander 
of the Armed Forces ordered the movement of the assault units 
from their exercise areas to their jumping-off points. 

The assault units (about 21 reinforced regiments, or 7 di- 
visions,) must be ready to begin the action against “Gruen” on 
September 30, the decision having been made one day previously 
by 1200 noon. 

This order was conveyed to Generel Keitel at 1320 through 
Major Schmundt. 

[pencil note by Schmundt] 


352 


388— PS 


[ITEM 34] [Typescript] 

[Stamp:] Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant Attached .to the 

Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor 

[initialled] Schm. 

Reed : 3 October 1938 

Req. No.: 261/38 Most Secret 

Adj. to the Fuehrer 
Berlin, 28 Sept 38 

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. 

No. 2310/38 Most Secret L I a 45 copies, 16th copy 

MOST SECRET 

To define spheres of responsibility on the Cz-German frontier, 
the following orders are issued : 

Through mobilization of the frontier guard (Grenzwacht) 
responsibility has shifted entirely on to the army, that is on to 
the competent general staff corps. All the units operating on 
the frontier are subordinate to them. 

No new units of police, customs or party may be shifted into 
the immediate frontier area without the knowledge of the army 
headquarters concerned, nor may units already in the area be 
reinforced without such knowledge. In addition no one may 
cross the frontier without the knowledge of the army head- 
quarters. 

For the Henlein Free Corps and units subordinate to this the 
principle remains valid, that they receive instructions direct from 
the Fuehrer and that they carry out their operations only in con- 
junction with the competent general staff corps. The advance 
units of the Free Corps will have to report to the local com- 
mander of the frontier guard immediately before crossing the 
frontier. 

Those units remaining forward of the frontier should — in 
their own interests — get into communication with the frontier 
guard as often as possible. 

As soon as the army crosses the Cz border the Henlein Free 
Corps will be subordinate to the OKH. Thus it will be expedient 
to assign a sector to the Free Corps even now which can be 
fitted into the scheme of army boundaries later. 

The frontier guard has orders only to protect the German 
frontier, and not to take part in operations on the other side of 


353 


388— PS 


the border. Any support to the Free Corps by the frontier 
guards anywhere over the frontier is prohibited. 

Chief of the Supreme Command of the 

Armed Forces 

Keitel 

Distribution II 
plus : 

Reich Minister of the Interior. 

Reich Finance Minister 
Deputy of the Fuehrer 
S. A. Hqs. 

Reichsfuehrer SS 

Reich Labour Service 

Free Corps Henlein (Oberstlt Koechling) 

[The following 2 pages are an exact duplicate: Copy 33] 


[ITEM 35] [ Typescript ] 

[Stamp:] Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant 

Attached to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor 

(pencil noted: Adjutant to the Fuehrer) 
Reed: 3 October ,1938 
Req. No: 262/39 Most Secret 

Berlin, Sept. 28, 1938 

Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 
No. 2315/38 Most Secret WFA/L II 

MOST SECRET. 

Re: Advance Measures Pertaining to Mobilization Plan (Army) 
Special Appendix 5 

Following advance measures may be carried out: 

On the Franco-German border (WEHRKREIS V and XII) 

1. Special Group Siegfried, Kz9148 — preparation of organiza- 

tion for the reception of refugees. 

2. Special Group Siegfried, Kz9145 — Preparation of employ- 

ment of district offices and staffs of collecting areas for 
the discharging of reservists. 

Chief of the Supreme Command 
of the Armed Forces 

(Signed) Keitel 

Distribution II 


354 


388— PS 


[ITEM 36] [ Typescript ] 

[Stamp:] Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant 

Attached to the Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor 

[pencil note:] Adjutant to the Fuehrer 

Schm. 

Reed : 3 Oct. 1938 

Req. No : 260/38 SECRET 

Berlin, Sept. 28, 1938 


Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. 
No. 2335/38 Most Secret WFA/L II 

MOST SECRET 


45 copies, 16th copy 

Subject: 4 SS-Totenkopf Battalions subordinate to the C in C 

Army. 

To : Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police. 

(SS Central Office) (36 copies) 

By order of the Supreme Command of the armed forces the 
following battalions of the SS Deaths Head organization will be 
under the .command of the C in C Army with immediate effect. 

II and III Bn. of the 2nd SS-Totenkopf Regiment Brandenburg, 
at present in Brieg (Upper Silesia) 

I and II Bn. of the 3rd SS-Totenkopf Regiment Thuringia, at 
present in Radebeul and Kotzenbroda near Dresden. 

C in C Army is requested to deploy these Bn’s for the West 
(Upper Rhine) , according to the Fuehrer’s instructions. 

These SS-Totenkopf units now operating in the Asch promon- 
tory (I and II Bn of Oberbayern Regiment) will come under the 
C in C Army only when they return to German Reich territory, 
or when the Army crosses the German-Cz. frontier. 

It is requested that all further arrangements be made between 
C in C Army and Reichsfuehrer-SS. (SS Central Office) 


For the Chief of the Supreme Command 
of the Armed Forces. 

Jodi 


Further : 
Distribution II 


355 


388— PS 


[ITEM 37] [Typescript] 

L II b 

28.9.38 


MEMORANDUM 

SA-General Herzog answers question of Adjutant’s Office, Chief 
of Staff of the SA, 1600: 

Reichsfuehrer SS, on the 26th of Sept., issued order to Chief 
of Staff of Sudeten German Free Corps, Ref. Diary 38/Most Se- 
cret, according to which the Volunteer Corps would come under 
the command of the Reichsfuehrer SS in case of German invasion 
of the Sudeten German territory. 

The order was signed by Berger, SS-Colonel. 

J. [initialled by Jodi] 


[ITEM 38] [Typescript] 

[Stamp — as usual] 

Reed 3 Oct 1938 

Req No. 263/38 MOST SECRET 
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 
No. 2385/38. Most Secret. L I a 

Adjutant to the Fuehrer 
Berlin 30.9.38 
1600 hrs 
120 Copies, 16th copy 


MOST SECRET 

Subject: Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces No. 2371/38 
Most Secret. OKW/WFA L I a dated 30.9.38 

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS NUMBER 2 TO DIRECTIVE NO I. 

1. Attachment of Henlein Free Corps: 

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces has just ordered 
that the Henlein Free Corps in its present composition be placed 
under command of Reichsfuehrer-SS and Chief of German Police. 

It is, therefore, not at the immediate disposal of OKH as field 
unit for the invasion, but is to be later drawn in like the rest of 
the police forces for police duties in agreement with the Reichs- 
fuehrer SS. 

The instructions OKW No. 2310/38 Most Secret of the 28th 
Sept (last paragraph but one) and OKW No. 2371/38 Most Se- 
cret of Sept 30 are amended accordingly. 


356 


388— PS 


2. Rate of Exchange for the Cz. Krone: 

The following rate of exchange will apply for all transactions 
and payments: 100 Cz. Kronen — 10.00 Marks (1 Cz. Krone — 10 
Rpfg) 

The Chief of the Supreme Command 
of the Armed Forces 

Keitel 

Distribution III 

and Special Distribution 
(including Henlein Free Corps and 
Reichsfuehrer SS through OKW/L II) 


[ITEM 39] [ Typescript ] 

[Stamp :] 

Reed 3 Oct 1938 

Req No 265/38 Most Secret 

Adj. to the Fuehrer 
Berlin, 30 Sept 1938 

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces 
OKW No. 2367/38 Most Secret 
WFA/L I A 

MOST SECRET 

60 copies, 16th copy 

DIRECTIVE #1 

Subject: Occupation of territory separated from Czechoslovakia. 

1. The sectors separated from Czechoslovakia will be occupied 
by the Armed Forces as follows: 

The sector marked I to be occupied on the 1st and 2nd of Oct, 
the sector marked II on Oct 2 and 3rd, the sector marked III on 
Oct. 3, 4 and 5, the sector marked IV on Oct. 6 and 7th. The re- 
maining area up to Oct 10. 

The extent of the area I-IV is shown on the attached map. The 
extent of the remaining areas will be announced later. 

2. The Armed Forces will have the following tasks: 

The present degree of mobilized preparedness is to be main- 
tained completely, for the present also in the West. Order for 
the rescinding of measures taken is held over. 

The entry is to be planned in such a way that it can easily be 
converted into operation “Gruen”. 

The depth of the territories to be occupied daily depends on the 
details of the evacuation, which are being settled by the interna- 
tional committee. 


357 


388— PS 


a. Army: First of all the following units are available for the 

invasion : 

Training Bns. 

Motorized and Armoured Units 
Adolf Hitler SS Bodyguard Regiment 
I and II Bns of SS Deaths Head Regiment (Oberbayern) 
Henlein Free Corps 

All combat action on the part of the Free Corps must cease 
as from 1st October. 

b. Air Force: Those ground installations (including supply and 
signal installations) situated in the separated areas are to be oc- 
cupied immediately and prepared for the use of our own units. 
Flying units can be transferred if this becomes necessary for the 
air defense of the territory yielded or for the possible switch to 
“Fall Gruen” in accordance with fig. 2. Flights over territory not 
yet cleared for occupation by German troops must be avoided at 
all costs. Flak must be assigned to those objectives which cannot 
be protected by Flak under the command of the Army. 

3. Those units of the Armed Forces intended for the occupation 
of sector I must cross the former Czech-German frontier by 
1200 noon Oct 1st. 

4. Armed resistance in the area cleared for occupation must be 
broken. Czech soldiers and other armed personnel found within 
the sector are to be disarmed and taken prisoner. The boundary 
of the sector against the Czechs is not to be crossed under any 
circumstances. Hostile action against the Czechs on or beyond 
this boundary is to be avoided. 

5. The conduct of the field units must be based on the realiza- 
tion that they are occupying a territory whose population, after 
be.ng harassed for years, looks upon the German Armed Forces 
as Liberators. 

6. The German frontier guard will remain on the former Ger- 
man-Czech frontier, as before. 

7. The securing of the boundaries of the sectors against the 
area still in Czech hands is sole responsibility of the army. 

For the Chief of the Supreme Command 
of the Armed Forces 


Distribution: III 

[Attached map is not reproduced]. 


KEITEL 


358 


388— PS 


[ITEM 40] [ Typescript ] 

[Stamp :] 

Reed 3 Oct 1938 

Req No. 264/38 Most Secret 

Adj. to the Fuehrer 
Berlin, 30 Sept 1938 

The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces 
OKW No. 2371/38, Most Secret, WFA/L I a 

MOST SECRET 

Special Orders No. 1 to Directive No. 1 
Subject: Occupation of territory ceded by Cz. 

1. Operational Area of the Army: 

The area to be newly occupied will be at first an operational 
area of the Army. In it the Supreme Commander of the Armed 
Forces will have full powers and authority to delegate these 
powers to the C-in-C’s of the armies. 

The Commanders exercising these full powers can publish 
laws, institute special courts and issue directives to offices valid 
for the operational area with the exception of the highest Reich 
authorities, the highest offices of the State of Prussia, and the 
executive board of the NSDAP. This authority to issue regula- 
tions has priority over regulations issued by other Superior au- 
thorities. 

2. Units under Command of Army: 

a. The units of the military SS (V. T.) and SS Totenkopf Regi- 
ments intended for the occupation of the sector remain under 
OKH control. 

b. The Sudeten German Free Corps comes under the control of 
OKH. The Bn’s of the Free Corps are to be employed in the di- 
rection of their native territory wherever possible. They retain 
their present armament. Provisioning to be guaranteed through 
the army Hqs. Members of the Free Corps do not come under 
the military penal code. The Hqs of the Free Corps, after occu- 
pation of territory III, is to be transferred from Bayreuth to 
Eger. 

c. The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, in coopera- 
tion with Reichsfuehrer SS and at the request of Army Hqs will 
direct Police Forces and Gestapo forces for the support of Secret 
Field Police forces in the occupied areas. As required for Mili- 
tary Police duties, the Special Police (SdP) will be drawn in as 
much as possible. 


359 


388— PS 


3. Taking over of Military Accommodation and RR Installa- 
tions: 

a . All military installations, barracks and property will be 
turned over in the occupied Sudeten German territories by OKH 
in so far as they were up to now the property of the Cz. army. 
By OKL if they were property of the Cz. Air Force (including 
civil aviation.) 

b. The Chief of Transport System will make arrangements with 
the Reich RR’s regarding the taking over of rail installations. 

4. Signal Communications : 

a. The Army will be at liberty to use the postal communication 
facilities within the area to be occupied. Requirements of the 
Luftwaffe are to be assured through the Field Signal Units under 
the command of the OKH attached to the Army Hqs. Depending 
on the situation, the most important communication installations 
are to be put into operation as soon as possible, secured and 
screened against Cz. 

Special emphasis must be laid on the effective silencing and con- 
fiscation of all transmitting installations. Official, private and 
permanent radio installations of the Cz army are to be secured 
through OKH, those of the Cz Air Force through OKL. 

5. Customs Frontier Guard 

After the crossing of the Reich frontier by the troops, the se- 
curing of the old frontier is the responsibility of the Customs 
Frontier Guard (Zollgrenzschutz) ; the Supreme Commander of 
the Armed Forces will put the necessary personnel from the 
Frontier Guard at their disposal. 

The customs regulation of the forward line of the area to be 
occupied, will be determined by the Supreme Commander of the 
Armed Forces in conjunction with the Inspector General of Cus- 
toms. Liaison officials are still at the disposal of Corps Head- 
quarters acc. to #16 of the regulations governing the VGAD. 
Shipments to Wehrmacht offices as well as members of the Wehr- 
macht are not subject to customs regulations. 

6. Application of Laws : 

a. Compensation laws are to be employed on both sides of the 
border. Public buildings are to be used mainly for billets. 
Requisitioned articles do not become the property of the armed 
forces. Compensation for services rendered in cash (German 
currency) . 

b. Special regulations will be issued with regard to the intro- 
duction of the German Penal Code in the occupied areas. 


360 


388— PS 


7. Mobilization Measures among Civilian Population: 

Mobilization measures will not be taken among civilian person- 
nel. But all authorities have been asked to carry out quickly 
demands made by armed force authorities. 

The following measures are especially requested in order to 
guarantee the tasks of the armed forces. 

a. Reichs Postal Ministry 

Securing of direct tele-communications in the areas Breslau, 
Dresden, Wuerzburg, Nurnberg, Munchen, Vienna, Berlin. Estab- 
lishing of Special Emergency networks. Furnishing of items to 
the armed forces to whatever degree they may be required. (Com- 
pare, Mobilization Book (Z) Section IX No. 3501, 3503, 3532). 
Fulfilling staff requirements as regards the restoring of signal 
networks in occupied areas. 

b. Ministry of Propaganda: 

Dispatch of commissioners to the chiefs of civil administration 
in the operational area. Prohibition of publication of military 
news of any kind in the press (compare Mobilization Book (Z) 
Part V No. 1758 and 1600) 

• 

8. Organizations of the Party: 

The Fuehrer’s Deputy has been asked to inform the party 
organizations that OKH must furnish permission if party units 
are to be brought into the Sudeten area. 

9. Economic Directives: 

Any confiscation of values or balances at credit institutions 
(Kredit instituten) in the Sudeten German area is prohibited. 
Requisitioning is also prohibited. Supplying of the armed forces 
with food, forage and fuel is to be carried out from the Reich. 
The following rate of exchange applies for all transactions and 
payments: 100 Cz. kronen = 9.00 RM ( 1 Cz. Kr = 9 Rpfg ) [the 
underlined crossed out.] 

[pencile note : will be published this afternoon] 

10. Payment of the armed forces 

For the parts of the armed forces operating, pay as applicable 
in accordance with the peacetime regulations for large-scale 
maneuvers will go into effect after leaving garrisons or assembly 
areas. All additional costs arising through the operation are to 
be deleted under chapter VIII E 20 (OKW Treasury) 

11. Administrative Directives: 

The army hqs will administer the occupied areas on their own 
responsibility. The C D Z with their special staffs are at their 
disposal in an advisory capacity (compare H. Dv. 90. No. 20 etc.) 


361 


388— PS 


12. Supply Installations: 

For the maintenance and putting into operation of supply 
installations OKW Admin. Staff will attach the following to the 
Army/H.Q.’s 


Army H. Q. 

Tech Hq 

To 

App Time of 
Arrival 

12 

13 

LANDAU/ISAR 

10.1 

2000 

10 

4 

PLAUEN 

10.2 

2000 

8 

3 

GORLITZ 

10.1 

2000 

2 

8 

LAMSDORF 

(SW/OPPELN) 

10.5 

2000 


13. Propaganda Companies: 

Propaganda companies are to be used. Amendments as regards 
attachment made necessary through the peaceful entry will be 
conveyed verbally. 

Chief of the Supreme Command 
of the Armed Forces 

KEITEL 

DISTRIBUTION : III and Special Distribution 


[ITEM 41] [ Typescript ] 

[Stamp:] Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the 
Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor 

[pencil note] Adjutant to the Fuehrer 

Reed: 3 Oct. 1938 

heq. No: 266/38 Most Secret 

Berlin 30.9.38 
200 copies, 153rd copy 
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 
WFA/L No. 2150/38 Most Secret IV a. 

MOST SECRET 

Subject: OCCUPATION OF SUDETEN-GERMAN TER- 

RITORY 

1. The Fuehrer and Reichs Chancellor has ordered that Sec- 
tions of the Armed Forces march into the Sudeten-German ter- 
ritoiy, beginning 1 October, 1938. There will be no general 


362 


388— PS 


mobilization of the Armed Forces (or case “X”). Units already 
mobilized, will, for the time being, remain at their present posts. 

2. Coincident with the crossing of the Reich frontier, the Com- 
mander in Chief of the Army will assume full powers in the 
territory to be occupied, together with authority to transfer this 
power to the C’s in C of the Armies. 

The Commander in Chief can exercise these powers, and pass 
laws, install special courts, and give directives to the appropriate 
departments and offices functioning in the area of operations, 
valid for the operational area with the exception of the highest 
Reich authorities or officers of the State of Prussia and the 
Executive Board of the NSDAP. In all other cases, the right of 
issuing directives has priority over directives from higher 
superior authorities. The area of operations will be extended 
forward according to the area to be occupied. The shifting of 
the rear frontier of the operational area will be ordered sep- 
arately. 

3. Mobilization measures will not be enforced in the civil 
sphere. However, all authorities are requested to carry out 
immediately the demands of the armed force authorities. To 
guarantee completion of the tasks of the armed fdrces the fol- 
lowing measures are especially desired : 

a. Reich Postal Ministry: 

Securing of direct tele-communications in the districts of the 
Communications Hqs, Breslau, Dresden, Wuerzburg, Nurnberg, 
Muenchen, Vienna and Berlin. 

Establishing of Special Communications networks. Furnishing 
of equipment to armed forces in whatever degree may be required 
(see Mob. Book (Z) Part IX, No. 3501-03-32). 

Furthermore it is requested that staff requirements as regards 
restoring communication networks in the occupied area, be met. 

b. Propaganda Ministry: 

Dispatch of commissioners to the Chiefs of Civil on the admin- 
istration operational area. Prohibition of the publication of 
military news of any kind in the press. (Compare Mob Book 
(Z) part V, 1758 & 1600) 

c. Reichsbank: 

Issue of Mobilization money supplies without fiduciary mone- 
tary tender is authorized. (Compare Mob Book (Z) Part XVIII, 
Nr 8031) 

4. Application of Laws: 

a. There will be a special directive as to the introduction of the 
German Criminal Code into the occupied territory. 


363 


388— PS 


b. The Army Compensation Law [Wehrleistungsgesetz] will 
be in force on both sides of the frontier. Public buildings will 
be used as billets primarily. Requisitioned articles will not be- 
come property of the armed forces. Payment for services ren- 
dered will be made in cash (German currency). 

5. Economic Directives: 

Any confiscation of valuables or balances at Credit Institutions 
[Kredit Instituten] is prohibited in the Sudeten-German area. 
Requisitioning is also prohibited. Supplies of food, forage and 
fuel for the armed forces will be drawn from the Reich. The 
following rate of exchange is effective for all transactions and 
payments : 

100 Czech kronen — 10.00 RM (1 Czech krone — 10 Pfg) 

6. Payment of the Armed Forces: 

For parts of the armed forces operating, pay as applicable 
in accordance with the peace-time regulations for large-scale 
maneuvers, effective from time of departure from areas or gar- 
risons. 

7. Customs Frontier Guard: 

After the, crossing of the Reich Frontier by the troops, the 
security of the old frontier will be taken over by the Customs- 
Frontier Guard at -whose disposal the supreme commander of the 
armed forces will put the necessary personnel. 

The supreme command of the armed forces will arrange the 
guarding of the front lines of the area to be occupied (as to 
collection of duties) with the Inspector General of Customs. The 
Liaison officials according to Nr 15 of the regulations pertaining 
to the V GAD will continue to be at the disposal of the Corps Hqs. 

Shipments to armed forces authorities as well as members of 
the armed forces are not subject to customs inspection. 

8. Administrative Directives: 

1 he armed Hqs will administer the occupied areas on their 
own responsibilities. The CdZ with their staff of experts are at 
their disposal in an advisory capacity (see H. Dv 90, Nr 20 etc) . 
In all matters of a police nature, the Reichsfuehrer SS is to be 
consulted. 

The Chief of the Supreme Command 
of the Armed Forces 

(signed) Keitel 

Distribution : Overleaf 

DISTRIBUTION 

The Fuehrer’s deputy for the attention of SS-Oberfuehrer Knob- 
lauch — 1st copy 


364 


388— PS 


Reichminister and Chief of the Reich Chancellery for the atten- 
tion of Reichminister Dr. Lammers — 2nd copy 

Foreign Office for the attention of Leg. Rat. Freiherr v. d. Heyden- 
Rynsch — 3rd copy 

Reichminister of the Interior for the attention of Min. Div. Dr. 
Danckwerts — 4th copy 

Reichsfuehrer SS and Chief of the German Police — Reich Defence 
(RV) Section — for the attention of SS-Brigadefuehrer Petri — 
5th copy 

Reich Minister for Enlightenment and Propaganda for the atten- 
tion of Major (Reserve) Wentscher — 6th copy 

Reich Minister of Justice for the attention of Min. Rat. Haastert 
— 7th copy 

Reich Finance Minister for the attention of Min. Rat. Geh. Rat. 
Dr. Bender — 8th copy 

Reich Finance Minister for the attention of Min. Rat. Dr. Mitze — 
9th copy 

Reich Minister of Communications — Motor Transport Service, 
Shipping Hydraulic Structures — for the attention of Min. Rat. 
Pigge — 10th copy 

Reich Minister of Transport — Railroad Dept. — for the attention 
of Div. Dr. Ebeling — 11th copy 

Reich Minister for Science, Education — National Culture for the 
attention of Min. Div. Prof. Dr. Krummel — 12th copy 

Reich Postal Minister for the attention of Min. Rat. Honold — 13th 
copy 

General Inspector for German Roadways for the attention of Reg. 
Baurat Schaeffler; — 14th copy 

Minister President General Fieldmarshall Goering, Director of the 
Four Year Plan and the Prussian State Ministry for the atten- 
tion of Min. Rat. Bergbohm — 15th & 16th copy 

Operational Staff G B for the attention of Ministerial Director 
Sarnow — 17th & 18th copies 

Reich Minister of Economies for the attention of Ob. Reg. Rat. 
Dr. Burandt — 19th copy 

Reich Minister for Food and Agriculture for the attention of Min. 
Rat. Dr. Dietrich — 20th copy 

Reich Labour Minister for the attention of Min. Rat. Schroeder — 
21st copy 

Directorate of the Reichsbank for the attention of the Reichsbank 
dir. Dr. Mueller— 22nd copy 

Reich Conservator of Forests for the attention of Oberlandforst- 
meister Hausmann — 23rd copy 

693256 — 46 — 24 


365 


388— PS 


Reich Office for long range regional planning (Raunoreburg) for 
the attention of Reg. Rat. Dr. Schepers — 24th copy 
President of the Secret Cabinet Council Reich Minister Freiherr 
von Neurath — 25th copy 

Reich Minister Frank for the attention of Oberstaatsanwalt Dr. 
Buhler — 26th copy 

Head of Reich Labour Service for the attention of Oberarbeits- 
fuehrer Richter — 27th copy 

OKH (2nd Div. Army General Staff) (80X) — 28th-107th copy 
Reich Minister for Air and C-in-C Air Force (2nd Div. Air Force 
General Staff) (30X) — 108th-137th copy 
OKM (A II) (15 x) — 138th-152nd copy 
Adjutant to the Fuehrer — 153rd copy 
OKW : Chief of OKW— 154th copy 
WZ — 155th copy 

Ausl/Abwehr (with NA for Foreign Abwehr I, II & III) (5 X) — 
156th-160th copy 

General Armed Forces Office (with NA for J. Pressegr. Vers.) 
(4X) — 161st-164th copy 

Armed Forces Staff (with NA for WWi, WRo, WRue) (4X) — 
165th-168th copy 

Armed Forces Communications (WNV) (2X) — 169th-170th copy 

L (Chief, la, lb, tc, II, IVa, IVb IVc, IVd, K) — 171st-180th copy 

WH — 181st copy 

WR — 182nd copy 

Special Staff W — 183rd copy 

Stock kept at L IV — 184th-200th copy 


[ITEM 42] [Typescript] 

200 copies, 153rd copy 
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 
L. No. 2385/38 Most Secret IVA 
Subject: Occupation of the Sudeten-German area. 

Berlin, 30.9.38 
[STAMP] 

Office of the Armed Forces Ajdutant 
attached to the Fuehrer & Reich Chancellor 

Rec. 3 Oct 1938 
Enclosures: Reg. No. 267138 
Dispatched — 
Clerk 

1. By order of the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, 


366 


388— PS 


the occupation of the Sudeten-German areas by the Armed Forces 
will be executed in a manner which will allow a changeover to 
military operations at any time. 

For the advance of the troops to coincide with the withdrawal 
of the Czechs, particularly in the fortified zones, and on account 
of the possibility of local resistance, it is necessary for the march 
in to be arranged in a way suited to the conduct of military opera- 
tions. 


2. The military occupation also necessitates the settling of eco- 
nomic conditions in the Sudeten-German area. Assimilation can 
only be brought about gradually. For this transition period the 
rate of exchange has been fixed at 100 Czech crowns to 10.00 
Reichmarks so as to enable the retail trade to function. It is a 
pre-condition of this temporary settlement, however, that, until 
a final settlement is made with regard to economics and currency, 
and in order to avoid placing the Sudeten-German population at a 
disadvantage, only those things are bought in the open market 
which come in the category of goods which fill the immediate 
needs of life. Any exploitation of the present economic situation 
is a serious offense. 

3. For the above stated reasons, travel into the Sudetenland 
from the old Reich will be confined to those officials and authori- 
ties who have been given specific tasks in the Sudeten-German 
area. It is requested that all civil authorities and all organiza- 
tions of the Party be instructed without delay that it is essential 
to obtain the previous approval of the military authorities charged 
with the exercise of executive power (C-in-C of the Army, Army 
HQ) for the transfer of departments and units of any kind into 
the Sudeten-German area which is under military authorities. 

The Chief of the Supreme Command 
of the Armed Forces 


Keitel 


[Distribution for Item 42 identical to that of Item 41] 


[ITEM 43 is seven pages of handwritten notes too illegible to 
translate.] 


367 


388— PS 


[ITEM 44] [Typescript] 

MOST SECRET 
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 
No. 2400/38 Most Secret Lla 
Top Secret 

Berlin, 1st October 1938 
150 copies, 18th copy 
[Stamp] 

Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the 
Fuehrer & Reich Chancellor. 

Rec. Oct. 3rd 1938, Enel. 2-30 
Reg. No. 268338 Secret 
Dispatched — 
Check — 

SPECIAL ORDERS NO. 3 to DIRECTIVE No. 1 
Parts of the Army Employed. 

In addition to the Sections of the Army whose employment has 
been approved (See Directive 1, Section 2a), the following units 
will also be used for the occupation: 

Command (Generalkommando) III 
10th Inf Regiment (4th Inf. Div) 

The Chief of Supreme Command of the Army 
By direction 

Jodi 

Distribution: III and special distribution 


| ITEM 45] [Telegram] 

Army Teleprint Network 
Teleprint Office Notes 
Received from 

HDZG Pass to Date Time Re. No. by 
9.10 Dept 9.10 Schm. [?] 

Klimnisch [ ?] 

Telegram HBZG 12 9110 1304 

TO LT. COL. SCHMUNDT FUEHRER’S TRAIN (FUHRERZUG) 
1. IF THE OCCUPATION OF ZONE 5 IS CARRIED OUT TODAY 
ACCORDING TO PLAN AND WITHOUT INCIDENT OKW 
INTENDS TO DISSOLVE V. G. A. D. IN THE WEST AS 
FROM 10.10 AND TO BRING THE 5 SERVING DIVISIONS 
BACK TO THEIR HOME STATIONS * * * 


368 


388— PS 


2. ACCORDING TO TELEGRAM RECEIVED HERE POPULA- 
TION OF IGLAU VERY WORRIED AND EXCITED. COM- 
MUNISTS THERE ARE ARMED. FOREIGN OFFICE HAS 
BEEN INFORMED. OKW SUGGESTS EMPLOYMENT OF 
ENGLISH LEGION, IF IT IS BROUGHT UP IN THIS AREA, 
FOR PROTECTION OF THE GERMANS. FUEHRER’S CON- 
SENT REQUESTED FOR 1 AND 2 * * * 

signed KEITEL 

[Ink Notes: — ] Telephoned this from Opera House in Saar- 
brucken 'at 2100 10.9 to Capt. Deyle. Fuehrer agreed to points 
1 and 2. In connection with 2 : if the lives of Germans threat- 
ened, troops to march in after short warning. 

SCHMUNDT, Lt. Col. 


[ITEM 46] [Typewritten letter ] 

The C-in-C of the Army 

Berlin, W 35, Tirpitzufer 72-76, 10 October 1938 

[Pencil notes] 
11.10.38 
1800 hours Schm. 

My Fuehrer! 

I have to report that the troops will reach the demarcation line 
as ordered, by this evening. In so far as further military opera- 
tions are not required, the order for the occupation of the coun- 
try which was given to me will thus have been fulfilled. The 
guarding of the new frontier line will be taken over by the rein- 
forced frontier supervision service [Grenzaufsichtsdienst] in the 
next few days. 

It is thus no longer a military necessity to combine the ad- 
ministration of the Sudetenland with the command of the troops 
of the army under the control of one person. 

I therefore ask you, my Fuehrer, to relieve me with effect from 
October 15, 1938, of the charge assigned to me — that of exercising 
executive powers in Sudeten German territory. 

Heil my Fuehrer, 

VON BRAUCHITSCH 

[Handwritten Note:] Submitted to Fuehrer 11 October. Agreed. 
Schm. 


369 


388— PS 


[ITEM 47] [ Telegram ] 

Remarks of teleprint office 
Army Telegraph Network 
Pass to Date Time R. No. by 
Schmundt’s 10.10 1940 Schm. 

Dept. 

Received from HOZ6, 10.10, 1930 


Telegram SECRET 

HBZG No. 17 1915 Schm. 

TELEGRAM TO FUEHRER’S TRAIN, LT. COL. SCHMUNDT 
IF EVENING REPORT SHOWS THAT OCCUPATION OF 
ZONE FIVE HAS BEEN COMPLETED WITHOUT INCI- 
DENT OKW INTENDS TO ORDER FURTHER DEMOBILIZA- 
TION 

PRINCIPLE: 1 TO SUSPEND OPERATION “GRUEN” BUT 
MAINTAIN A SUFFICIENT STATE OF PREPAREDNESS 
ON PART OF ARMY AND LUFTWAFFE TO MAKE INTER- 
VENTION POSSIBLE IF NECESSARY. 

2 ALL UNITS NOT NEEDED TO BE WITH- 
DRAWN FROM 'THE OCCUPIED AREA AND REDUCED TO 
PEACETIME STATUS, AS POPULATION OF OCCUPIED 
AREA IS HEAVILY BURDENED BY THE MASSING OF 
TROOPS. 

3 TO DISSOLVE TRUCK REGIMENTS AS A 
MATTER OF URGENCY, IN THE INTERESTS OF ECON- 
OMY. 

4 IN THE WEST— GRADUAL REVERSAL 
OF ALL MOBILIZATION MEASURES WITHOUT PREJU- 
DICE TO THE WORK ON THE LIMES. 

5 INTENTION OF THE C-IN-C OF THE 
ARMY TO RELINQUISH HIS EXECUTIVE POWERS ON 
10.15 

FUEHRER’S CONSENT REQUESTED 

OKW 

[Handwritten notes ] 

Fuehrer’s decision : 

1 — Agreed 

2 — Suggestion to be made on the 13th Oct in Essen by 
Gen. Keitel. Decision will then be reached. 

3 — Agreed 

4 — Agreed 

5 — Agreed 


370 


388— PS 


NB. Notice of 5 to be sent by 6th Division 
Relayed to Lt. Colonel Zeitzler at 2300, 10.11 

SCHMUNDT, Lt. Col. 
[in Schmundt’s writing] 

% * * * * * * 

[Next page contains illegible notes] 

[Handwritten notes ] 

10.10.38 

What is in the Zone? 


5 1 (motorized) 

1 (light) 

1 armoured 
1 mountain 
1 div. 

U 3 motorized div 
1 light 

1 armoured 

2 div 

Liebstandarte 


1 mountain 
3 div 

1 truck transport 
regt. 

3 4 div 

Germania 


For special duties 


1 1 armoured 

? div 


13 div 

4 div (motor- 
ized) 

3 armoured 
2 mountain 
2 light 

24 divisions 


[notes in Schmundt’s writing] 


[ Telegram ] 

Army Telegraph Network 
Notes of Telegraph Office 
Received from HOZG 11.10.10.45 

Pass to Date Time R. No. by 

Lt. Col. 11.10 Schm. 

Schmundt 
HBZG 008 1040 

TO THE ARMED FORCES ADJUTANT ATTACHED TO 
THE FUEHRER AND SUPREME COMMANDER OF ARMED 
FORCES. THE C-IN-C THE ARMY REGARDS HIS DUTIES 
AS POSSESSOR OF EXECUTIVE POWERS IN THE SUDE- 


371 


388— PS 


TEN GERMAN AREA AS FINISHED AS FROM 10.15 AND 
SUGGESTS THAT THE ADMINISTRATION BE TAKEN 
OVER ON THAT DATE BY REICH COMMISSAR HENLEIN, 
PROVIDING THAT FURTHER MILITARY OPERATIONS 
ARE NO LONGER NECESSARY. PERSONAL LETTER OF 
THE C-IN-C TO THE FUEHRER HAS BEEN DISPATCHED. 

OKH 6th Div. (Five) 

General Staff of the German Army 

11.37/38 


[ITEM 48] 

[Ink note J 

1. If advance orders, times can be shortened. Regrouping of 

armies. 

2. If Hungary, small degree of preparedness. 2 brigades be- 

tween Pressburg and Budapest. 1 brigade east of Friedl. 
[Rest of note impossible to decipher completely] 


[Telegram'] 

. Army Telegraph Network 
Notes of the telegraph office 
Received from HBZC 11.10.1955. 


Pass to 
Lt. Col. 
Schmundt 


Date 

11.10 


Time 

2030 


R. No. 


by 

Joe 


24 

+5 


1)4 Mot. 
Div. 
1 B’n 
ready 
to 

March 
[?] 1 Ar- 
m’d 
Brig. 


29 [Undecipherable 
note] 

TOP SECRET 

HBZG 13 1930.11.10 

Lt. Col. Schmundt 

Question 1 : WHAT REINFORCEMENTS ARE NECESSARY IN 
THE PRESENT SITUATION TO BREAK ALL 


372 


388— PS 


CZECH RESISTANCE IN BOHEMIA AND MORA- 
VIA? 

Answer: ARMY SUGGESTS: 

ARMY GROUP 5: Nothing 

ARMY GROUP FOR SPECIAL DUTIES: 1 Arm’d 
Brig., 2 Mob. Div. 

ARMY GROUP 4: Nothing 

ARMY GROUP 3: 1 Mobile Division 

ARMY GROUP 1: 1 Division ready to march and 1 

Mobile Division 

B LUFTWAFFE: EMPLOYMENT NECESSARY OF 
ALL FORCES PROVIDED TO 
DATE OKW BELIEVES THAT IT 
WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO COM- 
MENCE OPERATIONS WITHOUT 
THESE REINFORCEMENTS IN 
VIEW OF THE PRESENT SIGNS 
OF WEAKNESS IN CZECH RE- 
SISTANCE. 

Question 2: HOW MUCH TIME IS REQUIRED FOR THE RE- 
GROUPING OR MOVING UP OF NEW FORCES? 

Answer: A Army: FOR REGROUPING : 2 days. FOR MOVING 
UP OF NEW FORCES FROM THE REICH 4 
to 5 DAYS (INCLUDING MOBILIZATION) 
B Luftwaffe: OPERATIONAL DUTY POSSIBLE ANY 
TIME 

Question 3: HOW MUCH TIME WILL BE REQUIRED FOR 
THE SAME PURPOSE IF IT IS EXECUTED 
AFTER THE INTENDED DEMOBILIZATION AND 
RETURN MEASURES? 

Answer: A Army: IN THE SOUTHEAST ABOUT 10 to 11 
DAYS.— IN THE EAST 9 to 10 DAYS. 

B Luftwaffe : AFTER RETURN OF FLYING UNITS TO 
PEACE TIME AIRFIELDS AND THEIR 
DEMOBILIZATION— THE AA GUNS 
WHICH ARE READY FOR ACTION AND 
THE GROUND ORGANIZATION BEING 
LEFT AS THEY ARE— LENGTH OF 
* TIME IN SOUTHEASTERN AREA 12 

HOURS IF WEATHER FAVORABLE. 
AFTER DEMOBILIZATION IS COM- 
PLETE SEVERAL DAYS, IN ANY CASE 


373 


388— PS 


LESS THAN IN THE CASE OF THE 
ARMY. 

Question 4: HOW MUCH TIME WOULD BE REQUIRED TO 
ACHIEVE THE STATE OF READINESS OF OCT. 
1st? 

Answer: Army: 6 days. If the reserves are called up by radio, 
3 days at least. 

Luftwaffe: AIR DEFENSE WEST, BEFORE COM- 
MENCEMENT OF REORGANIZATION, 
WILL BE READY FOR OPERATIONS IN 
24 HOURS. 

(signed) KEITEL 


374 


3 88— PS 


[ITEM 49] [ Typewritten table] 

LI a 

Berlin, 12 October 1938 
3 copies, 1st copy 

REFLECTIONS 

Of the Supreme Command of the Army on the withdrawal of 
Forces from the Sudeten-German Area 



Present Strength 

No. of Div. 
To Be With- 
drawn 

Strength 
After With- 
drawal 

Army Group 

No. of Divs. 

Div. Nos. Ear- 
marked for 
Withdrawal 

Army Group 
Command 5 

5 1/3 

1/3 44, 2 Mtn , 

3 Mtn , 29 th 
Mot , 4 light, 2nd 
Armoured 

3 

2 1/3 1 1/3 

Army Group 
Command for 
Special Duties 

4 1/3 plus 
1 SS Regt 

1/3 5th , 7th, 
9th, lf5th, 1st 
Mtn. 

11/3 

3 1 

Army Group 
Command 
4 

7 (plus 1 
SS Regt) 

10th, 24th, 2nd 
(Mot), 13th 
(Mot), 20th 
(Mot), 1st 
Light, 1st Armd. 

2 

4 2 

Army Group 
Command 
3 

3 (plus 1 
SS Regt) 

4th, 3rd, 18th 

2 

2 1 

Army Group 
Command 

4 

8th, 28th, 30th, 
3rd Arm’d. 

1 

3 2 

TOTAL 

22 2/3 (Plus 
3 SS Regts) 


8 1/3 

14 2/3 (Plus 
3 SS Regts) 


Namely : 

11 2/3 Inf. 
Div 

3 Mtn Divs 
3 Mot Divs 
3 Light Divs 
3 Armd Divs 


Namely: 

3 1/3 Inf Divs 
2 Mtn Divs 
1 Mot Div 
1 Light Div 
1 Arm'd Div 

Naynely: 

8 2/3 Inf Div 

1 Mtn Div 

2 Mot Divs 

1 Light Div. 

2 Arm'd Divs 

71/3 


[ITEM 50] [ Telegram ] 

REICH WAR MINISTRY /NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE 

MOST SECRET 

Received on 17.10 from kg at 1535 by [Indecipherable] 

MBZ 0 61 

Telegram from MBZ 045 17/10 1525 
Lt. Colonel Schmundt 

OKW suggests that by 20 October about half of the Army 
forces still remaining in Sudeten-German Territory (14 1/5 Divs 


375 


388— PS 


and 3 SS Regiments) should be moved out, as otherwise the 
orderly discharging of the old age group at the end of October — 
this is necessary for the building up of the Army — and the reas- 
signment of the recruits will not be possible by 10/11. (Involved 
are the: 2nd Arm’d Div, 1st Mountain Div., 7th Div, 13th 
Motorized Div, 20th Motorized Div, 18th Div and 3rd Arm’d 
Div). Fuehrer’s decision requested today. 

Signed Keitel 

[Note at bottom in Schmundt's handwriting:] 

The Fuehrer has given his consent 17 Oct. By telephone, 1905 
hours, 17 Oct. to Capt. Vogel, Section L, OKW. 

Schmundt, Lt. Col. 


[ITEM 51] [ Typescript ] 

The Fuehrer and Supreme Comdr of the Armed Forces 

Berchtesgaden, 18 Oct. 1938 
Despatched 19 X 39 M 
TO THE C-IX-C OF THE ARMY 
GENERAL VON BRAUCHITSCH. BERLIN 

The occupation of the Sudeten-German territory has been 
completed, the operation being carried out by sections of the 
Army, the Air Forces, the Police, the military SS (SS Ver- 
fugungstruppe) , the SS and SA. 

Placed under protection of the armed forces, 3 V 2 millions of 
German compatriots have returned to the Reich once and for all. 

The Civil Administration is taking over charge of them on 
21 Oct 1938. Simultaneously I relieve you of your right to exer- 
cise executive power, while acknowledging the understanding 
cooperation of all departments. 

Along with our Sudeten German compatriots, the entire Ger- 
man people express their gratitude to those who participated in 
the liberation of the Sudeten-Land. 

(signed) Adolf Hitler 
Berchtesgaden, 18 Oct 1938 
(signed) Schmundt, 
Lieutenant Colonel, G. S. C. 

The Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer and 
Reich Chancellor. 

After Delivery: 

To the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 

I request that publication in the press be initiated from there. 

1st Draft. 


376 


388— PS 


To The C-in-C of the Army 

The occupation of the Sudeten-German territory had been com- 
pleted according to plan, the operation being carried out by sec- 
tions of the Army, Air Force, and police. Thus 3 x /2 million Ger- 
man compatriots have returned to the Reich once and for all, and 
have been placed under the protection of the Armed Forces. 

You have borne the responsibility for the occupation of the 
country and the care of the population from the day when the 
army marched in, and now I approve your proposal to release you 
from your authority to exercise executive power in the Sudeten- 
German area, date of expiry being October 20th 1938. 

My thanks to all those who participated in the liberation of the 
Sudetenland, for the order and discipline, the social understand- 
ing and devoted readiness to help with which they have done 
their duty. 

J. 

[Handwritten note] 

The military SS (SS Verfuegungstruppe), the SS and SA 


[ITEM 52] [Typescript] 


Berlin, 18 October 1938 
Supreme Command of the Armed Forces 

No. 2560/38 MOST SECRET LI a 1300 hours 

[Stamp] 60 copies 

Copy 

Office of the Armed Forces Adjutant attached to the Fuehrer & 

Reich Chancellor 
Reed. 20 Oct. 1938 
Req. No. 297/38 Most Secret 
Despatch Clerk W 

MOST SECRET 
Directive No. 4 

The Fuehrer has ordered: 

1. That about half of the forces of the Army still remaining 
in Sudeten-German territory be shipped back to their peace 
time bases. 

2. That those parts of the Luftwaffe which are under the com- 
mand of the Army be shipped back and returned to the 
C-in-C of the Air Force. The withdrawal of other parts of 


377 


388 — PS 


the Luftwaffe operating in Sudeten Germany will be effected 
by the C-in-C of the Air Force. 

' Chief of the Supreme Command 
of the Armed Forces 

Keitel 


Distribution: III 


[ITEM 53] \Telegram'] 

REICH WAR MINISTRY/NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE 

MOST SECRET 

Received at 1040 by [Indecipherable] Initials 
MBZ 066 

Telegram from MBZ 050 21/10 1030 

LIEUTENANT COLONEL SCHMUNDT: 

(SECRET)— OKW REQUESTS THE FUEHRER’S APPROVAL 
TO THE FOLLOWING DECREE: ON THE 20TH OF 

OCTOBER THE REICH LABOUR SERVICE CEASES TO BE 
UNDER THE COMMAND OF THE SUPREME COMMAND OF 
THE ARMED FORCES, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF THE 
RAD FORCES OPERATING IN THE AREA OF- THE WEST- 
ERN FORTIFICATIONS. THE CHIEF OF THE SUPREME 
COMMAND OF THE ARMED FORCES REGULATES THE 
CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT FOR THESE SECTIONS 
IN ACCORDANCE WITH MY DIRECTIVES, & AGREEMENT 
WITH THE REICHS LABOR LEADER. OKW NR 2690/38 
Secret WFA/L two of 20 Oct 38 JODL 
[Handwritten:] Consent given, 21 Oct 38. 

Passed to Colonel Jodi’s Ante-Room at 1400 
Sch 22/10 


378 


388— PS 


[ITEM 54] [ Typescript ] 


MOST SECRET 
TOP SECRET 
Only through officer 
Conference Notes 


L I a Berlin, 27.9.38 

4 copies, 1st copy 

[Pencil note] 

Time of Attack “Gruen”. 

(Z. v. A. Gruen) 

COORDINATED TIME OF ATTACK BY ARMY AND AIR 
FORCES ON X DAY 

As a matter of principle, every effort should be made for a co- 
ordinated attack by Army and Air Forces on X Day. 

The Army wishes to attack at dawn, i. e., about 0615; it also 
wishes to conduct some limited operations in the previous night, 
which, however, would not alarm the entire Czech front. 

Air Force’s time of attack depends on weather conditions. 
These could change the time of attack and also limit the area of 
operations. The weather of the last few days, for instance, would 
have delayed the start until between 0800 and 1100 due to low 
ceiling in Bavaria. 

If the Luftwaffe were to attack at the time desired by the Army 
no tactical surprise of the enemy’s air force would be achieved 
and it would necessitate certain changes in the method of at- 
tack (height of flight level). Consequently, from the outset the 
Luftwaffe has desired a later hour of attack on the part of the 
Army. Even so, there would be no definite guarantee of a well- 
timed coordinated attack of both Forces, as bad weather condi- 
tions on the day of attack might postpone the commitment of the 
Air Force on X Day in part or altogether. 

If an early hour of attack on the part of the Army is regarded 
as indispensable, a simultaneous attack by the Air Force, — de- 
sirable as it may be, — may possibly have to be dispensed with. 
Thus it is Proposed: 

Attack by the Army — independent of the attack by the air 
force — at the time desired by the Army (0615) and permission 
for limited operations to take place before them, however, only 
to an extent that will not alarm the entire Czech front. 

The Luftwaffe will attack at a time most suitable to them. 

J. 

[Initialled by Jodi.] 


379 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 392-PS 


The Social Life of New Germany with Special Consideration of 
the German Labor Front [Das Sociale Leben in neuen Deutsch- 
land unter besonderer Beruecksichtigung der Deutschen Arbeits- 
front] (Berlin, 1938) by Prof. Willy Mueller. Pages 51-54. 
[Prof. Mueller was Reich Indoctrination Administrator in the 
German Labor Front]. 

“The Supreme Directorate of the Political Organization-The 
Staff Director” 

Munich, 21 April 1933 
Circular Letter Nr. 6/33 

On Tuesday, 2 May 1933, the coordination action [Gleich- 
schaltungsaktion] of the free trade unions begins. 

The direction of the entire action lies in the hands of the Action 
Committee. 

The Action Committee is composed as follows : 

Dr. Robert Ley, Chairman. 

Rudolf Schmeer, Deputy. 

Schuhmann, Commissar of the General German Trade 
Union Federation [ADGB]. 

Peppier, Commissar for the General Independent Em- 
ployees 'Federation [AFA]. 

Muchow Organization. 

Bank Director Muller, Commissar, Director of the Bank 
for Workers, Employees and Officials. 

Brinckmann, Commissar Chief Cashier. 

Biallas, Propaganda and Press. 

All the commissar directors of the unions belong to the broader 
Action Committee. 

The essential part of the action is to be directed against the 
General German Trade Union Federation [ADGB] and the 
General Independent Employees Federation [AFA]. Any- 
thing beyond that which is dependent upon the free trade unions 
is left to the discretion of the Gauleiter’s judgment. 

The Gauleiters are responsible for the execution of the coordi- 
nation action in the individual areas. Supporters of the action 
should be members of the National Socialist Factory Cell Organ- 
izations [NSBO or National-Sozialistische Betriebszellen-Organ- 
isation] . 

SA as well as SS are to be employed for the occupation of trade 
union properties and for taking into protective custody personal- 
ities concerned. 


380 


392-PS 


The Gauleiter is to proceed with his measures on a basis of 
the closest understanding with competent regional factory cells 
directors [Gaubetriebszellenleiter] . 

The action in Berlin will be conducted by the Action Committee 
itself. 

In the Reich the following will be occupied : 

The directing offices of the unions; 

The trade union houses and offices of the free trade unions, 
The Party houses of the Socialist Democratic Party of 
Germany insofar as trade unions are involved there ; 

The branches and pay offices of the Bank for Workers, Em- 
ployees and officials, Inc. 

The district committees of the General German Trade Union 
Federation and of the General Independent Employees 
Federation. 

The local committees of the General German Trade Union 
Federation and of the General Independent Employees 
Federation. 

The following are to be taken into protective custody: 

All trade union chairmen [Verbandsvorsitzende] ; 

The district Secretaries and the branch directors of the 
“Bank for Workers, Employees and Officials, Inc.” 

The Chairmen of local committees as well as the employees of 
unions are not to be taken into protective custody but are to be 
urged to continue their work. 

Exceptions are granted only with the permission of the Gau- 
leiter. 

The taking over of the independent trade unions must proceed 
in such a fashion that the workers and employees will not be 
given the feeling that this action is against them, but on the con- 
trary, an action against a superannuated system which is not di- 
rected in conformity with the interests of the German nation. 

The Provisional local direction of the General German Trade 
Union and of the General Independent Employees’ Federations 
is to be taken over by a commissar of the National Socialist Fac- 
tory Cells Organization [NSBO]. 

The dealings with the authorities and other organizations are 
to be handed over immediately to the newly installed commissars. 

All funds and accounts of the independent trade unions are to 
be blocked immediately and remain thus until Thursday after- 
noon 1800 hours. Insofar as incumbent cashiers are permitted to 
remain in office they will be subject to the authority of the com- 


693256 — 46— 25 


381 


392— PS 


missar. All payment receipts must be countersigned by a com- 
missar. 

After raising the blocking of funds the usual payments for the 
support of persons, etc. must be unconditionally assured in order 
not to create a feeling of uneasiness among the members of the 
trade unions. 

As soon as possible mass assemblies are to be arranged for the 
free attendance by all trade union members. In these meetings 
the meaning of the action is to be set forth and it is to be ex- 
plained that the rights of the workers and employees are being 
unequivocally guaranteed. 

The following unions belong to the General German Trade Union 
Federation [Here follows an enumeration of 28 unions]. 

The following unions belong to the General Independent Em- 
ployees Federation [Here follows an enumeration of 13 unions]. 

Up to the present time the following have been proposed for 
commissars: [Here follows an enumeration of 17 names as com- 
missars for the most important arrangements of the General Ger- 
man Trade Union Federation], 

For the rest, the newly installed commissars will be nominated 
by the Gauleiters in close cooperation with the Regional Factory 
Cells Office. [Gaubetriebszellenamt]. 

It is to be understood that this action is to proceed in a strongly 
disciplined fashion. The Gauleiters are responsible in this re- 
spect; they are to hold the direction of the action firmly in hand. 

Heil Hitler! 

/s/ Dr. Robert Ley 


The NSBO (National Socialist Factory Cells Organization) 
took over not only the administrative apparatus but the entire 
press of the “Free Trade Unions.” The papers and magazines 
which had a pronounced party political [parteipolitisch] tend- 
ency had to stop their publication, while the other special pub- 
lications continued. By all these measures Marxism was to be hit 
exclusively, but not the idea of trade unions as such, in which the 
right and defense of the German workers were embodied. 

On 5 May 1933, the leader of the action committee reported 
to Hitler the success of the ordered action. Then, in a public mass 
demonstration, he reported about the events of 2 May to the 
workers of Berlin ; at the same time, he unfolded before them his 
future plans which were to secure the maintenance of the finan- 
cial efficiency of the trade unions in the interest of the worker. 


382 


392— PS 


Following the crushing of the free trade unions, the danger 
came, of course, that former functionaries would try to acquire 
money and other property items for themselves in an illegal 
manner. This, however, would have entailed damage to the mem- 
bers. To avoid these dangers on 12 May 1933, the Attorney Gen- 
eral of the State confiscated the property of the free trade unions 
and of all of their affiliated unions and administrative agencies 
in order to secure an orderly disposition of the property of the 
German workers. Dr. Robert Ley was assigned as the attorney 
with the right to dispose of the confiscated property [vefue- 
gungsberechtigter Pfleger der beschlagnahmten Vermoegen]. 

While the free trade unions were smashed [zertruemmert] in 
the action of 2 May, Dr. Ley granted the entire Union of the 
Christian Trade Unions with further full liberty of movement. 
For this purpose, he told it on the 6th of May 1933 that “nothing 
will be changed in the present situation until the return of the 
Saar to the Reich and that they (the Christian Trade Unions) 
should continue as before to represent and carry on the idea of 
the Christian Trade Unions and of Germandom as they see it”. 
Therefore the Christian Trade Unions put on temporary con- 
straint in their attitude toward the social political events of 2 
May and participated in the Saar in forming the “German Trade 
Union Front” in order to help to secure the result of the Saar 
voting by achieving a unity of the people. 

The former free trade union leaders behaved differently. These, 
with the assistance of their colleagues abroad and of the inter- 
national union of the trade unions, tried to oppose the measures 
of the German government; this induced Dr. Ley to introduce 
the defense against sabotage by the legal authorities. 

The hostile activities reached their peak at the International 
Workers Conference of Geneva which began on 8 June 1933. 
From the German side, Dr. Ley also took part in it; representa- 
tives of the Reich Cabinet and of the Christian Trade Unions 
were with him. The subjects for the meeting were labor media- 
tion, w T ork conditions in certain branches of industry, social in- 
surance, provision for unemployed, and shortening of the work- 
ing time. The participating states were to enter the basic rules, 
which were to be set up in an international agreement, into their 
social legislations. The Germans represented voiced the opinion 
that the situation of the working people could not be improved 
by international agreement but by providing work and bread for 
the workers. In spite of this opposite opinion, Germany took part 
at the conference; in this way the German government wanted 
to prove that it had no purpose whatever to smash the social 


383 


392— PS 


achievements of the German labor but that, on the contrary, she 
endeavored to retain them and lead them further. However, she 
was not willing to approve of an international agreement by 
which the further development of the German social legislation 
could be hampered. 

During the conference, a few foreign personalities opposed the 
German representatives in such a way that Dr. Ley was induced 
to reject the further participation of the German Delegation in 
the discussions. 

The atmosphere of Geneva did not remain without influence 
upon the representatives of the Christian Trade Unions. As al- 
ready mentioned, the Christian Trade Unions were first given op- 
portunity to continue their social work without interference. They 
began to exploit this favor. Also formally they have asserted 
that they were subject to all governmental measures which have 
been already taken or were to be taken; but that they could not 
refrain in the course of time from striving for a special position, 
which was to protect them from being ideologically converted to 
the world of national socialistic ideas. This attitude, which was 
contrary to the general interests and was prone to bring again 
dissension in the ranks of labor, induced Dr. Ley on 24 June 1933 
to order the complete incorporation of the Christian Trade Unions 
into the German Labor Front which had been founded in the 
meantime. It was again the NSBO to which this task was as- 
signed. At the same time the leaders of the Christian Trade 
Unions lost their honorary positions which were granted to them 
by Dr. Ley in the new social order. Concerning this, Dr. Ley sub- 
mitted the following statement: 

I. With the formation of the German Labor Front the 

majority of workers’ and capitalists’ organizations should 
have an opposite orientation. Not only should the last 
refuge of Marxism be liquidated by this means, but also 
it should be possible to remove the unfortunate schism of 
the German laboring men. Petty and selfish persons do 
not wish to recognize this great and revolutionary fact and 
seek to weaken this work by imitations and self-help or- 
ganizations. It is the will of the Fuehrer that outside of the 
German Labor Front no other organization (whether of 
worker or of employers) is to exist * * * 

II. National Socialism is exercising the power in its 
strength most generously, however this proceeding is be- 
ing interpreted here and there by its small opponents as 
weakness. This National Socialism believed that it could 


384 


392— PS 


be generous in dealing with the Christian trade unions and 
other middle-class groups. This fact was answered by in- 
gratitude and disloyalty. It turns out that the afore-men- 
tioned unions have shown the greatest corruption in treas- 
ury matters and in economic affairs. Because of this knowl- 
edge I offer the following: All offices of the Christian Trade 
Unions and of employee unions are to be occupied by Na- 
tional Socialists * * * 

(Signed) Dr. Robert LEY 

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 404-PS 

MEIN KAMPF 
Adolf Hitler 
German Edition, 1935 

[Pages 456 to 457] 

It is precisely our German people, that today, broken down, 
lies defenseless against the kicks of the rest of the world who 
need that suggestive force that lies in self-confidence. But this 
self-confidence has to be instilled into the young fellow-citizen 
from childhood on. His entire education and development has to 
be directed at giving him the conviction of being absolutely su- 
perior to others. With this physical force and skill he has again 
to win the belief in the invincibility of his entire nationality. For 
what once led the German army to victory was the sum of the 
confidence which the individual and all in common had in their 
leaders. The confidence in the possibility of regaining its freedom 
is what will restore the German people. But this conviction must 
be the final product of the same feeling of millions of individuals. 

[Page 475] 

The racial State will have to see to it that there will be a gen- 
eration which, by a suitable education, will be ready for the final 
and ultimate decision on this globe. The nation which enters first 
on this course will be the victorious one. 


MEIN KAMPF 
Adolf Hitler 
41st Edition, 1933 

Verlag Franz Eher Nachfolger, GMm. b.H. Muenchen. 
[Page 607, line 37 to page 608, complete] 

For this reason alone, The SA of the NSDAP could have nothing 
in common with a military organization. It was an instrument for 
defense and education of the National Socialist movement and 
its tasks lay in an entirely different province from that of the 
so-called combat leagues [Wehrverbaende]. But it could also con- 


385 


404-PS 


stitute no secret organization. The aim of secret organizations can 
only be illegal. In this way, the scope of such an organization is 
automatically limited. It is not possible, especially in view of the 
talkativeness of the German people, to build up an organization of 
any size and at the same time to keep it outwardly secret or even 
to veil its aims. Any such intention would be thwarted a thousand 
times. Not only that our police authorities today have a staff of 
pimps and similar rabble at their disposal, who will betray any- 
thing they can find for the Juda’s payment of thirty pieces of 
silver, and even invent things to betray, but the supporters 
themselves can never be brought to the silence, that is necessary 
in such a case. Only very small groups, by years of sifting, can 
assume the character of real secret organizations. But the very 
smallness of such organizations would remove their value for 
the National Socialist movement. What ive needed and still need 
ivere and are not a hundred or tivo hundred reckless conspirators , 
but hundreds of thousands of fanatical fighters for our phil- 
osophy of life [ Weltanschauung ]. We should not work in secret 
conventicles , but in mighty mass demonstrations , and it is not by 
dagger and poison or by pistol that the road can be cleared for 
the movement , but by the conquest of the streets . We must teach 
the Marxists that the future master of the streets is National 
Socialism , just as it will some day be the master of the state . 


MEIN KAMPF 
Adolf Hitler 

Munich, 1933, 39th Edition. 

[Page 675] 

The trade union in national-socialist interpretation, has not 
the mission to gradually transform into one class, through con- 
densation, all the various individuals among the people, thereby 
to take up the fight against other similarly organized structures 
within the nation. On the whole we cannot assign this mission 
to the trade union, rather it was first conferred on it at the mo- 
ment in which it became the weapon of Marxism. It is not that 
the trade union is imbued with the spirit of the class struggle, 
directly, on the contrary, Marxism has made of it an instrument 
for its class war. It created the economic weapon which the in- 
ternational world Jew uses for the ruination of the economic basis 
of free, independent national states, for the annihilation of their 
national industry and of their national commerce, and thereby 
lor the enslavement of free peoples in the service of international 
world finance Jewry. 


386 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 405-PS 


1933 REICHSGESETZBLATT, PART I, PAGE 285 
Law concerning Trustees of Labor 
of 19 May 1933 

The Reich Government has decided on the following law, which 
is hereby promulgated. 

Section 1 

1. The Reich Chancellor appoints trustees of labor for the 
larger economic areas upon the proposal of the competent pro- 
vincial governments and in agreement with them. 

2. The Reich Labor Minister will assign the trustees either to 
the participating provincial governments, if they agree, or to the 
provincial authorities. 

Section 2 

1. Until a new revision of the social constitution, the trustees 
are to regulate the conditions for the conclusion of labor con- 
tracts. This practice is to be legally binding for all persons and 
replaces the system founded on combinations of workers, of indi- 
vidual employers or of combinations of employers. The regula- 
tions concerning the general application (par 2 ff of the tariff 
accord decree in the publication of 1 March 1928, Reichsgesetz- 
blatt I, p 47) remain unaffected. 

2. Moreover, the trustees are also to look after the mainte- 
nance of the labor peace. 

3. Furthermore, they are to be convoked for their cooperation 
in the preparation of a new social constitution. 

Section 3 

The trustees are empowered to request aid of the competent 
Reich and provincial authorities for the execution of their regu- 
lations. They should contact the provincial government or one 
of their designated authorities before executing their measures, 
even though the danger of delay exists. 

Section 4 

The trustees of labor are bound by the directives and decrees 
of the Reich Government. 

Section 5 

The Reich Minister of Labor in agreement with the Reich Min- 
ister of Economics issues the necessary regulations for the im- 
plementation. 

Berlin 19 May 1933. 

The Reich Chancellor 

Adolf Hitler 


387 


405-PS 


The Reich Labor Minister 

Franz Seldte 

The Reich Economics Minister and Agriculture 

Hugenberg 

The Reich Minister of the Interior 

Frick 

The Reich Minister of Finance 

Count Schwerin von Krosigk 

PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 406-PS 

Contents 
Memorandum 
by Gauleiter 

Party Member Julius Streicher 

Enclosure 1: First memorandum by Gauleiter Deputy, Party 
Member Karl Holz, with postscriptum. 

Enclosure 2: Second memorandum by Gauleiter Deputy, Party 
Member Karl Holz, with postscriptum. 

Appendix 1: Case Sandreuter 
Appendix 2: Case Ritter 
Appendix 3: Case J. M. Lang 

MEMORANDUM 
BY GAULEITER 

PARTY MEMBER JULIUS STREICHER 
Action against the Jews on 9/10 November 1938. 

I was no longer present at the traditional fellowship congre- 
gation in the old town-hall in Munich on the evening of 9 No- 
vember 1938 when a speaker, who claimed to have higher au- 

thority, made it known that the party was launching an action 
against the Jews during the night of 9/10 November 1938. I 
was informed of this fact by the party members Obergruppen- 
fuehrer von Obernitz and Obergruppenfuehrer Litzmann around 
midnight of 9 November 1938. I declared to both these party 
members that I myself did- not approve of an action involving 
arson of synagogues and destruction of goods but that I would 
raise no objections, of course, if this action had been sanctioned 
by the party. Therefore, ivhat was done to the Jew's during the 
night of 9/10 November 1938 happened without my direct or in- 
direct assistance. 


388 


406— PS 


The consequences arising from the action against 
the Jews. 

The action against the Jews of November 1938 was not a spon- 
taneous one emanating from the population, and therefore was 
incomprehensible to many party members also as to its effects. 
Units of the components of the Party had been ordered to carry 
out the action against the Jews. If there is evidence now that 
in isolated cases party members with immaculate police records 
have appropriated goods during this action it should not be over- 
looked in judging such incidents that the appropriation toas com- 
mitted in an instant, ivhere all goods ivere being destroyed in ac- 
cordance with the orders given. April 14, 1939 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-li-PS 

Telegram 

GBA 760/43 [in ink crossed out in red] 

10 March 3. 

To the Fuehrer 
Fuehrer headquarters 

With the urgent request for immediate presentation to the 
Fuehrer in person and decision. 

Subject: Difficulties in recruiting of workers [Arbeitsdienstver- 
pflichtung] in the former Soviet territories. 

My Fuehrer: 

You can be assured that the Arbeitseinsatz is being carried out 
by me with fanatical determination, but also with care and con- 
sideration for the economical and technical, as well as human, 
necessities and occurrences. 

The replacement for soldiers who are to be freed and the rein- 
forcement of the armament program with newly needed workers 
can and will be supplied, in spite of great difficulties, which had 
to be overcome in the last two winter months. 258,000 foreign 
workers could be supplied during January and February to war 
industry, although the transports in the East were almost com- 
pletely lacking. The commitment of German men and women is 
in full force. 

Now that the difficulties of the winter months are disappearing 
more and more the transports from the East can be put into full 
operation again on account of preparations arranged by me. Al- 
though the report and commitment-results of German men and 
women is outstanding, in the heavy industrial labor the commit- 


389 


407-PS 


ment of productive foreigners who are used to labor cannot be 
neglected. 

Unfortunately, a few commanders in chief [Oberbefehlshaber] 
in the E3st mobilized the recruiting of men and women in the con- 
quered Soviet territories, as I was told by Gauleiter Koch — for 
political reasons. 

My Fuehrer! To fulfill my task I ask you to abolish these or- 
ders. I think it impossible that the former Soviet people should 
experience a better consideration than our own German people, on 
whom I was forced to levy drastic measures. If the obligation for 
labor and the forced recruiting of workers in the East is not 
possible anymore, then the German war industry and agriculture 
cannot fulfill their tasks to the full extent. 

I myself have the opinion that our army leaders should not give 
credence under any circumstances to the atrocity and propaganda 
campaign of the Partisans. The generals themselves are greatly 
interested that the support for the troops is made possible in 
time. 

I should like to point out that hundreds of thousands of excel- 
lent workers going into the field as soldiers now, cannot possibly 
be substituted by German women, not used to work even if they 
are trying to do their best. Therefore I have to use the people of 
the eastern territories. 

I myself report to you, that the workers belonging to all foreign 
nations are treated humanely, correctly and cleanly, are fed and 
housed well, and are even clothed. On the basis of my own serv- 
ices with foreign nations, I go as far as to state, that never before 
in the world were foreign workers treated as correctly as is now 
happening in the hardest of all wars by the German people. 

Therefore, my Fuehrer, I ask you to abolish all orders which 
oppose the obligation of foreign workers for labor and to report 
to me kindly, whether the concept of the mission presented here 
is still right. 

I would ask to talk to you personally about different important 
points of the Arbeitseinsatz at the beginning of next week, possi- 
bly Tuesday. 

Yours, always thankful, sincere and obedient 

Signed: Fritz Sauckel 


390 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-V AND VI-PS 


District Administration Thueringen of NSDAP 
The Plenipotentiary for The Direction of Labour. 

Weimar 15 April 1943 
Nr. 435/43 10 :25 o’clock 

To the Fuehrer, Obersalzberg. 

23 June 1943 
[stamped] 

My Fuehrer, 

As Gruppenfuehrer Bormann has already informed you, I am 
going to the eastern areas on the 15th April in order to secure 
1 million workers from the East for the German war economy in 
the coming months. 

The result of my last trip to France is that, after exact ful- 
fillment of the last program, another 450,000 workers from the 
western areas too, will come into the Reich by the beginning of 
the summer. 

Counting the manpower which comes into question from Po- 
land and the remaining areas, and which is in the neighborhood 
of about 150,000, it will become' possible again to place 5- to 600,- 
000 workers at the disposal of German agriculture and 1 million 
workers at the disposal of the armaments industry and the rest 
of the war industries by the coming summer months. 

I beg you to agree that the new French labor forces can also 
come into the Reich under conditions similar to those which 
applied to the last group. I have kept in touch with the High 
Command of the Armed Forces. 

Since the largest part of the Belgian civil workers and pris- 
oners of war perform very satisfactorily, I ask you to agree that 
a similar statute to that which was granted to the French be 
made for some 20,000 Belgian prisoners of war. This very great 
concession by you has made a very deep impression upon Laval 
and the French Ministers. Laval has repeatedly asked me to 
transmit his sincerest thanks for this to you, my Fuehrer. 

1. After one year’s activity as plenipotentiary for the direction 
of labor, I can report that 3,638,056 new foreign workers were 
given to the German war economy from 1 April of last year to 
31 March this year. 

As a whole, these forces have produced satisfactory perform- 
ances. Their feeding and housing is secured, their treatment so 
indisputably regulated that, in this respect too, our National So- 
cialist Reich presents a shining example to the methods of the 
capitalist and bolshevist world. However, it is naturally inev- 
itable that mistakes and blunders occur here and there. I will 


391 


407-V AND VI-PS 


continue to endeavor with the greatest energy to reduce them to a 
minimum. 

Besides the foreign civil workers, 1,622,829 prisoners of war 
will be employed in the German economy. 

2. The 3,638,056 workers are distributed amongst the follow- 
ing branches of the German war economy : 


Armament 1,568,801 

Mining industry 163,632 

Building 218,707 

Communications 199,074 

Agriculture and forestry 1,007,544 

Other economic branches 480,298 


Besides the employment of foreign workers, 5 million German 
men and women workers were transferred, inside the German eco- 
nomic structure, to the German war economy proper by being 
switched from businesses unimportant to the war effort to im- 
portant ones, or by retraining. 

All of these efforts were necessary in order to smooth out the 
natural fluctuations, for example, 'through death, sickness, expira- 
tions or breaches of contract, but especially through drafting into 
the Armed Forces and the shifting of industries into other re- 
gions and to facilitate the enlargement of the armament works, 
the establishment of new factories and the fulfillment of new 
programs. 

3. The result of the registration action for men and women up 
to the 7 April is as follows : 

On the basis of the order of 27 January 1943, 3,249,743 men 
and women have registered. The results are not yet final. 

The number of men amounts to 553,415 
that of women to 2,696,328 

Up till now about 52% of these registrations (that is 1,851,771) 
have been definitely fixed up by the Labor Bureaux. 

Lp till now only 32.5% of the men come into question for the 
direction of labor as the majority do not fit in with the require- 
ments as a result of old age or sickness. 

Employed up to the present moment are 66,008 men. Up to 
7 April 732,489 women were put to work. 

This result must be designated as outstanding. 44% of these 
women, however, work less than 48 hours per week because of 
their domestic circumstances. The basic armament industry has 
received from the women and men employed 
20,670 men 
341,100 women 


392 


407-V AND VI-PS 


It was possible to make some 130,000 available to agriculture 
and the rest to the Armed forces, postal service, railroads, etc. 

4. The result of the shutting-down measures taken by the Reich 
Minister for Economic Affairs includes 74,644 persons, of this 
group, mostly over-age and consisting of 27,218 men, 47,426 
women, only a third could be directed to industry, 10,108 men, 
17,929 women, of these the armament industry received 5,258 men, 
8,621 women. 

The rest were distributed to the remaining industries of war 
importance and to the Armed Forces. 

5. The demands of the armaments industry for men and women 
workers and the allocations of these from December 1942 until 
the end of March 1943 give the following result: 


Demand Allocation 

December 1942 ] 250,000 

January 1943 ]■ total 335,000 172,000 

February 1943 J 235.000 


total — 657,000 

March 1943 225,000 450,000 

replacements for those 
drafted from the armaments 
industry. 240,000 


800,000 1,107,000 

In the March figures 320,000 men and women are brought into 

account by the registration-action. 

* * * * * * * 

Since I, my Fuehrer, shall be staying in the eastern provinces 
on the 20 April, I beg, already today, to be allowed to extend my 
most fervent good wishes to you, along with those of my district 
and my family. 

You can be assured that the district of Thueringen and I will 
serve you and our dear people with the employment of all 
strength. 

The warmest desire is that you, my Fuehrer, may always en- 
joy the best of health and that we ourselves can serve you to 
your complete satisfaction. 

Your faithful and obedient, 

[signed] Fritz Sauckel 

Passed on : Puttig. 

Received : Weismann Oberg. 

Officially received : 1130 o’clock Heinstein pkz Munich for Sec- 
tion Roem. 3. 

The above telegram was also sent in letter form, [in ink] 

WE 15 Apl. 


393 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-VIII-PS 


The Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan 
The Plenipotentiary for Arbeitseinsatz 

Berlin W8, Mohrenstr 65 (Thuringenhaus) 17 May 1943 

Tel: 12 65 71 


To the Telegraph Office of the Party Chancellery 
Berlin W8 

Gauleiter Sauckel requests that the following telegram be trans- 
mitted to the Fuehrer and to the Reich Marshal of the Greater 
German Reich. 

BydirCCti0n Heil Hitler! 

[signature illegible] 


a. To the Fuehrer, Fuehrer Headquarters 

b. To the Reich Marshal for the Greater German Reich, Head- 
quarters 

to a. My Fuehrer! 

to b. Most respected Reich Marshal ! 

In regard to the Arbeitseinsatz in connection with the Organ- 
ization Todt, I request that I be permitted to submit the following 
figures : 

In addition to the labor allotted to the total German economy by 
the Arbeitseinsatz' since I took office, the Organization Todt was 
supplied with new labor continually. The total number of laborers 
employed by the OT amounted to 270,969 at the end of March 
1942 and 696,003 at the end of March 1943. 

In this it is noteworthy that the Arbeitseinsatz has accelerated 
the OT in the West for the purpose of completing the work on the 
Atlantic Wall and has furnished laborers with utmost energy. 
This is all the more remarkable because: 

1. In France, Belgium and Holland the industries work for the 
German war economy exclusively, and must always be supplied 
with labor in any case ; 

2. Great numbers of workers must be placed at the disposal of 
the German economy within the Reich itself. 

In spite of the attendant difficulties the supply of the OT in the 
west was raised from 66,701 at the end of March 1942 to 248,200 
at the end of March 1943. 

Thus the Arbeitseinsatz has done everything to help make 
possible the completion of the Atlantic Wall. 

to a Heil Hitler ! 

Your obedient and faithful 
Fritz Sauckel 

to b Your continually obliged 

Fritz Saukel 


394 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 407-IX-PS 


The Commissioner for the Four Year Plan 
The Plenipotentiary for the Arbeitseinsatz 

Berlin W8, 3 June 1943 


1751/43 [pencilled] ab 6/4/43 
To the Fuehrer of Greater Germany 
The Fuehrer’s Hq 
My Fuehrer! 

I beg to be permitted to report to you on the situation of the 
Arbeitseinsatz for the first 5 months of 1943. 


For the first time the following number of new foreign laborers 
and Prisoners of War were employed in the German war industry : 
January 1943 — 120,085 

February 1943 —138,354 

March 1943 —257,382 

April 1943 — 160,535 

May 1943 —170,155 


Total —846,511 

I may remark that this number of 850,000 was reached only 
after greatest difficulties were overcome which had not existed 
during the previous year; all those who have worked for the Ar- 
beitseinsatz, particularly in the occupied territories, did so with 
the greatest fanaticism and devotion. 

Unfortunately quite a number of our officials and employees 
were victims of murders and attacks by partisans. 

Besides those labor forces recruited for work within the Reich, 
several hundred thousand laborers were recruited in the occupied 
territories through the agencies for the Arbeitseinsatz as well as 
through the OT and the factories working in the East and the 
West for the German war industry. Furthermore the Wehrmacht 
received a large number of laborers as well as labor volunteers. 

Moreover, because of the order dated 27 January 1943 requir- 
ing everybody to register, the following numbers of men and 
women were made available: 



Men 

Women 

Total 

February . 

14,594 

163,012 

177,606 

March 

45,606 

494,931 

540,537 

April 

19,315 

269,374 

288,689 

May 

11,405 

186,683 

198,168 

Total 

91,000 

1,114,000 

1,205,000 


Of these approximately 800,000 are available only for less than 
48 hours of work per week. 


395 


407— IX— PS 


Altogether, German war industry during the first 5 months of 
1943 recruited more than 2,000,000 laborers. 

Furthermore, negotiations resulted in agreements and regula- 
tions on the following points : Wage control and increased produc- 
tion in the various European territories especially in France, which 
enabled us to keep wages in the occupied European territories on 
a reasonable level, to stabilize living conditions of foreign laborers 
working for Germany in spite of the difficult conditions of war, to 
increase production by means of wage control in these territories. 
These measures were carried out in agreement with industrial and 
farming authorities as well as with the Commissioner of the Reich 
for the control of prices. 

Heil ! 

Your obedient and faithful 

Signed : Sauckel 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 437-PS 

[Extract from report of Hans Frank to Hitler re situation in Po- 
land, dated 19 June 1943 — Pages 10 and 11.] 

In the course of time, a series of measures or of consequences 
of the German rule have led to a substantial deterioration of the 
attitude of the entire Polish people in the General Gouvernment. 
These measures have affected either individual professions or the 
entire population and frequently also — often with crushing se- 
verity — the fate of individuals. 

Among these are in particular: 

1. The entirely insufficient nourishment of the population, 
mainly of the working classes in the cities, whose majority is 
working for German interests. 

Until the war in 1939, its food supplies, though not varied, 
were sufficient and generally secure, due to the agrarian surplus 
of the former Polish state and in spite of the negligence on the 
part of their former political leadership. 

2. The confiscation of a great part of the Polish estates and 
the expropriation without compensation and resettlement of Po- 
lish peasants from manoeuvre areas and from German settle- 
ments. 

3. Encroachments and confiscations in the industries, in com- 
merce and trade and in the field of private property. 

4. Mass arrests and mass shootings by the German police who 
applied the system of collective responsibility. 

5. The rigorous methods of recruiting workers. 


396 


437— PS 


6. The extensive paralyzation of cultural life. 

7. The closing of high schools, junior colleges and universi- 
ties. 

8. The limitation, indeed the complete elimination of Polish 
influence from all spheres of State administration. 

9. Curtailment of the influence of the Catholic Church, limiting 
its extensive influence — an undoubtedly necessary move — and, in 
addition, until quite recently, the closing and confiscation of mon- 
asteries, schools and charitable institutions. 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 440-PS 

Berlin, 20 Nov. 1939 

The Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces 

OKW/WFA No. 213/39 g.k. Chefs. (Top Secret, Chief Matter) 

Department L (I) 

8 Copies, Copy 

Chief matter 
By officers only 

TOP SECRET 

Directive No. 8, for the conduct of the war. 

1. The state of alert, to make the continuation of the initiated 
concentration of troops possible at any moment, must be main- 
tained, for the time being. Only this will make it possible to ex- 
ploit favorable weather conditions immediately. 

The various components of the Armed Forces will make ar- 
rangements enabling them to stop the attack even if the order 
for such action is received by the High Command as late as D-l 
at 2300 hours. The keyword 

“Rhein” ( — start attack) 
or 

“Elbe” (^-withhold attack) 

will be passed on to the High Commands at the latest by this 
time. 

The High Commands of the Army and the Air Forces are re- 
quested after having determined the day for attack, to notify De- 
partment L of the High Command of the Armed Forces imme- 
diately with regard to the mutually agreed hour of the com- 
mencement of the attack. 

2. Contrary to previous orders, all measures intended against 
the Netherlands are to be carried out without special orders at 
the start of the general attack. 

The reaction of the Dutch Armed Forces cannot be foreseen. 


693256 — 46—26 


397 


440-PS 


The entering of our troops will take the character of a friendly 
occupation wherever no opposition is encountered. 

3. The Land-operations are to be carried out on the basis of the 
assemble directive of 29 October. The following is added to com- 
plete this directive: 

a. All measures have to be taken to move the emphasis of the 
operation quickly from Army Group B to Army Group A if 
greater and quicker successes than at Army Group B should be 
obtained there as the present disposition of enemy’s forces -that 
would indicate. 

b. The Dutch area, including the coastal West-Frisian Islands, 
without Texel for the time being, is to be seized as far as the 
Grebbe-Haas Line, until further notice. 

4. The Navy is authorized to take blockage measures for sub- 
marines against the Belgian and, contrary to previous orders, 
also against Dutch harbors and waterways, in the night before 
the attack and from the time of the start of the blockade activi- 
ties and the time of the land attack must also be kept as short as 
possible in the case of the use of submarines. 

Combat actions against Dutch naval forces are only authorized, 
if they adopt a hostile attitude. 

The Navy is charged with the coastal artillery defense of the 
coastal regions to be occupied, against attacks from the sea. 
Preparations have to be made accordingly. 

5. The tasks of the Air Force remain unchanged. They have 
been supplemented by special orders, issued orally by the Fueh- 
rer, concerning the landing from the air and the support of the 
army by the seizure of the bridges west of Maastricht. 

The 7th Atr-borne Division will only be committed for land- 
ing activities from the air after the seizure of bridges across the 
Albert Canal has been secured. The fastest means of transmission 
of this message between the High Command of the Army and 
the High Command of the Air Force must be guaranteed. 

Localities, especially great open town, and the industries are 
not to be attacked either in the Dutch or the Belgian-Luxembourg 
area, without (urgent) military reasons. 

6. The closing of the frontiers, a. The border and news traf- 
fic across the Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourg frontiers is to be 
kept at its present volume until the beginning of the attack in 
the orders to that effect to the military and civilian authorities 
are not to participate in the preparations for the closing of the 
border until the start of the attack. 

b. The Reich-Border is to be closed towards the Netherlands, 
Belgium and Luxembourg for all non-military border and news 


398 


440-PS 


traffic at the start of the attack. The Commander-in-Chief issues 
the orders to that effect to the military and civilian authorities 
concerned. The Highest Reich Authorities concerned, will be in- 
formed by the OKW (High Command of the Armed Forces) at 
the beginning of the attack that the measures for the closing of 
the borders will be issued immediately by the Commander-in- 
Chief of the Army, even for the Dutch Border outside of the op- 
erational territory. 

c. At first, restrictions in the border and news traffic will not 
be ordered after the start of the attack on the other Reich-Borders 
towards the neutral countries. Further prepared measures for the 
surveillance of personal and news traffic will be taken, if nec- 
essary. 

By order 

Distribution : Signed : Keitel 

High Command of the Army — 1st Copy. 

High Command of the Navy — 2nd Copy 
R. d. L. [Reichs-Ministry of the Air] and the High Com- 
mand of the Air Force — 3rd Copy. 

attested: von Trotha [?] 
Captain 

High Command of the Armed Forces: 

Chief. WFA— 4th Copy. 

L — 5-8th Copy. 

Distribution: 

Copies 

K 1st Copy 

IV 2nd Copy 

II 2nd Copy for information 

[in handwriting] Acknowledged 21 October [initials illegible] 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 442-PS 

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. 
OKW/WFA/L No. 33 160/40 Top Secret 

The Fuehrer’s hq. 16 July 1940 
7 copies, 4th copy 

TOP SECRET 

Transmit by officer courier only 

General Order No. 16 on the preparation of a landing operation 

against England. 

Since England, despite her militarily hopeless situation still 
shows no sign of willingness to come to terms, I have decided to 


399 


442-PS 


prepare a landing operation against England, and if necessary to 
carry it out. 

The aim of this operation is to eliminate the English homeland 
as a basis for the carrying on of the war against Germany, and if 
it should become necessary to occupy it completely ; 

To this end I order the following : 

1. The Landing must be carried out in the form of a surprise 
crossing on a broad front approximately from Ramsgate to the 
area west of the Isle of Wight, in which air force units will take 
the roll of artillery, and units of the navy the roll of the engi- 
neers. Whether it is practical to undertake subordinate actions, 
such as the occupation of the Isle of Wight or of County Cornwall, 
before the general landing is to be determined from the stand- 
point of every branch of the armed forces and the result is to be 
reported to me. I reserve the decision for myself. The prepara- 
tions for the entire operation must be completed by mid-August. 

2. To these preparations also belong the creation of those con- 
ditions which make a landing in England possible. 

a. The English air-force must morally and actually be so far 
overcome, that it does not any longer show any considerable ag- 
gressive force against the German attack. 

b. Mine-free channels must be created. 

c. By means of a closely concentrated mine-barrier the 
straight of Dover on both Flanks as well as the western entrance 
to the channel in the approximate line Aldemey-Portland must be 
sealed off. 

d. The area in front of the coast must be dominated and given 
artillery protection by strong coastal artillery. 

e. Tying down of the English naval forces in the North Sea as 
well as in the Mediterranean (by the Italians) is desired, whereby 
it must now be attempted that the English naval forces which are 
in the homeland be damaged by air and torpedo attack in strength. 

3. Organization of the leadership and of the preparations; 

Under my command and according to my general directions the 

supreme commanders will lead the forces to be used from their 
branches of service. The command-staffs of the supreme com- 
mander of the army, the supreme commander of the Navy, and the 
supreme commander of the air-force must from 1 August on be 
located within a radius of at'least 50 km. from my headquarters 
(Ziegenberg). Lodging the command staffs of the supreme com- 
manders of the army and navy together at Giessen appears prac- 
tical to me. 

Hence for the leadership of the landing armies the supreme 
commander of the army will have to employ an army group hq. 


400 


442-PS 


The project bears the code-name “Seeloewe” [Sea-lion], 

In the preparation and carrying out of the undertaking the fol- 
lowing tasks fall to the various branches : 

a. Army: will draw up the operational plan and the transport 
plan for all units of the 1st wave to embark. The AA artillery to 
be transported with the 1st wave will at the same time be attached 
to the army (to the individual crossing groups) until such a time 
as a division of tasks in support and protection of ground troops 
protection of the ports of debarkation and protection of the aerial 
strong points to be occupied can be carried out. The Army further- 
more distributes the means of transport to the individual 
crossing groups and establishes the embarkation and landing 
points in 'agreement with the Navy. 

b. Navy: will secure the means of transport and will bring 
them corresponding to the desires of the Army and according to 
the requirements of seamanship into the individual embarkation 
areas. Insofar as possible ships of the defeated enemy states 
are to be procured. For every ferrying point it will provide the 
necessary naval staff for advice on matters of seamanship with 
escort vessels and security forces. It will protect, along with the 
air forces employed to guard the movement, the entire crossing 
of the channel on both flanks. An order will follow on the 
regulation of the command relationship during the crossing. It 
is further the task of the navy to regulate, in a uniform manner, 
the building up of the coastal artillery, that is, all batteries which 
can be used for firing against sea targets of the Army as well as 
of the Navy, and to organize the fire control of the whole. As 
great an amount of very heavy artillery as possible is to be em- 
ployed as quickly as possible to secure the crossing and to pro- 
tect the flanks from enemy operations from the sea. For this 
purpose, railway artillery (supplemented by all available cap- 
tured pieces) without the batteries (Ks and K12) provided for 
firing on targets on the English mainland, is to be brought up 
and emplaced by use of railway turntables. 

Independent of this, the heaviest available platform batteries 
are to be opposite the Straits of Dover, so emplaced under con- 
crete that they can withstand even the heaviest aerial attacks 
and thereby dominate the Straits of Dover under any circum- 
stances in the long run, within their effective range. 

The technical work is the responsibility of the Todt Organiza- 
tion. 

c. Mission of the Air Force is: To hinder interference from 
the enemy air force. To overcome coastal defenses which could do 


401 


442-PS 


damage to the landing positions, to break the first resistance of 
enemy troops and to smash reserves which may be coming up. 
For this mission closest cooperation of individual units of the 
air force with the crossing units is necessary. Furthermore, to 
destroy important transportation routes for the bringing up of 
enemy reserves, and to attack enemy naval forces, which are 
coming up, while they are still far away from the crossing points. 
I request proposals on the use of parachute and glider troops. 
In this regard it is to be determined if it is worth-while here to 
hold parachute and glider troops in readiness as a reserve to be 
quickly committed in case of emergency. 

4. The armed forces chief of signals will carry out the neces- 
sary preparations for signal connections from France to the 
English mainland. The installation of the remaining 80km East 
Prussian cables is to be provided for in conjunction with the 
Navy. 

5. I request the supreme commanders to submit to me as soon 
as possible : 

a. The intentions of the Navy and Air Force for achieving the 
necessary conditions for the crossing of the channel (see figure 
2 ). 

b. The construction of the coastal batteries in detail (Navy). 

c. A survey of the tonnage to be employed and the methods of 
getting it ready and fitting it out.. Participation of civilian agen- 
cies? (Navy). 

d. The organization of aerial protection in the assembly areas 
for troops about to cross and the means of crossing (Air Force) . 

e. The crossing and operations plan of the army, composition 
and equipment of the first crossing wave. 

/. Organization and measures of the Navy and the Air Force 
for carrying out of the crossing itself, security of the crossing, 
and support of the landing. 

g. Proposals for the committment of parachute and glider 
troops, as well as for the attachment and command of anti-air- 
craft, after an extensive gain of territory on English soil has 
been made (Air Force). 

h. Proposal for the location of the command staffs of the su- 
preme commanders of the Army and of the Navy. 

i. The position of army, navy, and air force on the question 
whether and what subsidiary actions before the general landing 
are considered practical. 


402 


442-PS 


k. Proposal of army and navy on the overall command during 
the crossing. 

A. Hitler 
[Initialled] 

J [Jodi] 

K [Keitel] 

Distribution: 

Supreme Cmdr of the Army — 1st copy. 

Supreme Cmdr of the Navy — 2nd copy. 

Supreme Cmdr of the Air Force — 3rd copy. 

Armed Forces Command Section [?] — 4th copy. 

(WFA) 

Section L — 5th and 7th copy. 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 444-PS 


TOP SECRET 

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces 
WFSt/Abt.L(I) No 33 356/40 g.K. Chefs 
Only by officer 


Directive No. 18 


Fuehrer’s Headquarters 

12 November 40 
2F/408 
10 copies, 4th copy 
55 


The preparatory measures of Supreme Hq for the prosecution 
of the war in the near future are to be made along the following 
lines: — 


1. Relations with France. The aim of my policy towards 
France is to cooperate with this country in the most effective way 
for the future prosecution of the war against England. For the 
time being France will have the role of a “non-belligerent power” 
— she will have to tolerate German military measures on her ter- 
ritory, especially in the African colonies, and to give support, as 
far as possible, even by using her own means of defense. The most 
pressing task of the French is the defensive and offensive protec- 
tion of their French possessions (West and Equatorial Africa) 
against England and the deGaulle movement. From this initial 
task France’s participation in the war against England can de- 
velop fully. 

For the time being, the conversations with France resulting 
from my meeting with Marshal Petain are being carried on — 


403 


444-PS 


apart from the current work of the armistice commission — en- 
tirely by the foreign office [Auswartiges Amt] in cooperation 
with the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces [OKW]. 

More detailed directives will follow at the close of these talks. 

2. Spain and Portugal. Political steps to bring about an early 
Spanish entry into the war have been taken. The aim of German 
intervention in the Iberian peninsula (code name Felix) will be 
to drive the English out of the Western Mediterranean. For this 
purpose : 

a. Gibraltar will be taken and the Straits closed. 

b. The British will be prevented from gaining a foothold at an- 
other point of the Iberian peninsula, or the Atlantic Islands. 

The preparation and execution of this operation is intended as 
follows : 

Section I 

a. Reconnaissance troops (officers in civilian clothes) make the 
necessary preparations for the action against Gibraltar and for 
taking over aerodromes. As regards disguise and cooperation with 
the Spaniards they will comply with the security measures of the 
Chief of Foreign Intelligence. 

b. Special units of the Foreign Intelligence Bureau are to take 
over the protection of the Gibraltar area, in secret cooperation 
with the Spaniards, against English attempts to widen the terrain 
in front and against premature discovery and frustration of our 
preparations. 

c. The units intended for this operation will be kept in readiness 
away from the French-Spanish border and information will be 
withheld from the troops, at this early stage. In order to start 
operations, a warning order will be given three weeks before the 
troops cross the Spanish-French border (but only after conclusion 
of the preparations regarding the Atlantic Islands). 

With regard to the low capacity of the Spanish railways, the 
army will detail mainly motorized units for this operation, so that 
the railways are available for reinforcements. 

Section II 

a. Units of the Air Force, directed by observation at Algeciras, 
will, at a favorable moment, carry out an air attack from French 
soil on the units of the British fleet lying in the port of Gibraltar, 
and will force a landing on Spanish aerodromes after the attack. 

b. Shortly after this the units intended for use in Spain will 
cross the Franco-Spanish frontier on land or in the air. 

Section III 

a. Attack for the seizure of Gibraltar by German troops. 


404 


444 -PS 


b. Mobilization of troops to march into Portugal should the 
British gain a foothold there. The units intended for this will 
march into Spain immediately after the units intended for Gi- 
braltar. 

Section IV 

Support by the Spanish in closing the Straits after the seizure 
of the Rock from the Spanish-Moroccan side as well, if required. 

As for the strength of the units to be used for operation “Felix” 
the following will apply : 

Army. The units intended for Gibraltar must be in sufficient 
strength to seize the Rock even without Spanish assistance. 

Apart from this, a smaller group must be available to aid the 
Spaniards in the unlikely event of the British attempting to land 
at a different point on the coast. The units to be kept in readi- 
ness for a possible invasion of Portugal are to be predominately 
of a mobile nature. 

Air Force. Sufficient forces will be detailed for the air attack 
on Gibraltar to guarantee substantial success. 

For the subsequent operations against naval objectives and for 
the support of the attack on the Rock mainly dive-bomber units 
are to be transferred to Spain. 

Sufficient anti-aircraft artillery is to be supplied to the army 
units, and is also to be used to engage ground targets. 

Navy. Provision is to be made for U-boats to attack the Brit- 
ish-Gibraltar-Squadron, particularly when they leave harbor, 
which they are expected to do after the air raid. 

To support the Spaniards in the closing of the Straits, prepara- 
tions are to be made in cooperation with the army for the trans- 
fer of single coastal batteries. 

An Italian participation is not envisaged. 

As a result of operation “Gibraltar”, the Atlantic Islands (in 
particular the Canaries and Cape Verde Islands) will gain in- 
creased importance for the British conduct of the war at sea, 
as well as for our own. The commanders in chief of the Navy 
and Air Force are examining how the Spanish defense of the Ca- 
naries can be supported and how the Cape Verde Islands can be 
occupied. 

I also request that the question of an occupation of Madeira 
and the Azores be examined and also the advantages and disad- 
vantages that would arise from this for the conduct of the war 
at sea and in the air. The results of this examination are to be 
given to me as soon as possible. 

3. Italian Offensive against Egypt. If at all, the use of Ger- 


405 


444-PS 




man forces only comes into consideration after the Italians have 
reached Morsa Metruh. Even then the use of German air forces 
will be considered mainly if the Italians put at our disposal the 
air bases necessary for this. 

The preparations of the branches of the armed forces for use 
in this or any other North African theatre of war are to be car- 
ried on as follows : 

Army. Holding an armored division ready for use in North 
Africa (composition as previously provided for). 

Navy. Fitting out of such German ships lying in Italian ports 
as are suitable as transports for the transfer of the strongest 
possible forces either to Libya or to North West Africa. 

Air Force. Preparations for attacks on Alexandria and on the 
Suez Canal, so as to deny the British Command the use of the 
latter. 

4. Balkans. The commanders-in-chief of the Army will make 
preparations for occupying the Greek mainland north of the 
Aegean Sea in case of need, entering through Bulgaria, and thus 
make possible the use of German air force units against targets 
in the Eastern Mediterranean, in particular against those 
English air bases which are threatening the Roumanian oil area. 

In order to be able to face all eventualities and to keep Turkey 
in check, the use of an army group of an approximate strength 
of ten divisions is to be the basis for the planning and the cal- 
culations of deployment. It will not be possible to count on the 
railway, leading through Yugoslavia, for moving these forces into 
position. 

So as to shorten the time needed for the deployment, prepara- 
tions will be made for an early increase in the German Army 
mission in Roumania, the extent of which must be submitted 
to me. 

The Commander-in-chief of the Air Force will make prepara- 
tions for the use of German Air Force units in the South East 
Balkans and for aerial reconnaissance on the southern border of 
Bulgaria, in accordance with the intended ground operations. 

The German Air Force mission in Roumania will be increased 
to the extent proposed to me. 

Bulgarian requests to equip their army (supply of weapons, 
ammunition) are to be given favorable treatment. 

5. Russia. Political discussions have been initiated with the 
aim of clarifying Russia’s attitude for the time being. Irrespec- 
tive of the results of these discussions, all preparations for the 
East which have already been verbally ordered will be contin- 
ued. 


406 


444-PS 


Instructions on this will follow, as soon as the general outline 
of the army’s operational plans has been submitted to, and ap- 
proved by, me. 

6. Landing in England. Due to a change in the general situ- 
ation it may yet be possible or necessary to start operation “See- 
loewe” in the spring of 1941. The three services of the armed 
forces must therefore earnestly endeavor to improve conditions 
for such an operation in every respect. 

7. I shall expect the commanders-in-chief to express their opin- 
ions of the measures anticipated in this directive. I shall then 
give orders regarding the methods of execution and synchroniza- 
tion of the individual actions. In order to assure secrecy, only 
a restricted staff will work on these plans. This applies particu- 
larly to the operations in Spain and for the plans concerning the 
Atlantic Isles. 

Signed: Adolf Hitler 

J [initialled : Jodi] 

Distribution: 

Ob.d.H (Op.Abt.) — 1st Copy. 

Ob.d.M (l.Skl.) — 2nd Copy. 

Ob.d.L. (LwFueSt.Ia) — 3rd Copy. 

O.K.W. 

SFSt — 4th Copy. 

Abt. L. — 5th-10th Copy. 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 446-PS 

The Fuehrer and Commander-in-Chief of the German Armed 
Forces # 

OKW/WFSt/Abt.L(I) Nr. 33 408/40 gK Chefs. 

SECRET 

The Fuehrer’s Headquarters 

18 December 40 

(only through officer) 

9 copies, 4th copy 

Directive Nr. 21 
Case Barbarossa 

The German Armed Forces must be prepared to crush Soviet 
Russia in a quick compaigyi before the end of the war against 
England (case Barbarossa). 

For this purpose the Army will have to employ all available 


407 




446-PS 

units with the reservation that the occupied territories will have 
to be safeguarded against surprise attacks. 

For the Eastern campaign the Airforce will have to free such 
strong forces for the support of the Army that a quick comple- 
tion of the ground operations may be expected and that damage 
of the eastern German territories will be avoided as much as 
possible. This concentration of the main effort in the East is 
limited by the following reservation : That the entire battle and 
armament area dominated by us must remain sufficiently pro- 
tected against enemy air attacks and that the attacks on England 
and especially the supply for them must not be permitted to break 
down. 

Concentration of the main effort of the Navy remains unequi- 
vocally against England also during an Eastern campaign. 

If occasion arises I will order the concentration of troops for 
action against Soviet Russia eight weeks before the intended be- 
ginning of operations. 

Preparations requiring more time to start are — if this has not 
yet been done — to begin presently and are to be completed by 
15 May 1941. 

Great caution has to be exercised that the intention of an at- 
tack will not be reeognized. 

The preparations of the High Command are to be made on the 
following basis : 

I. . General Purpose: 

The mass of the Russian Army in Western Russia is to be de- 
stroyed in daring operations by driving forward deep wedges 
with tanks and the retreat of intact battle-ready troops into the 
wide space| of Russia is to be prevented. 

In quick pursuit a (given) line is to be reached from where 
the Russian Airforce will no longer be able to attack German 
Reich territory. The first goal of operations is the protection 
from Asiatic Russia from the general line Volga-Archangelsk. 
In case of necessity, the last industrial area in the Urals left to 
Russia could be eliminated by the Luftwaffe. 

In the course of these operations the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet 
will quickly erase its bases and will no longer be ready to fight. 

Effective intervention by the Russian Airforce is to be pre- 
vented through forceful blows at the beginning of the operations. 

II. Probable Allies and their tasks. 

***** 

[ Page 4. par. II] 

2. It will be the task of Rumania, together with the forces 


408 


446-PS 


concentrating there, to pin down the opponent on the other side 

and, in addition, to render auxiliary services in the rear area. 
******* 

[ Page 8, par. IV] 

IV. It must be clearly understood that all orders to be given by 
the commanders-in-chief on the basis of this letter of instructions 
are precautionary measures, in case Russia should change her 
present attitude toward us. The number of officers to be drafted 
for the preparations at an early time is to be kept as small as 
possible. Further co-workers are to be detailed as late as possible 
and only as far as each individual is needed for a specific task. 
Otherwise, the danger exists that our preparations (the time of 
their execution has not been fixed) will become known and 
thereby grave political and military disadvantages would result. 

V. I am expecting the reports of the commanders-in-chief on 
their further plans based on this letter of instructions. 

The preparation planned by all branches of the Armed Forces 
are to be reported to me through the High Command, also in re- 
gard to their time. 

[signed] Hitler 

[initialed by: Jodi, Keitel, Warlimont and one illegible.] 

Distribution: 

Ob. d. H. (Op. Abt.) — 1. copy 
Ob., d. M. (Ski.)— 2. copy 
Ob. d. L. (Lw.Fue.St.) — 3. copy 
OK W: 

WFSt. — If., copy 
Abt. — 5-9. copy 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 447-PS 
TOP SECRET 

Top Secret 
Only thru officer 

OKW 

Armed Forces Operational Staff 
Section L (IV/Qu) 

44125/41 Top Secret 

Fuehrer Hq, 13 March 1941 
5 copies, 4th copy 

Subject: Armed Forces Operational Staff/Section L(I) 
#33408/40. Top Secret. 18 December 1940 
Directives for Special Areas to Order #21 
(Case Barbarossa) 


409 




447-PS 


I. Area of operations and executive power 

1. The authorization to issue orders and the regulations xe- 
garding supply for an area of operations within the armed forces 
shall be set up by the High Command of the Armed Forces in 
East Prussia and in the General Gouvernement at the latest four 
weeks before operations are started. The proposal by the High 
Command of the Army (OKH) is being made in time, after an 
agreement with the Commander of the Luftwaffe (Ob.d.L.) has 
been reached. 

It is not contemplated to declare East Prussia and the General 
Gouvernemeirc an area of operations. However, in accordance 
with the unpublished Fuehrer orders from 19 and 21 October 
1939, the Supreme Commander of the Army shall be authorized 
to take all measures necessary for the. execution of his military 
aim and for the safeguarding of the troops. He may transfer his 
authority onto the Supreme Commander of the Army Groups 
and Armies. Orders of that kind have priority over all orders 
issued by civilian agencies. 

2. The Russian territory which is to be occupied shall be di- 
vided up into individual states with governments of their own, 
according to special orders, as soon as military operations are 
concluded. From this the following is inferred : 

a. The area of Operations, created through the advance of the 
Army beyond the frontiers of the Reich and the neighboring 
countries is to be limited in depth as far as possible. The Supi'eme 
Commander of the Army has the right to exercise the executive 
power in this area, and may transfer his authority onto the Su- 
preme Commanders of the Army Groups and Armies. 

b. In the area of operations, the Reichsfuehrer SS is, on be- 
half of the Fuehrer, entrusted with special tasks for the prepara- 
tion of the political administration, tasks which result from the 
struggle which has to be carried out between two opposing politi- 
cal systems. Within the realm of these tasks, the Reichsfuehrer SS 
shall act independently and under his own responsibility. The ex- 
ecutive power invested in the Supreme Commander of the Army 
(OKH) and in agencies determined by him shall not be affected 
by this. It is the responsibility of the Reichsfuehrer SS that 
through the execution of his tasks military operations shall not 
be disturbed. Details shall be, arranged directly through the OKH 
with the Reichsfuehrer SS. 

c. As soon as the area of operations has reached sufficient 
depth, it is to be limited in the rear. The newly occupied territory 
in the rear of the area of operations is to be given its own politi- 
cal administration. For the present, it is to be divided, according 


410 


447-PS 


to its genealogic basis ana to the positions of the Army Groups, 
into North (Baltic countries). Center (White Russia.) and 
South (Ukraine). In these territories the political administration 
is taken care of by Commissioners of the Reich who receive their 
orders from the Fuehrer. 

3. For the execution of all military tasks within the areas un- 
der the political administration in the rear of the area of opera- 
tions, commanding officers who are responsible to the Supreme 
Commander of the Armed Forces (OKW) shall be in command. 

The commanding officer is the supreme representative of the 
Armed Forces in the respective areas and the bearer of the mili- 
tary sovereign rights. He has the tasks of a Territorial Com- 
mander and the rights of a supreme Army Commander or a Com- 
manding General. In this capacity he is responsible primarily 
for the following tasks : 

a. Close cooperation with the Commissioner of the Reich in 
order to support him in his political task. 

b. Exploitation of the country and securing its economic values 
for use by German industry (see par. 4) . 

c. Exploitation of the country for the supply of the troops ac- 
cording to the needs of the OKH. 

d. Military security of the whole area, mainly airports, routes 
of supply and supply-dumps against revolt, sabotage and enemy 
paratroops. 

e. Traffic regulations. 

/. Billeting for armed forces, police and organizations, and 
for PW’s inasmuch as they remain in the administrative areas. 

The commanding officer has the right, as opposed to the civilian 
agencies, to issue orders which are necessary for the execution of 
the military tasks. His orders supersede all others, also those of 
the commissioners of the Reich. 

Service directives, mobilization orders and directives on the 
distribution of the necessary forces shall be issued separately. 

The time for the assumption of command by the commanding 
officers will be ordered as soon as the military situation shall al- 
low" a change in the command without disrupting military opera- 
tions. Until such time, the agencies set up by the OKH remain 
in office, operating according to the principles valid for the com- 
manding officers. 

4. The Fuehrer has entrusted the uniform direction of the ad- 
ministration of economy in the area of operations and in the ter- 
ritories of political administration to the Reich Marshal who has 
delegated the Chief of the “Wi Rue Amt” with the execution of 


411 


447-PS 




the task. Special orders on that will come from the OKW/Wi 
Rue Amt. 

5. The majority of the Police Forces shall be under the juris- 
diction of the Commissioners of the Reich. Requests for the em- 
ployment of police forces in the area of operations on the part of 
the OKH are to be made as early as possible to the OKW/Armed 
Forces Operational Staff /Section Defense. 

6. The behavior of the troops towards the population and the 
tasks of the military courts shall be separately regulated, and 
commanded. 

II. Personnel, Supply and Communication Traffic: 

7. Special orders shall be issued by the OKW Armed Forces 
Operational Staff for the measures necessary before the begin- 
ning of operations for the restriction of travel, delivery of goods 
and communications to Russia. 

8. As soon as operations begin, the German-Soviet Russian 
frontier and at a later stage the border at the rear of the area of 
operations will be closed by the OKH for any and all non-mili- 
tary traffic with the exception of the police organizations to be 
deployed by the Reichsfuehrer SS on the Fuehrer’s orders. Bil- 
leting and feeding of these organizations will be taken care of by 
the OKH-Gen. Qu. who may for this purpose request from the 
Reichsfuehrer SS' the assignment of liaison officers. 

The border shall remain closed also for leading personalities 
of the highest government agencies and agencies of the Party. 
The OKW/Armed Forces Operational Staff shall inform the high- 
est government and Party agencies of this fact. The Supreme 
Commander of the Army and the agencies under him shall de- 
cide on exceptions. 

Except for the special regulations applying to the police or- 
ganizations of the Reichsfuehrer SS, applications for entrance- 
permits must be submitted to the Supreme Commander of the 
Army exclusively. 

III. Regulations regarding Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary 

and Finland. 

9. The necessary arrangements with these countries shall be 
made by the OKW, together with the Foreign Office, and ac- 
cording to the wishes of the respective high commands. In case 
it should become necessary during the course of the operations 
to grant special rights, applications for this purpose are to be 
submitted to the OKW. 

10. Police measures for the protection of the troops are per- 
mitted, independently from the granting of special rights. Fur- 
ther orders in this shall be issued later. 


412 


447-PS 


11. Special orders shall be issued at a later date for the terri- 
tories of these countries, on the following subjects: 

Procurement of food and feed. 

Housing and machinery. 

Purchase and the shipment of merchandise. 

Procurement of funds and wage-control. 

Salaries. 

Request for indemnity-payments. 

Postal and telegraph services. 

Traffic. 

Jurisdiction. 

Requests of units of the Armed Forces and agencies of the 
OKW from the respective governments regarding these subjects, 
are to be submitted to the OKW/Armed Forces Operational Staff/ 
Section Defense not later than 27 March 1941. 

IV. Directives regarding Stveden. 

12. Since Sweden can only become a transient-area for troops, 
no special authority is to be granted the commander of the Ger- 
man troops. However, he is entitled and compelled to secure the 
immediate protection of RR-transports against sabotage and at- 
tacks. 

The Chief of the High Command of the 
Armed Forces 

Signed: KEITEL 

Distribution: 

OKH — 1st copy. 

OKM — 2nd copy. 

R.d.L.u.O.K.L. — 3rd copy. 

Armed Forces Operational Staff — 4th copy. 

Section L — 5th copy. 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 448-PS 

Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. 
OKW/WFST/Abt. L Nr. 44018/41 g. K. Chiefs 

F. H. Q. 11th Jan 44 

TOP SECRET 

13 copies, 4th copy. 

Order No. 22 

Participation of German Forces in the Fighting in the 
Mediterranean Theater of Operations. 

The situation in the Mediterranean Theater of Operation de- 
mands for strategical, political and psychological reasons German 


693256 — 46 — 27 


413 


448-PS 


assistance, due to employment of superior forces by England 
against our allies. 

Tripolitania must be held and the danger of a collapse of the 
Albanian front must be removed. Beyond that, the Army group 
Cavallero, in connection with later operations of the 12th Army, 
shall be enabled to start an attack also from Albania. 

I order therefore, the following: 

1. A blocking unit is to be recruited by the High Command of 
the Army which will be in a position to render valuable services 
to our Allies in the defense of Tripolitania especially against the 
English armored divisions. The principles for its composition will 
be given separately. The preparations for the transfer of the unit 
will be made in time to" follow immediately the present transport 
of an Italian armored division and a motorized division to Tripoli 
(starting approximately 20 February). 

2. The X Air Corps will retain Sicily as basis for operations. 
Its most important assignment will be the fight against the Eng- 
lish Naval forces and their communications between the western 
and eastern Mediterranean. Besides that, provisions are also to be 
made, with the help of temporary landing fields, to attack the Eng- 
lish unloading harbors and supply bases on the coast of Western 
Egypt and Cryenaica and thus give immediate support to the 
Army group of Graziani. 

The Italian Government has been asked to declare the territory 
between Sicily and the North African coast a “restricted area” 
[Sperrgebiet] in order to facilitate the operations of the X Air 
corps and to avoid incidents against neutral ships. 

3. For transfer to Albania, German units in the approximate 
strength of one corps, among them the 1st Mountain Division and 
Armored forces, are to be provided and held in readiness. The 
transport of the 1st Mountain Division is to commence, as soon as 
the approval of the Italians is received by the High Command of 
the Armed forces. In the meantime, it must be examined and 
determined with the Italian High Command in Albania whether 
and how many more forces for operational attacks could be em- 
ployed to good advantage and could also be supplied besides the 
Italian Divisions. 

The duty of the German forces will be : 

a. To serve in Albania for the time being as a reserve for an 
emergency case, should new crises arise there ; 

b. To ease the burden of the Italian Army group when later at- 
tacking with the aim : 

To tear open the Greek defense front on a decisive point 
for a far-reaching operation, 


414 


448-PS 


To open up the straits west of Saloniki from the back in 

order to support thereby the frontal attack of List’s Army. 

4. The directives for the questions of authority over the Ger- 
man troops to be employed in North Africa and Albania and the 
restrictions which are to be made with reference to their employ- 
ment, will be settled by the High Command of the Armed Forces 
and the Italian Armed Forces staff. 

5. The suitable transports available in the Mediterranean only 
as far as they are not already used for transportations to Tripoli, 
to be provided for the transfer of the Albania-bound troops. For 
transports of personnel, the transportation group Ju 52 stationed 
in Foggia is to be utilized. 

Every effort should be made to complete the transfer of the bulk 
of the German forces to Albania before the transfer of the block- 
ing unit to Lybia starts, (See 1) and the use of all German boats 
becomes necessary for this purpose. 

[signed] Adolf Hitler 

Distribution : 

OKH/Gen Staff of Army, operating — 1st cy. 

OKM/Skl— 2nd cy. 

Ob.d.L./Lw.F.St.I a — 3rd cy. 

OKW WFST— 4th cy. 

L — 5th to 9th cy. 

WNV— 10th cy. 

Foreign/Intelligence — 11th cy. 

Armed Forces, Transport Chief — 12th cy. 

German General with the Italian high command — 13th cy. 


F. H. Q. 29th Jan 41 

High Command of the Armed Forces 
WFST/Abt. L(I) Nr. 44018/41 g.K. Chefs II. Anz. 

13 copies, 4th copy. 

Ref : The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. 
OKW/WFST/Abt. L(L) Nr. 44018/41 gk Chefs. V. 11th 
Jan. 41 

The measures ordered in Order 22 are to be given the following 
code names : 

Operation Tripoli : “Sonnenblume” 

Operation Albania: “Alpenveilchen” 

The Chief of the High Command 
of the Armed Forces. 

By order 

(Signed) Warlimont 


415 


448- PS 

Distribution : 

OKH/general staff of Army, operations — 1st cy. 
OKM/SKL— 2nd cy. 

Ob. d. M./Lw Fuest — 3rd cy. 

OK W: 

WFST— 4th cy. 

Section L — 5th to 9th cy. 

WNV— 10th cy. 

Foreign/Intelligence — 11th cy. 

Armed Forces, Transportation Ch. — 12th cy. 
German General with the Italian high command — 
13th cy. 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 498-PS 

TOP SECRET 

The Fuehrer 

No. 003830/42 g. Kdos. OKW/WFSt 

Fuehrer HQ, 18 Oct. 1942 

12 copies, 12th copy. 

1. For some time our enemies have been using in their warfare 
methods which are outside the international Geneva Conventions. 
Especially brutal and treacherous is the behavior of the so-called 
commandos, who, as is established, are partially recruited even 
from freed criminals in enemy countries. From captured orders 
it is divulged, that they are directed not only to shackle prisoners, 
but also to kill defenseless prisoners on the spot at the moment 
in w T hich they believe that the latter as prisoners represent a 
burden in the further pursuit of their purposes or could otherwise 
be a hindrance. Finally, orders have been found in which the 
killing of prisoners has been demanded in principle. 

2. For this reason it was already announced in an addendum to 
the Armed Forces report of 7 October 1942, that in the future, 
Germany, in the face of these sabotage troops of the British and 
their accomplices, will resort to the same procedure, i.e., that they 
will be ruthlessly mowed down by the German troops in combat, 
wherever they may appear. 

3. I therefore order: 

From now on 'all enemies on so-called Commando missions in 
Europe or Africa challenged by German troops, even if they are 
to all appearances soldiers in uniform or demolition troops, 
whether armed or unarmed, in battle or in flight, are to be 
slaughtered to the last man. It does not make any difference 
whether they are landed from ships and aeroplanes for their ac- 


416 


498-PS 


tions, or whether they are dropped by parachute. Even if these 
individuals, when found, should apparently be prepared to give 
themselves up, no pardon is to be granted them on principle. In 
each individual case full information is to be sent to the O.K.W. 
for publication in the Report of the Military Forces. 

4. If individual members of such commandos, such as agents, 
saboteurs, etc. fall into the hands of the military forces by some 
other means, through the police in occupied territories for in- 
stance, they are to be handed over immediately to the SD. Any 
imprisonment under military guard, in PW stockades for instance, 
etc., is strictly prohibited, even if this is only intended for a short 
time. 

5. This order does not apply to the treatment of any enemy sol- 
diers who, in the course of normal hostilities (large-scale offen- 
sive actions, landing operations and airborne operations), are cap- 
tured in open battle or give themselves up. Nor does this order 
apply to enemy soldiers falling into our hands after battles at sea, 
or enemy soldiers trying to save their lives by parachute after 
battles. 

6. I will hold responsible under Military Law, for failing to 
carry out this order, all commanders and officers who either have 
neglected their duty of instructing the troops about this order, 
or acted against this order where it was to be executed. 

[signed] Adolf Hitler 


Distribution: Copy No. 

O.K.H. / Genst.d.H (High Command of the Army / 

General Staff of the Army). 1 

O.K.M. / Ski. (High Command of the Navy / 

Naval War Staff). 2 

Ob.d.L. / Lw.Fue.St. (C in C Air Force / Air 
Force Operational Staff). 3 

W.B. Norwegen (Armed Forces Commander, 

Norway) 4 

W.B.Sudeost (Armed Forces Commander, 

Southeast) 5 

Ob. West (C in C, West) 6 

Geb.A.O.K. 20 (20th Mountain Army) 7 

Ob. Sued (C in C, South) 8 

Pz.Armee Afrika (Panzer Army Africa) 9 

Rf.SS u. Chef d.Dtsch.Polizei (Reichsfuehrer 

SS and Chief of the German Police). 10 

OKW/WFSt (High Command of the Armed Forces 
/ Armed Forces Operational Staff). 11-12 


417 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 501-PS 


Field Post Office 
No 32704 
B Nr 40/42 


Kiev, 16 May 1942 


TOP SECRET 


To: SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer Rauff 


Berlin, Prinz-Albrecht-Str. 8 


[Handwritten:] 

pers. 

R/29/5 Pradel n.R 
b/R 


[Handwritten:] Sinkkel [?] b.R, p 16/6 


The overhauling of vans by groups D and C is finished. While 
the vans of the first series can also be put into action if the 
weather is not too bad, the vans of the second series (Saurer) 
stop completely in rainy tueather. If it has rained for instance 
for only one half hour, the van cannot be used because it simply 
skids away. It can only be used in absolutely dry weather. It 
is only a question now whether the van can only be used standing 
at the place of execution. First the van has to be brought to 
that place, which is possible only in good weather. The place 
of execution is usually 10-15 km away from the highways and is 
difficult to access because of its location ; in damp or wet weather 
it is not accessible at all. If the persons to be executed are driven 
or led to that placfe, then they realize immediately what is going 
on and get restless, which is to be avoided as far as possible. 
There is only one way left; to load them at the collecting point 
and to drive them to the spot. 

I ordered the vans of group D to be camouflaged as house- 
trailers by putting one set of window shutters on each side of 
the small van and two on each side of the larger vans, such as one 
often sees on farm-houses in the country. The vans became so 
well-known, that not only the authorities, but also the civilian 
population called the van “death van”, as soon as one of these 
vehicles appeared. It is my opinion, the van cannot be kept 
secret for any length of time, not even camouflaged. 

The Saurer-van which I transported from Simferopol to 
Taganrog suffered damage to the brakes on the way. The Se- 
curity Command [SK] in Mariupol found the cuff of the com- 
bined oil-air brake broken at several points. By persuading and 
bribing the H.K.P. [?] we managed to have a form machined, 
on which the cuffs were cast. When I came to Stalino and Gor- 
lowka a few days later, the drivers of the vans complained about 
the same faults. After having talked to the commandants of 
those commands I went once more to Mariupol to have some more 
cuffs made for those cars too. As agreed two cuffs will be made 


418 


50 1 -PS 


for each car, six cuffs will stay in Mariupol as replacements for 
group D and six cuffs will be sent to SS-Untersturmfuehrer Ernst 
in Kiev for the cars of group C. The cuffs for the groups B and 
A could be made available from Berlin, because transport from 
Mariupol to the north would be too complicated and would take 
too long. Smaller damages on the cars will be repaired by ex- 
perts of the commands, that is of the groups in their own shops. 

Because of the rough terrain and the indescribable road and 
highway conditions the caulkings and rivets loosen in the course 
of time. I was asked if in such cases the vans should be brought 
to Berlin for repair. Transportation to Berlin would be much 
too expensive and would demand too much fuel. In order to 
save those expenses I ordered them to have smaller leaks soldered 
and if that should no longer be possible, to notify Berlin immedi- 
ately by radio, that Pol. Nr is out of order. Besides that 

I ordered that during application of gas all the men were to be 
kept as far away from the vans as possible, so they should not 
suffer damage to their health by the gas which eventually would 
escape. I should like to take this opportunity to bring the fol- 
lowing to your attention: several commands have had the un- 
loading after the application of gas done by their own men. I 
brought to the attention of the commanders of those S.K. con- 
cerned the immense psychological injuries and damages to their 
health which that work can have for those men, even if not im- 
mediately, at least later on. The men complained to me about 
head-aches which appeared after each unloading. Nevertheless 
they don’t want to change the orders, because they are afraid 
prisoners called for that work, could use an opportune moment 
to flee. To protect the men from these damages, I request orders 
be issued accordingly. 

The application of gas usually is not undertaken correctly. In 
order to come to an end as fast as possible, the driver presses the 
accelerator to the fullest extent. By doing that the persons to 
be executed suffer death from suffocation and not death by dozing 
off as was planned. My directions now have proved that by cor- 
rect adjustment of the levers death comes faster and the prison- 
ers fall asleep peacefully. Distorted faces and excretions, such 
as could be seen before, are no longer noticed. 

Today I shall continue my journey to group B, where I can be 
reached with further news. 

Signed : Dr. Becker 

SS Untersturmfuehrer 


419 


50 1 -PS 


Reichs Security Main Office 
Message Center 

1900, 15 June 1942 [Handwritten:] 

Riga E 2 II D 3a Maj Pradel 

Message No 152452 R 16/6 

Wiederhausen 

Riga 7082— 15-6-42— 1855— BE 

To Reichs Security Main Office — Roem. 2D3A — Berlin 

TOP SECRET 

Subject: S-Vans 

A transport of Jews, which has to be treated in a special way, 
arrives weekly at the office of the commandant of the Security 
Police and the Security Service of White Ruthenia. 

The three S-vans, which are there, are not sufficient for that 
purpose. I request assignment of another S-van (5-tons). At the 
same time I request the shipment of 20 gas-hoses for the three 
S-vans on hand (2 Daimond, 1 Saurer), since the ones on hand 
are leaky already. 

The commandant of the Security Police and 

the Security Service 

“Ostland” 

Roem IT— 126/42 GRS 

Stamp : Signed : Truehe, SS-Hauptsturmfuehrer 

No 240/42 
II D 3a 16 June 42 
Procedure: [handwritten] 

1. When can we count on having another S-van ready? 

2. Are gas-hoses on hand, ordered or when to be delivered? 

3. Request answer. 

R 16/6 


Reichs Security Main Office 

II D 3a B Nr 240/42 Berlin, 22 June 1945 

TOP SECRET 

Stamped : 

Message Nr 107903 
Sent by message center 
2016, 22 June 42 

1. FS [?] 

To the Commandant of the Security Police and 

Security Service Ostland 

Riga 


420 


50 1 —PS 


Subject: S-Van 

The delivery of a 5-ton Saurer can be expected in the middle 
of next month. The vehicle has been at the Reichs Security Main 
Office for repairs and minor alterations up to this time. 100 
meters of hose will be supplied. 

By order of 

[signature as in heading] 

2. Dissemination at once by II D 3a (9) 

By direction 

Rauff 


Handwritten note: 


II D 3a (9) 


Berlin, 13 July 1942 


Nr I.Z. Widderhausen [?] for further action and attention to 
the note of 13 July 1942 on back page of telegram from Belgrad. 
For the reasons mentioned 5 sections of hose, each of 10 meters, 
can be supplied me. 

By direction 

[signature illegible] 


Reichs Security Main Office 
Stamps: 1003 9 Jun 1942 


handwritten : 

After return 
immediate repair 


II D 3a No 964/42 
10 June 1942 

R 10/6 

Notify about repair 

ND. Nr 144702 

Belgrad No. 3116 9.6.42 0950— SOM 

To : Reichs Security Office, Amt Roem 2 D 3 KL. A — Z. HD. V. 

Major Pradel — Berlin. 

Subject: Special-van-Saurer 
Preceding messages : None 

The Drivers SS-Scharfuehrer Goetz and Meyer have fulfilled 
their special mission and could be ordered back with the van men- 
tioned above. In consequence of a broken rear-axle-half, transpor- 
tation cannot be made by car. 

Therefore I have ordered the vehicle loaded and shipped back 
to Berlin by railroad. 


421 


50 l— PS 


Estimated arrival between 11th and 12th June 1942. The drivers 
Goetz and Meyer will escort the vehicle. 

The commandant of Security Police and Security Service 
Belgrad — Roem I— BNR 3985/42. 

Signed: Dr. Schaefer, SS-Obersturmbannfuehrer 


[Handwritten note back page] 

II D 3a (2) 

T.O.S. a Dr. SUKKEL 

Berlin, 11 June 1942 

For further action and immediate start of repairs. I request to 
be informed about arrival of vans. 

By direction: 

signed: Just 

Berlin, 16 June 1942. 

II D 3a (9) 

Note 

The vehicle arrived 16 June 1942 about 1300 h. After thorough 
cleaning the repairs will start immediately. 

By direction 

* signed:' [?] 

Berlin, 13 July 1942. 

II D 3a 9 

1. Note: The S-truck Pol 71463 is ready. 

2. Sent to the motor-pool management T. F. Niedevhausen for 
its information and further action. 

By direction 

signed: [?] 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 502-PS 


TOP SECRET 

B 101 
Enclosures 2 
Berlin, 17 July 1941 

Office IV 


Regulations (directives) 

for the commandos of the Chief of the Security Police 
and of the Security Service, which are to be activated 

in Stalags. 


The activation of commandos will take place in accordance with 
the agreement of the Chief of the Security Police and Security 


422 


502— PS 


Service and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces as of 
16 July 1941 (see enclosure I). The commandos will work inde- 
pendently according to special authorization and in consequence 
of the general regulations given to them, in the limits of the 
camp organizations. Naturally, the commandos will keep close 
contact with the camp commander and the defense officers as- 
signed to him. 

The mission of the commandos is the political investigating of 
all camp-inmates, the elimination and further “treatment” 

a. of all political, criminal or in some other way undesirable ele- 
ments among them. 

b. of those persons who could be used for the reconstruction of 

the occupied territories. 

For the execution of their mission, no auxiliary means can be 
put at the disposal of the commandos. The “Deutsche Fahndungs- 
buch”, the “Aufenthaltsermittlungsliste” and the “Sonderfahn- 
dungsbuch “UdSSR” will prove to be useful in only a small num- 
ber of cases; the “Sonderfahndungsbuch “UdSSR” is not suffic- 
ient, because it contains only a small part of Soviet-Russians 
considered to be dangerous. 

Therefore, the commandos must use their special knowledge and 
ability and rely on their own findings and self-acquired knowledge. 
Therefore, they will be able to start carrying out their mission 
only when they have gathered together appropriate material. 

The commandos must use for their work as far as possible, at 
present and even later, the experiences of the camp commanders 
which the latter have collected meanwhile from observation of the 
prisoners and examinations of camp inmates. 

Further, the commandos must make efforts from the beginning 
to seek out among the prisoners elements which appear reliable, 
regardless if there are communists concerned or not, in order to 
use them for intelligence purposes inside of the camp and, if 
advisable, later in the occupied territories also. 

By use of such informers and by use of all other existing possi- 
bilities, the discovery of all elements to be eliminated among the 
prisoners, must succeed step by step at once. The commandos 
must learn for themselves, in every case by means of short ques- 
tioning of the informers and eventual questioning of other pris- 
oners. 

The information of one informer is not sufficient to designate 
a camp inmate to be a suspect, without further proof ; it must be 
confirmed in some way if possible. 

Above all, the following must be discovered: 


423 


502— PS 


All important functionaries of state and party, especially 

Professional revolutionaries. 

Functionaries of the Komintern. 

All policy-forming party functionaries of the KPdSU and 
its fellow organizations in the central committees, in 
the regional and district committees. 

All Peoples-Commissars and their deputies. 

All former Political commissars in the Red Army. 

Leading personalities of the state authorities of central 
and middle regions. 

The leading personalities of the business world. 

Members of the Soviet-Russian intelligence. 

All Jews. 

All persons, who are found to be agitators or fanatical 
communists. 

It is not less important, as mentioned already, to discover all 
those persons who could be used for the reconstruction, adminis- 
tration and management of the conquered Russian territories. 

Finally, all such persons must be secured who are still needed 
for the completion of further investigation, regardless if they are 
police investigations or other investigations, and for explanations 
of questions of general interest. Among them are all those es- 
pecially, who because of their position and their knowledge are 
able to give information about measures and working methods of 
the Soviet-Russian State, of the communist party or of the 
Komintern. 

In the final analysis, consideration must be given to the nativity 
in all decisions to be made. The leader of the Einsatz Kommando 
will give every week a short report by telephone or an express- 
letter to the Reichs-Security-Main-Office, containing: 

1. Short description of their activities in the past week. 

2. Number of all definitely suspicious persons, (report of num- 
ber sufficient) 

3. Individual names of all persons found to be functionaries of 
the Komintern, leading functionaries of the party, Peoples-Com- 
missars, leading personalities and Political commissars. 

4. Number of all persons found not to be suspicious informers, 
with a short description of their position. 

A. Prisoners-of-war. ' 

B. Civilians. 

On the basis of those activity reports the Reichs-Security-Main- 
Office will issue immediately the further measures to be applied. 
For the measures to be applied on the basis of this successive di- 


424 


502— PS 


rective the commandos are to demand the surrender of the pris- 
oners involved from the camp command. 

The camp commandants have received orders from the Supreme 
Command of the Armed Forces, to approve such requests (see 
enclosure I). 

Executions are not to be held in the camp or in the immediate 
vicinity of the camp. If the camps in the General-Government are 
in the immediate vicinity of the border, then the prisoners are to 
be taken for special treatment, if possible, into the former Soviet- 
Russian territory. 

Should execution be necessary for reasons of camp discipline, 
then the leader of the Einsatz Kommando must apply to the camp 
commander for it. 

The commandos have to keep lists about the special treatments 
carried out and must contain: 

Current number. 

Family name and first name. 

Time and place of birth. 

Military rank. 

Profession. 

Last residence. 

Reason for special treatment. 

Day and place of special treatment 
(card file). 

In regard to executions to be carried out and to the possible re- 
moval of reliable civilians and the removal of informers for the 
Einsatz-group in the occupied territories, the leader of the Ein- 
satz-Kommando must make an agreement with the nearest State- 
Police-Office, as well as with the commandant of the Security 
Police Unit and Security Service and beyond these with the Chief 
of the Einsatz-group concerned in the occupied territories. 

Reports of that kind are to be transmitted for information to 
the Reichs-Security-Main-Office, IV. A 1. Excellent behavior dur- 
ing and after duty, the best cooperation w r ith the camp-com- 
manders, and careful examinations are the duty of all leaders and 
members of the Einsatz-Kommando. 

The members of the Einsatz-Kommando must be constantly im- 
pressed with the special importance of the missions entrusted to 
them. 


425 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 503-PS 


Top Secret 

High Command of the Armed Forces. 

No 55 1781/42 g. K Chefs. W F St/Qu 

F. H. Qu., 19 October 1942 

Top Secret 

By officer only 22 copies, 21st copy 

Added to the decree concerning the destruction of terror and 
sabotage troops (OKW/WFst No. 003830/42 top secret of 18 Oc- 
tober 1942) a supplementary order of the Fuehrer is enclosed. 

This order is intended for commanders only and must not un- 
der any circumstances fall into enemy hands. 

The further distribution is to be limited accordingly by the 
receiving bureaus. 

The bureaus named in the distribution list are held respon- 
sible, for the return and destruction of all distributed pieces of 
the order and copies made thereof. 

The Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces 
By order of 

Jodi 

1 enclosure 

(distribution list — over) 

Distribution list: ' 

General Staff of the Army — 1st copy 
Chief of Ordnance and Commander of Replacement Army 
— 2nd copy. 

High Command of the Navy Sea Warfare Diary — 3rd 
copy. 

High Command of the Air Force command staff — 4th copy. 
Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces in Norway — 
5th copy. 

Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces in The Nether- 
lands — 6th copy. 

Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces in the South- 
east — 7th copy. 

Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces in The Eastern 
Territory (Ostland) — 8th copy. 

Commanding Officer of the Armed Forces in the Ukraine 
— 9th copy. 

High Command West — 10th copy. 

High Command 20th Mountain army) 

(GEB.) AOH 20) 11th copy. 

Commanding Officer of German { 

troops in Denmark } — 12th copy. 

(Bfh. d. dt. Tr. in Denmark 


426 


503— PS 


High Command South — 13th copy. 

Tank Army — Africa — 14th copy. 

German General in Headquarters of Italian Armed Forces 
— 15th copy. 

Reich Fuehrer SS and Chief of German Police and Main 
Bureau for Security Police — 16th and 17th copies. 
High Command of the Armed Forces: 

Foreign Counter Intelligence — 18th copy. 

Armed Forces legal section (WR) — 19th copy. 

Armed Forces propaganda section (PR) — 20th copy. 
Armed Forces Command Staff, Quartermaster inclusive 
file copy — 21st copy. 

War Diary (KtC) — 22nd copy. 


Top Secret 
By officer only 

The Fuehrer and Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces 

18 K 

I have been compelled to issue strict orders for the destruction 
of enemy sabotage troops and to declare non-compliance with 
these orders severely punishable. I deem it necessary to an- 
nounce to the competent commanding officers and commanders 
the reasons for this decree. 

As in no previous war, a method of destruction of communi- 
cations behind the front, intimidation of the populace working 
for Germany, as well as the destruction of war-important in- 
dustrial plants in territories occupied by us has been developed 
in this war. 

In the east, this type of combat in the form of partisan war- 
fare as early as last winter led to severe encroachment upon our 
fighting strength and cost the lives of numerous German sol- 
diers, railroad workers, members of the labor corps [Organi- 
zation Todt], the labor service, etc. It severely interfered with 
and sometimes delayed for days, the performance of transporta- 
tion necessary for the maintenance of the fighting strength of 
the troops. By a successful continuation or perhaps even inten- 
sification of this form of war, a grave crisis in one or another 
place at the front might develop. Many measures against these 
horrible, as well as wily, sabotage activities have failed, simply 
because the German officer and his soldiers were not aware of 
the great danger confronting them and therefore in individual 
cases did not act against these enemy groups as would have been 
necessary in order to help the forward echelons of the front 
thereby the entire conduct of the war. 


427 




503— PS 

It was therefore in part necessary in the East to organize spe- 
cial units who mastered this danger or to assign this task to 
special SS formations. 

Only where the fight against this partisan disgrace was begun 
and executed with ruthless brutality were results achieved which 
eased the position of the fighting front. 

In all eastern territories tine tear against the partisans is there- 
fore a struggle of absolute annihilation of one or the other part. 

As soon as the realization of this fact becomes the common 
knowledge of troops, they will regularly be able to cope with 
these occurrences in short order ; otherwise their efforts achieve no 
decisive results and become purposeless. 

Even though under a different name, England and America 
have decided upon a similar kind of warfare, while the Russian 
attempts to put partisan troops behind our front by land and 
only in exceptional cases uses air transportation to land men and 
to drop supplies, England and America use this method of war- 
fare primarily by landing sabotage troops from submarines or 
pneumatic boats or by means of parachute agents. Essentially, 
however, this form of w T arfare does not differ from the activities 
of the Russian partisans. For it is the task of these troops : 

1. to build up a general espionage service with the assistance 
of willing natives, ' 

2. to organize troops of terrorists and supply them with the 
necessary weapons and explosives, 

3. to undertake sabotage activities which by destruction of 
traffic installations, not only continuously disrupt our commu- 
nications, but also, when things become serious, make troop 
movements absolutely impossible and eliminate our communica- 
tions system. 

Finally, these troops are to make attacks on war-important in- 
stallations, in which, according to a scientifically worked out pro- 
gram, they destroy key works by dynamiting, thereby forcing 
whole industries into idleness. 

The consequences of these activities are of extraordinary 
weight. I do not know whether each commander and officer is 
cognizant of the fact that the destruction of one single electric 
power plant, for instance, can deprive the Luftwaffe of many 
thousand tons of aluminum, thereby eliminating the construction 
of countless aircraft that will be missed in the fight at the front 
and so contribute to serious damage of the Homeland as well as 
bloody losses of the fighting soldiers. 

Yet this form of war is completely without danger for the ad- 
versary. Since he lands his sabotage troops in uniform but at the 


428 


503— PS 


same time supplies them with civilian clothes, they can, accord- 
ing to need, appear as soldiers or civilians. While they them- 
selves have orders to ruthlessly remove any German soldiers or 
even natives who get in their way, they run no danger of suf- 
fering really serious losses in their operations, since at the 
worst, if they are caught, they can immediately surrender and 
thus believe that they will theoretically fall under the provisions 
of the Geneva Convention. There is no doubt, however, that this 
is a misuse in the worst form of the Geneva agreements, especially 
since part of these elements are even criminals, liberated from 
prisons, who can rehabilitate themselves through these activities. 

England and America will therefore always be able to find 
volunteers for this kind of warfare, as long as they can truth- 
fully assure them that there is no danger of loss of life for them. 
At worst, all they have to do is to successfully commit their at- 
tack on people, traffic installations, or other installations, and 
upon being encountered by the enemy, to capitulate. 

If the German conduct of war is not to suffer grievous damage 
through these incidents, it must be made clear to the adversary 
that all sabotage troops will be exterminated, without exception, 
to the last man. 

This means that their chance of escaping with their lives is 
nil. Under no circumstances can it be permitted, therefore, that 
a dynamite, sabotage, or terrorist unit simply allows itself to 
be captured, expecting to be treated according to rules of the 
Geneva Convention. It must under all circumstances be ruthlessly 
exterminated. 

The report on this subject appearing in the Armed Forces 
communique will briefly and laconically state that a sabotage, 
terror, or destruction unit has been encountered and extermi- 
nated to the last man. 

I therefore expect the commanding officers of armies subordi- 
nated to them as well as individual commanders not only to real- 
ize the necessity of taking such measures, but to carry out this 
order with all energy. Officers and noncommissioned officers who 
fail through some weakness are to be reported without fail, or 
under circumstances — when there is danger in delay — to be at 
once made strictly accountable. The Homeland as well as the 
fighting soldier at the front has the right to expect that behind 
their back the essentials of nourishment as well as the supply of 
war-important weapons and ammunition remains secure. 

These are the reason for the issuance of this decree. 

If it should become necessary, for reasons of interrogation, 

693256 — 46 — 28 


429 


503— PS 


to initially spare one man or two, then they are to be shot imme- 
diately after interrogation. 

(signed) A. Hitler 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 506-PS 

Draft 

WFSt/Qu (Verw. 1) 

Nr 006580/44 g.Kdos 

Fuehrer Headquarters, 22 June 1944 
TOP SECRET 

2 copies — 1st copy 

Reference: WR 2 f 10.34 (III/10) Nr 158/44 g.Kdos.-119/44 V 
— of 17 June 1944 

Subject: Enemy agents — Fuehrer order 003830/42 g.Kdos/OKW 
/WFSt of 18 October 42 
To: WR 

WFSt agrees with the view taken in the letter of the Judge Ad- 
vocate of the Army group with the Supreme Commander South- 
west of 20 May 44 (Br. B Nr 68/44 g.K.). The Fuehrer order 
is to be applied even if the enemy employs only one person for 
a task. Therefore, it does not make any difference if several 
persons or a single person take part in a commando operation. 
The reason for the special treatment of participants in a com- 
mando operation is that such operations do not correspond to 
the German concept of usage and customs of (land) warfare. 

By direction 

initialled : W 

3 inclosures [Warlimont] 


[Following is an attached handwritten note] 

Qu 2 W 

All questions connected to the commando order (18 Oct 42) 
are to be handled according to a previous directive of Chef Qu 
at Qu 2 (W) page 2140, not at administration. 

[initial illegible] 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 508-PS 

TOP SECRET 

WFSt/Op (L) 

Fuehrer’s Headquarters November 21, 1942 

5 copies, 5th copy 

Subject: Landing of British Freight Gliders in Norw r ay. [Il- 
legible signature] 2/40/43 


430 




508— PS 


Note 

Supplement to situation report OKW/WFSt/Op. 21 Nov. 42. 

Air Force 5, G-2 Capt. S. Lilienskjold reports 21 Nov. by tele- 
phone to inquiry : 

1. Following supplementary report is made about landing of a 
British freight glider at Hegers in the night of November 11 : 

a. No firing on the part of German defense. 

b. The towing plane (Wellington) has crashed after touching 
the ground, 7 man crew dead. The attached freight glider also 
crashed, of the 17-man crew 14 alive. Indisputably a sabotage 
force. Fuehrer order has been carried out. 

2. In the same night a second freight glider landed East of 
Stavanger. 3 men of the crew were captured by the Norwegian 
police on November 21. They state that after it was detached 
the freight glider made a crash-landing at the Lyse Fjord in the 
night of Nov. 20; it had a crew of 16. Supposedly several dead 
and wounded. The landing occurred on the North shore of the 
Fjord, opposite the electric plant of Floerly (supplies Stavanger) . 

The plane has not yet been found. Each and every possible 
measure to find it and also to seize the other members of the crew 
has been initiated by the service district. 

The towing plane has apparently returned to England. The 
radio communication was monitored by Air Fleet #5. 

[signed] W 
Went out Nov. 11, 42 

Distribution: 

Chief of Operational Staff of the 
Armed Forces (previous telephone report) . 

Asst. Chief (Ktb). 

Operations (Army) . 

Operations ( N avy ) . 

Operations (Air Force) . 


TOP SECRET 

F. Amt. Ausl./Abw 

Ag Ausl. Nr. 1951/42 gKdos Ausl. Chef 
F XVI, El/e 

Berlin, 4 December, 1942 
3 copies, 1st copy 

To: WFSt 

For : Information 

From: Abw III. 

Subject: Fuehrer order of 18 Oct. 42, about treatment of enemy 

sabotage troops. 


431 




508-PS 

Attached copies of two teletype messages of the Norway coun- 
ter intelligence are hereby forwarded, referring to the order con- 
tained in the last paragraph of the 2nd teletype order of the Mili- 
tary commander of Norway 

It is asked that it should be examined how far this order is 
compatible with the above discussed Fuehrer order. 

By direction 

[Illegible signature] 

[Warlimont’s initials] 8/12 


Copy 

TOP SECRET 

1. Teletype to: 0 K W/Abw III F 
Subject: Commando Raid. 

On November 20, 1942, at 5:50 an enemy plane was found 15 
km NE of Egersund. It is a British aircraft (towed glider) made 
of wood without engine. Of the 17 member crew 3 are dead, 6 
are severely the others slightly wounded. 

All wore English khaki uniforms without sleeve-insignia. Fur- 
thermore following items were found : 8 knapsacks, tents, skiis and 
radio, exact number is unknown. The glider carried rifles, light 
machine guns, and machine pistols, number unknown. At present 
the prisoners are with the battalion in Egersund. 

A second plane has crashed 5 km East of Helleland. It had a 
6-man crew and is supposed to have towed the above glider. 

The artillery ofiker of Stavanger is still at the scene of the 
incident. Further exact report follows; new annexes attached. 
The competent commander’s staff (KDS) was immediately no- 
tified on the basis of the Fuehrer order. Foreign agency Norway, 
Nov. 20, 42, No. 34304/42 


TOP SECRET III F 

2. Teletype to : OKW/Amt Ausl./Abw III F 

Reference: Our No 3/304/42 g.Kdos III F of 20 Nov 42. 
Subject: Commando Raid. 

Foreign service (AST) reports to above teletype: 

Besides the 17 member crew, extensive sabotage material and 
work equipment were found. Therefore the sabotage purpose was 
absolutely proved. The 280th inf. div. ordered the execution of 
the action according to the Fuehrer’s order. The execution was 
carried out toward the evening of Nov. 20. Some of the prisoners 
wore blue ski-suits under their khaki uniforms which had no 
insignia on the sleeves. During a short interrogation the sur- 


432 


508— PS 


vivors have revealed nothing but their names, ranks, and serial 
numbers. 

The salvage of the sabotage material was performed by the 
commander’s staff (Kds) of Stavanger. The 2nd aircraft men- 
tioned in the above report is a two-engine plane and was prob- 
ably the towing plane. It will be inspected. In the same night of 
the 19th to 20th Nov. a second glider plane was landed at the 
Lysefjord, 20 km East of Stavanger, 8 km East of the electric 
plant of Floerly. Until now 3 men, presumably English, were cap- 
tured by the Norwegian police. The police are on the way to 
conduct a search for the plane. Supposedly dead and wounded lie 
around it. According to the statements of the prisoners, this 
freight gilder is supposed to have a 16-man crew. It is possible 
that this freight glider was towed by the same enemy plane which 
towed the glider found 15 km North East of Egersund. The 
armed forces commander of Norway was notified. Refer, at III 
Wi and Ag WNV/Fu, Oslo. 

In connection with the shooting of the 17 members of the crew, 
the armed forces commander of Norway (WBN) has issued an 
order to the district commanders, according to which the inter- 
rogations by G-2 and by BDS are important before the execution 
of the Fuehrer order; in case of no. 4 of the Fuehrer order the 
prisoners are to be handed out to the BDS. 

Foreign agency (Ast) Norway, No. 3/304/42 III F. g.Kdos 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 509-PS 

TOP SECRET 
Telegraph Office: GWNOL 

Date: 7 Nov. 1943 

SSD WAQC 0183 7/11 1112 DGZ 

To Supreme Command of the Armed Forces/Wehrmacht Fueh- 
rungsstab/Roem I c 
GKDOS (TOP SECRET). 

Subject: British Commando — Operation in Northwest. 

Pescara, 2 Nov. 43. 

3 commandos — special treatment — remaining 9 men wounded, 
in hospital. 

OB SUED F.A. ROEM Ic Nr 7595/43 TOP SECRET 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 512-PS 
TOP SECRET 

SSD HOSX 4041 13/12 1400— OKW/WFSt 

According to the last sentence of the F'uehrer order of . 18th 


433 




512-PS 

October (CHEFS), individual saboteurs can be spared for the time 
being in order to keep them for interrogation. The importance of 
this measure was proven in the cases of Glomfjord, Twoman tor- 
pedo Drontheim, and glider plane Stavanger, where interrogations 
resulted in valuable knowledge of enemy intentions. Since in the 
case of Egersund the saboteur was liquidated immediately and no 
clues were won; therefore, armed forces commander referred to 
above mentioned last sentence of the Fuehrer order (liquidation 
only after short interrogation). 

The Red Cross and the BDS protested after the immediate 
carrying out of the Fuehrer order in the case of Egersund and in- 
tend for their part to bring up the whole question as a matter of 
principle. 

WBN ROEM One A number 5409/42 GKDOS 

TOP SECRET 

14 December 1942 

SSD — Telegram 

[illegible pencil remarks] 

To: Supreme Command Armed Forces Foreign Department. 

For information: Commander Armed Forces Norway Supreme 
Command Armed Forces Counter Intelligence Service. 
Reference: AG Ausl. number 1951/42 Top Secret of 4 December 
1942. (Commahder Armed Forces Norway I a number 5409/42 
Top Secret of 13 December 1942). 

Subject: Commando Operations. 

It is reported that the armed forces commander Norway intends 
to spare individual saboteurs for the time being in order to have 
them interrogated. This intention corresponds to the last para- 
graph of the order OKW/WFSt/QU. number 551781/42 top secret 
CHEFS of 19th October 1942. 

OKW/WFSt/Qu (III) 
Number 004872/42 Top Secret 
W [Initialled Warlimont] 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 526-PS 

WFSt/Qu (III) 

Subject: Saboteurs, Toftefjord. 


TOP SECRET 
Notice 

On the 30. 3. 1943 in Toftefjord (70° Lat.) 


10. 5. 1943 


an enemy cutter 


434 




526-PS 


was sighted, cutter was blown up by the enemy. Crew: 2 dead 
men, 10 prisoners. 

Cutter was sent from Scalloway (Shetland Is.) by the Nor- 
wegian Navy. 

Armament: 2 Colt — MG’s, 2 mounted MG’s, a small transmitter. 
In addition there were supposed to have been 4. MG’s, 6 sub- 
machine guns and 1,000 kg of explosives on board. 

Captain of the Cutter: Norwegian, Lt. Eskeland. 

Purpose: Construction of an organization for sabotaging of 
strong-points, battery positions, staff and troop billets and 
bridges. 

Assigner of Mission in London: Norwegian, Maj. Munthe. 
Fuehrer order executed by S.D. [Security Service]. 

Wehrmacht Report of 6.4 announces the following about it: 

In Northern Norway an enemy sabotage-unit was engaged and 
destroyed on approaching the coast. 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 531-PS 

Armed Forces Operational Staff 
Qm (Adm. 1) 

No. 006688/44 Top Secret 


Fuehrer’s Hq, 23 June 1944 
TOP SECRET 

3 copies — 1st copy 

Reference: Fuehrer Order No. 003832/42/OKW/WFSt of 18 
Oct 42. 

Subject: Treatment of Commando Men. 

Conference memorandum 

Supreme Command West reports by teletype message No 1750/ 
44 Top Secret of 23 June 44: 

The treatment of enemy commando groups has so far been 
carried out according to the order referred to. With the large- 
scale landing achieved, a new situation has arisen. The order 
referred to directs in number 5 that enemy soldiers who are taken 
prisoner in open combat or surrender within the limits or nor- 
mal combat operations (large-scale landing operations and un- 
dertakings) are not to be treated according to numbers 3 and 4. 
It must be established in a form easily understood by the troops 
how far the concept “within the limits of normal combat opera- 
tions, etc.” is to be extended. The view of the Supreme Com- 
mand West is as follows: 


435 


53 1 -PS 

A. The commitment of air-borne troops and commandos ef- 
fected in Normandy falls clearly under number 5. 

B. It is likewise not to be contested that paratroop units or 
groups set down further to the rear are connected with the large- 
scale landing operation effected, if they have the mission of 
breaking supply lines or carrying out deceptive maneuvers etc. 
The German combat soldier will not always be able, during bat- 
tle, to decide whether it is a question of sabotage groups 
parachuted down or larger air-borne operations in closer or 
more distant connection with a landing from the sea already 
carried out or still being carried out. 

C. As a result of the large turn-over of troops in the area of 
the Supreme Command West, especially recently, it is possible 
that a considerable number of soldiers are ignorant of the order 
referred to, which dates from more than 1 y 2 years ago. For 
Germans from foreign countries (Volksdeutsche) and foreign 
nationalities the differentiation in the treatment of prisoners will 
hardly be able to be made clear due to language difficulties. A 
further reproduction of the order in the present situation, where 
cases of losses must be considered, is held by Supreme Command 
West to be a false course of action. Considerable reprisals 
against our own -prisoners must be expected if its contents be- 
come known. 

D. The application of number 5 for all enemy soldiers in uni- 
form penetrating from the outside into the occupied western 
areas is held by Supreme Command West to be the most correct 
and clearest solution. On the other hand an order of the chief 
office for Reich security to the commander of the SIPO (Security 
Police) and the SD (Security Service) in Paris has decided that 
numbers 3 and 4 of the order referred to are to be applied in the 
future the same as before in the case of uniformed parachutists 
committed in groups. A conversation with representatives of the 
higher SS and police fuehrers in France and of the commander 
of the SIPO and SD in Paris gave the result that according to 
the opinion of all concerned the difficulty lies in the determina- 
tion of the “limits of normal combat operations”. As a solu- 
tion it was agreed to set a line (e.g. Seine from the mouth to 
Rouen-Argentan-Avranches) North of which number 5, inland 
of which numbers 3 and 4 apply. This solution also must be 
called incomplete, since -the combat situation can at any time 
bring the necessity of extending this line to other coastal areas 
as well. In case of a large-scale aerial landing in the interior 
such boundaries cannot be drawn anymore at all. Supreme 


436 


53 1 -PS 


Command West requests, therefore, that, in agreement with the 
Reichsfuehrer SS, the decision be made, that, in view of the neiv 
situation, number 5 is to be applied in the ivhole occupied West- 
ern area. 

Position taken by Armed Forces Operational Staff: 

1. The Commando order remains basically in effect even after 
the enemy landing in the west. 

2. Number 5 of the order is to be clarified to the effect, that 
the order is not valid for those enemy soldiers in uniform, who 
are captured in open combat in the immediate combat area of the 
beachhead by our troops committed there, or who surrender. Our 
troops committed in the immediate combat area means the di- 
visions fighting on the front line as well as reserves up to and 
including corps headquarters. 

3. Furthermore, in dpubtful cases enemy personnel who have 
fallen into our hands alive are to be turned over to the SD, upon 
whom it is encumbent to determine whether the commando order 
is to be applied or not. 

4. Supreme Command West is to see to it that all units com- 
mitted in its zone are orally acquainted in a suitable manner 
with the order concerning the treatment of members of com- 
mando undertakings of 18 Oct 42 along with the above explana- 
tion. 

Proposal : 

Attached teletype message. 

signed : WARLIMONT 

Distribution : 

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces — 1 
copy through Deputy Commander of the Armed Forces 
Operational Staff. 

Ktb, 2 copies. 

Qu — Draft, 3 copies. 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 532-PS 


WFSt/Qu (Verw. 1) 


24 June 1944 


TOP SECRET 

5 copies, 1st copy 

SSD — Telegram. 

To 1. Supreme Command West. 

By mail to 2. Chief of General Staff, Army. 

By mail to 3. Supreme Command of the Air Force/Air Force 
Staff Headquarters. 


437 


532— PS 




By mail to 4. Supreme Command Navy/1 Ski. 

By mail to 5. Reichsfuehrer SS Command Staff. 

By mail to 6. Military Commander, France. 

By mail to 7. Supreme Command of Armed Forces/WR. 

Authority: 1. Order of the Fuehrer no. 003830/42 Top Secret of 
18 Oct 42/OKW/WFSt. 

2. Telegram Supreme Command West no. 1750/44 
Top Secret of 23 June 44. 

Subject: Treatment of Commandos. 

1. Standard operating procedure to (1) will be fully maintained. 

2. Numeral (5) refers to enemy soldiers in uniform who are 
captured in open combat by own troops stationed in the immedi- 
ate combat zone of the beachhead or who surrender. “Own troops 
stationed in the immediate combat zone” applies in this sense to 
those of combat divisions on line as well as reserves up to and in- 
cluding general staffs. 

3. In cases of doubt enemy personnel falling into our hands 
alive will be turned over to the SD, which will be responsible for 
the examination as to whether the order concerning commandos 
is applicable or not. 

4. Accordingly, the paratroop saboteurs dropped by the enemy 
over Britanny will be treated as commando personnel, since this 
area is not at present an immediate combat zone. It is immaterial 
in this case whether the paratroopers dropped wear uniform or 
civilian clothes. The number of paratroopers captured in Britanny 
will be included in the daily report currently. In this respect an 
annex to the armed forces report of 7 October 1942 has already 
been published to the effect that such criminal elements should be 
massacred in combat. 

(Remark: Enclosures of the order of the Fuehrer of 18 October 

1942 as well as the further order regarding the treatment of Com- 
mando personnel of 25 June 1944 are attached. The latter men- 
tions also paratroopers under number (2).) 

Distribution: [signature illegible] 

Chief of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces through 
Chief of the WFSt Qu (Entw.). 


438 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 537-PS 


Draft 

The Fuehrer’s Headquarters, 30 July 1944 

The High Command of the Wehrmacht 
009074/44 g.k./WFSt/Qu. ( Verw.l) 

TOP SECRET 

re: Treatment of members of foreign “Military Missions”, cap- 

tured together with partisans. 

In the areas of the High Command Southeast and Southwest 
members of foreign so-called “Military Missions” (anglo-Ameri- 
can as well as Soviet-Russian) captured in the course of the 
struggle against partisans shall not receive the treatment as stip- 
ulated in the special orders regarding the treatment of captured 
partisans. Therefore they are not to be treated as PWs but in con- 
formity with the Fuehrer’s order the elimination of terror and 
sabotage troops of 18 October 1942 (OKW/WFSt. 003830/42 
g.Kdos) . 

This order shall not be transmitted to other units of the armed 
forces via the High Commands and equivalent staffs and is to be 
destroyed after being read. 

The Chief of the High Command of the Wehrmacht 

KEITEL 

Distribution: 

High Comd S/E — 1st copy. 

High Comd S/W — 2nd copy. 

General Staff of the Army — 3rd copy. 

OKM/SK1.— 4th copy. 

OKL/Lw.Fu.Stb. — 5th copy. 

Reichsfuehrer — and Chief of the German Police — 

Staff RF — Attention Major General and Major 

General of the Waffen SS Rhode, also for RSH — 6th copy. 

OKW/AWA— 7th copy. 

/Chief PWs — 8th copy. 

WR — 9th copy. 

WFSt/W.Pr. — 10th copy. 

Op. (H-L-M) — 11th copy. 

Org. — 12th copy. 

Ktb. — 13th copy. 

Qu. (Draft) — 14th copy. 

Reserve — 15-25 copies. 


439 


PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 551-PS 


WFSt/Qu! (Verw. 1) 


Chef OKW— [in pencil] 
of 

[initial] J 

26 June 1944 

TOP SECRET [Rubber Stamp] 

5 copies — 1st copy 


KR - Teletype 

To 1. Supreme Commander West. 

2. Chief of Army General Staff. 

3. OKL/Lw Fu Stab. 

4. OKM/l.Skl. 

5. Reichsfuehrer SS — Command Staff. 

6. Military Commander, France. 

7. Military Commander, Belgium/Northern France. 

8. Armed forces Commander, Netherlands. 

9. OKW/WR., 

10. Supreme Commander Southwest [in pencil]. 

Reference: 1. Fuehrer Order No. 003830/42 Top Secret of 18 

Oct 1942 OKW/WFSt. 

2. Teletype Supreme Commander West No. 1750/44 Top Secret 
of 23 June 1944 (only to OKW/WFSt). 

Subject: Treatment of Kommando Participants. 

1. Even after the landing of Anglo-Americans in France, the 
order of the Fuehrer on the destruction of terror and sabotage 
units of 18 Oct 1942 remains fully in force. 

Enemy soldiers in uniform in the immediate combat area of 
the bridgehead, that is, in the area of the divisions fighting in the 
most forward lines as well as of the reserves up to the corps 
commands, according to ==5 of the basic order of 18 Oct 1942, 
remain exempted. 

2. All members of terror and sabotage units, found outside 
the immediate combat area, who include fundamentally all para- 
chutists, are to be killed in combat. In special cases, they are to 
be turned over to the SD. 

3. All troops committed outside the combat area of Normandy 
are to be informed about the duty to destroy enemy terror and 



[in pencil] 
[in pencil] 


440 


55 1 -PS 


sabotage units briefly and succinctly according to the directives 
issued for it. 

4. Supreme Commander West will report immediately daily 
how many saboteurs have been liquidated in this manner. This 
applies especially also to undertakings by the military command- 
ers. The number is to be published daily in the armed forces 
communique to exercise a frightening effect, as has already been 
done toward previous Kommando undertakings in the same man- 
ner. 


[Initial] W [Warlimont] 

[signature] Keitel 
OKW /WFSt/Qu. (Verio. 1) 
Nr. 006688/44 Top Secret 


Addition for Supreme Commander 

Southivest 

Similar action is to be taken in the 
Italian theater of war. 


[Written by hand] 


[initial] J [Jodi] 

After forwarding: 

Qu (Verw. 1) Simultaneously teletype — 1st copy. 

Op (H) — 2nd copy. 

Op (M)/(L)/Ktb. — 3rd copy. 

VO Foreign — 4th copy. 

VO W Pr — 5th copy. 

Copy was sent on 18 Aug to the Chief of the Security Police and 
the SD. 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 553-PS 


Memo secret 7/4 
(Annex 2 to H.Dr.g.l 
Page 7 current 1910.4) 

High Command of the armed forces 

WFSt. (Org.l) amt. AUSL.ABW/ABT ABW.III 

Nr. 8725/7. 42 g. (Illb 2) Berlin, 4 August 1942 

SECRET 

Combatting of single parachutists, 4 Aug. 1942. 

Unaltered reprint 1943 

Reference: OKW/WFSt/ ABt.L (II) Nr. 1858 geh.v. 10.8.40 
I. In case of enemy landings by air, a difference has to be made 
between : 

A. Parachute troops and airborne landing troops committed to 
fighting activities. 

B. Single parachutists and small groups of parachutists who 


441 


553— PS 


are dropped in order to execute missions of sabotage, espionage, 
terror or disruption. 

to a The combatting of enemy airborne forces is the exclusive 
mission of the armed forces according to the reference orders, 
to & For combatting single parachutists. In alteration of fig. 7 
v.a. the following is decreed: 

1. In territories (Reich territories and occupied territories) 
the combatting on single parachutists is the mission of those 
agencies of the Chief of the Security Police and Security Service 
[SD] designated as executive; in this matter it is immaterial 
whether the parachutists are in uniform or civilian clothes. 

2. To what extent armed forces and agencies of the armed 
forces should be committed for these missions is to be decided di- 
rectly by the district commanders [Wehrkreisbefehslhaber] or by 
territorial commanders [territorialen Befehlshaber] endowed 
with the powers of district commander with the competent 
agencies of security police and SD. 

3. So far as single parachutists are captured by members of 
the armed forces, they are to be delivered to the nearest agency 
of the Chief of the Security Police and SD, without delay; simul- 
taneously reports must be made to the competent intelligence 
agency. The sajne procedure is also valid for combat action di- 
rected against parachute troops or airborne-landing troops, in 
case the troops realize that they have to do with saboteurs or 
spies. If it should be discovered that the parachutists brought 
to security police by armed forces, or captured directly by mem- 
bers of the police are soldiers, the SS Reich leader and Chief of 
the German Police will take care that they will be transferred to 
the competent air forces agencies after the completion of the 
necessary inquiry. 

4. Reports concerning confirmed single parachutists are to be 
submitted without delay to the nearest agency of the Chief of 
Security Police and of the SD, simultaneously informing the coun- 
ter intelligence agency in charge which immediately has to for- 
ward the report to district command headquarters commander 
as well as the airforces command. Moreover, in principle fig. 4 
of the reference order is applicable. 

5. In territories not mentioned in fig. 1 , present regulations 
remain valid (transfer to secret field police). 

II. With regard to the use of objects captured or discarded, in 
the case of parachutists, as far as these items are sabotage ma- 
terials, or radio equipment, a supplementary order to fig. 9 v. a. 
is decreed: 


442 


553— PS 


1. Captured sabotage material to be delivered to the nearest 
security police agency and SD. 

The army will dispose of sabotage material captured by troops 
in the Eastern theater. With regard to further utilization of sabo- 
tage material delivered or reverting to the Security Police, agree- 
ments made between the Chief of Security Police and SD and 
foreign section of counter intelligence remain valid. 

2. Captured radio equipment, including the directions for oper- 
ations, code-material, voice material (Sprach-Material) in plain 
and in code text, are to be delivered immediately via local coun- 
ter intelligence agencies to OKW (Ag WNV Fu III) for use. The 
agencies concerned will be informed of results. After a comple- 
tion of investigations the captured radio equipment will again 
be at disposal, if needed. If further use of captured radio equip- 
ment is considered by either counter intelligence or Security Po- 
lice, then the delivery of the equipment might be omitted, upon 
agreement each time with Ag. WNV/Fu III, however, in this case 
photostatic copies of the directions for use, the code keys, etc., as 
well as technical descriptions of the equipment are to be for- 
warded quickly to Ag-WNV/Fu III. 

The Chief of High Command of the Armed Forces 

KEITEL 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 556-2-PS 

The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht 

Fuehrer Hq September 8, 1942 

The extensive coastal fortifications which I have ordered to be 
erected in the area of Army Group West make it necessary that 
in the occupied territory all available workers should be commit- 
ted and should give the fullest extent of their productive capaci- 
ties. The previous allotment of domestic workers is insufficient. 
In order to increase it, I order the introduction of compulsory 
labor and the pi'ohibition of changing the' place of employment 
without permission of the authorities in the occupied territories. - 
Furthermore the distribution of food and clothing ration cards to 
those subject to labor draft should in the future depend on the 
possession of a certificate of employment. Refusal to accept an 
assigned job, as well as abandoning the place of work without the 
consent of the authorities in charge, will result in the withdrawal 
of the food and clothing ration cards. The GBA [Deputy General 
for Arbeitseinsatz] in agreement with the military commander 
as well as the Reich Commissar, will issue the corresponding de- 
crees for execution. 

A Hitler 

[initialled] K [Keitel] 


443 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 556-13-PS 


Note for the files 

1. On 4 January 1943 at 8 P. M. Minister Speer telephones 
from the Fuehrer Headquarters and communicates that on the 
basis of the Fuehrer’s decision, it is no longer necessary to give 
special consideration to Frenchmen in the further recruiting of 
specialists and helpers in France. The recruiting can proceed 
with emphasis and sharpened measures. 

2. Commissar-General Schmidt with the Reich Commissar in 
Holland just telephones on 5 January 1943 at 5:20 P. M. and 
explains that on the basis of Armament Action 1943 he must 
achieve more recruiting in Holland. 

3. He has been criticized by the armament Commissions regard- 
ing the endangering of German contracts in Holland proper due 
to labor shortage. 

I told him that no attention would be paid these criticisms. 

He has already taken the same attitude and in the future will 
take the appropriate action. 

For Information 

(signed) SAUCKEL 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 579-PS 


Weimar, 5 January 1943 

The District Commissar in Riga — Employment Office 
Section [Fachgebiet] 2 (Commitment of work) 

Riga, 6 July 1942 

File note 

Subject: Commitment of Jews. 

here : cooperation with the administration offices of the 
armed forces. 

For the last 10 days Jews have been picked up almost daily for 
commitment in the peat industry by units of the armed forces. 
While doing so, very considerable difficulties arose because the 
members of the armed forces who get the Jews from the ghetto 
daily do not want to comply with the regulations which are is- 
sued by the man responsible for work commitment. 

It is agreed that the soldiers take over the Jews in columns at 
the exit of the ghetto. Actually, however, several soldiers enter 
the fenced-in ghetto and pick up the Jews in question without any 
permission. During the last week, government inspector Rotten- 
berger and the undersigned were present, at an early hour, dur- 
ing the dispatching of the Jews. Some soldiers also did not fol- 
low the instructions of the Reich German workers, entered the 
ghetto, and themselves got the men who had worked so far for 


444 


579-PS 


the units in question. It was pointed out to them that manpower 
had to be committed for specially urgent measures. These in- 
structions were not followed by the soldiers, but they shouted 
around in the presence of more than 1000 Jews, and simply took 
the men away in spite of the order forbidding it. In one instance 
a soldier arrived the next morning in a steel helmet and again 
did not follow the instructions of the Reich-German manpower. 
A German police sergeant was charged with banishing the soldiers 
from the ghetto. The sergeant had hardly turned around when 
the soldier entered the ghetto again and again got Jews whom 
he was not supposed to get, and took them away. In another 
case, the undersigned was just in time to prevent a pfc. of the 
air force from beating a Jewish policeman. The Jewish police- 
man beat a Jew who did not want to report for a certain work. 
The Jewish police is doing well with the daily commitment of 
about 4000 Jews. Therefore it must be prevented that Germans 
attack Jewish policemen in the presence'of thousands of Jews. 

As soon as German soldiers who pick up the Jewish manpower 
daily from the ghetto, follow the instructions of the Reich-German 
man power and, above all, keep discipline, it will be possible to get 
the Jewish manpower ready for work considerably faster every 
day. According to my opinion it is at least necessary that one 
German policeman who can prevent the illegal seizures by the 
German soldiers, be placed at the entrance of the ghetto daily 
from 0530 to 0800 hours. 

For information: 

signed Lippmann. 


The District Commissar in Riga 
The Chief of The Employment Office 
Riga Azsargu Iela 29/31 

Riga, 10 February 1942 

Department 

File No 

To the Reich Commissar for the Baltic 
states 

Work policies and social administration 
Riga, through the Commissar general in 
Riga. 

Subject: Transport of J6ws from Kauen. 

Ref.: Your letter of 6 February 1942. 

The transport of Jews from Kauen arrived here on 8 February 
1942. However, instead of the requested 500 males only, 

693256 — 46—29 

445 




579-PS 


222 males and 
137 females 

were sent. 

Due to the fact that there exists a considerable need of Jewish 
manpower for transport and construction work, I am requesting 
an additional 1000 Jewish males from Kauen. 

I was informed by the transport leader that the Jews in Kauen, 
as far as their commitment for work is concerned, are not under 
the jurisdiction of the employment office, but that the Jewish 
manpower is distributed by the German police. 

For : 

[signature illegible] 

( Oberregierungsrat ) 

[ink note:] 

To the Commissar General 
[Initials illegible] 

Command of Economic Affairs [Wirtschaftskommando] 
for - the Territory of the former Latvia Department of Work 

Riga, 21 July 1941 

Subject: Work commitment of Jeivs. 

File note 

According to the Group Agriculture there is a considerable 
shortage of workers for farming in Latvia, which endangers 
especially the beet harvest. According to my findings and also 
those of the economy office North (Wi.-In. Nord) no prisoners of 
war are at present available for farming. It should be examined, 
therefore, to which extent and under which conditions other pos- 
sibilities of commitment are available. 

To clarify the possibility of committing Jews, a conference 
took place today between the economy office North and the chief 
war administration advisor (O.K.V.R.) Ellroth, from the depart- 
ment of work. Together with Mr. Ellroth we went to the SS 
and conferred with the leader of the SD, Sturmbannfuehrer Batz, 
as well as his deputy, Hauptsturmfuehrer Kirsten. Our proposal 
to earmark the Jews, to put them together in a ghetto, then to 
establish a council for Jews, and to effect with it the extensive 
commitment of Jews for work, was favorably accepted. It was 
also agreed upon that the commitment of Jews for work should be 
effected only through the special offices for commitment to be 
created by the employment office resp. offices, in order to make 
sure of leadership according to the necessities for war and state 
policies. The SS reserves only the right of the decision of po- 
litical problems and the execution of political tasks. The ear- 


446 


579-PS 


marking of the Jews and their collection in a ghetto is being done. 
It was furthermore announced that conferences had already taken 
place between the SS - SD on the one hand and the military ad- 
ministration headquarters (Feldkommandatur) on the other hand, 
with the result that a registration of the Jews at the police pre- 
cincts, a daily report of the Jews there, and the establishment of 
a special office should be instituted for the execution of the com- 
mitment of Jews for work through the military administration 
headquarters. 

After that a conference with the war administration council 
[Kriegsverwaltungsrat] Nachtigall took also place at the mili- 
tary administration headquarters, which had the same result. 
The military administration headquarters (Fk.) agrees also that 
the commitment of Jews for work is done by the employment office 
after the registration of the Jews. While registering, a special 
index card can be put aside for this commitment of work. 

The discussions at the Fk. resulted furthermore in the issuing 
by the commander of the rear army district of a decree on ceil- 
ing prices and wages, already last Wednesday, because it is his 
opinion that he alone can issue official decrees with effective pen- 
alties. Furthermore, the locally customary prices and wages are 
already established. 

[signature illegible] 
O.K.V.R. 

Distribution : 

Wi.-In. Nord, Dept, for work Commandant 

SS.-SD. 

Fk. 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 614-PS 

“DIE NATIONALSOZIALISTISCHE REVOLUTION 1933”, 
compiled by Dr. Axel Friedrichs (Berlin 1935, pages 151-3), 
[which is Volume I of the documentary collection entitled 
“DOKUMENTE DER DEUTSCHEN POLITIK”, published by 
the Director of the Hochschule fuer Politik.] 

Proclamation of the Action Committee for the Protection of the 
German Labor 2 May 1933 

German workers and employees! Working people in the town 
and country! The bells have tolled to honor work. The entire 
German people have sung the high psalm about the working man 


447 


6 1 4- PS 


with a strength and enthusiasm which never before existed and 
thus has honored itself and the creative spirit. The wheels 
stopped, the anvil did not more resound, the miner came out of 
his mine: everywhere a holiday. 

What trade unions of all shades, red and black, Christian and 
“free”, have not even come close to accomplishing, what has been 
only a shadow even in the best years of Marxism, a puny miser- 
able copy compared to the gigantic thing of yesterday, NA- 
TIONAL SOCIALISM achieves in its first effort. 

It puts the worker and the peasant, the artisan and the em- 
ployee, briefly all working people, into the center of the State and 
renders the grabbing and despotic ones harmless. Who was that 
servant of capitalism, who was the reactionary who intended to 
oppress you and bereave you of all rights? Those red criminals 
who have abused you, well meaning, honest and decent German 
workers for decades, in order to deprive you and thus the entire 
people of its rights and heritage, or we, who amidst unutterable 
sacrifices and suffering, fought against these insane and distorted 
ideas of devilish Jews and the associates of the Jews? Already 
three months of National Socialistic government prove to you: 
Adolf Hitler is your friend ! Adolf Hitler struggles for your lib- 
erty ! Adolf Hitler gives you bread ! 

Today we are entering into the second chapter of the National 
Socialistic Revolution. You may say, what else do you want, you 
have the absolute power. True, we have the power, but we do not 
have the whole people, we do not have you workers a hundred 
percent, and it is you whom we want ; we will not let you be until 
you stand with us in complete, genuine acknowledgment. You 
shall also be freed of the last Marxian manacles, so that you may 
find your way to your people. 

For we know that without the German worker there is no Ger- 
man nation ! And before everything else we must protect you, so 
that your enemy Marxism and its satellites cannot attack you 
from the back again. 

Even though the Marxist Party such as the K.P.D has been 
completely destroyed, or find themselves in complete dissolution 
as the S.P.D., even if the party leaders have fled in miserable 
cowardice or have deserted everything and everyone; and have 
forsaken you, workers, cowardly and miserably as never before, 
we know that it is all pretense. Marxism pretends to be dead in 
order to resurrect itself anew with favorable opportunity and 
again to plunge the Judas dagger into your back. Just as in 1914 ! 
Even at that time it sponsored the war debts and spread itself 

448 




614-PS 


internationally in order to betray you to the imperialism of our 
enemies in 1918, and to sell you thereby to world capital. 

The sly fox doesn’t deceive us. Rather we will give him one last 
fatal shot so that we shall never again suffer with his resurrec- 
tion. The Leiperts and Grossmaenner may pretend ever so much 
fidelity to Hitler, but it is better that they should be in protective 
custody. Therefore we shall strike the main weapon out of the 
hands of the Marxist group and thereby take from it its last pos- 
sibility of renewed strengthening. The devilish teaching of the 
Jew Mardochai shall be destroyed wretchedly on the battlefield of 
the National Socialistic Revolution. 

It is not as if we wanted to disrupt and destroy the unions. On 
the contrary, we have never disturbed anything which has, in any 
way, value for our people and we shall never do so in the future ; 
that is a National Socialistic rule. This certainly goes for the 
unions which serve with hard work and were built up by the pen- 
nies taken from the mouths of the worker. No workers — your 
institutions are sacred and unimpeachable to us National Social- 
ists. I myself am a poor peasant’s son and understand poverty. 
I myself was 7 years in one of the biggest industries of Germany 
and I know the exploitation of anonymous capital, and I know, 
above everything else, of its stingy commercial methods, for, on 
account of my opinion I was fired from my occupation in 1928. 

Workers, I swear to you we will not only keep everything which 
exists, we will build up the protection and rights of the worker 
even further, so that he can enter into the new National Socialis- 
tic State as a completely worthwhile and respected member of 
the nation. 

Workers and peasants on a broad front together with the free 
occupations and skilled labor, — thus we shall build a new Reich 
of well being, honor and freedom. Forward with Hitler for Ger- 
many. 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 615-PS 

The Bishop of Limburg Limburg/Lahn, Aug 13, 1941 

To the Reich Minister of Justice Berlin 

[Various stamps and pencilled remarks appear on original] 

Regarding the report submitted on July 16 (Sub IV, pp 6-7) 
by the Chairman of the Fulda Bishops’ Conference, Cardinal Dr. 
Bertram, I consider it my duty to present the following as a 
concrete illustration of destruction of so-called “useless life.” 

About 8 kilometers from Limburg, in the little town of 
Hadamar, on a hill overlooking the town, there is an institution 


449 


6 1 5— PS 


which had formerly served various purposes and of late had been 
used as a nursing home; this institution was renovated and fur- 
nished as a place in which, by consensus of opinion, the above 
mentioned euthanasia has been systematically practiced for 
months — approximately since February 1941. The fact has be- 
come known beyond the administrative district of Wiesbaden, 
because death certificates from a Registry Hadamar-Moenchberg 
are sent to the home communities. (Moenchberg is the name of 
this institution because it was a Franciscan monastery prior to 
its secularization in 1803.) 

Several times a week buses arrive in Hadamar with a consid- 
erable number of such victims. School children of the vicinity 
know this vehicle and say: “There comes the murder-box again.” 
After the arrival of the vehicle, the citizens of Hadamar watch 
the smoke rise out of the chimney and are tortured with the ever- 
present thought of the miserable victims, especially when repul- 
sive odors annoy them, depending on the direction of the wind. 

The effect of the principles at work here are: Children call 
each other names and say, “You’re crazy; you’ll be sent to the 
baking oven in Hadamar.” Those who do not want to marry, 
or find no opportunity, say, “Marry, never! Bring children into 
the world so they can be put into the bottling machine!” You 
hear old folks say, “Don’t send me to a state hospital! After 
the feeble-minded have been finished off, the next useless eaters 
whose turn will come are the old people.” 

All God-fearing men consider this destruction of helpless be- 
ings as crass injustice. And if anybody says that Germany 
cannot win the war, if there is yet a just God, these expressions 
are not the result of a lack of love of fatherland but of a deep 
concern for our people. The population cannot grasp that sys- 
tematic actions are carried out which in accordance with Par. 
211 of the German criminal code are punishable with death! 
High authority as a moral concept has suffered a severe shock 
as a result of these happenings. The official notice that N. N. 
had died of a contagious disease and that for that reason his 
body has to be burned, no longer finds credence, and such official 
notices which are no longer believed have further undermined 
the ethical value of the concept of authority. 

Officials of the Secret State Police, it is said, are trying to 
suppress discussion of the Hadamar occurrences by means of 
severe threats. In the interest of public peace, this may be well 
intended. But the knowledge and the conviction and the indig- 
nation of the population cannot be changed by it; the conviction 
will be increased with the bitter realization that discussion is 


450 


615-PS 


prohibited with threats but that the actions themselves are not 
prosecuted under penal law. 

Facta loquuntur. 

I beg you most humbly, Herr Reich Minister, in the sense of 
the report of the Episcopate of July 16 of this year, to prevent 
further transgressions of the Fifth Commandment of God. 

[Signed] Dr. Hilfrich 

I am submitting copies of this letter to the Reich Minister of 
the Interior and the Reich Minister for Church Affairs. 

[initialled by the above] 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 621-PS 


The Reichsminister and Chief 
of the Reich Chancellery 

Berlin, W.8, 2 October 1940 
Voss Street 6 
SECRET REICH MATTER 

Rk. 665 B gRs 

To the Reichsminister of Justice, Dr. Guertner 


Dear Dr. Guertner : 

I herewith acknowledge your letters of 26 August and 25 Sep- 
tember forwarding to me further material about the death of 
inmates of nursing homes. I forwarded the enclosed reports 
of the Chief Prosecutors to Stuttgart and Naumburg to the 
Reichsminister of the Interior — Reichs Health Leader — for fur- 
ther action. 

Heil Hitler! 

Sincerely yours 
[signed] Dr. Lammers 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 630-PS 


[On letterhead A. Hitler] 

Reichsleiter Bouhler and Dr. Brandt, M.D. 


Berlin 1 Sept 1939 


are charged with the responsibility of enlarging the authority of 
certain physicians to be designated by name in such a manner 
that persons who, according to human judgment, are incurable 
can, upon a most careful diagnosis of their condition of sickness, 
be accorded a mercy death. 

signed : A. HITLER 

[Handwritten note] 

Given to me by Bouhler on 27 August 1940 
signed : Dr. Guertner 
III a 3/41 gRs / 


451 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 638 -PS 


Copy 


M 5/42 SECRET 

From the Reich Marshall’s Plans of 24.9.42. 

I. The Reich Marshall is looking for daring fellows, who will 
be employed in the East as Sonderkommandos [Special Purpose] 
and who will be able to carry out the task of creating confusion 
behind the lines. They are to be formed into bands under leader- 
ship and with interpreters allotted to them. For this purpose, 
the Reich Marshall is considering convicts who are first offenders, 
who have committed not particularly heinous offenses, for which 
there is human understanding. 

The Reich Marshall first of all mentioned persons convicted of 
poaching. He knew, of course, that the Reichsfuehrer SS had 
picked out the so-called poachers and they were already in his 
hands. He requests, however, that the question be reexamined. 
The only suitable men are those with a passion for hunting, who 
have poached for love of the trophy, not men who have laid snares 
and traps. The Reich Marshall also mentioned fanatical mem- 
bers of smuggling gangs, who take part in gun-battles on the 
frontiers and whfose passion it is to outwit the customs at the 
risk of their own lives, but not men who attempt to bring articles 
over the frontier in an express train or by similar means. 

The Reich Marshall leaves it to us to consider whether still 
other categories of convicts can be assigned to these bands or pur- 
suit commandos. 

In the regions assigned for their operations, these bands, whose 
first task should be to destroy the communications of the parti- 
san groups, could murder, burn and ravish; in Germany they 
would once again come under strict supervision. * * * 

(signed) Dr. Joel, 24.9.42 


Berlin, 6 October 1942 

Staff of MD IV, V 

The attached extract from the minutes of Cabinet Councillor 
Dr. Joel are submitted for the preparation of the report on Fri- 
day 9.10. 

Copy to State Secretary Dr. Rothenberger for his -attention. 


452 


TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 641 PS 


File No. 927/33 Munich, 1 June 1933 

District Attorney at the District Court Munich II 
(Tel: Local 5791, Long Distance 57801) 

to the 

Public Prosecutor “Generalstaatsanwalt” 
at the 

State Supreme Court MUNICH 

Subject: Death of the prisoner in protective custody Dr. Alfred 
Strauss in the concentration camp Dachau 

N-12432 in one copy submitted to the State Ministry of Justice 
Munich, 2 June 1933 

The Public Prosecutor at the State Supreme Court 

On May 24, 1933 the 30 year old, single attorney at law Dr. 
Alfred Strauss from Munich who was in the concentration camp 
Dachau as a prisoner. under protective custody was killed by 2 
pistol shots by SS man Johann Kantschuster who escorted him 
on a walk prescribed to him by the camp doctor, outside of the 
fenced part of the camp. 

Kantschuster gives the following report: He himself had to 
urinate; Strauss proceeded on his way. Suddenly Strauss broke 
away towards the shrub located at a distance of about 6 m from 
the line. When he noticed it, he fired 2 shots at the fugitive from 
a distance of about 8 m, whereupon Strauss collapsed dead. 

On the same day, May 24, 1933, a judicial inspection of the 
locality took place. The corpse of Strauss was lying at the edge 
of the wood. Leather slippers were on his feet. He wore a 
sock on one foot, while the other foot was bare, obviously because 
of an injury to this foot. Subsequently an autopsy was per- 
formed. Two bullets had entered the back of the head. Besides 
the body showed several black and blue spots and also open 
wounds. Coroner’s inquest was ordered; it took place on 26 
May 1933. According to the expert’s opinion death was caused 
by cerebral paralysis due to one bullet penetrating and one bullet 
lodging in the right portion of the cerebrum. Older scars were 
found at the right hip and seat, as well as hemorrhages of the 
left abdominal wall. The direction of the firing channels further 
revealed that the bullets had been fired from low behind and up- 
wards to the right. The distance from which they were fired 
could not be established by the autopsy ; for this purpose chemical 
and microscopical examinations are necessary. 

I have charged Kantschuster today with murder and have made 


453 


64 I -PS 




application for opening and execution of the judicial preliminary 
investigation as well as for a warrant of arrest against him. 

The District Court Public Prosecutor Attorney 

WINTERSBERGER 

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 642-PS 

File No: G 866/33 Munich, 1 June 1933 

State Prosecution at the 

State Court [Landgericht] Munich 

Local Telephone: 5791 Long Distance: 57801. 

To the Prosecutor General at The Supreme State Court 
[Oberlandesgericht] Munich. 

Subject: Decease of the arrestee in protective custody, Leonhard 
Hausmann in the Dachau concentration camp. 

No. 12431 with one copy submitted to the State Minister for 
Justice, Munich, 2 June 1933 
The Prosecutor General at the Supreme State Court. 

[signature illegible] 

On 17 May 1933, Leonhard Hausmann from Augsburg, 31 
years old, married, relief worker, who was kept in protective 
custody in the Dachau concentration camp, was shot by SS staff 
sergeant Karl Ehmann. According to the account pf the latter, 
Hausmann was to dig out young fir trees in the woods in the 
vicinity of the camp and pile them up on a certain spot. He was 
supervised by Ehmann. Suddenly the latter did not see him any- 
more. Therefore Ehmann looked after the prisoners and saw 
him running away in a stooped position, Ehmann ran after him, 
called “Halt” several times, once also “Stop”, but in vain. Where- 
upon Ehmann raised his pistol at the prisoner and fired without 
aiming; Hausmann dropped dead. Ehmann asserts that he